Opinion
Civil Action No. 4:21-cv-00418-O
2022-12-15
Constantino GEORGIOU, Plaintiff, v. BATTERY JUNCTION CORPORATION et al., Defendants.
A. Craig Eiland, Eiland & Bonnin, P.C., Galveston, TX, Angela J. Nehmens, Peiffer Wolf Carr Kane Conway & Wise LLP, San Francisco, CA, Jasleen Singh, William A. Levin, Levin Simes Abrams LLP, San Francisco, CA, Samira Bokaie, Constangy Brooks Smith & Prophete LLP, San Francisco, CA, for Plaintiff. David P. Stone, Nelson Mullins Riley & Scarborough LLP, Plano, TX, Kathryn J. Skagerberg, Nelson Mullins Riley & Scarborough LLP, Nashville, TN, for Defendant LG Chem, Ltd. Charles W. Fillmore, The Fillmore Law Firm, Fort Worth, TX, Christopher Thomas Nezworski, Stephen Kyle Voss, Brown Pruitt Wambsganss Ferrill & Dean PC, Fort Worth, TX, Christopher J. Pruitt, Brown Pruitt Peterson & Wambsganss, Fort Worth, TX, for Defendant Shore Power, Inc.
A. Craig Eiland, Eiland & Bonnin, P.C., Galveston, TX, Angela J. Nehmens, Peiffer Wolf Carr Kane Conway & Wise LLP, San Francisco, CA, Jasleen Singh, William A. Levin, Levin Simes Abrams LLP, San Francisco, CA, Samira Bokaie, Constangy Brooks Smith & Prophete LLP, San Francisco, CA, for Plaintiff. David P. Stone, Nelson Mullins Riley & Scarborough LLP, Plano, TX, Kathryn J. Skagerberg, Nelson Mullins Riley & Scarborough LLP, Nashville, TN, for Defendant LG Chem, Ltd. Charles W. Fillmore, The Fillmore Law Firm, Fort Worth, TX, Christopher Thomas Nezworski, Stephen Kyle Voss, Brown Pruitt Wambsganss Ferrill & Dean PC, Fort Worth, TX, Christopher J. Pruitt, Brown Pruitt Peterson & Wambsganss, Fort Worth, TX, for Defendant Shore Power, Inc. ORDER Reed O'Connor, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Before the Court are Defendant Shore Power, Inc.'s Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction (ECF No. 41), filed August 22, 2022; Plaintiff's Response (ECF No. 43), filed September 12, 2022; and Defendant's Reply (ECF No. 44), filed September 26, 2022. The Court finds that the Motion should be, and is, hereby DENIED. I. Background
The Court recites the facts as stated in Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint. See Sec. Am. Compl., ECF No. 35. At this stage, the Court accepts all well-pleaded allegations in the complaint as true. Sonnier v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins., 509 F.3d 673, 675 (5th Cir. 2007).
This action arises out of Plaintiff Constantino Georgiou's allegation that he sustained injuries from an exploding lithium-ion battery in his e-cigarette device. On or around December 8, 2018, Plaintiff purchased the subject lithium-ion 18650 batteries from Defendant Shore Power, Inc.'s website. On March 17, 2019, Plaintiff was walking in Southlake, Texas with the subject battery in his pants pocket. Suddenly, Plaintiff states he felt a searing pain as the battery exploded and flames engulfed his leg and torso. Plaintiff removed the battery from his pocket and was able to extinguish the flames that engulfed his body.
Defendant Shore Power, Inc. doing business as Battery Junction.
Plaintiff was taken to Parkland Memorial Hospital in Dallas, Texas where he was admitted to the ICU Burn Center. Plaintiff was hospitalized for two weeks and underwent multiple skin grafts for a large hole that was burned into his leg.
Plaintiff filed the present lawsuit on March 10, 2021, listing as defendants Shore Power, Inc., LG Chem, Ltd., and Does 1-50.
Defendant Shore Power, Inc. is a Connecticut corporation with its principal place of business in Connecticut. Defendant operates entirely online, with no physical stores. Defendant filed a Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction on August 22, 2022, arguing that this Court sitting in Texas does not have personal jurisdiction over Defendant. The Motion is now ripe for the Court's review.
See Def. Mot., ECF No. 41.
II. Legal Standard
When a nonresident defendant files a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, the burden of proof is on the plaintiff as the party seeking to invoke the district court's jurisdiction. WNS, Inc. v. Farrow, 884 F.2d 200, 203 (5th Cir. 1989). "[T]he party who bears the burden need only present a prima facie case for personal jurisdiction; proof by a preponderance of the evidence is not required." D.J. Invs., Inc. v. Metzeler Motorcycle Tire Agent Gregg, Inc., 754 F.2d 542, 545-46 (5th Cir. 1985). Furthermore, "on a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, uncontroverted allegations in the plaintiff's complaint must be taken as true, and conflicts between the facts contained in the parties' affidavits must be resolved in the plaintiff's favor." Id. at 546.
"A federal district court sitting in diversity may exercise personal jurisdiction over a [nonresident] defendant if (1) the long-arm statute of the forum state creates personal jurisdiction over the defendant; and (2) the exercise of personal jurisdiction is consistent with the due process guarantees of the United States Constitution." Clemens v. McNamee, 615 F.3d 374, 378 (5th Cir. 2010) (citation omitted). "Because Texas's long-arm statute reaches to the constitutional limits, the question [a federal court] must resolve is whether exercising personal jurisdiction over the defendant offends due process." Id.
The exercise of "[p]ersonal jurisdiction comports with due process when first, the defendant has the requisite minimum contacts with the forum state and second, requiring the defendant to submit to jurisdiction in the forum state would not infringe on 'traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.' " Companion Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Palermo, 723 F.3d 557, 559 (5th Cir. 2013) (quoting Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 105, 107 S.Ct. 1026, 94 L.Ed.2d 92 (1987); Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316, 66 S.Ct. 154, 90 L.Ed. 95 (1945)). When a nonresident defendant "purposefully avail[s] [it]self of the benefits of the forum state, so that [it] 'should reasonably anticipate being haled into court' there," the defendant's conduct establishes minimum contacts. Id. (quoting Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 472, 105 S.Ct. 2174, 85 L.Ed.2d 528 (1985); World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297, 100 S.Ct. 559, 62 L.Ed.2d 490 (1980)).
"There are two types of minimum contacts: contacts that give rise to specific personal jurisdiction and those that give rise to general jurisdiction." Clemens, 615 F.3d at 378. General jurisdiction exists when a defendant's "affiliations with the State are so 'continuous and systematic' as to render them essentially at home in the forum State." Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 919, 131 S.Ct. 2846, 180 L.Ed.2d 796 (2011) (quoting Int'l Shoe Co., 326 U.S. at 317, 66 S.Ct. 154). "Specific jurisdiction exists when the defendant has purposefully directed his activities at residents of the forum . . . and the litigation results from alleged injuries that arise out of or relate to those activities." Clemens, 615 F.3d at 378 (alteration in original) (internal citations omitted).
III. Analysis
In this case, neither party alleges that Defendant is subject to general jurisdiction in Texas. Thus the remaining dispute is whether the Court may exercise specific personal jurisdiction related to this matter. In the Fifth Circuit, courts generally employ a three-step test in analyzing specific jurisdiction, looking to:
Def. Mot. 7, ECF No. 41; Pl. Resp. 1, ECF No. 43.
(1) whether the defendant has minimum contacts with the forum state, i.e., whether it purposely directed its activities toward the forum state or purposefully availed itself of the privileges of conducting activities there; (2) whether the plaintiff's cause of action arises out of or results from the defendant's forum-related contacts; and (3) whether the exercise of personal jurisdiction is fair and reasonable.Def. Distributed v. Grewal, 971 F.3d 485, 490 (5th Cir. 2020) (citation omitted). Further:
When a court rules on a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction without holding an evidentiary hearing, it must accept as true the uncontroverted allegations in the complaint and resolve in favor of the plaintiff any factual conflicts posed by the affidavits. Therefore, in a no-hearing situation, a plaintiff satisfies his burden by presenting a prima facie case for personal jurisdiction.Latshaw v. Johnston, 167 F.3d 208, 211 (5th Cir. 1999) (citations omitted).
A. Minimum Contacts with Texas
Plaintiff's argument to establish minimum contacts can be broken down to this: (1) Defendant runs a highly interactive website; (2) via its website, Defendant marketed, advertised, sold, and shipped its products directly to Texas residents, including Plaintiff; (3) when Defendant shipped the product to Plaintiff, it became foreseeable that the product would be used in Texas; and (4) Defendant maintained a Tax ID registration in Texas. Defendant argues that its activities were not purposefully directed to Texas, but rather, any connection with Texas was initiated and consummated by Plaintiff and/or others who unilaterally sought out Defendant's website.
Sec. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 18-23; Pl. Resp. 9-12, ECF No. 43.
Def. Mot. 10, ECF No. 41.
"The analysis applicable to a case involving jurisdiction based on the Internet should not be different at its most basic level from any other personal jurisdiction case." Admar Int'l, Inc. v. Eastrock, L.L.C., 18 F.4th 783, 786 (5th Cir. 2021) (quoting Pervasive Software, Inc. v. Lexware GmbH & Co. KG, 688 F.3d 214, 226-27 (5th Cir. 2012)). To assess the existence or absence of minimum contacts based on activities on the internet, the Fifth Circuit in Mink v. AAAA Dev. LLC adopted the Zippo "sliding scale" test. See 190 F.3d 333, 336 (5th Cir. 1999) (adopting the reasoning from Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Zippo Dot Com, Inc., 952 F. Supp. 1119, 1124 (W.D. Pa. 1997)). "The sliding scale attempts to classify websites along a spectrum of interactivity. One end of the spectrum involves fully interactive websites which allow users to conduct business with the website owner . . . . The other end of the spectrum involves fully passive websites which simply convey information to users." DeJesus v. BRP US Inc., No. 1:18-CV-0010-RP, 2019 WL 2563844, at *4 (W.D. Tex. Mar. 25, 2019), report and recommendation adopted, No. 1:18-CV-10-RP, 2019 WL 2563832 (W.D. Tex. Apr. 16, 2019) (citation omitted). Generally, the exercise of personal jurisdiction is proper in situations involving "fully interactive" websites, but not "passive" ones. Id. (citing Zippo, 952 F. Supp. at 1124). Between these two extremes, courts evaluate purposeful availment by looking at the website's "level of interactivity" and the "commercial nature of the exchange of information that occurs on the [w]ebsite." Admar Int'l, 18 F.4th at 786 (quotation omitted).
In this case, Defendant's contacts with Texas are based entirely on sales it made through its website. Defendant does not deny that its website is at least moderately interactive. The website allowed for the placement of online orders. Defendant does not deny that the transactions performed via the website resulted in at least one sale of a battery to a Texas resident, the Plaintiff. Further, Plaintiff has presented evidence that, through its website, Defendant generates thousands of dollars of revenue through its sales of batteries and power source solutions from and within the State of Texas. The Court finds that Defendant's website likely falls along the middle zone of the Zippo spectrum.
See generally Def. Mot, ECF No. 41; Def. Reply, ECF No. 44.
Pl. Resp. 4, ECF No. 43.
Because the website falls along the middle of the Zippo spectrum, the Court must evaluate whether, via the website, Defendant purposefully targeted Texas specifically based on the site's total interactivity and commercial nature. Brainstorm XX, LLC v. Wierman, No. 4:21-CV-584-SDJ, 2022 WL 4387858, at *4 (E.D. Tex. Sep. 22, 2022); see also Admar Int'l, 18 F.4th at 786 (finding that ultimately, the Zippo test seeks to determine whether defendant purposefully targeted the forum state). Defendant's website enables Texas residents to pay for and purchase products directly from the site and permits customers to have the product shipped directly to their Texas residences. See Tempur-Pedic Intern., Inc. v. Go Satellite Inc., 758 F. Supp. 2d 366, 373-74 (N.D. Tex. 2010) (finding defendant's website was sufficiently interactive to establish minimum contacts where the website specifically permitted shipping to Texas and enabled Texas residents to purchase products online directly from the website); see contra Mink v . AAAA Dev. LLC, 190 F.3d at 336-37 (finding the website was not sufficiently interactive where the website provided only a printable mail-in order form, a toll free telephone number, and an email address, but had no capacity for buyers to place online orders). Defendant's website is "clearly distinguishable from a case where a passive defendant merely lists an email address or telephone number or where a third-party customer, on his own initiative, contacts the defendant to inquire about its willingness to transact business." Tempur-Pedic Intern., Inc., 758 F. Supp. 2d at 373-74.
However, in the Fifth Circuit, "the mere possibility that forum residents have visited a website—even an extremely interactive one—does not alone constitute minimum contacts between the website's owner and the forum." DeJesus v. BRP US Inc., 2019 WL 2563844, at *4 (quoting Shippitsa Ltd. v. Slack, No. 3:18-CV-1036-D, 2019 WL 277613 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 22, 2019)). A plaintiff further "must offer evidence or non-conclusory allegations that Texas residents have actually interacted with the website" in order to establish the requisite minimum contacts for personal jurisdiction. Id. (citation omitted). Here, Plaintiff has offered evidence that he purchased the battery directly from Defendant's website. He also provided evidence of other sales Defendant has made to the State of Texas through its website. Therefore, the Court finds that Defendant's website is sufficiently interactive to establish Defendant has purposefully availed itself of the privileges of conducting activities in Texas, thereby establishing minimum contacts.
Sec. Am. Compl. ¶ 67, ECF No. 35.
Pl. Resp. 4, ECF No, 43.
As a secondary argument, Plaintiff contends that Defendant has sufficient minimum contacts with Texas as Defendant directly sent its allegedly faulty products into Texas via the stream of commerce. Defendant does not directly address Plaintiff's stream of commerce argument. In the Fifth Circuit, "mere foreseeability or awareness" that a product will reach the forum state's market is "a constitutionally sufficient basis for personal jurisdiction if the defendant's product made its way into the forum state while still in the stream of commerce." Ainsworth v. Moffett Engineering, Ltd., 716 F.3d 174, 177 (5th Cir. 2013) (quoting Luv N' Care, Ltd. v. Insta-Mix, Inc., 438 F.3d 465, 470 (5th Cir. 2006)). A product remains in the stream of commerce until "a consumer of the product, not a distributor or retailer," possesses it. In re Toyota Hybrid Brake Litig., No. 4:20-CV-127, 2021 WL 2805455, at *8 (E.D. Tex. July 6, 2021) (quoting Eddy v. Printers House (P) Ltd., 627 F. App'x 323, 327 (5th Cir. 2015)).
Id. at 9-10, ECF No. 43.
See generally Def. Reply, ECF No. 44.
The Court therefore concludes that Plaintiff has made a sufficient prima facie showing of minimum contacts to ensure that Defendant is not being haled into this jurisdiction "solely as a result of random, fortuitous, or attenuated contacts." Tempur-Pedic Intern., Inc., 758 F. Supp. 2d at 376 (quoting Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. at 475, 105 S.Ct. 2174). Unlike the defendants in cases such as World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 297, 100 S.Ct. 559, where defendants' products had entered the state only once the product was in consumers' control, Defendant is not a victim of unilateral third-party conduct. See Tempur-Pedic Intern., Inc., 758 F. Supp. 2d at 376. "Defendant cannot open itself for business to every state in the United States and then feign surprise when it receives an order from a resident of one of the states." Id. Defendant deliberately held itself out as willing to sell to residents nationwide and internationally, it accepted customers from Texas, and it shipped products directly to customers in Texas. Id.; see also AdvanceMe, Inc. v. Rapidpay LLC, 450 F.Supp.2d 669, 673-74 (E.D. Tex. 2006) (finding personal jurisdiction on basis of two sales to Texas, ongoing potential for sales to Texas, and a dropdown menu of states that allowed potential customer to identify Texas as its state). Defendant would certainly have been aware that filling any orders made by persons with Texas addresses, like Plaintiff, would mean shipping products to Texas, likely for use in Texas. See Tempur-Pedic Intern., Inc., 758 F. Supp. 2d at 376. "[H]ad [Defendant] wanted to exclude certain jurisdictions, it was able to refuse to deal with certain customers or to turn down any orders after checking customer addresses." Id.
See Pl. Resp. 4-5, ECF No. 43.
In its Motion, Defendant relies upon the case Pervasive Software Inc. v. Lexware GmbH & Co. KG, which is distinguishable from the present case. 688 F.3d 214 (5th Cir. 2012). In Pervasive Software Inc., the Fifth Circuit held that the defendant's commercial, interactive website from which twelve persons or businesses in Texas purchased products in a four-year span was not enough to establish minimum contacts. Id. at 226. However, Pervasive Software Inc. was not a products liability case where the stream of commerce analysis would be appropriate. Further, the defendant in that case was a German corporation producing German tax and financial software programs for German taxpayers exclusively in the German language. Id. at 217. The corporation had no offices or sales agents in Texas, and its website was exclusively available in the German language. Id. at 227-28. The defendant sold products for use exclusively by German taxpayers, not by people in Texas. The court concluded the defendant's actions toward Texas and its affiliation with that state were not so deliberate and substantial that the defendant should have reasonably anticipated being haled into court in Texas. Id. at 228. Meanwhile, in the present case, Defendant, an American corporation, sold Plaintiff a product directly via its website. While the defendant in Pervasive Software Inc. could not reasonably anticipate being haled into Texas court as the product itself was tailored for use in Germany and for German taxpayers, the product in the present case is not so limited. The Court thus finds Pervasive Software Inc. is distinguishable and does not dictate the Court's analysis.
The Court therefore concludes that Plaintiff has made a prima facie showing of minimum contacts to support a finding of specific personal jurisdiction over Defendant.
B. Plaintiff's Cause of Action Arises Out of Defendant's Forum-Related Contacts
The Court looks next to whether Plaintiff's claims arise out of or relate to Defendant's contacts with Texas. A court may exercise specific jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant only when a "sufficient nexus" exists "between the [defendant]'s contacts with the forum and the cause of action." Clemens, 615 F.3d at 378-79 (quoting Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414 n.8, 104 S.Ct. 1868, 80 L.Ed.2d 404 (1984)). At this juncture, the "central concern" of specific jurisdiction zooms into focus — "the relationship among the defendant, the forum, and the litigation." In re Toyota Hybrid Brake Litig., 2021 WL 2805455, at *12 (quoting Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 204, 97 S.Ct. 2569, 53 L.Ed.2d 683 (1977)). Here, Plaintiff contends his claims arise out of Defendant's contacts with Texas because the product sold and shipped to him by Defendant is what serves as the basis of this litigation. Defendant contends Plaintiff's claims do not arise out of any contacts Defendant has with Texas because Plaintiff's claims arise out of his unilateral purchase and alleged misuse of the product sold to him by Defendant.
Pl. Resp. 12-13, ECF No. 43.
Def. Reply 5-6, ECF No. 44.
To support its contention, Defendant relies on the language of World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, which states that the mere "unilateral activity of those who claim some relationship with a nonresident defendant cannot satisfy the requirement of contact with the forum State." 444 U.S. at 298, 100 S.Ct. 559. However, this quote merely sheds light on whether or not minimum contacts exist in the first place, which the Court already addressed above. Further, the Fifth Circuit has held "a sale made or fulfilled by the defendant directly to a plaintiff that the defendant knows is located in the forum-state is not unilateral activity in the strictest sense of the term, as it necessarily requires the defendants' willing participation in the transaction." Getagadget, L.L.C. v. Jet Creations Inc., No. 19-51019, 2022 WL 964204, at *4 (5th Cir. Mar. 30, 2022). In this case, Defendant sold and shipped the battery at issue directly to Plaintiff's address in Texas. This was no unilateral activity on the part of Plaintiff. The Supreme Court in World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. does not address the "arises out of or relates to" inquiry, as the Supreme Court determined that the defendant did not have sufficient minimum contacts with the forum state. 444 U.S. at 299, 100 S.Ct. 559. Therefore, the case does not assist the Court in its analysis of whether Plaintiff's claims arise out of or relate to Defendant's contacts with Texas.
The Court finds no caselaw to support Defendant's contention that Plaintiff's alleged misuse of the battery breaks the connection between Defendant, Texas, and the litigation. Further, as Plaintiff highlights in his Response, whether Plaintiff misused the subject battery sold to it by Defendant is a disputed fact that will not be relied upon by the Court prior to the actual discovery phase of this litigation. Therefore, the Court finds that Plaintiff's claims arise from and relate to Defendant's contacts with Texas. Defendant sold the battery directly to Plaintiff's address in Texas. Plaintiff used the battery in Texas, and it exploded in Texas, allegedly injuring Plaintiff. See In re Toyota Hybrid Brake Litig., 2021 WL 2805455, at *13 (citation and quotation marks omitted) (finding "[a]t day's end, the relatedness prong is met when the claims pleaded arise out of the product"). Plaintiff's claims thereby arise from Defendant purposefully availing itself of doing business in Texas by selling and shipping the battery to Plaintiff in Texas via its website and further by shipping the battery to Plaintiff through the stream of commerce.
Pl. Resp. 14, ECF No. 43.
C. Whether the Exercise of Personal Jurisdiction is Fair and Reasonable
With the Court finding that Defendant has sufficient minimum contacts with Texas and that Plaintiff's claims arose out of Defendant's contacts with Texas, Defendant must now demonstrate that "asserting jurisdiction would offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice." Hess v. Bumbo Int'l Tr., 954 F. Supp. 2d 590, 593 (S.D. Tex. 2013). Defendant "must present a compelling case that the presence of some other considerations would render jurisdiction unreasonable." Burger King v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. at 477, 105 S.Ct. 2174. "It is rare to say the assertion [of jurisdiction] is unfair after minimum contacts have been shown." Wien Air Alaska, Inc. v. Brandt, 195 F.3d 208, 215 (5th Cir. 1999) (citation omitted).
To determine whether it is unreasonable "to require [a] corporation to defend" itself in a specific forum, courts estimate "the inconveniences which would result to the corporation from a trial away from its home or principal place of business." Int'l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 317, 66 S.Ct. 154 (citation and quotation marks omitted). In making this assessment, courts balance:
(1) the burden on the nonresident defendant, (2) the forum state's interests, (3) the plaintiff's interest in securing relief, (4) the interest of the interstate judicial system in the efficient administration of justice, and (5) the shared interest of the several states in furthering fundamental social policies.E. Concrete Materials, Inc. v. ACE Am. Ins. Co., 948 F.3d 289, 298 (5th Cir. 2020) (citation omitted). The Court will address each factor in turn.
1. Burden on the nonresident Defendant
Defendant argues that the burden on Defendant will be substantial if this case remains in Texas, particularly because nearly all of Defendant's employees and facilities are in Connecticut. Defendant argues that defending against Plaintiff's claims in Texas will unnecessarily increase the financial burden on Defendant and will require additional time and expense associated with traveling to and from this jurisdiction for hearings, depositions, and trial. Further, Defendant argues that the batteries at issue in this litigation were supplied to Defendant by IMR, which has no contact with Texas. Plaintiff contends that any burden on Defendant is null considering the thousands of dollars Defendant has made through repeated sales to Texas.
Def. Mot. 12, ECF No. 41.
Id.
Id.
Pl. Resp. 13, ECF No. 43.
The Court finds that Defendant has not made a "compelling case" that it would be unduly burdened should the case remain in Texas. Burger King v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. at 477, 105 S.Ct. 2174. Plaintiff has sufficiently shown that Defendant made numerous sales to Texas residents, including Plaintiff. Defendant has not shown any reasons to conclude that it will be unduly burdensome to defend itself in a forum where the evidence shows it has intentionally made sales. Tempur-Pedic Intern., Inc., 758 F. Supp. 2d at 377.
See Sec. Am. Compl. ¶ 67, ECF No. 35; Pl. Resp. 4, ECF No. 43.
2. Forum State's Interests
Defendant contends that Texas' limited interest in the claims are belied by Plaintiff originally litigating the incident in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Georgia for six months prior to filing this action in March of 2021 and then delinquently providing notice of the lawsuit to Defendant in July of 2022. Further, Defendant contends that Texas law, specifically section 82.003 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code expressly limits the liability of nonmanufacturing sellers who do not design, alter, or modify products as Defendant argues is the case here. Plaintiff argues that Texas has an interest in trying the case in Texas as Plaintiff was injured and treated in Texas as a result of Defendant shipping the battery to Texas.
Def. Mot. 12, ECF No. 41.
Id.
Pl. Resp. 14, ECF No. 43.
The fact that Plaintiff tried to litigate in Georgia first does not take away from Texas' interest in having the case litigated here, especially as the injury occurred in Texas, to a Texas resident, allegedly due to the malfunction of a product shipped to Texas. Further, while section 82.003 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code limits liability for nonmanufacturing sellers, Texas still does have an interest in protecting its citizens from defective products being shipped into the State, and Plaintiff has not yet had opportunity to show whether Defendant can be held liable in light of section 82.003. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 82.003.
See generally Sec Am. Compl., ECF No. 35.
3. Plaintiff's interest in securing relief
Defendant argues that Plaintiff initially filed his suit in Georgia and that, despite the action pending since spring 2021, Plaintiff has yet to serve any of the other Defendants. The unserved defendants are foreign defendants, and Plaintiff has kept the Court informed as to his efforts to serve these defendants and the difficulties he has encountered. Here, the Court finds that Plaintiff decidedly has an interest in securing relief for his claims.
Def. Mot. 13, ECF No. 41.
See Mot. to Extend Time, ECF No. 45.
4. The interest of the interstate judicial system in the efficient administration of justice
Defendant contends that the bulk of Plaintiff's allegations relate to LG Chem, and both LG Chem and IMR appear to be necessary parties for resolution of these controversies, intimating that other forums likely have a greater interest in resolving these disputes, a fact belied by Plaintiff's prior filing and pursuit of the Georgia litigation. Defendant further contends that Plaintiff could pursue his claims in Connecticut, where Defendant is a resident. IMR is not named as a defendant and LG Chem, Ltd. is a Korean Corporation. There is no evidence of an American forum that would have a greater interest than Texas in resolving this dispute. Further, while Plaintiff could pursue his claims in Connecticut, he does not have to, as Texas is also a proper state for Plaintiff to litigate his claims.
Def. Mot. 13, ECF No. 41.
Id.
5. The shared interest of the several states in furthering fundamental social policies
Defendant lastly contends that no social policy is implicated by this action, but to the extent that a social policy is implicated, Defendant contends that Plaintiff's claim arising out of his intentional and unilateral misuse of the subject battery contrary to the express warning on Defendant's website, does not further any fundamental social interest but rather imposes an unfairness upon Defendant. The states do have an interest in protecting consumers from faulty products. However, this factor does not point towards any particular state.
Id. at 13-14.
The Court finds that the five fairness factors outlined in E. Concrete Materials, Inc. v. ACE Am. Ins. Co. warrant the Court's exercise of specific personal jurisdiction over Defendant in Texas.
IV. Conclusion
As the Court finds that Plaintiff has established (1) Defendant has sufficient minimum contacts with Texas; (2) Plaintiff's claims arise from or are related to Defendant's contacts with Texas; and (3) Defendant cannot show it would be unfair or unreasonable for this Court to exercise jurisdiction over Defendant, the Court finds that it has specific personal jurisdiction over Defendant. Defendant's Motion to Dismiss is DENIED.
SO ORDERED on this 15th day of December, 2022.