Opinion
03-16-1903
GEORGE JONAS GLASS CO. v. GLASS BLOWERS ASS'N OF UNITED STATES & CANADA et al.
Hampton & Fithian and John W. Harding, for complainant. H. L. Miller and John W. Westcott, for defendants.
Suit by the George Jonas Glass Company against the Glass Blowers Association of the United States & Canada and others for an injunction to restrain defendants from picketing and illegally interfering with plaintiff's employés. On order to show cause why an injunction should not be granted pendente lite. Decree for complainant.
Hampton & Fithian and John W. Harding, for complainant.
H. L. Miller and John W. Westcott, for defendants.
GREY, V. C. (orally). In this case an order was made that the defendants show cause why an injunction should not issue according to the prayer of the bill of complaint. Accompanying that order, an ad interim stay was allowed, restraining certain named defendants "from entering or attempting to enter complainant's premises, consisting of its glass manufacturing plant at Minotola, in the township of Buena Vista, county of Atlantic and state of New Jersey; and from obstructing or attempting to obstruct the free passage of any employé or employés of complainant in going to and from complainant's premises; from in any wise threatening or using any coercive language or coercion whatever in order to induce any employe of complainant not to work for complainant; and from in any wise interfering with, or annoying by acts or words, any such employe of complainant, against his will, in going to and from, or while engaged in, such employment; and from entering its grounds and premises for the purpose of interfering with, hindering, or obstructing its business; and from compelling or Inducing, or attempting to compel or induce, by threats, intimidation, annoying language, or acts of force and violence any of the employés of complainant to refuse to or fail to perform their duties as such employés; and from compelling or inducing, or attempting to compel or induce, by threats, intimidation, annoying language or acts, force or violence, any of the employés of complainant to leave the service of complainant; and from preventing or attempting to prevent any person or persons, by threats, intimidation, annoying language or acts, force or violence, from entering the service of the complainant; and from congregating at or near the said premises of complainant, or in the public highway, for the purpose of intimidating complainant's employés or preventing them from rendering their services to complainant, and from inducing, by the payment of money, or by promises to pay money, or coercing by threats, annoying language, or acts, said employés to break their contracts of employment with complainant and to leave its employment; and from collecting, either singly or in combination with others, in and about the approaches to complainant's said plant, or in the public highway, for the purpose of picketing or patrolling or guarding the streets, highways, gates, and approaches to complainant's said property for the purpose of intimidating or coercing any of the employés of the complainant in going to and from their work, and the said factory of the complainant; and from congregating at or about any place at Minotola for the purpose of Intimidating, threatening, or coercing any person or persons seeking employment of complainant; and from going, either singly or collectively, to the homes of complainant's employés, or any of them, for the purpose of intimidating or coercing any or all of them to leave the employ of complainant, or from entering complainant's employment; and from intimidating or in any manner threatening the wives and families of said employés at their homes because of their said employment; and from conspiring in meetings, or otherwise conspiring together, by threats or other coercive action, to induce or coerce any of the employés of complainant to leave the service of said complainant, or to prevent any person, by threats, intimidation, force, or violence, from entering the service of complainant; and that the said William M. Doughty be, and he hereby is, restrained from using money in furtherance of the purpose of preventing employés of the complainant from returning to their work, and from paying money to such employés to induce such employés to leave their employment with complainant." On the coming in of the order to show cause, the defendants filed separate answers, to the number of about 100, most of them using the same printed form; blank spaces being filled with the names of particular answering defendants. Numerous affidavits were attached to these answers, in which printed forms were used; many of the defendants swearing to the same precise form of words. Additional separate affidavits were also submitted in opposition to the allowance of the writ.
Neither by these elaborate pleadings, nor the accompanying affidavits, nor in the arguments of the defendants' counsel, is it claimed that the terms of the restraint allowed by the above-recited ad interim stay work any hardship or oppression upon the defendants. The whole burden of the pleadings, proof, and argument submitted by the defendants is directed to a denial of the facts and circumstances set up in the complainant's bill, and to contentions that the strike which is now admittedly being conducted under the direction of the defendants at the complainant's works is carried on without either violence, Intimidation, or other unlawful interference with the complainant's business. The situation is this: A restraint is outstanding which imposes no hardship upon the defendants, and the legality of which is not challenged, save as it is contended that in point of fact there is no occasion for its exercise. At the present stage of the case, this question is before the court upon ex parte affidavits. The cause has been set down for a day certain on final hearing, when witnesses will be produced in open court and subjected to cross-examination on the very same points which are now presented only by voluntary affidavits. It is indicated that the case will turn almost wholly upon the credibility and weight of the testimony of witnesses of whose worthiness the court has but little opportunity to be advised. If I pass upon the credibility of this testimony as exhibited by the affidavits on file, I shall have prejudged this case, and have subjected the parties to embarrassment when the same facts shall be presented by the same witnesseson the stand, giving their testimony in open court. There will be two hearings and decisions on substantially the same question. The cause can be disposed of on the final hearing in a much more intelligent and conclusive manner.
As the ad interim restraint is not injurious to the defendants, but its removal may work great harm to the complainant, the present status may remain until the final hearing gives a full opportunity to pass upon the whole case by a single judgment.