Opinion
Civil Action No. 99-2698 Section "A"
April 28, 2000
ORDER AND REASONS
In this action involving death and injury in a vehicular accident, before the Court are cross-motions for partial summary judgment. All parties seek a resolution of whether, and how, a state statute limits the amount of plaintiffs' possible damages. Plaintiffs also seek a ruling that defendants are not entitled to immunity from suit. For reasons set out infra, both parties' motions with respect to the state statutory matter are DENIED; and the plaintiffs' motion regarding immunity is GRANTED.
This action has been consolidated with civil action number 99-3176, but the motions apply to action number 99-2698 only.
Deputy Sheriff Kevin Wilson, while on duty, was driving a Sheriff's department car. His and another vehicle collided, causing the death of Mary George and the injury of her daughter, Donna George. Donald George, husband of Mary and father of Donna, observed the accident from another car.
Plaintiffs are Donald George, Donna George and Mary George's four adult children from another marriage, James Nettles, Vicky Longmire, Cynthia Day and Rebecca Day. Defendants are Deputy Wilson, his employer Sheriff I.F. Hingle and their insurer Gulf Insurance Group. All six plaintiffs assert a survival claim for the damages suffered by Mary George (LSA-C.C. art. 2315.1) and also assert their individual claims for their own damages caused by her death (LSA-C.C. art. 2315.2). Donna George asserts a claim for the damages occasioned by her own injury (LSA-C.C. art. 2315). Donald George asserts two claims for the torts committed against himself when he was subjected to seeing his wife killed and to seeing his daughter injured (LSA-C.C. art. 2315.6)
Limitation on liability
In this diversity action, the following sections of LSA-R.S. 13:5101, et seq. are applicable to lawsuits
for injury to person or property against . . . a political subdivision of the state, or against an officer or employee of a political subdivision arising out of the discharge of his official duties or within the course and scope of his employment.
The Sheriff is a "political subdivision" of the state. § 5102. Section 5106 provides, in part:
B. (1) In all suits for personal injury to any one person, the total amount recoverable, including all derivative claims, exclusive of property damages, medical care and related benefits and loss of earnings, and loss of future earnings, as provided in this Section, shall not exceed five hundred thousand dollars.
(2) In all suits for wrongful death of any one person, the total amount recoverable, exclusive of property damages, medical care and related benefits and loss of earnings or loss of support, and loss of future support, as provided in this Section, shall not exceed five hundred thousand dollars.
Based on that statute, defendants assert as to general damages that: all plaintiffs as a group may recover no more than $500,000 for the death of Mary George; Donna George's recovery for her own injury is limited to $500,000; and Donald George may recover for his own tort claim no more than $500,000, because he really suffered only one injury, not two, in observing the accident.
Plaintiffs do not contend that § 5106 does not apply to the claims herein. But, they posit that it applies as a limitation of $500,000 on the following: the survival claim, each of the six wrongful death claims, the personal injury suffered by Donna George and each of the two personal claims of Mr. George.
The parties also disagree regarding whether the limitation applies to the direct action claims against the insurer.
The Court declines to resolve the motions related to the statutory limitation because at this time they are speculative and premature. If it is found at trial that plaintiffs are entitled to a judgment in amounts exceeding the limitations suggested by defendants, then the matter will be ripe for resolution and defendants may file post-trial motions with respect to those issues.
Eleventh Amendment Immunity
Pursuant to the eleventh amendment of the Constitution, federal courts have no jurisdiction over suits instituted by individuals against States. Plaintiffs seek a ruling that this action against the Sheriff and his Deputy is not barred by that amendment. Although defendants asserted immunity in their answer, they have not otherwise opposed this portion of plaintiffs' motion.
The issue is whether the State of Louisiana is the real party in interest in a suit against a Louisiana Sheriff. If so, this suit is barred. To resolve that matter, the Court must consider the following six factors set out in Hudson v. City of New Orleans, 174 F.3d 677, 681 (CA5 1999): (1) whether state law views the Sheriff as an arm of the state; (2) the source of the Sheriff's funding; (3) the Sheriff's degree of autonomy; (4) whether the Sheriff is involved primarily in local or statewide problems; (5) whether the Sheriff has authority to sue and be sued in his own name; and (6) whether the Sheriff has the right to hold and use property. Ibid. The factors are not of equal weight; and the second factor, whether the state will pay any judgment, is the most important. 174 F.3d, at 682.
Regarding the Hudson factors, state law deems the Sheriff to be a "political subdivision" of the state (with parishes, municipalities, etc.) LSA-R.S. 13:5102. Political subdivisions of a state are not protected from suit by the eleventh amendment. Mt. Healthy City School District Board of Education v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 280, 97 S.Ct. 568, 572 (1977). (Factor 1.)
Any damages incurred by the Sheriff or his deputy in this matter will not be paid by the state. LSA-R.S. 42:1441.A. ("The state of Louisiana shall not be liable for any damage caused by a . . . sheriff . . . within the course and scope of his official duties, or damage caused by an employee of a . . . sheriff. . . . (Factor 2.)
The Sheriff "is a virtually autonomous local official." See Burge v. Parish of St. Tammany, 187 F.3d 452, 469 (CA5 1999) ("Under the Louisiana Constitution and laws, a district attorney, like a sheriff, is virtually an autonomous local government official.") (Factor 3.)
Pursuant to the Louisiana Constitution and many other laws, the Sheriff's duties are limited to his local parish. See LSA-Const. Art. V, § 27. ("In each parish a sheriff . . . shall be the chief law enforcement officer in the parish. . . .") (Factor 4.)
The Sheriff may sue and be sued. See Valentine v. Bonneville Insurance Company, 691 So.2d 665, 668 (La. 1997). ("The law of Louisiana affords no legal status to the 'Parish Sheriff's Department' so that the department can sue or be sued, such status being reserved for the Sheriff.") (Factor 5.)
The Sheriff may hold and use property. (Factor 6). He may "purchase and equip real property, § 33:1422(D), and controls his own general fund and may borrow against that fund if necessary, 33:1423(D), and such borrowing creates "a special obligation by and of the sheriff. . . ." 33:9010(A).
All the Hudson factors demonstrate that the Sheriff, not the State of Louisiana, is the real party in interest in this lawsuit. Therefore, the Sheriff and his deputy are not protected by the State's eleventh amendment immunity.