Opinion
No. 37343.
November 14, 1949.
1. Infants — delinquent children — Youth Court Act — certification to circuit court.
The Youth Court Act authorizes the Youth Court to certify to the circuit court the case of any child over thirteen years of age charged with a felony and when such a case has thus been certified, the circuit court may thereupon proceed to indictment, trial, conviction and sentence. Chap. 207, Laws 1946.
2. Constitutional law — appeal — constitutionality of statute — when will not be decided.
The appellate court will not pass upon the constitutionality of a statute unless such decision is necessary to dispose of the case.
Headnotes as approved by Hall, J.
APPEAL from the circuit court of Newton County; PERCY M. LEE, Judge.
A.B. Amis, for appellants.
Clearly these appellants were found to be and were by the Youth Court adjudged to be delinquents. See order of the Youth Court of date January 29, 1949. Clearly the Youth Court had jurisdiction to entertain these proceedings and to enter an order declaring these appellants to be delinquents. See Sections 3 and 9 of Chapter 207 of the Laws of 1946. Clearly these appellants were actually tried and convicted on the identical charges by the Youth Court. Clearly to compel these appellants to again stand trial on the identical charges, after a court of competent jurisdiction had already tried and convicted them on the same charges, was and is violative of Section 22 of the Mississippi Constitution.
Clearly the Youth Court could have, after investigation, certified these appellants to the Circuit Court of Newton County, for proper criminal proceedings (Section 15 Chapter 207 Laws 1946), but that is not what happened in the instant case. What actually happened was that the Youth Court exercised its full jurisdiction, tried and convicted these appellants and then adjudged that they were delinquent and ordered them confined in Oakley Reformatory. That was the severest sentence that could be imposed by the Youth Court. Then being unable to have its order enforced on account of crowded conditions existing at the reform school, the Youth Court without any right so to do attempted to exercise its discretion and certify these appellants to the Circuit Court for trial on proper criminal proceedings. Had the Youth Court not entered its order adjudicating these appellants to be delinquents and ordering them confined, then under the provisions of Section 15 of Chapter 207 Laws 1946, it could have certified said children for trial in the Circuit Court, but having exhausted its powers by entering a final order of adjudication, we believe that was a sufficient conviction on the merits and that any further prosecution was and is prohibited by Section 22 Mississippi Constitution.
We want also to submit to the court the question as to the meaning of Section 4 of Chapter 207 Laws of 1946. In the instant case clearly the Youth Court obtained jurisdiction. Suppose that such Youth Court should now determine to parole these delinquents to their parents. What then as to the judgment and sentence as entered by the Circuit Court? Can it be said that the Youth Court relinquished its jurisdiction and cannot now interfere with the order of the Circuit Court, or will it be said that the Youth Court had jurisdiction and can therefore take action under Section 4 of Chapter 207 Laws 1946? The Youth Court either did or did not have jurisdiction to enter the order of conviction and if it did then it had no authority to certify these appellants to the Circuit Court, and if it did not, then as held by the lower court the Youth Court Act is unconstitutional in so far as it infringes on the right of the Circuit Court to dispose of all criminal business. If it be unconstitutional to that extent then the act is a nullity in so far as the real purpose and intent of the act is concerned and this court by proper opinion so declare the act to be unconstitutional.
We earnestly submit that these appellants were improperly and unlawfully tried and convicted in the Circuit Court of Newton County, Mississippi, and that the verdict and judgment should be set aside and these appellants stand adjudged under the order of the Youth Court as entered under date of January 29, 1949.
George H. Ethridge, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.
I submit that so far as the jurisdiction is concerned neither the Circuit Court nor the Justice Court can be deprived of any of its constitutional jurisdiction and the statute under review, Chapter 207, Laws of 1946, seemingly ignores the constitutional grants and seeks to substitute the judgment of the Legislature for that of the Constitutional Convention.
The proceedings in the present case, so far as the Youth Court is concerned, was not founded on an indictment in any court but was founded on a mere affidavit and the act of being dealt with, to-wit: the stealing of the $1,100.00 was a felony and no prosecution could be instituted for the punishment of a felony except by indictment by the grand jury. Section 27 of the Constitution provides that no person shall for any indictable offense be proceeded against criminally by information except in cases arising in the land or naval forces or the military when in actual service or by leave of the court for misdemeanor in office but the Legislature, in cases not punishable by death or by imprisonment in the penitentiary, may dispense with the inquest of the grand jury, and may authorize prosecutions before justices of the peace, or such inferior court or courts as may be established, and the proceedings in such cases shall be regulated by law.
For a felony in this state no person can be prosecuted and punished until the grand jury finds an indictment, specifying the crime for which the person is to be tried. By Section 26 of the Constitution in all criminal prosecutions the accused shall have a right to be heard by himself or counsel to demand the nature and cause of the accusation and to be confronted by the witnesses against him and provides for a speedy and public trial by an impartial jury of the county where the offense was committed. It will be noted from the Act under consideration that no jury is required or permitted in proceedings in a Youth Court. Also, Section 31 of the Constitution provides for the right of trial by jury to remain inviolate. In addition to this, Chapter 207 expressly provides that the proceedings in that court are not criminal and provides that there shall be no disability imposed on any person found delinquent under that chapter.
Coming now to the sentence imposed by the trial judge, I submit that the law does not authorize the committing of a person convicted for felony in the reformatory institutions mentioned in Chapter 207. Larceny or stealing property in excess of $25.00 is grand larceny and a felony. Punishment imposed for grand larceny is a sentence in the Penitentiary for a number of years, not exceeding five. Section 2240, Code 1942. It appears that the appellants were convicted clearly on an indictment of grand larceny and no discretion is given to dispense with the punishment prescribed by law. I respectfully submit that the sections referred to above under Chapter 207 do not authorize the criminal courts (circuit court, county court and justice of the peace court) to imprison in the reformatory institutions any person convicted of a felony but is confined to the punishment prescribed by law. Consequently, conviction in this case should be upheld but the case should be remanded to the court below solely for the purpose of imposing a sentence required by law. In the state of confusion which the provisions of Chapter 207, Laws of 1946, bring into the law the court should enter upon a full consideration of that statute in connection with the constitutional provisions mentioned and determine whether or not any part of Chapter 207 is constitutional because many of the separate parts are unconstitutional. I submit that persons under thirteen years may be proceeded against under the provisions of Chapter 207 and if a person is found to be a criminal delinquent under the age of eighteen years and no prosecution has been instituted against him, proceedings under the Youth Court may be applied to them, not as punishment, but as protection and reformation of such person. This power in said Youth Court cannot and does not prohibit any constitutional court from proceeding whenever its jurisdiction is properly invoked.
Appellants are admittedly guilty of the larceny of $1,100 in currency. They are fifteen and fourteen years of age, respectively. Upon their apprehension a proceeding was instituted in the Youth Court seeking to have them adjudged delinquent and dealt with under the provisions of the Youth Court Act, Chapter 207, Laws of Mississippi of 1946. Upon the hearing, they were adjudged delinquent, but instead of imposing a sentence upon them the Youth Court certified them for proper criminal proceedings to the Circuit Court of Newton County, the order reciting that the offense committed by them would be a felony if committed by an adult.
In the Circuit Court they were indicted, tried, convicted and sentenced to a term of five years each in Oakley Training School at Oakley, Mississippi, from which they appeal.
It is contended by appellants that the Youth Court first obtained jurisdiction of this matter, that the Circuit Court was wholly without jurisdiction, and that consequently its judgment is void and should be reversed.
Section 3 of the Youth Court Act confers original jurisdiction in that court concerning any delinquent or neglected child "except as otherwise provided herein". Section 9 provides that the Youth Court may terminate its jurisdiction over such child; and Section 15 provides: "If a child thirteen years of age or older is charged with an offense which would be a felony if committed by an adult, the court, after full investigation, may, in its discretion, retain jurisdiction and proceed with the case as a delinquency case, or certify such child for proper criminal proceedings to any court which would have trial jurisdiction of such an offense if committed by an adult, and may fix the amount of bail, except that the circuit court shall have exclusive jurisdiction of such child if he be charged with any crime which, upon conviction, is punishable by life imprisonment or death."
Section 19 of said Act provides that upon conviction of such child in the Circuit Court, the trial judge may, in his discretion, and in lieu of other statutory punishment, commit such child to any state institution now or hereafter established for delinquents.
(Hn 1) It will at once be seen from the foregoing sections of the Act that it fully authorizes everything that was done in this case. The Circuit Court was not deprived of its jurisdiction by virtue of the fact that appellants were first brought into the Youth Court, since the latter court, as it was fully authorized to do, certified them over to the Circuit Court for appropriate proceedings against them. The appeal is, therefore, without merit.
The Attorney General has filed an able and lengthy brief assailing the constitutionality of numerous provisions of the Youth Court Act, and has asked that we declare the whole act, or at least a goodly portion of it, unconstitutional. It will be noted that this case has been disposed of without reaching the constitutional question. It is well-settled that (Hn 2) this Court will not pass upon the constitutionality of a statute unless such decision is necessary to dispose of the case. Numerous cases to this effect are collated in 4 West's Miss. Dig., Constitutional Law, 46.
Affirmed.