Opinion
Civil Action 21-1210
07-24-2024
STEPHEN BARRY GIBBONS, Plaintiff, v. SABANDA Imam SCI-Green, Defendant.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
MAUREEN P. KELLY, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
I. RECOMMENDATION
Pending before the Court is Defendant Sabanda's Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs Second Amendment Complaint (“Motion”). ECF No. 88.
For the reasons that follow, it is respectfully recommended that the Motion to Dismiss be denied.
A. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
1. Factual Allegations
Plaintiff Stephen Barry Gibbons (“Gibbons”) is an inmate incarcerated at the State Correctional Institution at Greene (“SCI-Greene”). Gibbons brings this pro se action arising out of allegations that his constitutional rights were violated by limitations on his right to practice his religion when incarcerated at SCI-Greene. ECF No. 84.
Gibbons is a practicing Muslim. Id. ¶¶ 7, 8, 11. In July 2019, he was transferred to SCI-Greene and was placed in the Security Threat Group Management Unit (“STGMU”). Id. ¶ 4. Defendant Sabanda is employed as a Corrections Chaplain (Iman) at SCI-Greene. IT ¶ 3.
Ramadan is an Islamic religious holiday recognized by the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections (“DOC”). Id. ¶ 6. The DOC provides inmates participating in Ramadan a secondary dietary schedule to facilitate daily fasting and permits those partaking in the fast to attend a prayer service each night. Id. While housed in the STGMU, a prisoner may participate in the Ramadan fast, but is not allowed to congregate with other inmates to join the nightly prayer service. Id. ¶ 9.
Gibbons submitted an inmate request slip to Sabanda, asking permission to participate in the Ramadan fast in 2020. Id. ¶¶ 8, 10. Sabanda informed Gibbons that he had unilaterally changed Mr. Gibbons' religious affiliation from Muslim to “none” after “being instructed . . . that you are in fact a Blood member and not Muslim.” Id. ¶ 11. Without a registered Muslim religious affiliation, Gibbons would be unable to participate in the Ramadan fast. Id.
Gibbons informed Sabanda that he was incorrect; Gibbons was still a Muslim. Id. ¶ 13a.On April 7, 2020, Gibbons requested Sabanda provide him a religious preference form. Id. ¶ 13b. Sabanda did not supply Gibbons with the form until April 14. Id. ¶ 13c. That same day, Gibbons completed the form and indicated that he was Muslim. Id. ¶ 14. He submitted the form to Sabanda and again requested to participate in Ramadan. Id. Sabanda informed Gibbons that it would take about three hours to update his religious affiliation in the system. Id. ¶ 15.
Gibbons' Amended Complaint, ECF No. 84, contains three Paragraph 13s. This Court construes the first as Paragraph 13a, the second as Paragraph 13b, and the third as Paragraph 13c.
On April 16, 2020, Gibbons informed Sabanda that Ramadan would begin on April 23, and SCI-Greene would not allow him to participate until Sabanda changed Gibbons' religious status back to Muslim. Id. ¶ 16. On April 27, thirteen days after Sabanda received Gibbons' completed religious preference form and four days after Ramadan began, Sabanda informed Gibbons that his religious affiliation was listed as Muslim. Id. ¶ 17. Because of Sabanda's delay, Gibbons could not participate in the 2020 Ramadan fast. Id. ¶ 18.
As a result of these events, Gibbons asserts violations of his right to freely practice his religion under the First Amendment and the Religious Freedom Restoration Act. Id. ¶¶ 21, 22.
2. Procedural Posture
Gibbons began this action on September 10, 2021 by lodging a Complaint without paying the filing fee or moving for leave to proceed in forma pauperis. ECF No. 1. Gibbons later submitted the filing fee, and his Complaint was filed on December 7, 2021. ECF No. 13. His Complaint names as defendants Sutherland, a nurse practitioner, and Dr. Leslie, a physician at SCI-Forest, (collectively, the “Medical Defendants”), as well as DOC employees Bickell, Ulimmi Cleim, Rich Kustenbauder, Zachary Moslak, W. Nicholson, Oberlander, D. Perry, Sabanda, Lt. Swank, Eric Tice, John Wetzel, and M. Zaken (collectively, the “Corrections Defendants”). Id. ¶¶ 1, 11-23, 87.
In his initial Complaint, Gibbons set forth a First Amendment claim for violation of the Free Exercise clause; a First Amendment retaliation claim; a Fourteenth Amendment due process claim; and an Eighth Amendment claim for deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs. Id.¶¶5, 6, 84-98.
The Medical Defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss and Brief in Support on October 28, 2022. ECF Nos. 37 and 38. The Corrections Defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss and Brief in Support on November 30, 2022. ECF Nos. 43 and 44. Plaintiff filed a response in opposition to the Motions to Dismiss on February 17, 2023. ECF No. 58. After resolving the Motions to Dismiss, Gibbons' sole remaining claim was his alleged violation of his First Amendment right to freely practice his religion asserted against Defendant Sabanda. ECF Nos. 63 and 71.
Gibbons filed an Amended Complaint on December 15, 2023. ECF No. 84. Sabanda filed the instant Motion to Dismiss and Brief in Support on January 12, 2024. ECF Nos. 88 and 89. Gibbons filed a Response and Brief in Support on January 31, 2024. ECF Nos. 91 and 92.
The Motion to Dismiss is now ripe for consideration.
B. STANDARD OF REVIEW
1. Motion to Dismiss
A complaint may be dismissed under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” “[D]etailed pleading is not generally required.” Connelly v. Lane Const. Corp., 809 F.3d 780, 786 (3d Cir. 2016). Rather, the rules require “only ‘a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,' in order to ‘give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.'” Id. (quoting Bell Atl. Corp, v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face” by providing facts which “permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct. .Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678-79 (2009).
In assessing the sufficiency of a complaint, the court must accept as true all material allegations in the complaint and all reasonable factual inferences must be viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Odd v. Malone, 538 F.3d 202, 205 (3d Cir. 2008). The court, however, need not accept bald assertions or inferences drawn by the plaintiff if they are unsupported by the facts set forth in the complaint. See Cal. Pub. Employees' Ret, Sys, v. Chubb Corp., 394 F.3d 126, 143 (3d Cir. 2004) (citing Morse v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 132 F.3d 902, 906 (3d Cir. 1997)). Nor must the court accept legal conclusions set forth as factual allegations. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. Thus, the United States Supreme Court has held that a complaint is properly dismissed under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) where the factual content does not allow the court “to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; see also Phillips v. Cnty. of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 231 (3d Cir. 2008) (finding that, under Twombly, “labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action” do not suffice. The complaint therefore “must allege facts suggestive of [the proscribed] conduct” that are sufficient “to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of the necessary element[s of his claim].”). Id. at 233-34.
2. Pro Se Pleadings and Filings
Plaintiff is proceeding pro se. Pro se pleadings and filings, “however inartfully pleaded,” must be held to “less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers” Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972). If the court can reasonably read pleadings to state a valid claim on which the litigant could prevail, it should do so despite failure to cite proper legal authority, confusion of legal theories, poor syntax, and sentence construction, or litigant's unfamiliarity with pleading requirements. Boag v. MacDougall, 454 U.S. 364 (1982); U.S, ex rel. Montgomery v. Brierley, 414 F.2d 552, 555 (3d Cir. 1969) (A “petition prepared by a prisoner . . . may be inartfully drawn and should ... be read ‘with a measure of tolerance'”); Freeman v. Dep't. of Corr., 949 F.2d 360 (10th Cir. 1991). Under our liberal pleading rules, a district court should construe all allegations in a complaint in favor of the complainant. Gibbs v. Roman, 116 F.3d 83 (3d Cir. 1997) (overruled on other grounds); see also Nami v. Fauver, 82 F.3d 63, 65 (3d Cir. 1996) (discussing Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) standard); Markowitz v. Ne. Land Co., 906 F.2d 100, 103 (3d Cir. 1990) (same).
Even so, there are limits to the court's procedural flexibility - “pro se litigants still must allege sufficient facts in their complaints to support a claim . . . [T]hey cannot flout procedural rules - they must abide by the same rules that apply to all other litigants.” Mala v. Crown Bay Marina, Inc., 704 F.3d 239, 245 (3d Cir. 2013) (citations omitted). Accordingly, because Plaintiff is a pro se litigant, the Court will consider the facts and make inferences where it is appropriate.
C. DISCUSSION
In support of the Motion to Dismiss, Sabanda argues that the facts alleged by Gibbons in the Amended Complaint do not amount to a violation of his right of free exercise of religion. ECF No. 89 at 8. Sabanda asserts that fasting is not the only way a Muslim can participate in Ramadan and that Gibbons does not allege facts that indicate “he was barred from completely participating in Ramadan or that he was entirely unable to pray, attend services, fast, or participate in any other religious activity related to Ramadan.” IE
In his response brief, Gibbons argues that “the entire reason for Ramadan is the denial of personal comforts through fasting.” ECF No. 92 at 3. He also notes that he was held in isolation and could not participate in Ramadan in any other way, including group prayer or other religious activities, and could not buy commissary foods to aid a fast independent of SCI-Greene's Ramadan schedule. Id. at 3-4.
Although Plaintiff is incarcerated, the United States Supreme Court has held that “convicted prisoners do not forfeit all constitutional protections by reason of their conviction and confinement in prison.” Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 545 (1979). “Inmates clearly retain protections afforded by the First Amendment, . . . including its directive that no law shall prohibit the free exercise of religion.” O'Lone v. Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 348 (1987) (internal citation omitted). However, an inmate “retains [only] those First Amendment rights that are not inconsistent with his status as a prisoner or with the legitimate penological objectives of the corrections system.” Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 822 (1974); see also DeHart v. Hom, 227 F.3d47, 51 (3d Cir. 2000).
As a threshold matter, “only those beliefs which are both sincerely held and religious in nature are entitled to constitutional protection.” DeHart, 227 F.3d at 51. In order to establish a free exercise violation, plaintiff must show that defendants “burdened the practice of his religion by preventing him from engaging in conduct mandated by his faith without any justification reasonably related to legitimate penological interests.” Heleva v. Kramer, 330 Fed.Appx. 406, 408 (3d Cir. 2009) (citing Turner v, Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987)).
[Turner] directs courts to assess the overall reasonableness of such regulations by weighing four factors. “First, there must be a ‘valid, rational connection' between the prison regulation and the legitimate governmental interest put forward to justify it,” and this connection must not be “so remote as to render the policy arbitrary or irrational.” Second, a court must consider whether inmates retain alternative means of exercising the circumscribed right. Third, a court must take into account the costs that accommodating the right would impose on other inmates, guards, and prison resources generally. And fourth, a court must consider whether there are alternatives to the regulation that “fully accommodate [] the prisoner's rights at de minimis cost to valid penological interests.”DeHart, 277 F.3d at 51 (quoting Waterman v. Farmer, 183 F.3d 208, 213 (3d Cir. 1999)).
Upon review, the Motion to Dismiss should be denied. At this initial stage of the litigation, Sabanda does not argue that his delay in providing Gibbons the necessary forms or in submitting those forms is reasonably related to a legitimate penological interest. Also, Sabanda does not question whether Gibbons had a sincerely held religious belief that required him to fast during Ramadan. Sabanda argues that other alternative avenues existed for Gibbons to practice his religion, ECF No. 89 at 8, but, giving Gibbons the benefit of inferences he is entitled to at the pleading stage, Gibbons has. sufficiently pleaded that Sabanda's conduct was a substantial burden on a practice mandated by his faith and deprived him of the constitutional right to freely exercise his religion. See Abd-Ali v. Sibanda, No. CV 16-1643, 2018 WL 7324563, at *6 (W.D. Pa. Nov. 2, 2018), report and recommendation adopted as modified. No. CV 16-1643, 2019 WL 244554 (W.D. Pa. Jan. 17, 2019) (“By impeding his access to the appropriate forms to make that request [to participate in the Ramadan fast], a reasonable jury could conclude that Defendants intentionally interfered with Plaintiffs constitutionally-protected right to freely exercise his religious beliefs.”); Taylor v. Cox, 912 F.Supp. 140, 144-45 (E.D. Pa. 1995) (holding that Plaintiffs allegation that the prison deprived him of a Koran, which rendered him unable to participate in Ramadan, was sufficient to plead substantial interference with a central tenant to his religion to survive a motion to dismiss).
Therefore, the Motion to Dismiss should be denied.
D. CONCLUSION
For these reasons, it is respectfully recommended that Defendant Sabanda's Motion to Dismiss, ECF No. 88, should be denied.
In accordance with the Magistrate Judges Act, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), and Local Rule 72.D.2, the parties are permitted to file written objections in accordance with the schedule established in the docket entry reflecting the filing of this Report and Recommendation. Objections are to be submitted to the Clerk of Court, United States District Court, 700 Grant Street, Room 3110, Pittsburgh, PA 15219. Failure to timely file objections will waive the right to appeal. Brightwell v. Lehman, 637 F.3d 187, 193 n. 7 (3d Cir. 2011). Any party opposing objections may file their response to the objections within fourteen (14) days thereafter in accordance with Local Civil Rule 72.D.2.
Honorable Marilyn J. Horan, United States District Judge