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Gayle v. Louisiana Dock Co.

United States District Court, E.D. Louisiana
Jul 31, 2000
CIVIL ACTION NO: 99-3110, SECTION: "R"(4) (E.D. La. Jul. 31, 2000)

Summary

holding that proffered expert testimony was not helpful to the jury in deciding whether employee needed assistance to lift heavy objects high enough to clear a railing

Summary of this case from Thibodeaux v. Gulf Coast Tugs, Inc.

Opinion

CIVIL ACTION NO: 99-3110, SECTION: "R"(4)

July 31, 2000


ORDER AND REASONS


Defendant, Louisiana Dock Co., L.L.C., moves the Court in limine to exclude the testimony of plaintiff's maritime safety expert, Captain C.R. Davenport. Because Captain Davenport's expert testimony will not help the jury pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 702, the Court grants defendant's motion.

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff, Cantrell Gayle, alleges that on July 4, 1998, he sustained injuries while attempting to of f load coils of cable from the fleet tug M/V JEANNIE MARIE to another tug, the M/V BOB LIVINGSTON. At the time of the incident, plaintiff was employed by defendant, Louisiana Dock Co., L.L.C., as a member of the crew of the JEANNIE MARIE. On October 12, 1999, plaintiff filed suit against defendant under the Jones Act and general maritime law. He has retained Captain C.R. Davenport as a maritime safety expert. Defendant now seeks to exclude Captain Davenport from testifying as an expert at trial. This case is set for a bench trial on August 28, 2000.

II. DISCUSSION

Expert testimony is admissible at trial when it will "assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue." FED. R. EVID. 702. The Advisory Committee Notes to Federal Rule of Evidence 702 provide:

Whether the situation is a proper one for the use of expert testimony is to be determined on the basis of assisting the trier. "There is no more certain test for determining when experts may be used than the common sense inquiry whether the untrained layman would be qualified to determine intelligently and to the best possible degree the particular issue without enlightment from those having a specialized understanding of the subject involved in the dispute." Ladd, Expert Testimony, 5 VAND. L. REv. 414, 418 (1952). When opinions are excluded, it is because they are unhelpful and therefore superfluous and a waste of time. 7 Wigmore § 1918.
See id. Adv. Comm.'s Note.

Defendant argues that Captain Davenport will testify on matters of common knowledge and thus his testimony will not help the jury. Defendant relies on Peters v. Five Star Marine Service, in which the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision to exclude Captain Davenport's maritime safety expert testimony on whether it was reasonable for an employer to instruct his employee to manually move equipment on the deck of a boat during heavy seas, whether cargo was improperly stowed, and whether diesel fuel would make the deck of a boat slippery. 898 F.2d 448, 449 (1990). The Peters court found that the district court correctly decided that the jury could analyze this situation using only their common experience and knowledge. See id. at 449-50. In so concluding, Peters distinguished its facts from those in the unpublished decision of Smith v. United Gas Pipeline Co., 857 F.2d 1471 (5th Cir. 1988). 898 F.2d at 450. The Fifth Circuit in Smith reversed the district court's decision to exclude expert testimony on the reasonableness of using a ship's crane equipped with a "headache ball" and a shackle without a "tag line" to transfer materials from one ship to another while the two ships were stern-to-stern in heavy waters, taking into account the backwash created by both vessels' propellers. See id. (describing Smith). See also Grissom v. Sea Fleet, Inc., 1997 WL 644090 (E.D. La. Oct. 17, 1997) (permitting expert testimony on whether there was too much slack in the mooring line and whether the "biter end" of the line should have been hanging in the water).

In his expert report, drafted after interviewing plaintiff and reviewing the Coast Guard's report of the accident and a booklet of safety rules signed by plaintiff, Captain Davenport opined that plaintiff sustained his injuries when he asked his lead deckhand for help in transferring the wire coils, but was refused. ( See Def's Mot. Lim. Ex. A, at 2-3.) Captain Davenport notes that the transfer required plaintiff to pick up ten wire coils, each weighing 68 to 75 pounds, and toss each one over a three chain railing onto the deck of the BOB LIVINGSTON. ~ See id. at 1. Because chain railings are usually a standard 39 inches high and plaintiff is only 5 foot 1/4 inch tall, tossing the wire coils over the chain rail would have required plaintiff to lift the coils higher than chest high and extend his arms over the chain rail. See id. at 2. The Court agrees with defendant that Captain Davenport's report contains nothing that an ordinary factfinder, using common sense and general knowledge, could not also adequately assess. It does not require specialized knowledge to determine whether a supervisor reasonably refused assistance to a fellow employee charged with lifting heavy objects over a certain height to clear a railing, and thus caused the employee's subsequent injuries.

Plaintiff argues that the Court should, in the alternative, defer ruling on defendant's motion in limine because the depositions of three crewmembers have been taken since Captain Davenport's report, and plaintiff anticipates that Captain Davenport will issue a supplemental report after he reviews those depositions. However, plaintiff says nothing about how those depositions might alter the facts in this case or Captain Davenport's opinions. The essence of Captain Davenport's report is that the lead deckhand aboard the JEANNIE MARIE was improperly trained in safety matters and caused plaintiff's injuries by refusing to help him transfer the wire coils. Simply because this case involves a loading/of f loading operation does not mean that it requires expert testimony. Plaintiff has provided the Court with no information to suggest that any equipment unique to the maritime industry or any technical maneuvers caused his injuries, as in Smith and Grissom. Like Peters, the facts of this case are within the ordinary realm of experience of the average factfinder and, under Rule 702, expert testimony is unnecessary.

III. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, defendant's motion in limine to exclude the expert testimony of Captain C.R. Davenport is GRANTED.


Summaries of

Gayle v. Louisiana Dock Co.

United States District Court, E.D. Louisiana
Jul 31, 2000
CIVIL ACTION NO: 99-3110, SECTION: "R"(4) (E.D. La. Jul. 31, 2000)

holding that proffered expert testimony was not helpful to the jury in deciding whether employee needed assistance to lift heavy objects high enough to clear a railing

Summary of this case from Thibodeaux v. Gulf Coast Tugs, Inc.
Case details for

Gayle v. Louisiana Dock Co.

Case Details

Full title:CANTRELL GAYLE v. LOUISIANA DOCK CO., L.L.C

Court:United States District Court, E.D. Louisiana

Date published: Jul 31, 2000

Citations

CIVIL ACTION NO: 99-3110, SECTION: "R"(4) (E.D. La. Jul. 31, 2000)

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