Opinion
June 10, 1982
Appeal from an order of the Supreme Court at Special Term (Cholakis, J.), entered August 14, 1981 in Greene County, which granted defendant's motion to dismiss the complaint, with leave to replead. This libel and slander action is grounded on allegations that defendant falsely stated that plaintiff had accused another of theft. Since the offensive publication is not defamatory per se, the complaint, to withstand a motion to dismiss, must plead special damages ( Wehringer v Allen-Stevenson School, 46 A.D.2d 641, affd 37 N.Y.2d 864, cert den 424 U.S. 924; Grinaldo v Meusburger, 34 A.D.2d 586, 587, app dsmd 27 N.Y.2d 598). This same requirement obtains if the complaint is read as charging a prima facie tort ( ATI, Inc. v Ruder Finn, 42 N.Y.2d 454, 458). Here special damages, defined as "loss of a pecuniary nature" ( Bishop v New York Times Co., 233 N.Y. 446, 452), have not been pleaded. The allegation that plaintiff "was required to expend large sums of money" does not allege special damages for it is of insufficient particularity ( Rager v McCloskey, 305 N.Y. 75, 81; see, also, Morrison v National Broadcasting Co., 19 N.Y.2d 453, 458), as is the claim that plaintiff has been damaged in the round figure of $1,000,000 (see Drug Research Corp. v Curtis Pub. Co., 7 N.Y.2d 435, 441). Order affirmed, with costs. Sweeney, J.P., Main, Casey, Mikoll and Yesawich, Jr., JJ., concur.