Opinion
Case No. 2:08-cv-626
03-18-2015
LUCAS GEORGANDELLIS, M.D., Plaintiff, v. HOLZER CLINIC INC., Defendants.
Magistrate Judge King
OPINION & ORDER
This matter is before the Court on Plaintiff Lucas Georgandellis' Motion to Enforce the Settlement Agreement, Order a Show Cause Hearing, Set Scheduling Order, and Award damages and Attorneys' Fees. (Doc. 126). For the reasons set forth herein, the Motion is DENIED.
I. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff Lucas Georgandellis, M.D. ("Plaintiff") was a former physician and shareholder of Holzer Clinic, Inc., and a member of the staff at the affiliated Holzer Medical Center. In the underlying dispute in this case, Plaintiff brought claims against the Holzer Medical Center and James Phillippe, Chief Executive Officer of the Holzer Medical Center (collectively, "HMC Defendants"). Plaintiff also brought claims against the Holzer Clinic, Inc., and individual defendants who are shareholders of the Holzer Clinic, including T. Wayne Munro, M.D., Jon M. Sullivan, M.D., Michael Canady, M.D., G. Patrick Connors, and Robert E. Daniel (collectively, "Clinic Defendants"). In his Amended Complaint, Plaintiff alleged violations of the Federal False Claims Act, the Whistleblower Statute, federal and state anti-trust law, and defamation law.
Plaintiff had chaired a peer review committee at HMC that faulted the leadership of the Holzer Clinic for allowing an unqualified physician to perform an operation that led to the death of a patient. Plaintiff alleged that due to his activities as a whistleblower, the Holzer Clinic suspended him on three occasions, which resulted in the loss of his medical malpractice insurance. Each time he lost his medical malpractice insurance, he simultaneously lost his privileges at HMC.
Prior to trial, the HMC Defendants and the Clinic Defendants entered into two, separate settlement agreements with Plaintiff, both of which included mutual non-disparagement, non-defamatory, and confidentiality provisions. (HMC Defendants' Settlement Agreement, Doc. 127-1, ¶¶ 8, 11; Clinic Defendants' Settlement Agreement; Doc. 127-2, ¶¶ 7, 8). Both agreements also provided that after the execution of the agreement, Georgandellis would dismiss with prejudice all claims against the defendants. (HMC Defendants' Settlement Agreement, Doc. 127-1, ¶ 4; Clinic Defendants' Settlement Agreement; Doc. 127-2, ¶). Finally, both agreements provided that any dispute or alleged breach related to the Agreements shall be governed by the laws of the State of Ohio, and shall be brought in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio.
On June 14, 2010, a stipulation of dismissal of the HMC Defendants was filed, which stated: "Upon agreement of the parties, the Holzer Medical Center and James Phillippe are dismissed with prejudice as Defendants in this case." (Doc. 115). On July 7, 2010, a stipulation of dismissal of the Clinic Defendants was filed, which stated:
Pursuant to Rule 41(A)(1)(A)(ii) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Plaintiff Lucas Georgandellis, M.D. and Defendant Holzer Clinic file their Stipulation of Dismissal with Prejudice. This matter has been resolved to the satisfaction of all parties. An Entry resolving this matter is attached for the Court's convenience.(Doc. 116). On July 7, 2010, the Court entered the following:
Upon the parties' Stipulation of Dismissal with Prejudice, and with good cause shown, this case is hereby DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. Lucas Georgandellis, M.D., Holzer Clinic Inc., T. Wayne Munro, M.D., Jon M. Sullivan, M.D., Michael Canady, M.D., Robert E. Daniel and G. Patrick Connors will abide by the agreed upon settlement agreement and release.(Doc. 119). The Court made no similar entry with respect to the HMC Defendants.
In the instant Motion, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants violated the non-disparagement provisions in both Settlement Agreements due to language used in eight (8) letters sent to potential employers, hospitals, and accrediting bodies seeking information about Plaintiff. All letters at issue were sent by HMC staff or representatives in response to requests for information about Plaintiff sent directly to HMC, and not to the Holzer Clinic.
The letters at issue include the following language:
Dr. Georgandellis was a Member of the Medical Staff at Holzer Medical Center Gallipolis from March 19, 2003 to January 1, 2008. He was granted clinical privileges in Nephrology and was a member of our Department of Internal Medicine.
During that time he proved to be a capable and competent clinician. However, he did have some difficulties in his interaction with some other physicians on our staff.
Holzer Medical Center Bylaws require that all appointees to the Medical Staff carry medical malpractice liability insurance. There were three instances when Dr. Georgandellis' privileges were suspended because he did not meet this requirement.
On November 18, 2013, the Plaintiff requested the Magistrate Judge to schedule a status conference with respect to the enforcement and or violations of the Settlement Agreements entered into by the parties. (Doc. 120). As grounds for this Court's jurisdiction over such a conference, the Plaintiff cited to the July 7, 2010 Entry entered by this Court concerning the dismissal of the Clinic Plaintiffs. Parties were unable to reach an agreement through the status conference, so the Plaintiff filed the instant Motion to Enforce the Settlement, Order a Show Cause Hearing, Set Scheduling Order, and Award Damages and Attorney's Fees. (Doc. 126).
II. JURISDICTION
A. Standard
Enforcement of a settlement agreement, "whether through [an] award of damages or decree of specific performance is more than just a continuation or renewal of the dismissed suit, and hence requires its own basis for jurisdiction." Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Amer., 511 U.S. 375, 378 (1994). As this Court explained in Dowling v. Select Portfolio Servicing Inc., according to the Supreme Court's decision in Kokkonen:
[If] there is a dispute over the settlement agreement (i.e., an alleged breach) the issue is one of contract law, subject to state law. If the district court no longer has subject matter jurisdiction—because a contract dispute is not a federal question, and the parties may not be diverse—the district court will not be able to enforce the agreement, unless, that is, it has retained jurisdiction.No. 2:05-CV-0049, 2007 WL 928639, at *6 (S.D. Ohio Mar. 27, 2007) (Marbley, J).
When, as part of a settlement agreement, a plaintiff voluntarily dismisses a suit pursuant to Rule 41(a)(1)(ii), a claim for breach of that settlement agreement is simply a claim for breach of contract, "part of the consideration for which was dismissal of an earlier federal suit." Kokkonen, 375 U.S. at 381. Because Rule 41(a)(1)(ii) "does not by its terms empower a district court to attach conditions to the parties' stipulation of dismissal," the only way the Court retains jurisdiction over a settlement agreement—a term of which was dismissal pursuant to Rule 41(a)(1)(ii)—is by agreement of the parties, which is then incorporated into the Court's Order of Dismissal. Id. at 381-382. Specifically, the Court can retain jurisdiction to enforce the settlement agreement:
if the parties' obligation to comply with the terms of the settlement agreement had been made part of the order of dismissal—either by separate provision (such as a provision "retaining jurisdiction" over the settlement agreement) or by incorporating the terms of the settlement agreement in the order. In that event, a breach of the agreement would be a violation of the order, and ancillary jurisdiction to enforce the agreement would therefore exist.Id. at 381.
The Konokken Court explained that unless a court incorporates such terms in an order of dismissal, pursuant to the wishes of both parties, "enforcement of the settlement agreement is for state courts, unless there is some independent basis for federal jurisdiction." Id. at 382.
B. Analysis
Before this Court determines whether it has retained jurisdiction over the settlement agreements, this Court must determine which settlement agreements are actually at issue. Although the Plaintiff speaks in general terms about "Defendants" in his motion, the exhibits attached to Plaintiff's Motion show that each of the letters at issue was written in response to inquiries about Dr. Georgandellis sent directly to the Holzer Medical Center, and not to the Holzer Clinic, Inc. Plaintiff argues, however, that Dr. Munro, who is an individual party to the Clinic Agreement, wrote two of the letters attached to Plaintiff's motion (see Exhibits I and J, Docs. 127-9, 10 ), and, as such, the Clinic Agreement was violated as well.
This Court finds that Dr. Munro wrote those letters in his capacity as the CEO of the Holzer Health System—parent company of HMC—in response to inquiries sent to the Holzer Medical Center, only. Dr. Munro appears in the Clinic Settlement Agreement only as a "Clinic Defendant," and in paragraph 7, the Non-Disparagement clause, Dr. Munro is referred to in his capacity as a "representative" of the Clinic. Accordingly, any and all communications written by Dr. Munro with respect to Dr. Georgandellis are not necessarily governed by the Clinic Settlement Agreement, but only those written in his capacity as a representative of the Clinic. Thus, this Court finds that the letters at issue written by Dr. Munro can only be considered potential breaches of the HMC Agreement, and not the Clinic Agreement. In sum, this Court determines that since all of the letters at issue were written by representatives of the Holzer Medical Center, the only question before this Court is whether this Court has jurisdiction over an alleged breach of the HMC Settlement Agreement.
This Court finds that it does not. In its request for a status conference on the instant matter, Plaintiff cited to this Court's July 7, 2010 Entry, concerning the dismissal of the Clinic Defendants, as the grounds for this Court's jurisdiction over the enforcement of both the Clinic Settlement Agreement and the HMC Settlement Agreement. (Doc. 119). That Entry does not provide the basis for this Court's jurisdiction over a breach of the HMC Settlement Agreement, which is the only agreement at issue.
This Court notes that even if the Clinic Settlement Agreement were at issue in this case, the Court's July 7, 2010 Entry does not comply with the requirements Konnoken laid out for a Court to retain jurisdiction over a settlement agreement after a case is voluntarily dismissed pursuant to Rule 41(a)(1)(ii). Although the entry states that parties agree to abide by the terms of the settlement agreement, the entry is not an order that incorporates the terms of the settlement agreement into the order, or an order that states that the Court retains jurisdiction of the matter.
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The Plaintiff and the HMC Defendants did not request this Court to file an order dismissing the case and retaining jurisdiction. Instead, the Plaintiff simply filed a stipulation of dismissal of the HMC defendants, pursuant to Rule 41(a)(1)(ii). (Doc. 115). Thus, according to the strictures of Kokkonen, as there is no independent basis for federal jurisdiction over this dispute, this Court does not have jurisdiction over an alleged breach of the HMC Settlement agreement in this case; instead, the state court has exclusive jurisdiction in the case of a breach. While the parties provided in the HMC Settlement Agreement that the United States District Court of the Southern District of Ohio would have jurisdiction in the case of a dispute arising from the HMC Settlement Agreement, such a statement does not override federal law as it concerns federal jurisdiction. If the Plaintiff wishes to bring a claim for breach of the HMC Settlement Agreement, such a claim must be filed in state court.
III. CONCLUSION
For the above reasons, the Plaintiff's Motion is DENIED (Doc. 116).
IT IS SO ORDERED.
s/Algenon L. Marbley
ALGENON L. MARBLEY
United States District Court Judge
DATED: March 18, 2015
(Doc. 127 at 3; Doc. 127-3 at 2; Doc. 127-4 at 2; Doc. 127-5 at 2; Doc. 127-6 at 2; Doc. 127-7 at 2; Doc. 127-8 at 2; Doc. 127-9 at 2; Doc. 127-10 at 2)