Opinion
20-P-980
06-18-2021
Cheryl GARDNER v. Robert DANGELO.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0
This case, between plaintiff Cheryl Gardner and her brother, the defendant, Robert Dangelo, involves the determination of the appropriate statute of limitations that applies to the plaintiff's claim in count one of her complaint. According to the judge, the parties stipulated that in 1997, an attorney for Nicholas Dangelo, the parties’ father, wrote a letter to Nicholas's children, Cheryl, Robert, and David Dangelo, recommending "the transfer of [their] father's home to Robert with [a] retained life estate [for the father] as soon as possible in order to facilitate [the father's] Medicaid application." The attorney wrote another letter to Nicholas's children in 2000 saying that if the house were deeded to Robert as a caretaker child, that would protect the house from being taken and having its value applied against Nicholas's nursing home expenses. The parties further stipulated that Cheryl and David, both acting on behalf of their father through a power of attorney, executed a deed transferring the father's home to Robert, reserving a life estate for the father. There is also no dispute that on June 5, 2000, Robert signed a deed ("Robert's deed") transferring the property to himself, David, and Cheryl, as tenants in common, each with a one-third undivided interest in the property. Robert's deed was not recorded. The undisputed trial evidence indicates that it was held in escrow by the father's lawyer for recording after the father's death.
Because of the common surname and for consistency, we use the parties’ and other family members’ first names. For clarity, we frequently refer to Nicholas Dangelo as "the father."
No issue is raised on appeal with respect to whether the procedure that actually took place in this case was a proper mechanism for placing the property out of the reach of Medicaid.
The father died on June 2, 2009. On September 28, 2009, counsel for Robert sent correspondence to David's attorney and the father's attorney purporting to "repudiate" Robert's deed and demanding its immediate return so that it could be destroyed. More than six years later, in 2016, Cheryl filed this suit.
The defendant moved to dismiss on statute of limitations grounds. His motion was denied. The case was tried to another judge of the trial court who concluded that title to the property was in the three siblings because Robert's deed was valid as between them despite having not been recorded, see Cooper v. Monroe, 237 Mass. 192, 198 (1921), and was effective at the moment at which the signed and sealed deed was delivered to the father's attorney. The trial judge also ruled that Cheryl's one third interest in the property has been held by the defendant in a resulting trust for the benefit of Cheryl since June 5, 2000, the date the deed was executed.
The judge stated only that it was held "in trust." He did not say that it was held in a resulting trust. Nonetheless, in the paragraph immediately preceding that declaration, the judge described the law with respect to resulting trusts. For present purposes, as it is immaterial to our conclusion, we will assume that the declaration was that Cheryl's interest was held in a resulting trust.
On appeal, the defendant raises a single issue: whether the claim in this case, denominated "[d]eclaratory judgment - [r]esulting trust," was barred by the statute of limitations. The motion judge, in an opinion reaffirmed by the trial judge, concluded that a twenty-year statute of limitations applies to this claim because it is one for the recovery of land. See G. L. c. 260, § 21. Robert argues that Cheryl asserted a claim for a resulting trust, and that the statute of limitations for such claims is six years measured from the date when "the plaintiff becomes aware that the trust has been repudiated." Stapleton v. Macchi, 401 Mass. 725, 729 (1988).
There is case law indicating that a claim that property is held in a resulting trust is subject to a six-year statute of limitations from the date of repudiation of the trust. See Stapleton, 401 Mass. at 729 ; Boston v. Roxbury Action Program, Inc., 68 Mass. App. Ct. 468, 474 (2007). Cheryl argues that a resulting trust is not a cause of action but a remedy without a set limitations period, and that the limitations period is instead determined by the type of underlying claim. In the circumstances of this case, we may assume without deciding that a six-year statute of limitations applies to claims that property is held in a resulting trust, even real property, as the defendant argues.
Despite the verbiage in the complaint, however, the factual assertions in this case do not amount to a claim that the property is held in a resulting trust. The plaintiff is not bound by the legal theories articulated in his or her complaint. See Republic Floors of New England, Inc. v. Weston Racquet Club, Inc., 25 Mass. App. Ct. 479, 487 (1988). Rather, under our rules of notice pleading, a complaint must contain a short simple statement of the facts. See Mass. R. Civ. P. 8 (a) (1), 365 Mass. 749 (1974). If those facts allege a claim upon which relief can be granted, the claim is sufficient. See Gallant v. Worcester, 383 Mass. 707, 709-710 (1981). The legal theory described in the complaint is of no moment. See Republic Floors of New England, Inc., 25 Mass. App. Ct. at 487 ("The fact that the prayer for relief asked the trial court to ‘determine and assess damages arising from the negligence,’ rather than for breach of warranty, is not determinative as long as the pleading put [the opposing party] on notice of the nature of the claim or the facts which are alleged to give rise to its liability").
Indeed, this case has nothing to do with a resulting trust. A resulting trust is created when a title owner takes title to property that is in fact beneficially owned by someone else. See Citizens Bank of Mass. v. Coleman, 83 Mass. App. Ct. 609, 612 (2013). This often occurs when one person takes title to property but another person provided the purchase money for the property, id. at 612-613, but that is not the only circumstance in which a resulting trust will be found to have been created. Id. at 613-614.
The allegation in the complaint and what was found by the judge after trial was not that the defendant was the title owner of property that has a different equitable owner, the only circumstance in which a resulting trust exists. The questions raised by the facts in the complaint and ruled upon by the judge were whether Robert remained the legal title owner, or whether legal title in the property was vested in the three siblings as tenants in common as a result of Robert's deed. With the defendant exercising dominion and control over the real property under a claim of undivided title, the plaintiff's suit seeking a declaration of her rights as the holder of legal title to a one-third undivided interest in that property is properly understood as an action for the recovery of land subject to the twenty-year statute of limitations.
Although it appears, and we have assumed for purposes of this decision, that the judge declared that the property was held by the defendant in a resulting trust for the benefit of the plaintiff as the owner of a one-third undivided interest in the property, that aspect of the judgment has not been challenged on appeal. The only claim made on appeal was that the court lacked jurisdiction due to the statute of limitations. Therefore, our affirmance of the judgment leaves that aspect of the judgment in its entirety undisturbed.
Judgment affirmed.