Opinion
No. 05-14-01578-CV
06-02-2016
CYNTHIA M. GARZA, Appellant v. WELLS FARGO BANK, N.A., Appellee
On Appeal from the County Court at Law No. 4 Dallas County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. CC-14-04563-D
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before Justices Lang, Brown, and Richter
Opinion by Justice Brown
The Hon. Martin Richter, Justice, assigned.
In this eviction case, appellant Cynthia M. Garza appeals a summary judgment awarding possession of real property to Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. In two issues, Garza asserts (1) the deed on which Wells Fargo's based its right to possession was void, and (2) the trial court lacked jurisdiction. For the following reasons, we affirm.
Garza initially also presented a third issue asserting Wells Fargo's summary judgment evidence was not properly authenticated. At oral argument, Garza waived that issue. Therefore, we do not consider it. --------
I. Background
In 2009, Garza's mother Mary Trevino, executed a deed of trust to secure a note she had obtained to refinance her house. The deed of trust provided that, if the property was sold at foreclosure, the borrower or any person holding possession of the property through the borrower was required to immediately surrender possession of the property to the purchaser. The deed of trust also provided that, if possession was not surrendered, the borrower or such other person became tenants-at-sufferance.
In 2013, Trevino died intestate and Garza moved into the house with her family. Garza subsequently filed an application to determine heirship in probate court to establish her interest in Trevino's estate. While the heirship proceeding was pending, Wells Fargo foreclosed on the deed of trust and obtained a substitute trustee's deed to the property. After the foreclosure sale, Wells Fargo demanded Garza vacate the property. When she failed to do so, Wells Fargo filed a petition for forcible detainer in justice court. Garza failed to answer and the justice court rendered a default judgment in favor of Wells Fargo. Garza appealed, which was by trial de novo to county court.
Wells Fargo filed a motion for summary judgment asserting it was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Relying on the deed of trust, Wells Fargo asserted Garza became a tenant-at-sufferance after the foreclosure sale and that it was entitled to a judgment awarding it immediate possession because Garza refused to surrender possession after it demanded she do so.
In her response to the motion, Garza claimed the trial court had no jurisdiction over the detainer action because it could not determine the right to possession without resolving a title dispute, which it lacked jurisdiction to resolve. Specifically, Garza asserted Wells Fargo's right to possession depended upon the validity of its deed, which she claimed was void. To show Wells Fargo's deed was void, Garza relied on her application to determine heirship, which she filed in probate court before the foreclosure sale. According to Garza, because the opening of an administration of a probate estate suspends the power of sale in a deed of trust, her filing of the application similarly suspended the power of sale. See Pearce v. Stokes, 291 S.W.2d 309, 568 (Tex. 1956) (opening of an administration suspends power of sale in deed of trust executed by decedent). Therefore, she asserted Wells Fargo's deed was void and, as Trevino's heir, she was the true owner of the property. Garza also filed a motion to dismiss for want of jurisdiction raising essentially the same arguments. The trial court denied Garza's motion to dismiss and granted summary judgment in favor of Wells Fargo. This appeal followed.
In her first issue, Garza asserts Wells Fargo failed to show it was entitled to immediate possession of the property because its deed was void. In her second issue, Garza inconsistently argues that the trial court had no jurisdiction to determine title issues. We conclude the trial court had jurisdiction over the detainer action and that questions related to the validity of Wells Fargo's deed were irrelevant and could not be considered by the trial court.
II. Applicable Law
A justice court in the precinct in which the real property is located has jurisdiction in eviction suits, including forcible detainer suits, but has no jurisdiction to adjudicate title to the property at issue. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 24.004 (West 2014) ("justice court in the precinct in which the real property is located has jurisdiction in eviction suits"); TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 27.031(b) (4) (West Supp. 2015) (justice court has no jurisdiction to adjudicate title to land); Tex. R. Civ. P. 510.3 ("in an eviction suit, the justice court must adjudicate the right to actual possession and not title"). In a de novo appeal, the county court's jurisdiction is restricted to the jurisdictional limits of the justice court. Rice v. Pinney, 51 S.W.3d 705, 708 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2001, no pet.); see also Childress Oil Co. v. Wood, 111 Tex. 165, 166 (1921) Rodney R. Elkins & Co. v. Immanivong, 406 S.W.3d 777, 779 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2013, no pet.).
Because a justice court may not adjudicate title to real property, if a plaintiff's right to immediate possession in a detainer action necessarily requires resolution of a title dispute, a county court in a de novo appeal has no jurisdiction over the action. Bruce v. Fed. Nat. Mortg. Ass'n, 352 S.W.3d 891, 893 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2011, pet. denied); Schlichting v. Lehman Bros. Bank FSB, 346 S.W.3d 196, 199 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2001, pet. dism'd); Rice, 51 S.W.3d at 709. But if an independent basis exists on which to award immediate possession that would not require resolution of a title dispute, the justice court, and therefore the county court, has jurisdiction to do so. Bruce, 352 S.W.3d at 893; Schlichting, 346 S.W.3d at 199; Rice, 51 S.W.3d at 709.
A deed of trust that creates a landlord and tenant-at-sufferance relationship on foreclosure provides an independent basis to determine the issue of immediate possession without resolving the issue of title. Bruce, 352 S.W.3d at 893; Schlichting, 346 S.W.3d at 199; Rice, 51 S.W.3d at 709. Specifically, in such cases, the trial court need not resolve disputes related to the validity of the foreclosure sale; such disputes are not relevant to determining the right to immediate possession. Fontaine v. Deutsche Bank Nat. Trust Co, 372 S.W.3d 257, 259 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2012, pet. dism'd w.o.j.); Williams v. Bank of New York Mellon, 315 S.W.3d 925, 927 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2010, no pet.); Shutter v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 318 S.W.3d 467, 471 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2010, pet. dism'd w.o.j.).
III. Analysis
Here, it is undisputed that Garza's mother executed a deed of trust that contained a provision creating a landlord-tenant-at-sufferance relationship upon foreclosure. That deed of trust provided the trial court with an independent basis to determine immediate right to possession without resolving Garza's title dispute. Bruce, 352 S.W.3d at 893; Schlichting, 346 S.W.3d at 199; Rice, 51 S.W.3d at 709. Therefore, the trial court had jurisdiction over the detainer action.
Furthermore, the evidence Garza relies on to show the trial court erred in granting Wells Fargo's motion for summary judgment relates entirely to the validity of Wells Fargo's title. Not only did the trial court lack jurisdiction to determine that issue, that evidence was immaterial to any issue in the action. Schlichting, 346 S.W.3d at 199; see also Fontaine, 372 S.W.3d at 259; Williams, 315 S.W.3d at 927; Shutter, 318 S.W.3d at 471; see also Mitchell v. Armstrong Capital Corp., 911 S.W.2d 169, 171 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1995, writ denied). Therefore, Garza's issues are without merit.
Finally, we acknowledge that, at oral argument, Garza asserted the trial court was without jurisdiction because the probate court entered a judgment declaring that Garza was Trevino's heir and had a fifty percent interest in her mother's separate real property. According to Garza, the probate court's judgment rebutted the existence of a landlord-tenant-at-sufferance relationship and deprived the trial court of jurisdiction. Even if we agreed the probate court's judgment had any bearing on Wells Fargo's right to possession, at most, Garza's argument would show the trial court erred in granting summary judgment, not that it lacked jurisdiction to do so. Garza also argued, in the alternative, the probate court's judgment controverted the existence of a landlord-tenant-at-sufferance relationship. Garza did not raise that argument either in her response to Wells Fargo's motion or in her brief to this Court. Therefore, we may not consider it. See Pat Baker Co., Inc. v. Wilson, 971 S.W.2d 447, 450 (Tex. 1998) (appellate court may not reverse in the absence of properly assigned error); City of Houston v. Clear Creek Basin Auth, 589 S.W.2d 671, 679 (Tex. 1979) (non-movant must expressly present to the trial court any issues that would defeat movant's entitlement to summary judgment). We affirm the trial court's judgment.
/Ada Brown/
ADA BROWN
JUSTICE 141578F.P05
JUDGMENT
On Appeal from the County Court at Law No. 4, Dallas County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. CC-14-04563-D.
Opinion delivered by Justice Brown. Justices Lang and Richter participating.
In accordance with this Court's opinion of this date, the judgment of the trial court is AFFIRMED.
It is ORDERED that appellee WELLS FARGO BANK, N.A. recover its costs of this appeal from appellant CYNTHIA M. GARZA. Judgment entered this 2nd day of June, 2016.