Opinion
H051532
11-14-2024
SUNNY GARCIA, et al., Plaintiffs and Respondents, v. GRACE R. THOMPSON, et al., Defendants and Appellants.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Santa Clara County Super. Ct. No. 23CV415223
Greenwood, P. J.
Appellants Grace R. Thompson and Jordan Thompson lived in a residential unit owned by respondents Sunny Garcia and Celia Estillore. Sunny and Celia served a 60-day notice of termination of Grace and Jordan's tenancy, and thereafter filed a complaint for unlawful detainer when Grace and Jordan failed to vacate the property. Following a bench trial, the court entered judgment for respondents entitling them to possession of the property. On appeal, appellants contend respondents failed to give proper notice under Civil Code section 1946.2 to justify the unlawful detainer judgment. Finding no error, we affirm the trial court's judgment.
Because several of the people involved in this matter share the same surnames, we will refer to the individuals by their first names for clarity.
Subsequent statutory references are to the Civil Code unless otherwise noted.
I. Factual and Procedural Background
The unlawful detainer complaint arises from a family dispute. Sunny and Celia (collectively respondents) are sisters. Grace and Jordan are mother and daughter. Respondents' brother, John Estillore, is Grace's father. Grace's mother, appellant Gloria Estillore, was married to John until his death.
Gloria was not a tenant at the subject property. She entered the unlawful detainer action as a claimant on the belief that John had an ownership interest in the property such that she had an interest as his spouse. At trial, Grace testified to her belief that John owned the property. Sunny testified that she made all of the mortgage and property tax payments and that she and Celia were the sole owners of the property. While the trial court was not in a position to make a dispositive ruling on the issue of ownership in the unlawful detainer action, it did find that appellants failed to establish a defense to respondents' claims based on Gloria's alleged ownership. Appellants do not challenge the finding on appeal. We will not address the issue of ownership in this opinion except as is necessary for context.
In 1998, Grace and her then-husband entered into a written rental agreement with Sunny for a unit (Unit A) at a two-unit residential property in Los Altos, California. The agreement was for one year, and Grace and her family vacated the unit at the end of the lease. More than a decade later, respondents gave Grace and her adult children, including Jordan, permission to live in the second unit in the building (Unit B). Grace and Jordan did not have a lease that required them to pay rent while they lived in Unit B. At the time Grace and Jordan took possession of Unit B, John, who did not live at the property, served as the property manager for the duplex, a role he held until he died in January 2022.
In February 2023, respondents served a "60-Day Notice of Termination of Tenancy for No-Fault Just Cause Civ. Code § 1946.2. subd. (b)(2)" to Grace and Jordan by registered mail, return receipt requested. Under "grounds," respondents stated, "Intent to occupy the residential real property: [¶] Civ. Code §§ 1946.2(b)(2)(A)(i) and 1946.2(b)(2)(A)(ii): Non-Payment of Rent to Owners; unlawful squatting under misguided theory of ownership or other ownership possessory claim." (Boldface omitted.) The notice indicated to Grace and Jordan that "the periodic tenancy by which you hold possession of the premises" would be terminated in 60 days from the date of service of the notice "for No Fault Just Cause." (Boldface omitted.) The notice further specified, "RELOCATION ASSISTANCE NOT PROVIDED. Pursuant to Civ. Code § 1946.2, subd. (d), the Owner is claiming unlawful possession and non-payment of rent; as such, no relocation assistance in the form of either [sic] a direct payment to you shall be provided." (Boldface omitted.)
In May 2023, respondents filed an unlawful detainer complaint using optional Judicial Council form UD-100, naming Grace, Jordan, "and All Persons in Possession" as defendants. Respondents alleged that Grace and Jordan entered into an oral agreement to rent Unit B beginning in 2008. While respondents indicated in the complaint that a written rental agreement was attached to the complaint, they also stated that relevant information was included in an addendum to the complaint. In that addendum, respondents alleged that Grace and Jordan initially "obtained possession" in 1998 based on the attached lease for Unit A between Grace and her ex-husband, although they vacated the premises in 1999. Respondents alleged that 10 years later they granted Grace and her adult children, including Jordan, "oral possession" so that they had somewhere to live after Grace's divorce. Grace and Jordan did not pay rent between 2008 and May 2023 when respondents filed the complaint. Respondents stated that they asked that rent be paid, but Gloria claimed ownership of the property and said that Grace and Jordan did not need to pay rent. Respondents indicated in the addendum that they had retained a real estate agent to list the property for sale once they terminated Grace and Jordan's occupancy of the property.
There was also a tenant living in Unit A of the duplex, who agreed to move.
In the form complaint, respondents checked the box indicating that the tenancy at issue was subject to the Tenant Protection Act of 2019. They also checked the box stating that "The tenancy was terminated for at-fault just cause (Civil Code, § 1946.2(b)(1))." Respondents confirmed that they served the 60-day notice to quit on Grace and Jordan, and attached a copy of the notice to the complaint. They checked a box on the form stating, "Plaintiff demands possession from each defendant because of expiration of a fixed-term lease." (Italics omitted.)
" 'California's first comprehensive antirent g[o]uging and eviction control law, the Tenant Protection Act of 2019 (Assem. Bill No. 1482 (2019-2020 Reg. Sess.)),' added sections 1946.2, 1947.12, and 1947.13 to the Civil Code, effective January 1, 2020. [Citations.] . . . Only the applicability of section 1946.2 is at issue in the instant case as the latter two statutes do not address evictions, but limitations on rental rates. (See § 1947.12 [limitations on gross rental rate increase]; § 1947.13 [limitations on rental rates upon expiration of rental restrictions].)" (Borden v. Stiles (2023) 92 Cal.App.5th 337, 346 (Borden).)
Grace and Jordan answered the complaint in July 2023. They then filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings, which the trial court denied.
Appellants did not designate the answer as part of the record on appeal or include it in their motion to augment the record, which this court granted in 2024. The register of actions included in the record reflects the answer filed by Grace and Jordan after the court ruled on a motion to quash they filed. The pleadings related to the motion to quash are not included in the record, and appellants do not reference the motion in their briefs on appeal.
Respondents interpret this appeal as a challenge in part to the trial court's order denying appellants' motion for judgment on the pleadings. Appellants do not reference the motion or resulting order in their briefs. "When an appellant fails to raise a point . . . we treat the point as waived. [Citation.]" (Benach v. County of Los Angeles (2007) 149 Cal.App.4th 836, 852, fn. omitted.) We will review only the trial court's unlawful detainer judgment.
The court held a bench trial in October 2023. Grace and Sunny testified at the trial. After hearing their testimony and considering the documentary evidence introduced by respondents, the trial court ruled that respondents had met their burden of proof, and entered judgment in favor of respondents for possession of Unit B. In the written judgment, the court found that section 1946.2 was "inapplicable because there was no written or oral lease and that no rental payments were ever paid (for 13 years) by [Grace or Jordan]."
II. Discussion
Appellants argue respondents failed to give proper notice to justify the unlawful detainer judgment. They contend that the complaint is uncertain and subject to demurrer because respondents claimed in the complaint that they terminated the tenancy for at-fault just cause pursuant to section 1946.2, subdivision (b)(1), but alleged both at-fault and no-fault bases for termination in the 60-day notice. For these same reasons appellants contend the complaint fails to state a cause of action. To the extent respondents cited nofault just cause as the basis to terminate the tenancy, appellants claim that respondents' failure to provide relocation assistance as required by section 1946.2, subdivision (d) renders the 60-day notice void and further demonstrates inconsistencies between the 60-day notice and the unlawful detainer complaint, contributing to the uncertainty. Finally, appellants claim that respondents' reference in the complaint to a prior rental agreement between Grace and Sunny also renders the complaint uncertain.
The briefing on appeal was unclear, making it difficult to discern the contentions of both parties. This court recognizes that the familial relationships underlying the action undoubtedly complicated matters, and we have made our best efforts to distill and address the arguments.
References in this opinion to section 1946.2 are to the version in effect in 2023, when respondents filed the complaint and the trial court entered judgment in their favor. (Stats. 2021, ch. 125, § 3.) Subsequent amendments to section 1946.2 effective in 2024, including those set forth in the current version of the statute, are not at issue in this appeal. (See Stats. 2023, ch. 290, § 1; Stats. 2024, ch. 8, § 1.)
A. Standard of Review
We apply the de novo standard of review to determine when an unlawful detainer complaint states a cause of action as a matter of law and to issues of statutory construction. (Naylor v. Superior Court (2015) 236 Cal.App.4th Supp. 1, 6.) "In reviewing a judgment based upon a statement of decision following a bench trial, we review questions of law de novo, and we review the trial court's findings of fact for substantial evidence. 'Under this deferential standard of review, findings of fact are liberally construed to support the judgment and we consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the prevailing party, drawing all reasonable inferences in support of the findings.' [Citation.]" (Durante v. County of Santa Clara (2018) 29 Cal.App.5th 839, 842.)
In reviewing these proceedings de novo, we recognize that, due to the summary nature of the proceedings, we must strictly construe the relevant unlawful detainer statutes. (Dr. Leevil, LLC v. Westlake Health Care Center (2018) 6 Cal.5th 474, 480 (Dr. Leevil, LLC).) Respondents had the responsibility to" 'bring [themselves] clearly within the statute[s].' [Citation.]" (Ibid.)
B. Application of Section 1946.2 to Proceedings
The trial court determined that section 1946.2 did not apply to Grace and Jordan's occupancy of Unit B because there was no oral or written contract that required them to pay rent. Based on respondents' complaint, which alleges that there did exist a tenancy which is subject to the Tenant Protection Act of 2019, and that the tenancy was being terminated for at-fault just cause under section 1946.2, subdivision (b)(1), appellants argue on appeal that respondents were required to comply with the requirements of 1946.2 in order to obtain the unlawful detainer judgment giving them possession of the unit. Respondents contend section 1946.2 does not apply because there was no hiring, reward, or other consideration in exchange for occupancy of the property. Rather, Grace and Jordan possessed the property through "at-will allowance."
Section 1946.2, subdivision (a) provides, "after a tenant has continuously and lawfully occupied a residential real property for 12 months, the owner of the residential real property shall not terminate a tenancy without just cause, which shall be stated in the written notice to terminate tenancy."" 'Tenancy' means the lawful occupation of residential real property and includes a lease or sublease." (§ 1946.2, subd. (k)(3).) The Legislature adopted section 1946.2 as part of the chapter of the Civil Code that applies to "all persons who hire dwelling units located within this state including tenants, lessees, boarders, lodgers, and others, however denominated." (§ 1940, subd. (a).) "Hiring is a contract by which one gives to another the temporary possession and use of property, other than money, for reward, and the latter agrees to return the same to the former at a future time." (§ 1925.)
Based on our construction of the statutes, we conclude that sections 1925 and 1946.2 apply here. While this court is bound by the trial court's factual finding that there was no lease between the parties for payment of rent, the trial court did not determine that there was no "reward" that would establish a hiring under section 1925. Further the trial court's statement of decision indicates the court interpreted "tenancy" in section 1946.2 to require the payment of rent. This construction of the statute is too narrow and fails to fully consider the language of section 1925. "Had the Legislature intended the word 'reward' in section 1925 to be construed as limited to the payment of rent, it would have used the word 'rent' in that statute or otherwise said so." (Borden, supra, 92 Cal.App.5th at p. 349, fn. 4.) "While a tenancy at will is, by definition, an agreement whereby a tenant is granted permission to occupy real property without provision for the payment of rent, it would appear that definition does not preclude a landowner from giving possession and use of real property for a reward other than rent within the meaning of section 1925. [Citation.]" (Id. at p. 350.)
Reviewing the application of sections 1925 and 1946.2 de novo here, the evidence presented at trial supports a reasonable inference that Grace and Jordan lived in Unit B without rent in part because Grace's father, John, was the property manager of the duplex, receiving minimal financial compensation for his work. Based on John's statements, Grace believed he owned the duplex. Either respondents gave Grace and her children permission to live in Unit B directly as a reward for John's work, or they gave John permission to allow his family to live in the unit, akin to a sublease. Grace testified it was her understanding that John paid for several improvements to the property with his own money. This evidence demonstrates John's property management services were provided in part as a reward to respondents for allowing Grace and Jordan to live in Unit B, bringing their occupancy of the unit within the definition of "hiring" under section 1925, and "tenancy" under section 1946.2.
Neither the language of the relevant statutes, nor caselaw interpreting the statutes, requires that the person providing the reward to the property owners must be an occupant of the property in order to establish a tenancy. The plain language of section 1925 requires that the owner of the property give possession to the tenants in exchange for a reward. It does not define "reward" or place limits on the source of the reward. The Oxford English Dictionary defines "reward" as "A recompense or return given to (or received by) a person for some service, merit, or favour, or for hardship endured." (Oxford English Dict. (Sept. 2024) <https://doi.org/10.1093/OED/6528070110> [as of Nov. 14, 2024], archived at <https://perma.cc/E78Q-B4TP>.) Here, John provided services to respondents so that his child and grandchild could have a place to live. Respondents gave Grace and Jordan use and possession of Unit B in exchange for the reward of John's services, no different than if John agreed to pay monetary rent for Grace and Jordan. This was sufficient reward to meet the definition of hiring and tenancy under sections 1925 and 1946.2.
Based on respondents' complaint and the evidence presented at trial, we conclude that section 1946.2 was applicable in the underlying proceedings.
C. Respondents' Compliance with Section 1946.2
Appellants seek reversal of the judgment on the basis that respondents failed to comply with section 1946.2. While we have concluded that section 1946.2 applied to this tenancy, based on our de novo review of the record, we find no error and affirm.
1. Inconsistencies between the 60-day notice and the complaint did not render the judgment erroneous or void.
In order to terminate a tenancy under section 1946.2, the owner must have "just cause, which shall be stated in the written notice to terminate tenancy." (§ 1946.2, subd. (a).) The statute sets forth two categories of just cause: at-fault and no-fault. (§ 1946.2, subd. (b).) "Default in the payment of rent" is included in the definition of at-fault just cause. (§ 1946.2, subd. (b)(1)(A).) No-fault just cause includes "Intent to occupy the residential real property by the owner . . . [,]" and "Withdrawal of the residential real property from the rental market." (§ 1946.2, subds. (b)(2)(A)(i), (B).)
Because respondents checked the box on the form unlawful detainer complaint claiming they were terminating the tenancy for at-fault just cause, but set forth a no-fault just cause basis for termination of the tenancy in the 60-day notice, appellants first argue the complaint is uncertain. In support of this contention, appellants cite Code of Civil Procedure section 430.10, subdivision (f), which authorizes a demurrer to a pleading that is uncertain, and Fenton v. Groveland Community Services Dist. (1982) 135 Cal.App.3d 797 (Fenton), wherein the appellate court determined the trial court erred in sustaining a demurrer on the ground of uncertainty in a voting rights action.
Unlike in Fenton, here we are not considering whether a trial court erred in sustaining a demurrer. We are strictly construing section 1946.2 to determine whether respondents clearly brought themselves within the statute. (Dr. Leevil, LLC, supra, 6 Cal.5th at p. 480.) However, appellants' arguments regarding uncertainty of the complaint do bear on our assessment of respondents' compliance with the statutory requirements to obtain an unlawful detainer judgment. To that end, the opinion in Fenton is instructive. In finding error in the trial court's decision to sustain the demurrer, the Fenton court held, "A plaintiff '. . . need not particularize matters "presumptively within the knowledge of the demurring" defendant. [Citation.]' [Citation.]" (Fenton, supra, 135 Cal.App.3d at p. 810, disapproved on other grounds by Katzberg v. Regents of University of California (2002) 29 Cal.4th 300.) A demurrer based on uncertainty addresses situations where there is doubt about what the pleader is alleging, and should not be sustained where the responding party "could not have maintained any reasonable doubts as to what [the pleaders] were alleging." (Fenton, at p. 810.) Furthermore, uncertainty does not support a demurrer where it arises out of the legal effect of the facts alleged in the complaint. "The pleader need not allege the legal effect of the facts he states in his complaint. [Citation.]" (Ibid.)
Uncertainty in the allegations set forth in a complaint is an issue appropriately addressed through a special demurrer, which must be filed within the time to answer the unlawful detainer complaint. (See Code Civ. Proc., §§ 430.80, 1170, 1167.3.) Failure to raise the issue by special demurrer constitutes waiver of the issue. (See Drennan v. Star Paving Co. (1958) 51 Cal.2d 409, 417.) Because appellants did not assert that the complaint was uncertain by special demurrer in the trial court, their appellate challenge to the complaint as uncertain is waived.
In the 60-day notice of termination of tenancy, respondents indicated that they intended to occupy the property, but also referenced Grace and Jordan's non-payment of rent, and appellants' "misguided theory of ownership or other ownership possessory claim." Strictly construing the statute, this is sufficient to support a finding that respondents stated just cause to terminate the tenancy in the written notice, as required by section 1946.2, subdivision (a). Respondents provided additional factual information in support of their unlawful detainer cause of action in the complaint. In addition to contending that Grace and Jordan lived in the unit rent-free and identifying Gloria's claim of ownership in the property, respondents alleged their intention to list the property for sale once Grace and Jordan's occupancy ended. These are facts presumptively within the knowledge of appellants, and appellants have not demonstrated that they could maintain any reasonable doubt as to what respondents were alleging.
As described in Fenton, the uncertainty claimed by appellants pertains not to the facts alleged in the complaint, but to their legal effect. The 60-day notice and the complaint set forth facts that, if proved, demonstrated just cause to terminate the tenancy under section 1946.2. If respondents proved at trial that appellants defaulted in paying rent, as alleged in the 60-day notice and complaint, such proof would have demonstrated at-fault just cause under section 1946.2, subdivision (b)(1)(A) to terminate the tenancy. If respondents showed at trial that they intended to occupy the property or remove it from the rental market, such proof would have constituted no-fault just cause under section 1946.2, subdivisions (b)(2)(A)(i) and (B) to terminate the tenancy. The 60-day notice and complaint "clearly [brought] itself within the purview of the unlawful detainer statutes. [Citations.]" (Smith v. Municipal Court (1988) 202 Cal.App.3d 685, 689.) Appellants' challenge to the complaint as uncertain fails. We thus turn to appellants' argument that the judgment must be reversed because appellants did not comply with the requirements of section 1946.2.
2. The 60-day notice was sufficient to support a judgment based on no-fault just cause.
Ultimately, respondents did not prove at-fault just cause to terminate Grace and Jordan's tenancy under section 1946.2, subdivision (b)(1)(A). Both Sunny and Grace testified at trial that there was never an agreement between the parties that Grace and/or Jordan would pay rent to respondents. Therefore, there was no basis to find that Grace and Jordan defaulted on payment of rent. (§ 1946.2, subd. (b)(1)(A).)
On appeal appellants do not deny that there was substantial evidence presented at trial of respondents' desire to sell the property and thus remove it from the rental market, a no-fault basis to terminate Grace and Jordan's tenancy under section 1946.2, subdivision (b)(2). Sunny testified that respondents decided to sell the property when John passed away and was no longer managing the property. They discussed that desire with Grace and Jordan at that time, which Grace confirmed in her testimony. Appellants instead argue that respondents did not comply with the requirements of section 1946.2, subdivision (d) in issuing the 60-day notice terminating the tenancy for no-fault just cause, because they did not provide relocation assistance, or notify appellants of their right to relocation assistance.
At oral argument, appellants' counsel argued that respondents should have provided 30 days' notice rather than the 60 days actually given to appellants. A no-fault termination of the tenancy under section 1946.2, subdivision (b)(2) requires 60-days' notice to the tenants. (See § 1946.1, subd. (b).) As we conclude that the evidence supports this legal basis to terminate the tenancy, the 60-day notice was sufficient, and appellants' argument is without merit.
When an owner issues notice to terminate a tenancy for no-fault just cause, the owner must either provide the tenant a relocation assistance payment equal to one month of the tenant's rent, or waive the final month's rent prior to the rent becoming due. (§ 1946.2, subds. (d)(1), (3).) The owner must also notify the tenants of their right to relocation assistance or rent waiver in the notice terminating the tenancy. (Id., subd. (d)(3)(A).) "An owner's failure to strictly comply with [section 1946.2, subdivision (d)] shall render the notice of termination void." (Id., subd. (d)(4).) Because respondents attached a copy of the 1998 lease between Grace and Sunny to the complaint, appellants suggest that respondents should have offered them $1,950 in relocation assistance, and that respondents' failure to do so rendered the notice void.
We are not persuaded. Respondents did not attach the 1998 lease between Grace and Sunny to the complaint as evidence of a current, written agreement reflecting a rental payment requirement owed by Grace and Jordan to respondents. Rather, they attached it as evidence of the history between the parties. They specified in the complaint that it was a "one year lease, and [Grace and her family] vacated in 1999." In the 60-day notice respondents served on Grace and Jordan, they indicated that relocation assistance would not be provided because they were claiming "unlawful possession and non-payment of rent."
Given that the 60-day notice alleged both at-fault and no-fault just cause under section 1946.2, and the fact that Grace and Jordan were not obligated to pay rent to respondents, we construe the notice to signify that appellants were not offering relocation assistance or a rent waiver because Grace and Jordan were not paying, and did not owe, rent. Under section 1946.2, subdivision (d)(3)(A), the amount of relocation assistance an owner is required to provide is based on the amount of rent the tenants owe. Here, there was no rent in effect when respondents issued the notice to terminate the tenancy. Thus, there was no statutory amount of relocation assistance they were required to offer, and they said as much in the 60-day notice. In short, we conclude that because respondents did not contend that appellants owed rent under the 1998 lease, they were not required to offer relocation assistance based on the rent set forth in that lease.
Respondents gave proper notice to appellants of the termination of their tenancy for no-fault just cause under a strict construction of section 1946.2, subdivision (b)(2). The evidence at trial demonstrated that respondents intended to remove the subject property from the rental market. The trial court did not err by entering the possession only judgment in respondents' favor.
III. Disposition
The possession only unlawful detainer judgment is affirmed.
WE CONCUR: Grover, J., Danner, J.