Opinion
Case No. 5:16-cv-02975-EJD
03-31-2017
TOM GARCIA, Plaintiff, v. COMCAST CABLE COMMUNICATIONS MANAGEMENT LLC, Defendant.
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO COMPEL ARBITRATION
Re: Dkt. No. 29
Defendant Comcast Cable Communications Management LLC moves to compel Plaintiff Tom Garcia to arbitrate his wage-and-hour claims. Comcast's motion will be GRANTED.
I. BACKGROUND
Garcia was a Comcast employee from 2010 to 2014. Def.'s Mot. to Compel Arbitration ("Mot."), Dkt. No. 29 at 1. Garcia's claims arise from Comcast's "failure to pay all commissions owed to Plaintiff and putative class members." Pl.'s Opp'n to Def.'s Mot. to Compel Arbitration ("Opp'n"), Dkt. No. 32 at 2.
In 2013, Comcast implemented an alternative dispute resolution program called Comcast Solutions. Mot. at 1-2. It covers Comcast's California employees, including Garcia. Id. It specifies a three-step procedure for resolving disputes between Comcast and its employees. Id. at 2. First, when a dispute arises, Comcast determines whether Comcast Solutions covers the employee's claim, and if it does, Comcast and the employee will try to resolve the dispute informally. Id. Second, the employee can request mediation at Comcast's expense. Id. Third, if mediation fails, the employee can request binding arbitration through JAMS or the AAA, and Comcast will reimburse the employee for up to $1,500 for attorneys' fees and costs. Id. The agreement also contains a class action waiver. Collins Decl. Ex. A, Dkt. No. 30-1 at 10.
Comcast now seeks to compel Garcia to arbitrate his claims through the Comcast Solutions program.
II. LEGAL STANDARD
The Federal Arbitration Act ("FAA") governs the agreement between Garcia and Comcast. Collins Decl. Ex. B, Dkt. No. 30-2 at 8.
Under the FAA, written arbitration agreements "shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the avoidance of any contract." 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2012). The FAA "leaves no place for the exercise of discretion by a district court, but instead mandates that district courts shall direct the parties to proceed to arbitration on issues as to which an arbitration agreement has been signed." Chiron Corp. v. Ortho Diagnostic Sys., Inc., 207 F.3d 1126, 1130 (9th Cir. 2000) (citing Dean Witter Reynolds Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 218 (1985)). A district court's role is limited to determining (1) whether the parties agreed to arbitrate and, if so, (2) whether the claims at issue are within the scope of that agreement. Id. If the party seeking arbitration meets these two requirements, the court must compel arbitration. 9 U.S.C. § 4; Chiron, 207 F.3d at 1130.
If a contract contains an arbitration clause, the clause is presumed to be valid. AT&T Techs., Inc. v. Commc'ns Workers of Am., 475 U.S. 643, 650 (1986). "[A]ny doubts concerning the scope of arbitrable issues should be resolved in favor of arbitration." Three Valleys Mun. Water Dist. v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 925 F.2d 1136, 1139 (9th Cir. 1991). The party opposing arbitration has the burden of showing that an arbitration clause is invalid or otherwise unenforceable. Engalla v. Permanente Med. Grp., Inc., 15 Cal. 4th 951, 972 (1997).
Nonetheless, "arbitration is a matter of contract and a party cannot be required to submit to arbitration any dispute which he has not agreed so to submit." AT&T, 475 U.S. at 648 (quoting Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 582 (1960)). General contract law principles govern the interpretation and enforcement of arbitration agreements. First Options of Chicago v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 944 (1995).
III. DISCUSSION
Garcia argues that the arbitration agreement is unenforceable because it is procedurally unconscionable, substantively unconscionable, illusory, and not bilateral. He further argues that the agreement's class action waiver is invalid.
A. The agreement is not procedurally unconscionable.
First, Garcia argues that the agreement is procedurally unconscionable because he was not "given a printed copy" of it. Opp'n at 17-18; see Carlson v. Home Team Pest Def., Inc., 239 Cal. App. 4th 619, 632-33 (2015) (holding that an agreement was procedurally unconscionable because, among other reasons, the plaintiff asked for a copy but never received it). But Comcast has presented evidence showing that it mailed physical copies to Garcia's home address. Mot. at 13-14; Collins Decl., Dkt. No. 30 ¶¶ 5, 7; Collins Decl. Exs. D, E, F, Dkt. Nos. 30-4, 30-5, 30-6. And although Garcia claims he never received a printed copy, he does not dispute that he received the same materials electronically. Collins Decl. Exs. F, G, Dkt. Nos. 30-6, 30-7 (showing that Garcia received and opened an email that notified him about Comcast Solutions and provided a link to the materials that were mailed). Digital copies suffice.
Second, Garcia argues that he "was not able to make a fully informed decision" because the agreement did not expressly state the California Labor Code sections that are subject to arbitration. Opp'n at 18. Instead, the agreement says that it covers "any claims . . . related to or arising from any aspect of the employment relationship"—including the claims Garcia brings here ("that a portion of your compensation was wrongly withheld," "that you did not receive minimum wage, were not paid overtime and/or were not properly compensated for all of your hours worked"). Collins Decl. Exs. B, C, Dkt. Nos. 30-2 at 2, 30-3 at 3. The agreement adequately describes the claims it covers. See, e.g., Torbit, Inc. v. Datanyze, Inc., No. 5:12-CV-05889-EJD, 2013 WL 572613, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 13, 2013) (granting a motion to compel arbitration where the agreement covered "all claims 'relating to or arising out of our employment relationship' "); Chiron, 207 F.3d at 1131 (enforcing an arbitration agreement with a "broad and far reaching" scope). The cases Garcia cites do not require the agreement to include statutory citations for claims that would be subject to arbitration.
B. The agreement is not substantively unconscionable.
Garcia first argues that the agreement is substantively unconscionable because it imposes "improper statutes of limitations" in the form of "a unilateral 30-day time limitation for an employee to act" on a claim against Comcast. Opp'n at 14. As discussed above, the agreement specifies a three-step procedure for resolving employees' claims: first, review and informal resolution; second, mediation; and third, binding arbitration. Collins Decl. Ex. B, Dkt. No. 30-2 at 4-7. The thirty-day limit applies to the third step: if mediation fails, the employee "will be given up to 30 calendar days to initiate Step 3 (Arbitration) by filing an Arbitration Request Form with the Comcast Solutions Lead." Id. at 6. Garcia cites no authority showing that this limit is improper. Instead, he interprets the 30-day filing period as a time limit on his right to bring claims under Comcast Solutions in the first place. His interpretation is incorrect: his claims under Comcast Solutions face the same statutes of limitations that would apply if he were to assert them in proceedings before a court or agency. See Collins Decl. Ex. C, Dkt. No. 33 at 5; Mot. at 11 ("standard statutes of limitations as provided by law apply to the initiation of claims under Comcast Solutions").
Next, Garcia argues that the agreement "fails to provide employees with a 'fair opportunity' to present their claims" because it imposes limits on discovery and evidence that are stricter than the limits in civil trials. Opp'n at 15-17 (noting that, for example, the agreement limits each side's discovery to four depositions, 20 interrogatories, and 15 document requests, and it limits arbitration hearings to two eight-hour days with five witnesses per side). However, Garcia omits portions of the agreement that allow an employee to request extra discovery or hearing time, which the arbitrator can grant at his or her discretion. Collins Decl. Ex. B, Dkt. No. 30-2 at 7. Courts routinely find that reasonable procedural limits are valid in arbitration proceedings, particularly when employees can request additional discovery as needed. See, e.g., Armendariz v. Found. Health Psychcare Servs., Inc., 24 Cal. 4th 83, 106 (2000) (holding that employees are "entitled to discovery sufficient to adequately arbitrate their statutory claim, including access to essential documents and witnesses, as determined by the arbitrator(s)") (emphasis added); Dotson v. Amgen, Inc., 181 Cal. App. 4th 975, 984 (2010) (upholding an arbitration agreement that limited discovery to a single deposition, since "the agreement gives the arbitrator the broad discretion . . . to order the discovery needed to sufficiently litigate the parties' claims"); Mercuro v. Sup. Ct., 96 Cal. App. 4th 167, 182 (2002) (upholding an arbitration agreement that provided that "each side shall be limited to three depositions and an aggregate of 30 discovery requests of any kind, including sub-parts, except as mutually agreed to by the parties"); Abeyrama v. J.P. Morgan Chase Bank, No. CV12-00445 DMG MRWX, 2012 WL 2393063, at *4 (C.D. Cal. June 22, 2012) ("While the arbitration agreement normally allows only two depositions, such limitations are generally legal if either party can ask the arbitrator to expand discovery for good cause.").
C. The agreement is not otherwise unenforceable.
Garcia suggests that the agreement is illusory because it provides that "[n]othing in this Document should be construed as creating a contract of guaranteed employment for any employee of the Company or as otherwise altering the 'at will' nature of employment with the company." Opp'n at 10-11 (quoting Collins Decl. Ex. B, Dkt. No. 30-2 at 9). Garcia's position is meritless. This provision reiterates that the agreement does not change the employment status of at-will employees, but it does not alter the fact that the arbitration agreement is binding on both parties.
Garcia also argues that the agreement lacks mutuality because certain claims are excluded from arbitration under the Comcast Solutions program. Opp'n at 12-13; Collins Decl. Ex. B, Dkt. No. 30-2 at 3 (enumerating the claims that are not covered under the arbitration agreement). "To avoid being found substantively unconscionable, 'arbitration agreements must contain at least a modicum of bilaterality.' " Beard v. Santander Consumer USA, Inc., No. 1:11-CV-11-1815 LJO, 2012 WL 1292576, at *9 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 16, 2012), report and recommendation adopted, No. 1:11-CV-01815-LJO, 2012 WL 1576103 (E.D. Cal. May 3, 2012) (quoting Armendariz, 24 Cal. 4th at 119). Garcia argues that the agreement "lacks basic fairness and mutuality [because] it requires one contracting party, but not the other, to arbitrate all claims arising out of the same transaction or occurrence or series of transactions or occurrences." Opp'n at 12 (quoting Armendariz, 24 Cal. 4th at 120). Yet most of the excluded claims are likely to be brought by employees, not by Comcast—for instance, claims for unemployment benefits, claims for workers' compensation benefits, claims under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act, and claims under the National Labor Relations Act. Collins Decl. Ex. B, Dkt. No. 30-2 at 3. On the whole, the exclusions favor both Comcast and its employees, depending on the nature of the claim. Contrary to Garcia's assertion, the exclusions are not so "overly harsh" or "one-sided" as to render the agreement unconscionable. Armendiraz, 24 Cal. 4th at 114; see also Beard, 2012 WL 1292576, at *10 ("The absence of an exact parallel between the parties' obligations under an arbitration agreement does not require the Court to find the agreement to be unconscionable. California law requires an arbitration agreement to have only a 'modicum of bilaterality.' "); Sanchez v. Valencia Holding Co., LLC, 61 Cal. 4th 899, 922 (2015) (finding no unconscionability where one exclusion favored the company that drafted the arbitration agreement, while another exclusion favored the consumer).
D. Garcia's claims are within the scope of the agreement.
The agreement covers claims in which the "alleged violation relates to or arises from the employment relationship . . . including compensation . . . ." Collins Decl. Ex. B, Dkt. No. 30-2 at 3. Garcia alleges that Comcast failed to pay wages on time and failed to pay commission wages, and that these failures constituted unlawful and unfair business practices. Compl., Dkt. No. 1-1 at ¶¶ 31-44. These claims fall within the scope of the agreement (and Garcia does not argue otherwise).
E. The class action waiver is enforceable.
The agreement includes a class action waiver:
To participate in the Comcast Solutions Program, both you and the company waive the right to a civil action or a jury trial for any covered claims. You also waive the right to bring or participate in a class action or in a collective or representative action on covered legal claims, to the fullest extent permitted by law. All covered legal claims will be handled through the three-step Comcast Solutions process; both you and the company will be bound by the final decision of the arbitrator.
Collins Decl. Ex. A, Dkt. No. 30-1 at 10.
Class action waivers are enforceable where an employee has an opportunity to opt out. Johnmohammadi v. Bloomingdale's, Inc., 755 F.3d 1072, 1076 (9th Cir. 2014) ("[W]e fail to see how asking employees to choose between [arbitration and class-action litigation] can be viewed as interfering with or restraining their right to do anything."); Mohamed v. Uber Techs., Inc., 836 F.3d 1102, 1112 n.6 (9th Cir. 2016) ("the option to opt out meant that Uber drivers were not required 'to accept a class-action waiver as a condition of employment,' and thus there was 'no basis for concluding that [Uber] coerced [Plaintiffs] into waiving [their] right to file a class action' in violation of the NLRA").
Here, Garcia had the option to opt out. He received an email with instructions on how to opt out, and Comcast has submitted proof that he opened this email. Collins Decl. Exs. F, G, Dkt. Nos. 30-6, 30-7. He also received a hard copy mailing with opt-out instructions. Collins Decl. Exs. D, E, Dkt. Nos. 30-4. 30-5. He received these materials more than five weeks before the opt-out deadline. Collins Decl., Dkt. No. 30 ¶ 7. In addition, over four thousand Comcast employees received the same instructions, and nearly ten percent of them decided to opt out. Collins Decl., Dkt. No. 34 ¶ 8. Comcast provided Garcia with an adequate opportunity to opt out of the arbitration agreement.
Garcia claims that "[w]hen [he] was hired by Defendant, [he] was forced to accept Defendant's arbitration policy . . . ." Garcia Decl., Dkt. No. 32-1 ¶ 3. How he reached this conclusion is unclear, since he was hired in August 2010 (id. ¶ 1), but Comcast Solutions was not implemented for Comcast's California employees until 2013 (Collins Decl., Dkt. No. 34 ¶ 2; Collins Decl. Ex. D, Dkt. No. 30-4 at 2).
IV. CONCLUSION
Comcast's motion to compel arbitration is GRANTED. Garcia shall arbitrate his claims on an individual basis, rather than on a class, collective, or representative basis. This case is STAYED pending resolution of the arbitration proceedings. The Clerk shall administratively close this file.
IT IS SO ORDERED. Dated: March 31, 2017
/s/_________
EDWARD J. DAVILA
United States District Judge