Opinion
H043810
07-28-2017
ESEQUIEL PAUL GARCIA, Petitioner, v. THE SUPERIOR COURT OF SANTA CLARA COUNTY, Respondent, NEIL MCDOWELL, as Warden, etc., Real Party in Interest.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (Santa Clara County Super. Ct. No. CC800985)
I. INTRODUCTION
After a jury trial, defendant Esequiel Paul Garcia was convicted of first degree murder and sentenced to life in prison without the possibility of parole. In his petition for writ of mandate, prohibition, or other appropriate relief (writ of mandate/prohibition), Garcia seeks a writ vacating the order of the Santa Clara County Superior Court denying his motion for postconviction discovery under Penal Code section 1054.9 and compelling the court to issue a new order requiring the California Department of Corrections (CDCR) to allow him the means to access and print from the hundreds of CDs and DVDs that his trial counsel received as discovery from the prosecution and which are now in the possession of his parents, in order to prepare a petition for writ of habeas corpus in propria persona. We summarily denied Garcia's petition for writ of mandate/prohibition on August 15, 2016.
All statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise indicated.
On October 26, 2016, the California Supreme Court transferred this matter to this court with directions to vacate our August 15, 2016 order denying Garcia's petition for writ of mandate/prohibition and to issue an order directing respondent court to show cause why: (1) respondent Santa Clara County Superior Court does not have jurisdiction to grant the relief Garcia seeks; and (2) Garcia is not entitled to the relief requested.
For the reasons stated below, we determine that respondent court properly exercised its jurisdiction to consider Garcia's section 1054.9 motion for postconviction discovery. We further determine that Garcia is not entitled to the relief requested from the court's denial of his motion. As we will explain, section 1054.9 does not authorize the trial court to order the CDCR to comply with Garcia's requests to access and print from electronic discovery because (1) Garcia's trial counsel has turned over the requested discovery; and (2) the requests pertain to the conditions of his confinement. We therefore conclude that the trial court did not err in denying Garcia's motion for postconviction discovery without prejudice to further proceedings in the superior court of the county of his confinement, and we will deny the petition for writ of mandate/prohibition.
II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On our own motion, we take judicial notice of this court's prior opinion in a related appeal, People v. Garcia (Mar. 2, 2015, H036346) [nonpub. opn.], and this court's order denying Garcia's related petition for writ of habeas corpus, In re Esequiel Paul Garcia on Habeas Corpus (Mar. 2, 2015, H040387). (Evid. Code, § 452, subd. (d)(1).) Our summary of the pertinent factual and procedural background includes some information that we have taken from the prior opinion.
A. Factual Background
In 2004, Mark Achilli owned a bar called Mountain Charley's where Tessa Donnelly was employed as a bartender. Donnelly and Achilli dated for four years before they broke up and Donnelly began dating Garcia. At about the same time, Achilli sold Mountain Charley's and another business, 180 Restaurant, to Garcia. Donnelly was employed by Garcia at 180 Restaurant.
In 2007 and 2008, Donnelly and Garcia had an off and on romantic relationship. Donnelly and Achilli began dating again in early 2008. Garcia was observed driving by Donnelly's apartment. His roommate recalled that Garcia had asked him to check on Donnelly's whereabouts and Garcia had threatened Achilli. Garcia had also contacted a private investigator with a request that his girlfriend be followed because Garcia believed she was seeing Achilli.
In January 2008, Garcia asked the doorman at Mountain Charley's, Daniel Chaidez (Daniel), if he "knew anyone who could get rid of a problem." Daniel telephoned his cousin, Miguel Chaidez (Miguel), who asked him what sort of problem it was. Daniel responded that the problem was a person. A few days later, Miguel called Daniel and told him "it was possible." After some negotiating, a price of $9,500 was agreed upon. Daniel told Miguel how to obtain a photograph of Achilli online.
Since there are other persons with the surname Chaidez, we will refer to them by their first names for purposes of clarity and not out of disrespect.
On March 11, 2008, Garcia gave Daniel $4,000 for the murder of Achilli. On March 12, 2008, Daniel wired $2,500 to Miguel. On March 13, 2008, Garcia gave Daniel $5,500 in cash in a paper bag. Daniel then called Miguel and told him that he had all the money. Also on March 13, 2008, Miguel gave "someone" $1,500 in cash, Achilli's photograph, and Achilli's address.
Achilli was found shot to death in a townhouse carport at his home address around noon on March 14, 2008. A few minutes before noon, Miguel had called Daniel and told him "the mission was accomplished." They met later and Daniel gave Miguel the remaining $6,500.
During the police investigation of the area surrounding the murder scene, officers recovered the murder weapon, a Lorcin .380 semi-automatic pistol, as well as a baseball cap, gloves with gunshot residue, and a jacket. They also recovered a torn photograph of Achilli and a page of printed driving directions to Achilli's home address. The fingerprints on the driving directions belonged to Lucio Estrada and Miguel's brother, Cesar Chaidez. The major DNA profile on the baseball cap, gloves, and jacket belonged to Estrada. A book entitled "Hit Man A Technical Manual for Independent Contractors" was found during a subsequent police search of Estrada's apartment.
Garcia testified that he had nothing to do with the murder of Achilli and he had made large cash withdrawals from his personal bank account and his restaurants' accounts in February and March of 2008 for business reasons.
B. Procedural Background
1. Prior Appeal
On February 4, 2009, an amended information was filed that charged Garcia, Miguel, and Estrada with the March 14, 2008 murder of Achilli. As to Garcia, it was alleged that if he was not the actual killer, he had aided, abetted, counseled, commanded, induced, solicited, requested or assisted the principal actor in the commission of the murder within the meaning of section 190.2, subdivision (c). The case proceeded to a jury trial and on October 26, 2010, the jury found all three defendants guilty of first degree murder and found true the special circumstance allegations against Estrada. On May 10, 2012, Garcia was sentenced to life in prison without the possibility of parole.
Garcia appealed and this court affirmed the judgment (People v. Garcia, supra, H036346) and denied his related petition for a writ of habeas corpus (In re Esequiel Paul Garcia on Habeas Corpus, supra, H040387).
2. Defendant's Motion For Postconviction Discovery
The record in this original proceeding indicates that on March 11, 2016, Garcia sent a letter to a judge of respondent Santa Clara County Superior Court "requesting a court order directing the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR) to allow him access to a laptop, printer, and hard drive for purposes of reviewing his court records and transcripts." The record also reflects that Garcia sent two more letters to a judge of the Santa Clara County Superior Court: (1) a March 22, 2016 letter "requesting an order directing trial counsel to provide him with the discovery, laptop, CD's and hard drive that he had obtained from a prior trial counsel;" and (2) an April 4, 2016 letter "seeking a 'status update' regarding those two requests and indicating that he intends to file a federal petition for writ of habeas corpus."
In the March 22, 2016 letter to the court, Garcia stated that his trial counsel, Edward M. Sousa , had provided Garcia's father with the "re-discovered file" of 15 legal boxes, 241 CDs/DVDs, a Sony Vaio laptop, and an external hard drive. Garcia also claimed that Sousa had retained the original discovery materials, which were previously provided to Garcia's prior retained trial counsel, Harry A. Robertson.
The April 25 , 2016 Order
In its April 25, 2016 order, the Santa Clara County Superior Court treated Garcia's letters as postjudgment motions. The trial court denied Garcia's requests for orders directed to the CDCR and trial counsel on the ground that "[t]here is no decisional or statutory authority for a trial court to entertain a post-judgment motion such as those submitted here, which are unrelated to any proceeding now pending before the court."
The July 29 , 2016 Order
The record reflects that Garcia filed a motion for reconsideration that was received by the Santa Clara County Superior Court on May 25, 2016. The motion for reconsideration was not included in the record in this original proceeding.
The Santa Clara County Superior Court's July 29, 2016 order granted the motion for reconsideration, noting that "[i]n that motion [Garcia] has made clear that his requests are made pursuant to Penal Code section 1054.9, and on that basis this Court will address those requests on their merits." In the order, the court noted that Garcia had requested the court to order the "CDCR, at Ironwood State Prison, to provide him the means to review voluminous digital discovery currently in his possession." The court denied the request as follows: "Because that request pertains to a 'condition of confinement,' Santa Clara County Superior Court is not the proper forum for seeking that relief. California Rule of Court 4.552(b)(2)(B) recognizes that issues relating to 'conditions of an inmate's confinement' should be considered in the Superior Court in the county in which the inmate is confined."
On our own motion, we take judicial notice of the facts that Ironwood State Prison is located in Blythe, California, and the Blythe Courthouse is a courthouse of the Riverside County Superior Court. (People v. Jackson (2016) 1 Cal.5th 269, 294 (Jackson) ["courts may take judicial notice of matters of common knowledge, including official maps"]; Evid. Code, § 452, subd. (h).)
The court further explained its reasoning for denying Garcia's request in the July 29, 2016 order: "The reasons for this are threefold. First, the relief [Garcia] seeks is in the nature of mandate, requiring that the court have territorial jurisdiction over the entity or institution to whom mandate might issue. Secondly, the Superior Court in the county having such jurisdiction is necessarily more familiar with the procedures and policies of the institutions within that jurisdiction, and is better able to resolve the matter. Third, should a hearing be required, transportation and other logistic concerns are more easily handled on a local basis." The July 29, 2016 order concluded that "[f]or the foregoing reasons, the request for an order directing CDCR to make certain accommodations is denied without prejudice to being brought in the Superior Court in the county in which [Garcia] is confined."
The July 29, 2016 order also addressed Garcia's request that his trial counsel be ordered to "turn over portions of a prior attorney's file in his possession." The court ruled that "Penal Code section 1054.9 does not provide any authority for that request, and for those reasons, the request for an order for production of those files is denied."
C. Writ Proceedings
On July 28, 2016, the day before the Santa Clara County Superior Court issued the July 29, 2016 order, Garcia filed a petition for writ of mandate/prohibition in this court naming the Santa Clara County Superior Court as respondent and "Neil McDowell, Warden," as the real party in interest. Garcia sought a writ vacating the April 25, 2016 order of the Santa Clara County Superior Court. Garcia also sought a writ compelling the court to issue a new order compelling the CDCR "to allow access to a non-internet accessible device pursuant to Penal Code, § 1054.9 to view all digital discovery [377 CD's/DVD's], to allow access to a printer in order to be able to print supportive exhibits to prepare a writ of habeas corpus petition and to order Mr. Edward M. Sousa . . . to provide prior retained counsel's . . . file [i.e. 15 legal boxes, 241 CD's/DVD's, 1 Sony Vaio laptop & 1 external hard-drive] . . . in order to prepare a writ of habeas corpus and the supportive exhibits that are attached to this writ of mandate." In support of his request for writ relief, Garcia argued that (1) he was entitled to postconviction discovery in order to prepare a petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to section 1054.9; and (2) a motion for postconviction discovery under section 1054.9 should be heard by the trial court where the conviction occurred.
On our own motion, we take judicial notice of the fact that Neil McDowell is the warden of Ironwood State Prison. (Jackson, supra, 1 Cal.5th at p. 294; Evid. Code, §452, subd. (h).)
In his "traverse," Garcia states only that he "believes that the second issue raised in his petition [whether trial counsel should be ordered to transfer his file to petitioner] is adequately briefed and submits the issue." We will treat the issue as waived. " '[E]very brief should contain a legal argument with citation of authorities on the points made. If none is furnished on a particular point, the court may treat it as waived, and pass it without consideration. [Citations.]' [Citations.]" (People v. Stanley (1995) 10 Cal.4th 764, 793.)
In a letter to this court filed on July 28, 2016, in support of his writ petition, Garcia acknowledged that trial counsel Sousa had picked up discovery from the Santa Clara County District Attorney consisting of 281 CDs and 96 DVDs. Garcia also indicated that his parents now had possession of this discovery, stating that "[d]ue to the discovery being in a digital format, [he] has to rely on his parents to review the discovery as their availability permits, however, they have no legal training and do not have the time to dedicate one hundred percent of their time to [his] case nor the technical knowledge to be able to quickly navigate and locate materials on these CDs/DVDs."
The exhibits attached to Garcia's writ petition include, among other things, a letter dated March 23, 2011, from Jeffrey Rosen, Santa Clara County District Attorney, to Sousa which stated: "Enclosed please find the DVD listed below in the above-mentioned case. [¶] DVD DISCOVERY 2011 (all documents generated) [¶] You will be notified when a copy of all the media will be available for pick-up on the first floor of our office."
The exhibits attached to the writ petition also include a letter dated July 13, 2015, from trial counsel Sousa to Garcia, which states in part: "Please understand that I no longer represent you. [¶] As you know and per your request, I gave your entire case file to your civil attorney Mr. Barber and, therefore, have no case file to look through to find what you want. [¶] The case file, which I turned over to Mr. Barber, contained all discovery that was provided by the Santa Clara County DA's office. Because Robertson's file was such a mess, I had the DA's office 're-discovered' [sic] the entire case file to me upon my appointment."
Additional exhibits to the writ petition include Garcia's inmate requests at Ironwood State Prison and prison staff's responses. Garcia's inmate request dated February 17, 2014, stated that he was in the process of preparing a habeas petition and he needed to review the discovery in his case, a majority of which was on CDs and DVDs. He asked: "How can my former counsel send these to me?"; "How can I view the DVDs?"; and "Is there a limit on the number that can be sent to me?" Prison staff responded on March 25, 2014, as follows: "ISP [Ironwood State Prison] does not currently have a process or medium for the viewing of [CDs]. Your attorney will need to provide materials in a paper format for your review in respect to any case materials. Your attorney can send all documents to you in the legal mail. However, you need to take into consideration how much space you have and are authorized in your cell. Please refer to Title 15 in respect to personal property."
California Code of Regulations, Title 15, section 3161 provides: "Inmate-owned legal materials/documents, law books and papers shall be limited to the availability of space authorized by section 3190(b) for personal property in the inmate's quarters/living area except as specified in this section. Inmates may possess up to one cubic foot of legal materials/documents related to their active cases, in excess of the six cubic feet of allowable property in their assigned quarters/living area. Legal materials/documents, law books and papers in excess of this limitation shall be disposed of pursuant to section 3191(c). Inmates may request the institution/facility store excess legal materials/documents related to their active cases(s) when such materials/documents exceed this one cubic foot additional allowance. Inmate-owned law books in excess of the additional allowance shall not be stored by the institution/facility."
In a second inmate request dated March 27, 2014, Garcia stated: "Please advise on how to deal with discovery that is only in a digital format and needs to be reviewed in order to prepare the habeas." Prison staff responded on March 28, 2014: "I will follow up with the custody captain to determine if other options are available on your facility yard and provide a response upon speaking with him. At this time, there is no capability in the library to view or listen to these materials. I will provide additional information after determination is made."
In a third inmate request dated April 1, 2014, Garcia stated: "All of the discovery will be provided by the court under [section] 1054.9. The court will direct the DA's office to provide me with full file. Please advise on the possible options." Prison staff responded on April 3, 2014: "In order for you to view discovery via CD's/DVD's you will have to have authorization from the court ordering ISP [Ironwood State Prison] to allow you to view the material. The counselor will have to retain the DVD's in their possession at all times and viewing would occur on their schedule/availability."
In a fourth inmate request dated July 1, 2015, Garcia stated: "I am currently preparing my writ of habeas corpus on the denial of my direct appeal and in order to complete the writ I need access to all of the discovery. The discovery is on a flash drive and contains 18,000 pages in a PDF format and there [are] 377 CD's/DVD's that contain interviews and computer forensic results. In order to prepare this writ, I need access to this info. What is the process to have an external hard drive sent in, so I [can] review this material in order to prepare the writ." Prison staff responded on July 3, 2015: "You are not allowed to have outside external equipment sent in to view CDs. Where are these disc[s] located and how do we access them?"
In a fifth inmate requested dated August 17, 2015, Garcia stated: "The discovery file was turned over by my prior counsel to my parents. In order to access the 377 CD's/DVD's they would need to be sent . . . via external hard-drive. The CD's/DVD's can not be printed out as they are digital discovery. This material is essential for me to prepare my habeas petition. How do [you] propose I proceed? Please advise." (Italics added.) Prison staff responded on August 18, 2015: "I can not advise you of any litigation matters. I can suggest that you contact outside legal to help you with your issues and to assist with your petition."
This court summarily denied Garcia's petition for writ of mandate/prohibition on August 15, 2016. Garcia petitioned for review by the California Supreme Court and on October 26, 2016, the California Supreme Court issued an order granting the petition for review. The October 26, 2016 order states: "The matter is transferred to the Court of Appeal, Sixth Appellate District, with directions to vacate its August 15, 2016 order denying the petition for writ of mandate/prohibition and to issue an order directing respondent court to show cause why: (1) the Santa Clara County Superior Court does not have jurisdiction to grant the relief petitioner seeks; and (2) petitioner is not entitled to the relief requested."
On November 7, 2016, this court issued an order vacating the August 15, 2016 order denying the petition for writ of mandate/prohibition and ordering respondent Santa Clara County Superior Court to show cause why it does not have jurisdiction to grant the relief petitioner seeks and why petitioner is not entitled to have the relief requested. The November 7, 2016 order also allowed the filing of a return and a reply by Garcia. On December 6, 2016, this court granted Garcia's request for appointment of counsel in this matter. Having reviewed the return and exhibits filed by the Attorney General and the "traverse" filed by Garcia's appointed counsel in reply, and having given the parties an opportunity for oral argument, we turn to our discussion of the merits as directed by the California Supreme Court.
III. DISCUSSION
A. Jurisdiction
Regarding the proper jurisdiction for a postconviction discovery motion under section 1054.9, the California Supreme Court has instructed that "when no execution is imminent, a person seeking specific discovery under section 1054.9 should first file the motion in the trial court that rendered the judgment." (In re Steele (2004) 32 Cal.4th 682, 692, fn. omitted (Steele).) Here, the Santa Clara County Superior Court granted reconsideration of the court's April 25, 2016 order, in which the court had ruled that it lacked jurisdiction to consider Garcia's postconviction discovery motion. The Santa Clara County Superior Court then accepted jurisdiction over Garcia's postconviction discovery motion because Garcia had asserted in later filings that his motion was made under section 1054.9, and addressed the motion on the merits in the court's July 29, 2016 order.
As stated in the July 29, 2016 order, the court determined that Garcia sought an order compelling the CDCR, at Ironwood State Prison, to provide him with the means to review a large volume of digital discovery that was in his possession, and also compelling his trial counsel to turn over portions of a prior attorney's file. The court ruled that it was not authorized by section 1054.9 to grant the relief requested, and denied the motion without prejudice to being brought in the superior court in the county in which Garcia is confined.
Since the Santa Clara County Superior Court properly ruled that it had jurisdiction under section 1054.9 to consider Garcia's postconviction discovery motion (see Steele, supra, 32 Cal.4th at p. 692), we turn to the issue of whether the trial court erred in determining that section 1054.9 does not authorize the court to order the CDCR to provide Garcia with the means to access and print from his digital discovery materials at Ironwood State Prison.
B. Section 1054.9
Section 1054.9 provides in part: "(a) Upon the prosecution of a postconviction writ of habeas corpus or a motion to vacate a judgment in a case in which a sentence of death or of life in prison without the possibility of parole has been imposed, and on a showing that good faith efforts to obtain discovery materials from trial counsel were made and were unsuccessful, the court shall, except as provided in subdivision (c), order that the defendant be provided reasonable access to any of the materials described in subdivision (b). [¶] (b) For purposes of this section, 'discovery materials' means materials in the possession of the prosecution and law enforcement authorities to which the same defendant would have been entitled at time of trial." (Italics added.)
"Effective January 1, 2003, the Legislature added section 1054.9 to the Penal Code. (Stats. 2002, ch. 1105, § 1, enacting Sen. Bill No. 1391 (2001-2002 Reg. Sess.) (Senate Bill 1391).)" (Steele, supra, 32 Cal.4th at p. 690.)
The Attorney General argues that section 1054.9 does not apply to Garcia's postconviction discovery motion. As we will discuss, the pertinent decisions of the California Supreme Court support the Attorney General's position.
In Barnett v. Superior Court (2010) 50 Cal.4th 890 (Barnett) the California Supreme Court discussed the legislative intent in enacting section 1054.9: "The legislative history behind section 1054.9 shows that the Legislature's main purpose was to enable defendants efficiently to reconstruct defense attorneys' trial files that might have become lost or destroyed after trial. [Citation.] For example, the following discussion appears repeatedly in committee reports and other legislative history materials: [¶] 'According to the sponsor, "The problem that occurs all too often is this: a defendant's files are lost or destroyed after trial and habeas counsel is unable to obtain the original documents because the State has no legal obligation to provide them absent a court order. This leads to many delays and causes unnecessary public expenditures as prosecutors and habeas counsel litigate whether the defendant can demonstrate a need to re-access the materials and information originally available to him or her at trial. [¶] . . . The purpose of this bill is to provide a reasonable avenue for habeas counsel to obtain documents to which trial counsel was already legally entitled." ' (E.g., Assem. Com. on Public Safety, Analysis of Sen. Bill No. 1391 (2001-2002 Reg. Sess.) as amended Apr. 10, 2002, p. 3.)" (Barnett, supra, at pp. 897-898.)
Thus, under section 1054.9 "a defendant sentenced to death or life imprisonment without the possibility of parole (LWOP) who is prosecuting a postconviction habeas corpus petition may seek discovery of 'materials in the possession of the prosecution and law enforcement authorities to which the same defendant would have been entitled at [the] time of trial.' [Citations.]" (People v. Superior Court (Morales) (2017) 2 Cal.5th 523, 527 (Morales).)
The prerequisites to postconviction discovery under section 1054.9 were enumerated in Steele, supra, 32 Cal.4th at pages 696-697 and recently reaffirmed in Morales: "The defendant must first make good faith efforts to obtain the materials from trial counsel, but the statute encompasses not only materials trial counsel actually possessed (but that have been lost for whatever reason) but also those ' "in the possession of the prosecution and law enforcement authorities to which the same defendant would have been entitled at [the] time of trial," ' regardless of whether he or she specifically requested them. [Citation.] That is, 'we interpret section 1054.9 to require the trial court, on a proper showing of a good faith effort to obtain the materials from trial counsel, to order discovery of specific materials currently in the possession of the prosecution or law enforcement authorities involved in the investigation or prosecution of the case that the defendant can show either (1) the prosecution did provide at [the] time of trial but have since become lost to the defendant; (2) the prosecution should have provided at [the] time of trial because they came within the scope of a discovery order the trial court actually issued at that time, a statutory duty to provide discovery, or the constitutional duty to disclose exculpatory evidence; (3) the prosecution should have provided at [the] time of trial because the defense specifically requested them at that time and was entitled to receive them; or (4) the prosecution had no obligation to provide at [the] time of trial absent a specific defense request, but to which the defendant would have been entitled at [the] time of trial had the defendant specifically requested them.' [Citation.]" (Morales, supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 584.)
However, our Supreme Court has cautioned that "the Legislature was primarily concerned with preventing the problems that occur when the trial attorney's files no longer exist through no fault of the defendant. This concern, together with the Legislature's evident intent to make section 1054.9 an efficient method of discovery, causes us to conclude that section 1054.9 requires defendants who seek discovery beyond file reconstruction to show a reasonable basis to believe that other specific materials actually exist. Otherwise, a discovery request can always become . . . a free-floating request for anything the prosecution team may possess." (Barnett, supra, 50 Cal.4th at p. 899.)
In the present case, the record before us in this original proceeding indicates that Sousa, Garcia's trial counsel, turned his entire case file over to Garcia's civil attorney. The case file included all the discovery provided by the Santa Clara County District Attorney. Garcia has acknowledged that his parents now have possession of these discovery materials. Since Garcia has successfully obtained all discovery materials from his trial counsel, he cannot meet the section 1054.9, subdivision (a) prerequisite of an unsuccessful good faith attempt to obtain discovery materials from trial counsel. (See § 1054.9, subd. (a); Barnett, supra, 50 Cal.4th at pp. 897-898.) Moreover, in the present writ proceeding Garcia has not asserted that he seeks other specific materials that exist and are in the possession of the prosecution or law enforcement. (See § 1054.9, subd. (b).) Accordingly, section 1054.9 does not apply to Garcia's postconviction discovery motion, which seeks an order compelling the warden of the Ironwood State Prison to provide him with the means to access electronic discovery materials that he successfully obtained from trial counsel and are now in the possession of his parents.
In his reply, Garcia contends that section 1054.9 broadly authorizes the trial court to "guarantee that defendants get access to the discovery in their cases," and therefore Garcia is entitled to a court order compelling the warden to provide him with access to electronic discovery. Garcia notes that the Santa Clara County Department of Corrections provided him with an "IPOD" while he was in county jail so he could view and listen to discovery materials, including surveillance footage, at the time of his motion for a new trial. Garcia further contends that the warden should be ordered to either provide him with a device to access his electronic discovery or the means to print pages of his discovery. Alternatively, Garcia argues that the Santa Clara County District Attorney should be ordered "to print out the 18,139 page[s] of documents, transcribe the CDs and DVDs and provide them to [him]."
We are not convinced by Garcia's argument. Section 1054.9 expressly provides for "reasonable access" to discovery materials where the postconviction defendant can satisfy two prerequisites: (1) the defendant has made "a showing that good faith efforts to obtain discovery materials from trial counsel were made and were unsuccessful;" and (2) the discovery materials are those "in the possession of the prosecution and law enforcement authorities to which the same defendant would have been entitled at time of trial." (§ 1054.9, subds. (a) & (b); Morales, supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 584.) Thus, the "reasonable access" provision of section 1054.9 expressly provides for access to discovery materials in the possession of the prosecution and law enforcement authorities that the defendant was not able to obtain from his or her trial counsel after a good faith effort. The "reasonable access" provision therefore does not apply to Garcia's postconviction discovery requests, since on the record before us it appears that Garcia has obtained all discovery materials to which he is entitled from his trial counsel. For these reasons, we conclude that the trial court did not err in denying Garcia's section 1054.9 motion for postconviction discovery.
C. Administrative Remedy
We understand Garcia to request a writ compelling the prison authorities to provide the means for him to access a large volume of discovery materials that are in a digital format, to enable him to prepare in propria persona a petition for writ of habeas corpus challenging his conviction. However, we have determined that section 1054.9 does not authorize the trial court to make a postconviction order for reasonable access to discovery where, as here, that discovery has already been provided to the defendant by his or her trial counsel and no showing has been made that other specific materials exist and are in the possession of the prosecution or law enforcement. (See § 1054.9, subd. (b).) The next issue we consider is whether Garcia has an administrative remedy as a prison inmate.
The Santa Clara County Superior Court, in the July 29, 2016 order, denied Garcia's request for access to electronic discovery in prison "[b]ecause that request pertains to a 'condition of confinement,' Santa Clara County Superior Court is not the proper forum for seeking that relief. California Rule of Court 4.552(b)(2)(B) recognizes that issues relating to 'conditions of an inmate's confinement' should be considered in the Superior Court in the county in which the inmate is confined."
California Rules of Court, Rule 4.552(b)(2)(B) provides: "If the superior court in which the petition is filed determines that the matter may be more properly heard by the superior court of another county, it may nonetheless retain jurisdiction in the matter or, without first determining whether a prima facie case for relief exists, order the matter transferred to the other county. Transfer may be ordered in the following circumstances: [¶] . . . [¶] If the petition challenges the conditions of an inmate's confinement, it may be transferred to the county in which the petitioner is confined. A change in the institution of confinement that effects a change in the conditions of confinement may constitute good cause to deny the petition." --------
The Attorney General argues that Garcia's discovery requests concern the conditions of his confinement at Ironwood State Prison, and therefore Garcia's remedy is to obtain access to printed discovery materials as permitted by the prison's rules and regulations. Alternatively, the Attorney General argues that Garcia has not exhausted his administrative remedies because he did not submit any inmate appeal of the prison staff's informal denials of his requests for the means to access and print from the electronic discovery.
In his reply, Garcia reiterates his argument that section 1054.9 authorizes the Santa Clara County Superior Court to grant his discovery requests and to ensure that he has reasonable access to the digital discovery in his parents' possession. Garcia also argues that an administrative remedy would be inadequate because the Ironwood State Prison staff has previously told him that inmates are barred from possessing or viewing electronic media and he must obtain a court order before he will be allowed to access electronic discovery.
We have found no merit in Garcia's argument that section 1054.9 authorizes the Santa Clara County Superior Court to order the prison authorities to provide him with access to electronic discovery that he has successfully obtained from trial counsel. We also find no merit in Garcia's contention that the administrative remedy is inadequate, since, as we will explain, we agree with the Santa Clara County Superior Court that Garcia's discovery requests pertain to the conditions of his confinement.
The United States Supreme Court has established that prison inmates have a right of access to the courts "to present claimed violations of fundamental constitutional rights." (Bounds v. Smith (1977) 430 U.S. 817, 825 (Bounds), overruled on another point in Lewis v. Casey (1996) 518 U.S. 343, 354 (Lewis).) With respect to the availability of legal resources in prison, the decision in Bounds "guarantees no particular methodology but rather the conferral of a capability—the capability of bringing contemplated challenges to sentences or conditions of confinement before the courts." (Lewis, supra, 518 U.S. at p. 356.) The decision in Lewis concerned a class action by inmates of the State of Arizona Department of Corrections who claimed that the "shortcomings" in their access to legal resources in prison, including physical access to the prison law library, the training of library staff, the updating of legal materials, and the availability of photocopying, violated their constitutional right of access to the courts under Bounds, supra, 430 U.S. 817. (Lewis, supra, at p. 346.) The Lewis court ruled that "[t]he tools [Bounds, supra, 430 U.S. 817] requires to be provided are those that the inmates need in order to attack their sentences, directly or collaterally, and in order to challenge the conditions of their confinement." (Lewis, supra, at p. 355.)
Access to legal resources in prison is validly subject to prison regulations, however, because "a prison regulation impinging on inmates' constitutional rights 'is valid if it is reasonably related to legitimate penological interests.' [Citation.]" (Lewis, supra, 518 U.S. at p. 361.) The Lewis court further explained that "[s]uch a deferential standard is necessary . . . , [¶] 'if "prison administrators . . . , and not the courts, [are] to make the difficult judgments concerning institutional operations." Subjecting the day-to-day judgments of prison officials to an inflexible strict scrutiny analysis would seriously hamper their ability to anticipate security problems and to adopt innovative solutions to the intractable problems of prison administration.' [Citations.]" (Ibid.) Thus, the decision in Lewis shows that the issue of an inmate's access to legal resources in prison is an issue pertaining to the conditions of the inmate's confinement.
The CDCR's regulations provide an administrative appeals process with three levels of review for an inmate's appeal of grievances, including grievances regarding the conditions of confinement. (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 15, §§ 3084.1 et seq.) " 'The appeal process is intended to provide a remedy for inmates . . . with identified grievances and to provide an administrative mechanism for review of departmental policies, decisions, actions, conditions, or omissions . . . .' [Citation.]" (In re Andres (2016) 244 Cal.App.4th 1383, 1393.) Once the administrative remedy has been exhausted, an inmate may challenge the conditions of his or her confinement by a petition for a writ of habeas corpus (People v. Villa (2009) 45 Cal.4th 1063, 1069) or, depending upon the relief sought, a petition for writ of mandate (Villery v. Department of Corrections & Rehabilitation (2016) 246 Cal.App.4th 407, 416). "If the challenge is to conditions of the inmate's confinement, then the petition should be transferred to the superior court of the county wherein the inmate is confined if that court is a different court from the court wherein the petition was filed." (Griggs v. Superior Court (1976) 16 Cal.3d 341, 347 (Griggs); Cal. Rules of Court, rule 4.552(b)(2)(B); but see In re Roberts (2005) 36 Cal.4th 575, 583-584 [the court in Griggs did not attempt to state a general rule].)
In the present writ proceeding, we express no opinion as to whether Garcia has exhausted his administrative remedy with respect to his request for the means to access and print from electronic discovery in prison. We conclude only that Garcia is not entitled to the relief requested in this original proceeding under section 1054.9, and the trial court did not err in denying his motion for postconviction discovery without prejudice to further proceedings in the superior court in the county in which Garcia is confined, because (1) Garcia's trial counsel has turned over the requested discovery; and (2) the requests pertain to the conditions of his confinement.
Having reached this conclusion, we express no opinion as to the merits of any administrative remedy that Garcia may seek or the merits of any petition for a writ of habeas corpus or petition for writ of mandate that he may file in the future. In particular, we express no opinion as to the merits of Garcia's request that the CDCR be ordered "to allow him access to a laptop, printer, and hard drive for purposes of reviewing his court records and transcripts."
IV. DISPOSITION
The petition for a writ of mandate/prohibition is denied.
/s/_________
BAMATTRE-MANOUKIAN, J. WE CONCUR: /s/_________
PREMO, ACTING P.J. /s/_________
MIHARA, J.