Opinion
A-13948
08-14-2024
BRITTANY RAYANN GARCIA, Appellant, v. STATE OF ALASKA, Appellee.
Quinlan Steiner, Attorney at Law, under contract with the Public Defender Agency, and Terrence Haas, Public Defender, Anchorage, for the Appellant. Donald Soderstrom, Assistant Attorney General, Office of Criminal Appeals, Anchorage, and Treg R. Taylor, Attorney General, Juneau, for the Appellee.
UNPUBLISHED See Alaska Appellate Rule 214(d)
Appeal from the Superior Court, Third Judicial District, Anchorage,Trial Court No. 3AN-16-07518 CR Kevin M. Saxby, Judge.
Appearances:
Quinlan Steiner, Attorney at Law, under contract with the Public Defender Agency, and Terrence Haas, Public Defender, Anchorage, for the Appellant.
Donald Soderstrom, Assistant Attorney General, Office of Criminal Appeals, Anchorage, and Treg R. Taylor, Attorney General, Juneau, for the Appellee.
Before: Allard, Chief Judge, and Wollenberg and Terrell, Judges.
Pursuant to a plea agreement, Brittany Rayann Garcia pleaded guilty to second-degree theft for defrauding Alaska USA Federal Credit Union. The State alleged that Garcia falsely claimed that she was the victim of identity theft and that money had been stolen from her account.
AS 11.46.130(a)(1). As part of the agreement, the State dismissed two additional charges.
Garcia entered into a deferred sentencing agreement in which the State agreed to allow her to withdraw her guilty plea and to dismiss the second-degree theft charge if she paid $4,224.73 in restitution to Alaska USA Federal Credit Union within two years. If Garcia failed to pay the restitution, then her guilty plea would remain, and she would receive a sentence of 18 months with 18 months suspended (with a 2-year term of probation) for the second-degree theft conviction.
Garcia failed to meet the two-year deadline. The superior court found that Garcia materially breached the agreement by failing to pay the restitution within the two-year period and was therefore not entitled to withdraw her guilty plea and have the charge dismissed. Garcia now appeals that ruling.
Like a plea agreement, a deferred sentencing agreement "is essentially a contract between a defendant and the government." When one party alleges a violation of an agreement, a trial court must determine whether a breach occurred, and if so, whether the breach is material.
Ririe v. Anchorage, 474 P.3d 660, 664 (Alaska App. 2020).
See id. (citing Dutton v. State, 970 P.2d 925, 928 (Alaska App. 1999)).
On appeal, we will uphold a trial court's findings of historical fact - i.e., "findings regarding the terms of the agreement and whether those terms were violated" - unless those findings are clearly erroneous. Whether a breach is material, however, is a question of law that we review de novo. A breach is material when it "destroys the basic value of the agreement and excuses the non-offending party from further adherence to the terms of the agreement." We determine whether a breach is material "by examining the reasonable expectations of the parties and then assessing to what extent the breach defeated these expectations."
Dutton, 970 P.2d at 928 (citing Closson v. State, 812 P.2d 966, 970 (Alaska 1991)).
Ririe, 474 P.3d at 664.
Dutton, 970 P.2d at 928.
Id. at 929; see also Closson v. State, 784 P.2d 661, 665 (Alaska App. 1989) ("Decisions on materiality must be based on the totality of the circumstances." (citing Restatement (Second) of Contracts §§ 241-42 (1981))), rev'd on other grounds, 812 P.2d 966.
According to emails submitted to the superior court during litigation on Garcia's motion, the State initially proposed an eighteen-month repayment period as part of the deferred sentencing agreement; Garcia countered, proposing a four-year period. The State rejected this proposal and proposed the two-year period ultimately agreed to by the parties. The agreement itself also required that there be a status hearing at the conclusion of the two-year period on December 5, 2019 to ensure Garcia's compliance and that Garcia "provide proof of full payment to the State one week before the hearing."
At the December 5, 2019 hearing, Garcia requested a six-month extension to pay the outstanding balance of approximately $1,500. The superior court set an evidentiary hearing regarding Garcia's request, but she failed to appear at this hearing. The superior court set a sentencing hearing on April 3, 2020. Garcia again failed to appear at that hearing. The court issued a bench warrant for Garcia's arrest, and she remained in abscond status for sixteen months.
It appears from the record that, approximately nine months after the April 2020 sentencing hearing at which Garcia failed to appear, she personally attempted to quash the outstanding warrant, but the court issued a "deficiency" notice indicating that her request needed to be filed through counsel.
In late August 2020, nearly nine months after the original repayment deadline (and while she was still in warrant status), Garcia completed payment on the restitution judgment. Garcia later filed a motion to withdraw her guilty plea and have the theft charge dismissed, arguing that timeliness of payment was not a material term of the deferred sentencing agreement and that she had substantially complied with the agreement.
The superior court denied this motion and Garcia's subsequent motion for reconsideration, finding that Garcia's failure to pay the restitution in full by December 5, 2019 constituted a material breach of the plea agreement. The court further found that Garcia compounded this breach by missing an evidentiary hearing that was held "to give her the opportunity to explain and argue her position regarding the unpaid balance," and by further missing her original sentencing date.
On appeal, Garcia contests the court's denial of her motion, arguing that the State's primary interest in this case was encouraging Garcia to take responsibility for her conduct and ensuring that the bank was fully repaid for its loss. But the history of the parties' negotiations regarding the repayment period and other related terms of the agreement shows that restitution was a fundamental component of the agreement and that the two-year repayment deadline was an essential term.
See Ririe, 474 P.3d at 665-66 (relying on extrinsic evidence to determine whether breach of a deferred sentencing agreement was material).
Moreover, Garcia did not complete repayment until three months after the extended deadline she had requested, during which time she failed to attend two required court appearances, one of which was specifically for the purpose of addressing her efforts to pay restitution. Under these circumstances, we agree with the superior court that Garcia materially breached the agreement by failing to pay the restitution in full within the two-year period.
We note that, because Garcia never appeared for the evidentiary hearing regarding her request for an extension, she did not present any evidence at that time of the efforts she had made to pay restitution within the allotted time and why she had failed to meet the deadline, supporting the court's finding that she had not shown a good-faith basis for an extension. Moreover, when Garcia's attorney requested the six-month extension, the attorney agreed that if the extension was granted, and Garcia did not meet that deadline, the judgment should be imposed.
Accordingly, the judgment of the superior court is AFFIRMED.