Opinion
2014-07-3
In the Matter of Michael F. GETMAN, as Oneonta City Prosecutor, Respondent, v. Lucy P. BERNIER, as Judge of the City Court of the City of Oneonta, Respondent, and Stephanie M. Tooker, Appellant.
DerOhannesian & DerOhannesian, Albany (Danielle Smith of counsel), for appellant. John M. Muehl, District Attorney, Cooperstown (Michael F. Getman of counsel), for Michael F. Getman, respondent.
DerOhannesian & DerOhannesian, Albany (Danielle Smith of counsel), for appellant. John M. Muehl, District Attorney, Cooperstown (Michael F. Getman of counsel), for Michael F. Getman, respondent.
Before: PETERS, P.J., LAHTINEN, GARRY, ROSE and DEVINE, JJ.
PETERS, P.J.
Appeal from a judgment of the Supreme Court (Burns, J.), entered October 29, 2013 in Otsego County, which granted petitioner's application, in a proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78, to prohibit respondent City Court Judge of the City of Oneonta from enforcing an order that required a competency hearing to be held.
Respondent Stephanie M. Tooker was arrested after allegedly assaulting Maria Golfo in the City of Oneonta, Otsego County. Prior to the commencement of a jury trial, Tooker moved pursuant to CPL 60.20(1) for an order granting a hearing to determine whether Golfo was competent to testify as to the alleged assault in light of her level of intoxication on the night of the incident. Respondent City Court Judge of the City of Oneonta (hereinafter respondent) granted Tooker's motion. Petitioner, the Oneonta City Prosecutor, thereafter commenced this CPLR article 78 proceeding seeking a writ of prohibition enjoining respondent from holding a competency hearing. Supreme Court granted the petition and vacated respondent's order, prompting this appeal by Tooker.
We reverse. The extraordinary remedy of prohibition lies “only when a court ... acts or threatens to act without jurisdiction in a matter ... over which it has no power over the subject matter or where it exceeds its authorized powers in a proceeding over which it has jurisdiction” (Matter of State of New York v. King, 36 N.Y.2d 59, 62, 364 N.Y.S.2d 879, 324 N.E.2d 351 [1975];see Matter of Soares v. Herrick, 20 N.Y.3d 139, 145, 957 N.Y.S.2d 664, 981 N.E.2d 260 [2012];Matter of Oglesby v. McKinney, 7 N.Y.3d 561, 565, 825 N.Y.S.2d 431, 858 N.E.2d 1136 [2006] ). Such an excess of power, particularly in the context of a pending criminal proceeding, must “implicate the legality of the entire proceeding” (Matter of Rush v. Mordue, 68 N.Y.2d 348, 353, 509 N.Y.S.2d 493, 502 N.E.2d 170 [1986];see Matter of Patel v. Breslin, 45 A.D.3d 1240, 1241, 846 N.Y.S.2d 748 [2007],lv. denied10 N.Y.3d 704, 857 N.Y.S.2d 36, 886 N.E.2d 801 [2008] ), “as distinguished from an error in a proceeding itself” (Matter of Holtzman v. Goldman, 71 N.Y.2d 564, 569, 528 N.Y.S.2d 21, 523 N.E.2d 297 [1988];see Matter of State of New York v. King, 36 N.Y.2d at 62, 364 N.Y.S.2d 879, 324 N.E.2d 351;Matter of Heckstall v. McGrath, 15 A.D.3d 824, 825, 790 N.Y.S.2d 566 [2005] ).
Here, petitioner argued—and Supreme Court agreed—that respondent acted in excess of her authority in ordering a competency hearing because a witness' level of intoxication at the time of the incident in question and its effect on his or her ability to recall the events has no bearing on whether such witness is competent to testify at trial. It is manifest, however, that a trial court has the authority to make a preliminary inquiry as to a witness' competency to testify at trial ( seeCPL 60.20[1]; People v. Scott, 86 N.Y.2d 864, 865, 635 N.Y.S.2d 167, 658 N.E.2d 1040 [1995];People v. Parks, 41 N.Y.2d 36, 46–47, 390 N.Y.S.2d 848, 359 N.E.2d 358 [1976];People v. Rensing, 14 N.Y.2d 210, 213, 250 N.Y.S.2d 401, 199 N.E.2d 489 [1964];People v. Miller, 295 A.D.2d 746, 747, 746 N.Y.S.2d 50 [2002];People v. Johnston, 186 A.D.2d 822, 822, 589 N.Y.S.2d 351 [1992],lvs. denied81 N.Y.2d 790, 594 N.Y.S.2d 736, 737, 610 N.E.2d 409, 410 [1993];People v. Hickey, 133 A.D.2d 421, 422, 519 N.Y.S.2d 560 [1987] ). As such, any error in respondent's decision to hold a competency hearing would, at most, amount to a mere substantive error of law that does not justify the invocation of this extraordinary remedy. “[P]rohibition will not lie as a means of seeking collateral review of mere trial errors of substantive law or procedure, however egregious the error may be, and however cleverly the error may be characterized by counsel as an excess of jurisdiction or power” (Matter of Rush v. Mordue, 68 N.Y.2d at 353, 509 N.Y.S.2d 493, 502 N.E.2d 170;see Matter of Pirro v. Angiolillo, 89 N.Y.2d 351, 355, 653 N.Y.S.2d 237, 675 N.E.2d 1189 [1996];Matter of State of New York v. King, 36 N.Y.2d at 62, 364 N.Y.S.2d 879, 324 N.E.2d 351;Matter of Lesley T. v. D'Emic, 94 A.D.3d 768, 770, 941 N.Y.S.2d 282 [2012];Matter of Cuomo v. Hayes, 54 A.D.3d 855, 857–858, 864 N.Y.S.2d 103 [2008] ). The parties' remaining contentions are academic.
ORDERED that the judgment is reversed, on the law, without costs, and petition dismissed. LAHTINEN, GARRY, ROSE and DEVINE, JJ., concur.