Opinion
23-CV-2343 (LTS)
05-22-2023
NICOLE GARRETT, Plaintiff, v. KAREN CUMMBERBATCH, Defendant.
ORDER TO AMEN
LAURA TAYLOR SWAIN, Chief United States District Judge
Plaintiff, who is currently detained at the Rose M. Singer Center (“RMSC”) on Rikers Island, brings this pro se action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that Defendant Karen Cummberbatch, who is a social service counselor at RMSC, violated her federal constitution rights. By order dated March 21, 2023, the Court granted Plaintiff's request to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”), that is, without prepayment of fees. For the reasons set forth below, the Court grants Plaintiff leave to file an amended complaint within 60 days of the date of this order.
Prisoners are not exempt from paying the full filing fee even when they have been granted permission to proceed IFP. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1).
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The Prison Litigation Reform Act requires that federal courts screen complaints brought by prisoners who seek relief against a governmental entity or an officer or employee of a governmental entity. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The Court must dismiss a prisoner's IFP complaint, or any portion of the complaint, that is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B), 1915A(b); see Abbas v. Dixon, 480 F.3d 636, 639 (2d Cir. 2007). The Court must also dismiss a complaint if the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(h)(3).
While the law mandates dismissal on any of these grounds, the Court is obliged to construe pro se pleadings liberally, Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009), and interpret them to raise the “strongest [claims] that they suggest,” Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (emphasis in original). But the “special solicitude” in pro se cases, id. at 475 (citation omitted), has its limits -to state a claim, pro se pleadings still must comply with Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which requires a complaint to make a short and plain statement showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.
Rule 8 requires a complaint to include enough facts to state a claim for relief “that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A claim is facially plausible if the plaintiff pleads enough factual detail to allow the Court to draw the inference that the defendant is liable for the alleged misconduct. In reviewing the complaint, the Court must accept all well-pleaded factual allegations as true. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678-79 (2009). But it does not have to accept as true “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action,” which are essentially just legal conclusions. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. After separating legal conclusions from well-pleaded factual allegations, the Court must determine whether those facts make it plausible - not merely possible - that the pleader is entitled to relief. Id.
BACKGROUND
The following allegations are taken from the complaint. In December 2022, Plaintiff's “[l]egal [g]uardian, mother, [a]unt” passed away. (ECF 1, at 3.) Plaintiff spoke with Defendant, who is the social services counselor at RMSC. Plaintiff “filled out the proper paperwork . . . to attend the funeral services, or at least a Zoom.” (Id.) Defendant, however, “never submitted the paperwork.” (Id.) Plaintiff's brother also called the social services department “many times [but] never received an answer.” (Id. at 5.) On the day of the funeral, “Ms. Malcomb brought [Plaintiff] a[n] obituary with a[n] apology that Ms. Cummberbatch did not submit the paperwork.” (Id.)
Plaintiff does not otherwise identify this individual.
Plaintiff does not list any injuries on the section of the complaint form asking her to describe her injuries, but in the section of the form asking her to state the relief she is seeking, Plaintiff indicates that she is seeking $100,000 in compensatory damages for “mental anguish.” (Id.)
DISCUSSION
A. No independent constitutional right
To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege both that: (1) a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and (2) the right was violated by a person acting under the color of state law, or a “state actor.” West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48-49 (1988).
To the extent Plaintiff is asserting a claim based on her inability to attend her relative's funeral, she fails to state a claim because prisoners and pretrial detainees do not have a constitutional right to attend the funeral of a relative. See, e.g., Verrone v. Jacobson, No. 95-CV-10495, 1999 WL 163197, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (noting that “a prisoner does not have a protected right to attend the funeral of a relative”); Green v. Coughlin, No. 94-CV-3356, 1995 WL 498808, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 22, 1995) (“Generally, prison inmates do not have a constitutionally protected right under § 1983 to attend a funeral ....”); Mercer v. Green Haven Corr. Fac., No. 94-CV-6238, 1998 WL 85734, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 27, 1998) (“[A]n inmate does not have a constitutional right to attend a family member's funeral.”); Colon v. Sullivan, 681 F.Supp. 222, 223 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (“Denying a prisoner permission to attend the funeral of a relative does not involve the denial of a liberty interest protected by the Constitution.”) (citations omitted).
B. Substantive due process
Even in the absence of an independent constitutional right to attend a relative's funeral, Plaintiff may be able to assert a constitutional claim arising from alleged psychological harm that she experienced. See McPherson v. Coombe, 174 F.3d 276, 280 (2d Cir. 1999) (in the context of a convicted prisoner, assuming without deciding, “that if, in order to cause a particular inmate psychological distress, prison officials deny the inmate leave which is otherwise available to attend a parent's funeral, such conduct may in some circumstances constitute cruel and unusual punishment”).
Plaintiff's reference to the mental anguish caused by Defendant may be an attempt to assert a substantive due process claim under the Fourteenth Amendment. The substantive component of the Due Process Clause protects the individual against “the exercise of power without any reasonable justification in the service of a legitimate governmental objective,” County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 845, 846 (1998). A substantive due process claim will not lie unless the defendant's conduct is found to be “so egregious, so outrageous, that it may fairly be said to shock the contemporary conscience.” Id. at 848 n.8; Ferran v. Town of Nassau, 471 F.3d 363, 370 (2d Cir. 2006) (governmental action must be “arbitrary, conscienceshocking, or oppressive in the constitutional sense, not merely incorrect or ill-advised,” to be actionable as a substantive due process violation).
“[C]onduct intended to injure in some way, unjustifiable by any government interest, is the sort of official action most likely to rise to the conscience-shocking level.” Lewis, 523 U.S. at 849; see Johnson v. Newburgh Enlarged Sch. Dist., 239 F.3d 246, 252 (2d Cir. 2001) (“[M]alicious and sadistic abuses of government power that are intended only to oppress or to cause injury and serve no legitimate government purpose unquestionably shock the conscience.”). By contrast, “negligently inflicted harm is categorically beneath the threshold.” Lewis, 523 U.S. at 849.
Here, Plaintiff fails to state a substantive due process claim. Plaintiff's allegations suggest, at most, that Defendant was negligent when she failed to file Plaintiff's paperwork, and negligence does not amount to a constitutional violation under Section 1983. See Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 335-36 (1986) (the Fourteenth Amendment does not provide a remedy for negligence); Davidson v. Cannon, 474 U.S. 344, 348 (1986) (same); Lewis, 523 U.S. at 849 (stating that “negligently inflicted harm is categorically beneath threshold” to show a substantive due process violation); Colon, 681 F.Supp. at 223 (dismissing claims plaintiff was negligently denied permission to attend grandmother's funeral because “there can be no recovery under section 1983 on the basis of negligence”) (citation omitted). Plaintiff alleges no facts suggesting that Defendant acted with the intent to cause harm to Plaintiff or that her actions “may fairly be said to shock the contemporary conscience.” Lewis, 523 U.S. at 848 n.8.
In light of Plaintiff's pro se status, the Court grants Plaintiff leave to file an amended complaint alleging additional facts, and the Court will analyze whether they suggest that Defendant acted with the intent to cause Plaintiff psychological harm when she failed to file Plaintiff's application to attend the funeral.
LEAVE TO AMEND
Plaintiff proceeds in this matter without the benefit of an attorney. District courts generally should grant a self-represented plaintiff an opportunity to amend a complaint to cure its defects, unless amendment would be futile. See Hill v. Curcione, 657 F.3d 116, 123-24 (2d Cir. 2011); Salahuddin v. Cuomo, 861 F.2d 40, 42 (2d Cir. 1988). Indeed, the Second Circuit has cautioned that district courts “should not dismiss [a pro se complaint] without granting leave to amend at least once when a liberal reading of the complaint gives any indication that a valid claim might be stated.” Cuoco v. Moritsugu, 222 F.3d 99, 112 (2d Cir. 2000) (quoting Gomez v. USAA Fed. Sav. Bank, 171 F.3d 794, 795 (2d Cir. 1999)). Because Plaintiff may be able to allege additional facts to state a valid substantive due process claim under Section 1983, the Court grants Plaintiff 60 days' leave to amend her complaint to detail her claims.
In the “Statement of Claim” section of the amended complaint form, Plaintiff must provide a short and plain statement of the relevant facts supporting each claim against each defendant. If Plaintiff has an address for any named defendant, Plaintiff must provide it. Plaintiff should include all of the information in the amended complaint that Plaintiff wants the Court to consider in deciding whether the amended complaint states a claim for relief. That information should include:
a) the names and titles of all relevant people;
b) a description of all relevant events, including what each defendant did or failed to do, the approximate date and time of each event, and the general location where each event occurred;
c) a description of the injuries Plaintiff suffered; and d) the relief Plaintiff seeks, such as money damages, injunctive relief, or declaratory relief.
Essentially, Plaintiff's amended complaint should tell the Court: who violated her federally protected rights and how; when and where such violations occurred; and why Plaintiff is entitled to relief.
Because Plaintiff's amended complaint will completely replace, not supplement, the original complaint, any facts or claims that Plaintiff wants to include from the original complaint must be repeated in the amended complaint.
Plaintiff may consult the legal clinic opened in this District to assist people who are parties in civil cases and do not have lawyers. The Clinic is run by a private organization called the New York Legal Assistance Group (“NYLAG”); it is not part of, or run by, the court (and, among other things, therefore cannot accept filings on behalf of the court, which must still be made by any pro se party through the Pro Se Intake Unit).
To receive limited-scope assistance from the Clinic, Plaintiff may mail a signed retainer and intake form to the NYLAG Pro Se Clinic at 40 Foley Square, LL22, NY, NY 10007. Once the paperwork is received, the Clinic will coordinate contact with the litigant. Once received, it may take up to two weeks for the Clinic to contact the litigant. Copies of the Clinic's flyer, retainer, and intake form are attached to this order.
CONCLUSION
Plaintiff is granted leave to file an amended complaint that complies with the standards set forth above. Plaintiff must submit the amended complaint to this Court's Pro Se Intake Unit within 60 days of the date of this order, caption the document as an “Amended Complaint,” and label the document with docket number 23-CV-2343 (LTS). An Amended Civil Rights Complaint form is attached to this order. No summons will issue at this time. If Plaintiff fails to comply within the time allowed, and she cannot show good cause to excuse such failure, the complaint will be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.
The Court certifies under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3) that any appeal from this order would not be taken in good faith, and therefore IFP status is denied for the purpose of an appeal. Cf. Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 444-45 (1962) (holding that an appellant demonstrates good faith when he seeks review of a nonfrivolous issue).
SO ORDERED.