Opinion
No. 2D21-805
11-17-2021
James William GAMBREL and Tuttle 5040, LLC, Petitioners, v. Nicole M. SAMPSON, Respondent.
Mark D. Tinker of Cole, Scott & Kissane, P.A., Tampa, for Petitioners. Lorenzo Williams of Gary, Williams, Parenti, Watson & Gary, P.L.L.C, Stuart, for Respondent.
Mark D. Tinker of Cole, Scott & Kissane, P.A., Tampa, for Petitioners.
Lorenzo Williams of Gary, Williams, Parenti, Watson & Gary, P.L.L.C, Stuart, for Respondent.
LUCAS, Judge.
James Gambrel and Tuttle 5040, LLC, the defendants below, have filed a petition for a writ of mandamus to compel the circuit court to enter a judgment on an arbitration award. Because the circuit court failed to perform the ministerial duty of entering a judgment pursuant to a statutory directive, we grant the petition.
Nicole Sampson, the plaintiff below, and Mr. Gambrel were involved in an automobile accident in which Mr. Gambrel rear-ended her car. At the time of the accident, Mr. Gambrel was working for Tuttle 5040. Ms. Sampson filed a negligence lawsuit against Mr. Gambrel and his employer.
After engaging in discovery, the parties agreed to submit the case to nonbinding arbitration pursuant to section 44.103, Florida Statutes (2020), and Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.820. The arbitrator found in favor of Ms. Sampson but did not award her any damages other than her past medical expenses. The award was signed on December 8, 2020, and served that same day by electronic mail on the parties' respective lawyers.
An email of the award was also sent to a paralegal who worked for Ms. Sampson's counsel. The paralegal would later confirm that she received the email of the award on December 8 but did not read it until the following day. After reading the concluding paragraph of the award (which warned, "If Demand for a Trial is not filed pursuant to Rule 1.820, Florida Rules of Civil Procedure, within twenty (20) days of service of this award, a civil judgment will be entered embodying the terms of the award."), the paralegal calendared a deadline to file a demand for trial twenty days later—but from the date she had read it, December 9, not the date it had been served, December 8. When no party had requested a trial de novo within the statutory twenty-day deadline, Mr. Gambrel filed a motion for entry of judgment on December 29. Later that same day, Ms. Sampson filed a motion seeking a trial de novo on her negligence complaint.
The circuit court convened an evidentiary hearing on both motions. After hearing testimony from the paralegal, the presiding judge allowed that it was a "close call" and even acknowledged that if the word " ‘shall’ in the rule [guides] what I have to do ... I may be in a situation where I do not withstand appellate scrutiny." Nevertheless, the court entered an order granting Ms. Sampson's motion for trial. In its order, the court found that the paralegal's calendaring mistake was due to an "excusable and reasonable misunderstanding." Since Florida's public policy favors resolution of disputes on the merits, and since the scheduling error did not impact the court's ability to process the litigation, the circuit court concluded that entering a judgment on the arbitration award "would unnecessarily and unfairly deny Plaintiff's right to trial." The court's order granted Ms. Sampson's motion and denied the defendants' motion.
The petitioners bring this timely mandamus petition to challenge that order.
Article V, section 4(b)(3), of the Florida constitution authorizes the district courts of appeal to issue writs of mandamus. Mandamus may be used "to enforce an ‘established legal right by compelling a person in an official capacity to perform an indisputable ministerial duty required by law.’ " Smith v. State , 696 So. 2d 814, 815 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997) (quoting Puckett v. Gentry , 577 So. 2d 965, 967 (Fla. 5th DCA 1991) ). A petition for a writ of mandamus is appropriately issued when a lower court fails to perform an indisputable, nondiscretionary ministerial duty. See, e.g. , Ledger v. City of St. Petersburg , 135 So. 3d 496, 497 (Fla. 2d DCA 2014) (holding that mandamus relief was warranted where the lower court failed to comply with a ministerial duty imposed by statute); Grant v. State , 257 So. 3d 1223, 1223 (Fla. 3d DCA 2018) (holding that a writ of mandamus was the proper remedy to compel the trial court to undertake its ministerial act); Hutto v. State , 201 So. 3d 725, 725 (Fla. 1st DCA 2016) (granting the petitioner's mandamus petition where the lower court had a ministerial duty to accept the petitioner's notice of appeal and transmit it to the appellate court); Palm Beach Marketplace, LLC v. Aleyda's Mexican Restaurante, Inc. , 103 So. 3d 911, 912 (Fla. 4th DCA 2012) (holding that the trial court had "a ministerial duty to provide the remedies set forth in the statute"). Mandamus has frequently been invoked to compel courts to enter judgments confirming arbitration awards when there is no discretion to do otherwise. See, e.g. , Wells v. Castro , 117 So. 3d 1233, 1238 (Fla. 3d DCA 2013) ("Because Castro's Prevailing Party Motion did not set forth any of the statutorily enumerated grounds to vacate an arbitration award, the trial court was required to confirm the [arbitration] Award ...."); Polley v. Gardner , 98 So. 3d 648, 649 (Fla. 1st DCA 2012) (granting petition for writ of mandamus where "the petitioners met all the statutory requirements for confirmation and entry of final judgment"); Farmer v. Polen , 423 So. 2d 1035, 1037 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982) (granting mandamus review to compel the trial court to enter a judgment on an arbitration award where the respondent had failed to timely challenge the validity of the arbitration proceeding or provision). The case before us is another such instance.
Section 44.103(5) states:
The arbitration decision shall be presented to the parties in writing. An arbitration
decision shall be final if a request for a trial de novo is not filed within the time provided by rules promulgated by the Supreme Court .... If no request for trial de novo is made within the time provided, the decision shall be referred to the presiding judge in the case who shall enter such orders and judgments as are required to carry out the terms of the decision, which orders shall be enforceable by the contempt powers of the court, and for which judgments execution shall issue on request of a party.
The procedural rule the Florida Supreme Court adopted to establish the statutory deadline is rule 1.820(h), and it provides:
If a motion for trial is not made within 20 days of service on the parties of the decision, the decision shall be referred to the presiding judge, who shall enter such orders and judgments as may be required to carry out the terms of the decision as provided by section 44.103(5), Florida Statutes.
There is no dispute that under Florida Rule of Judicial Administration 2.516(b)(1)(D), Ms. Sampson was required to file her request for trial no later than December 28. Her filing on December 29 was after the deadline.
Both the deadline and the directive to trial courts are cast in mandatory terms. Citizens Prop. Ins. Corp. v. Trapeo , 136 So. 3d 670, 679 (Fla. 2d DCA 2014) (holding that the use of the word "shall" in the statute meant that the court's obligation was "a ministerial act with no room for discretion and is also a duty imposed on the court by law").
The Fourth District has observed that the entry of a judgment on a section 44.103 arbitration award is a nondiscretionary, ministerial duty. In Connell v. City of Plantation , 901 So. 2d 317, 318-19 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005), a plaintiff in a slip and fall case obtained an arbitration award pursuant to a nonbinding arbitration under section 44.103 and neither party requested a trial within twenty days. The plaintiff moved for a final judgment on the award and requested taxable costs, but before the court had entered the judgment, the city paid the arbitration award in full. Id. at 319. The circuit court declined to enter the judgment, reasoning there was nothing further for it to do since the arbitrator's award had been satisfied. Id. The Fourth District reversed.
In this case, neither party requested a trial de novo within twenty days. Thus, pursuant to the statute, the presiding judge was required to "enter such orders and judgments as are required to carry out the terms of the decision." [ § 44.103(5).] The court denied entry of a final judgment, reasoning there were no orders or final judgments required to carry out the terms of the decision because the award had been paid.
While we understand the logic the court employed to reach its decision, the decision was nevertheless wrong. This court has previously held that entry of a judgment in accordance with an arbitration's decision is a ministerial act. The trial court has no discretion to deny such a request.
Id.
So, too, the circuit court below had no discretion to refuse to enter a judgment when neither the plaintiff nor the defendants had requested a trial by December 28. The court's attempt to graft an excusable neglect exception into the statute and rule where none exists was simply unauthorized. Ms. Sampson suggests that to hold otherwise amounts to some kind of an unfair "gotcha" tactic. We very much disagree. The statute says what it says and so does the rule that implements its deadline. If a litigant fails to request a trial within twenty days of service of the arbitration award, the court "shall" enter a judgment on that award.
It was also never raised below. Although Ms. Sampson presented the testimony of the paralegal to explain why her request for a trial was a day late, she did not contend that Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.540 has any applicability to a prejudgment nonbinding arbitration award. See Byers v. Callahan , 848 So. 2d 1180, 1183 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003) ("[A] trial court is without jurisdiction to ‘hear and determine matters which are not the subject of appropriate pleadings and notice.’ "(quoting Todaro v. Todaro , 704 So. 2d 138, 139 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997) ).
On one occasion, our court held that when both a plaintiff and defendant filed trial statements for a previously scheduled trial nine days after the entry of a nonbinding arbitration award, there was sufficient compliance with rule 1.820(h) to allow the plaintiff to seek a trial de novo. See De Acosta v. Naples Community Hosp., Inc. , 300 So. 3d 264, 267 (Fla. 2d DCA 2019). We remarked in passing that to hold otherwise would have subjected the plaintiff to a "gotcha tactic" by the defendant. Id. De Acosta did not purport to craft a generalized "gotcha" exception to the rule and statute's operation. To the contrary, the De Acosta court was addressing a singularly unique set of circumstances, and its holding should be understood as such.
Because this circuit court failed to do so, we are compelled to issue a writ of mandamus.
Petition granted.
ATKINSON and LABRIT, JJ., Concur.