Summary
holding that no evidentiary hearing was necessary when section 2255 petitioner's allegations that trial counsel's performance was unreasonable in connection with plea advice were "wholly conclusory and unsupported by any independent evidence"
Summary of this case from Belloso-Ibarra v. U.S.Opinion
02 Civ. 817 (SWK).
March 10, 2003
OPINION AND ORDER
Petitioner pro se Luis Germosa moves pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255, to vacate, set aside or correct the sentence imposed by the Court following his conviction for violation of federal narcotics laws. Germosa claims that he was denied effective assistance of counsel. For the reasons set forth below, Germosa's motion is denied.
BACKGROUND
On August 7, 1997, a federal grand jury sitting in :he Southern District of New York returned a nine count supersedng indictment against Germosa and his co-defendant, Dario Garcia. Count one charged Germosa with engaging in a conspiracy to distribute and possession with intent to distribute crack. and powder cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846, and counts two through seven charged him with distributing and possessing with intent to distribute crack on six occasions between December 13, 1993 and February 3, 1994, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841. Count nine charged Germosa with using and carrying a firearm in relation to drug trafficking, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c).
Garcia was charged only in count one and count eight of the superseding indictment. Count eight only applied to Garcia.
The prosecution arose out of Germosa's ownership and operation of a cocaine and crack business at 1061 St. Nicholas Avenue, New York, New York. The drug business utilized two apartments in the building, as well as a small compartment located in the basement. In exchange for money, Garcia, who was the superintendent of 1061 St. Nicholas Avenue, permitted Germosa to use the small compartment in the basement to store cocaine and guns. On October 29, 1997, following an eight-day jury trial, Germosa was convicted on counts one through seven and count nine. On October 21, 1998, the Court sentenced Germosa to 228 months imprisonment, five years supervised release and a mandatory $400 special assessment.
The judgment was entered on November 13, 1998, and an amended judgment was entered on March 26, 1999, to correct a clerical mistake regarding the stated term of supervised release.
On January 23, 1998, Germosa moved for a judgment of acquittal pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 29, or for a new trial pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 33. Germosa argued that the Government violated its obligation under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1962), to disclose material exculpatory evidence. The Court denied the motion, see United States v. Germosa, No. 95 Cr. 486, 1998 WL 152571 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 2, 1998), and the Second Circuit affirmed in an unpublished decision.See United States v. Germosa, 199 F.3d 1324 (2d Cir. 1999). On January 8, 2001, the Supreme Court denied Germosa's petition for a writ of certiorari. See Germosa v. United States, 531 U.S. 1080 (2001).
During the criminal case, Germosa was represented by, and consulted with, numerous attorneys. Initially, Germosa was represented by CJA attorney Lawrence Feitell, Esq. Mr. Feitell appeared for Germosa at his March 7, 1996 arraignment and the March 13, 1996 status conference. Following that status conference, the Court received a letter from Barry F. Kenyon, Esq., advising that he had been retained to represent Germosa. Because Mr. Kenyon may have had a potential conflict of interest, the Court held a Curcio hearing on April 17, 1996. Subsequent to the Curcio hearing, Germosa decided to find another attorney.
At the May 1, 1996 status conference, Mr. Feitell was relieved as counsel and Walter Ramos, Esq., became Germosa's attorney. On May 7, 1996, Mr. Ramos sought bail for Germosa, which was denied. Mr. Ramos also appeared for Germosa at three subsequent status conferences. Mr. Ramos was then relieved at the October 2, 1996 status conference, and Mark A. Kovler, Esq., became Germosa's attorney. On or about January 10, 1997, Mr. Kovler filed a motion to dismiss the charges against Germosa due to pre-indictment and post-indictment delays. The Court denied the motion on January 28, 1997. See Order dated January 28, 1997. Following the Court's decision, Mr. Kovler continued to represent Germosa for approximately four additional months.
At the May 15, 1997 status conference Mr. Kovler was relieved, and Ernest H. Hammer, Esq., became Germosa's fourth attorney of record. Mr. Hammer represented Germosa throughout his trial in October 1997, and filed the post-trial motions. However, by the time of sentencing, Germosa had again changed attorneys. On July 10, 1998, CJA attorney Charles Lavine, Esq., was appointed to represent Germosa for the purposes of sentencing and appeal.
Germosa now moves pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 to vacate, set aside or correct his sentence on the ground that he received ineffective assistance of counsel.
DISCUSSION
I. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, the petitioner must show (1) "that counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness . . . under prevailing professional norms" and (2) that there is a reasonable probability that but for counsel's unprofessional performance, the outcome of the proceeding would have been different. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88, 693-94 (1984). With respect to the first prong of Strickland, there is a strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the "wide range of reasonable professional assistance." Clark v. Stinson, 214 F.3d 315, 321 (2d Cir. 2000) (quotation omitted). Although this presumption can be overcome, the burden of proving that counsel's performance was unreasonable lies with the petitioner. See Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 381 (1986).
Germosa claims that he received ineffective assistance of counsel because he was not adequately advised that it would have been more advantageous for him to plead guilty than to proceed to trial. The Second Circuit has stressed that "[t]he decision whether to plead guilty or contest a criminal charge is ordinarily the most important single decision in a criminal case . . . [and] counsel may and must give the client the benefit of counsel's professional advice on this crucial decision." United States v. Gordon, 156 F.3d 376, 380 (2d Cir. 1998) (quotation omitted). Specifically, Germosa asserts that his counsel (1) advised him to stand trial; (2) failed to engage in plea discussions with the Government; (3) failed to advise him on the decision whether to plead guilty or proceed to trial, and misinformed him that he would face a total, maximum sentence of ten years' imprisonment after trial; and (4) failed to advise that him that he could plead guilty to the indictment "straight up" without a plea offer.
A. Petitioner Fails To Establish That Counsel's Performance Was Unreasonable
First, Germosa argues that counsel advised him to stand trial. This allegation, however, is wholly conclusory and unsupported by any independent evidence. Germosa offers no evidence regarding the alleged conversations he had with his counsel regarding his decision to stand trial. In fact, Germosa's allegations are contradicted by the affidavits of his counsel. Mr. Ramos, Germosa's second attorney of record, states that he "never told Mr. Germosa that he should go to trial." See Affirmation of AUSA Robin L. Baker, dated August 7, 2002 ("Baker Aff."), Ex. B, Affirmation of Walter Ramos, Esq. ("Ramos Aff.") at ¶ 12. Moreover, Mr. Hammer, Germosa's trial counsel, states that he advised Germosa to take the plea offer. See Baker Aff., Ex. H, Affidavit of Ernest H. Hammer, Esq. ("Hammer Aff.") at ¶ 10(5). However, according to Mr. Hammer, Germosa wanted to proceed to trial "because the plea offer was too much and the government could not prove its case against him." Hammer Aff. at ¶ 10(2). Therefore, the Court finds that Germosa has not satisfied the first prong of Strickland as to his allegation that counsel advised him to stand trial.
Second, Germosa argues that counsel failed to engage in plea discussions with the Government. This assertion is also unsupported by any independent evidence, and, in fact, is contradicted by the evidence. While he represented Germosa, Mr. Ramos attempted to obtain a plea offer for his client. See Ramos Aff. at ¶ 17. On July 1, 1996, Germosa and Mr. Ramos attended a proffer session with the Government. See Baker Aff., Ex. D, Notes of ATF Agent. Additionally, at the July 31, 1996 status conference immediately following the proffer session, the Government reported that discussions regarding a possible disposition of the case were continuing. See Baker Aff., Ex. E, Transcript of July 31, 1996 status conference. Mr. Kovler also attempted to obtain a plea agreement for Germosa and sent two letters to AUSA Robert B. Buehler to facilitate a possible plea. See Baker Aff., Ex. F, Letter from Mark A. Kovler, Esq., to AUSA Robert B. Buehler dated March 24, 1997; Ex. G, Letter from Mark A. Kovler, Esq., to AUSA Robert B. Buehler dated April 14, 1997. After Mr. Hammer became Germosa's attorney on May 15, 1997, he contacted the Government regarding whether the proposed plea offer, which Germosa viewed as too severe, could be improved. See Hammer Aff. at ¶ 10(4). The Government declined, and when Mr. Hammer reported the response to his client, Germosa told Mr. Hammer to prepare for trial.See id. at ¶¶ 10(5) and 10(6). Therefore, the Court finds Germosa has not satisfied the first prong of Strickland with respect to his assertion that his counsel failed to engage in plea discussions with the Government.
Third, Germosa argues that counsel failed to provide advice on his decision to either plead guilty or proceed to trial, and misinformed him that he would face a total, maximum sentence of 10 years imprisonment if he chose to stand trial and was convicted. In other words, Germosa contends that counsel failed to properly apprise him of the comparative sentence exposure between standing trial and accepting the plea offer.See United States v. Gordon, 156 F.3d at 380 ("[K]nowledge of the comparative sentence exposure between standing trial and accepting a plea offer will often be crucial to the decision of whether to plead guilty.") (quotation omitted). To support this allegation, Germosa offers not only the statements in his petition but also a letter, dated December 21, 1997, he sent to Mr. Hammer after he received the Pre-Sentence Investigation Report. See Amended Motion to Vacate Sentence, dated January 26, 2002, Ex. G. In that letter, Germosa wrote "I was given to understand by you prior to going to trial that the most I will be facing is up to [sic] 10 years in case we blew trial." Id.
In response, Mr. Hammer states that he informed Germosa of the comparative sentence exposure he would face based upon his decision to stand trial or plead guilty. Hammer Aff. at ¶ 10(8). Mr. Hammer also advised Germosa that if he chose to plead guilty, his sentence would probably be decreased for acceptance of responsibility. See id. at ¶ 10(9). Mr. Hammer states that after he advised Germosa that the Government would not improve the plea offer, Germosa decided to proceed to trial. See id. at ¶ 10(2). Mr. Hammer also explained to Germosa that if he proceeded to trial and was convicted of the charges in the indictment, he would face a sentence of at least 15 years imprisonment.See id. at ¶ 10(11).
Therefore, the Court finds Mr. Hammer did not advise Germosa that the longest term of imprisonment he faced was up to 10 years when he in fact faced a mandatory minimum sentence of 15 years; 10 years on the narcotics conspiracy charge (Count One), pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A), and a mandatory consecutive sentence of 5 years on the firearm charge (Count Nine), pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). Accordingly, Germosa has not satisfied the first prong of Strickland with regard to his allegation that counsel did not advise him of the potential sentencing exposure based on his decision to either stand trial or plead guilty.
Finally, Germosa argues that counsel failed to advise that him that he could plead guilty to the indictment "straight up" without a plea offer, and he was not provided with certain other advice regarding such a plea. Germosa, however, does not offer any evidence to support this allegation beyond the self-serving statements contained in his petition. Counsel asserts that Germosa was advised regarding the benefits he would receive by entering a guilty plea instead of proceeding to trial. See Ramos Aff. at ¶ 12; Hammer Aff. at ¶ 10(9). Although Mr. Hammer never advised Germosa to enter a guilty plea without a plea agreement, it is apparent from Germosa's rejection of the plea agreement as too harsh that he would not have accepted that choice. See Hammer Aff. at ¶¶ 2-6. Accordingly, the Court finds that Germosa has not satisfied the first prong of Strickland with regard to his assertion that counsel failed to advise him that he could plead guilty to the indictment "straight up," without a plea offer.
B. Petitioner Fails to Establish Prejudice
Even if Germosa was able to show that counsel's performance was unreasonable, which he cannot, Germosa has made no showing that he suffered any prejudice. To demonstrate prejudice, a defendant claiming ineffective assistance of counsel with respect to a potential plea must provide some "objective evidence" that counsel's errors made a difference in the decision whether to plead guilty. United States v. Gordon, 156 F.3d 381.
Germosa states that but for counsel's unreasonable performance, he would have pleaded guilty. Citing Gordon, Germosa asserts that the disparity between the 120-month sentence he claims Mr. Hammer advised him he was to receive and the 228-month sentence he actually received after trial adequately corroborates his claim. The Second Circuit in Gordon held that a defendant suffered prejudice where there was a substantial disparity between the actual sentencing exposure under the Sentencing Guidelines and the sentence exposure represented by the defendant's attorney, and the defendant stated that but for the erroneous advice from his counsel, he would have pleaded guilty. See id. at 380. In that case, the defense attorney admitted that he had mistakenly advised the defendant regarding his maximum sentencing exposure. See id. at 377. Here, however, Germosa has offered no such statements from any of his former attorneys. Moreover, Germosa has failed to offer any other "objective evidence" to support his assertion that he suffered prejudice as a result of his counsel's alleged errors. Therefore, the Court finds that Germosa has not satisfied the second prong of Strickland.
Because Germosa has failed to satisfy either prong of Strickland, his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel as to his decision to stand trial instead of accepting a plea is denied.
II. Evidentiary Hearing
Germosa also requests an evidentiary hearing regarding his claim that he was denied effective assistance of counsel. 28 U.S.C. § 2255 provides that a court shall hold an evidentiary hearing "unless the motion and the files and records of the case conclusively show that the prisoner is entitled to no relief." A district court may therefore rely on its own familiarity with the case and deny the motion without a hearing if the court concludes that the claim "lack[s] . . . any truly meritorious allegation." United States v. Aiello, 900 F.2d 528, 534 (2d Cir. 1990). Because Germosa's allegations lack any merit, a hearing is not necessary to decide the motion. Accordingly, Germosa's request for an evidentiary hearing is denied.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, Germosa's motion pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 to vacate, set aside or correct his sentence is denied.
The Court further declines to issue a certificate of appealability. The petitioner has not made a substantial showing of a denial of federal right and appellate review is, therefore, not warranted. See 28 U.S.C. § 2853; Tankleff v. Senkowski, 135 F.3d 235, 241 (2d Cir. 1998); United States v. Perez, 129 F.3d 255, 259-60 (2d Cir. 1997);Lozada v. United States, 107 F.3d 1011 (2d Cir. 1997). Should the petitioner seek to appeal in forma pauperis, the Court certifies, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3), that any appeal of this Order would not be taken in good faith. See Coppege v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 444 (1962).
SO ORDERED.