Opinion
Civ. No. 99-470-AH-M
August 22, 2000
JUDGMENT
This matter having come before the Court on motion for summary judgment and in accordance with the findings of fact and conclusions of law entered this day, it is hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED, and DECREED that Plaintiff shall have and recover nothing from Defendants and that Plaintiff's claims are due to be, and hereby are, DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
ORDER
This matter is before the Court on Defendants' motion for summary judgment. (Doc. 87). After considering the motion, supporting briefs, evidence on file, and applicable law, the Court finds that the Defendants' motion for summary judgment is due to be granted.
I. Facts
Plaintiff brought this action alleging several claims arising from activities connected with a state court proceeding. In the underlying state court case, Plaintiff and Defendants were sued for alleged fraudulent actions involving the sale of satellite television systems. The jury in the state court action ultimately returned a verdict for 581 million dollars against Plaintiff and Defendants.
Plaintiff alleges that Defendants, through their legal counsel, Bradley Arant Rose White, L.L.P., fraudulently mislead Plaintiff to believe that Defendants were providing for Plaintiffs legal defense. Plaintiff claims that due to Defendants' actions, Plaintiff failed to defend or participate in the state court litigation. Plaintiffs amended complaint states:
29. Whirlpool, pursuant to its litigation strategy, approached Gantt through Bradley, Arant and represented to Gantt:
(a) Gantt did not belong as a Defendant in the case, and Bradley, Arant would make sure that Gantt was dismissed;
(b) Whirlpool intended to mount a vigorous defense on behalf of itself and Gantt to make sure that these cases were dismissed or defeated;
(c) Whirlpool's vigorous defense in the Carlisle, Merriweather, and/or Woods cases would eliminate any future or similar lawsuits against Gantt or Whirlpool from being filed or from being successful;
(d) Bradley, Arant would represent Gantt in these cases and would provide Gantt with a vigorous defense;
(e) Whirlpool would protect Gantt's interest in these cases; and
(f) Gantt need not respond to a cross-claim filed by Whirlpool against Gantt.
30. Subsequent to the representations set forth above, Whirlpool, through its attorneys, Bradley, Arant, during the trial of the case, represented to Gantt that:
(a) the trial was proceeding in Gantt's favor;
(b) Gantt's testimony at trial was not necessary for Gantt to prevail;
(c) Gantt was not to attend the trial (even though Gantt was a named-Defendant and insisted on attending the trial);
(d) Gantt's employees and former employees whose testimony would have assisted in Gantt's defense (but would have proved problematic to Whirlpool's defense), were not necessary; and
(d) Gantt's employees were to stay home and not show up at the trial.
31. These representations made by Whirlpool through Bradley, Arant were all false, misleading, and intentionally deceptive. Whirlpool never intended to mount a vigorous defense on behalf of Gantt or to in any way represent or protect Gantt's best interest.
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37. Instead, Gantt unwittingly fell prey to Whirlpool's litigation strategy which was to keep from the [state] Plaintiffs, judge and jury Gantt's truthful testimony regarding the pattern and practice of fraud in the satellite industry and his independent efforts to eliminate fraudulent practices from the satellite industry.
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41. However, Whirlpool and Bradley, Arant immediately understood that Gantt's testimony and evidence would prove incriminating in this and other cases and could be used by the Plaintiffs and their expert witness to substantiate charges that fraud and corruption were widespread in the satellite industry.
42. Consequently, Whirlpool deliberately concealed the existence of this evidence from discovery in this and other pending cases.
(emphasis added).
Defendants have moved for summary judgment asserting that Plaintiffs claims are barred by the Alabama Legal Services Liability Act, Ala. Code 1975, §§ 6-5-570 to 6-5-581. Defendants also contend that no representations were made to Plaintiff regarding legal representation, and that Plaintiff has failed to come forward with any evidence of an agency relationship sufficient to bind Defendants to their legal counsel's alleged statements.
II. Summary Judgement Standard
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c) provides that summary judgment shall be granted: "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). "A factual dispute is "genuine' if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party. A fact is "material' if it might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing substantive law." Beck v. Somerset Technologies, Inc., 882 F.2d 993, 996 (5th Cir. 1989) (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986)); accord Tipton v. Bergrohr GMBH-Siegen, 965 F.2d 994, 998 (11th Cir. 1992).
The basic issue before the Court on a motion for summary judgment is "whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law." See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 251-252. The moving party has the burden of showing the absence of a genuine issue as to any material fact, and in deciding whether the movant has met this burden the Court must view the movant's evidence and all factual inferences arising from it in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. See Adickes v. S.H Kress Co., 398 U.S. 144, 157 (1970); see also Fitzpatrick v. City of Atlanta, 2 F.3d 1112, 1115 (11th Cir. 1993). "If reasonable minds could differ on the inferences arising from undisputed facts, then a court should deny summary judgment." Miranda v. B B Cash Grocery Store, Inc., 975 F.2d 1518, 1534 (11th Cir. 1992) (citing Mercantile Bank Trust v. Fidelity Deposit Co., 750 F.2d 838, 841 (11th Cir. 1985)).
Once the movant satisfies their initial burden under Rule 56(c) of demonstrating the absence of a genuine issue of material fact, the burden shifts to the nonmovant to "come forward with "specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial."' See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e)). Otherwise stated, the nonmovant must "demonstrate that there is indeed a material issue of fact that precludes summary judgment." See Clark v. Coats ClarK Inc., 929 F.2d 604, 608 (11th Cir. 1991). "A mere "scintilla' of evidence supporting the [nonmoving] party's position will not suffice; there must be enough of a showing that the jury could reasonably find for that party." Walker v. Darby, 911 F.2d 1573, 1577 (11th Cir. 1990) (citation omitted). "[T]he nonmoving party may avail itself of all facts and justifiable inferences in the record taken as a whole." Tipton, 965 F.2d at 998 (citing United States v. Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654, 655 (1962)). ""The evidence of the non-movant is to be believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his favor.'" Tipton, 965 F.2d at 999 (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255). "Where the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party, there is no genuine issue for trial." Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587 (internal quotation and citation omitted).
III. Legal Services Liability Act
Section 6-5-573 of the Legal Services Liability Act provides: "There shall be only one form and cause of action against legal services providers in courts in the State of Alabama and it shall be known as the legal service liability action and shall have the meaning as defined herein." Ala. Code 1975, § 6-5-573 (emphasis added). Both parties acknowledge that Defendants in this case are not legal services providers. Therefore, the Court finds that the Legal Services Liability Act does not control the resolution of Plaintiff's claims.
IV. Agency
Defendants also assert that they are entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiffs claims to the extent that Plaintiff has asserted that Defendants are liable for the acts of Bradley Arant through some form of agency relationship.
"An attorney has the authority to bind his client, [only where] the attorney acts within scope of his authority." See Flowers v. McGill, 442 So.2d 6, 7 (Ala. 1983). The Alabama Supreme Court has explained:
An attorney is the special agent of his client, whose duties, usually confined to the vigilant prosecution or defense of the suitor's rights. The power of an attorney is not co-equal, co-extensive, or the equivalent of that of the client. He is, as has been said in numerous decisions of this court, a special agent, limited in duty and authority to the vigilant prosecution or defense of the rights of the client. He can enter into no bargains or contracts, though he may make agreements in writing touching the course of proceedings in pending suits, or the issue or return of executions on judgments he may have obtained, which will bind the client.Birmingham Electric Co. v. Cochran, 8 So.2d 171, 173 (Ala. 1942) (internal quotations omitted). Where a party seeks to hold another liable under a theory of agency, the asserting party has the burden of establishing the existence of the agency. Holland v. Fidelity Financial Services, Inc., 709 So.2d 1246, 1249 (Ala. 1999).
In the instant case, Plaintiff seeks to hold Defendants liable for representations and acts purportedly performed by their legal counsel. Defendants have submitted an affidavit by Fred M. Haston III, an attorney with Bradley Arant, in support of their motion. The affidavit states that Bradley Arant did not offer to represent Plaintiff in the state action and that Defendants did not direct Bradley Arant to defend Plaintiff.
As noted above, the scope of an attorney's authority is generally limited to that necessary to prosecute or defend a client's case. An attorney owes each client a duty of loyalty, see ALABAMA RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT, Rule 1.7, and the independent representation of separate clients falls outside the scope of an attorney's special authority. Defendants have come forward with evidence indicating not only that no representations were made to Plaintiff, but also that they did not authorize any such purported representations. Plaintiff thus had the burden to come forward with some evidence that Bradley Arant made these representations within the scope of an agency relationship, or that through apparent agency, Plaintiff reasonably believed that such a relationship existed. Plaintiff has failed to come forward with any evidence to refute the affidavit of Mr. Haston. As Plaintiff has failed to meet his burden, summary judgment is due to be granted on Plaintiffs claims.
V. Conclusion
Due to the foregoing, Defendants' motion for summary judgment is GRANTED.