Opinion
Record No. 2585-92-2
August 31, 1993
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF CHARLOTTESVILLE JAY T. SWETT, JUDGE.
(Peter McIntosh; Michie, Hamlett, Lowry, Rasmussen and Tweel, on briefs), for appellant.
(Susan D. White, on brief), for appellee.
Present: Judges Benton, Coleman and Willis.
Pursuant to Code § 17-116.010 this opinion is not designated for publication.
Harry Y. Gamble, Jr. (husband) appeals the order of the circuit court awarding Constance P. Gamble (wife) $400 per month in spousal support. Husband contends that the award was not consistent with this Court's decision on the first appeal in this matter. Upon reviewing the record and the briefs of the parties, we conclude that this appeal is without merit. Accordingly, we affirm the decision of the circuit court. Rule 5A:27.
In Gamble v. Gamble, 14 Va. App. 558, 577-78, 421 S.E.2d 635, 647 (1992), we reversed the award of spousal support in the amount of $850 and remanded the case for reconsideration of the amount of spousal support in light of the views expressed in the opinion. We specifically found that the trial judge abused his discretion by fashioning a spousal support award that effectively required husband to satisfy the mortgage obligations on the marital home he was required to convey to wife. Id. at 577, 421 S.E.2d at 647. "Because we [were] unable to determine that the amount of the award would be the same had the [trial judge] properly considered the rental income and the payment of the second mortgage we revers[ed] the spousal support award and remand[ed] the issue of the amount of spousal support for reconsideration." Id.
On remand, the trial judge stated the following in his letter opinion:
As I announced from the bench, the award of spousal support of $400.00 per month was based on a reconsideration of all of the evidence presented during the earlier evidentiary hearing and upon reconsideration of all the factors set forth in § 20-107.1 in light of the decision of the Court of Appeals. As I mentioned from the bench, I had given consideration in my initial award of spousal support to all of the evidence presented which necessarily included the testimony of Mrs. Gamble's rental income and the fact that Mrs. Gamble would be obligated to the second mortgage based upon the transfer of the marital residence.
I do not agree with Mr. McIntosh [husband's attorney] that the Court of Appeals directed this trial court to completely disregard expenses to be incurred by Mrs. Gamble for housing which would be the case if Mr. McIntosh's argument is correct.
These statements demonstrate that the trial judge considered wife's rental income of $250 per month in its reconsideration. Additionally, the letter opinion and order reflect that the trial judge reconsidered the award in light of the trial evidence, this Court's opinion, and all of the factors contained in § 20-107.1. A detailed analysis of the factors identified in Code § 20-107.1 is contained in the trial court's letter opinions of July 20, 1990 and August 17, 1990.
We did not imply in our previous opinion that the trial court, on remand, could not consider any of wife's housing expenses in making its award. We stated that, "[t]he record reflects that the first mortgage payment of $372 monthly was an obligation listed in Mrs. Gamble's expense sheet that the chancellor considered under factor one. Thus, the second mortgage payment of $509 monthly, rather than $881, would have been the maximum amount properly considered by the chancellor under factor eight." Gamble, 14 Va. App. at 576, 421 S.E.2d at 646. The trial judge did not err in considering portions of wife's housing expenses in its calculation of the award.
The trial judge's award adequately addressed our concerns regarding the spousal support award. The original award of $850 was greatly reduced by the trial judge and does not appear to have any relation to the equitable distribution award. We will not disturb the trial judge's award of spousal support when, as here, the decision is supported by substantial credible evidence. Williams v. Williams, 14 Va. App. 217, 221, 415 S.E.2d 252, 254 (1992).
For the reasons stated, we affirm the award of spousal support, grant the wife's request for attorney's fees, and remand to the trial judge for the assessment of a reasonable fee. A Copy,
Affirmed.
Teste: Patricia G. Davis By: Deputy Clerk