Opinion
Civil Action No. 20-611
03-23-2021
THOMAS R. GALLOWAY, JR., Plaintiff, v. JOHN R. WALTON, Warden, Westmoreland County Prison, WESTMORELAND COUNTY PRISON, GEORGE LOWTHER, D. Security Warden, ERIC SCWARTZ, D. Warden of Treatment, Defendants.
District Judge Nora Barry Fischer
Re: ECF No. 46 REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
I. RECOMMENDATION
Plaintiff Thomas R. Galloway, Jr. ("Plaintiff") brings this pro se civil rights action against Westmoreland County Prison ("WCP") and three of its officials - Warden John R. Walton, Deputy Security Warden George Lowther, and Deputy Warden of Treatment Eric Scwartz - alleging that each violated his constitutional and statutory rights by: (1) interfering with the exercise and practice of his faith, (2) failing to properly clean the WCP or provide inmates cleaning products to protect against infection, and (3) unlawfully confiscating funds from his inmate account for the payment of court-ordered fines and costs. ECF No. 30.
Presently before the Court is Defendants' Motion to Dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), ECF No. 46. For the reasons that follow, it is respectfully recommended that the Motion to Dismiss be granted as to Plaintiff's claim under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 ("RFRA"), 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb et seq., but denied as to all remaining claims.
II. REPORT
A. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Plaintiff commenced this action with submission of a Complaint alleging claims against police and prosecutors arising out of his arrest in Westmoreland County and separately alleging claims against WCP and its officials and employees for unlawful strip searches, the failure to undertake precautions related to the COVID-19 pandemic, unauthorized monetary withdrawals from his prison account for payment of court costs, unlawful WCP commissary prices, and interfering with Plaintiff's ability to practice his Jewish faith. ECF No. 9. Plaintiff then filed a First Amended Complaint alleging only a claim for deliberate indifference related to a staph infection. ECF No. 19. Thereafter, the Court issued an Order requiring Plaintiff to file one consolidated amended complaint setting forth all claims against all parties that Plaintiff intended to assert. ECF No. 23. Plaintiff responded with a letter reflecting that he wished to proceed only as to his medical indifference claims related to a staph infection. ECF No. 25. The Court acknowledged Plaintiff's withdrawal of certain claims and parties, and issued an Order designating ECF No. 19 as the operative Amended Complaint. ECF No. 26. Ten days later, the Court received Plaintiff's second Amended Complaint ("Second Amended Complaint"). ECF No. 30. In the interest of justice and considering Plaintiff's pro se status, the Court acknowledged this last filing as Plaintiff's operative complaint. ECF No. 31.
In the Second Amended Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants have violated his rights under the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and the RFRA by denying him all means to practice his faith, including kosher meals, special holiday meals, books of the Jewish faith, and access to a rabbi. ECF No. 30 ¶¶ 9-13, 23. Plaintiff also alleges that Defendants exercised deliberate indifference to inmate health and safety by failing to "properly" clean the facility and otherwise failing to provide inmates with appropriate cleaning products. Id. ¶¶ 14-15. Plaintiff alleges that because of facility cleanliness issues, he contracted a painful staph infection that has since healed but left him scarred. Id. ¶ 16 and at 10. Finally, Plaintiff alleges that while awaiting trial on his most recent state charges, he is suffering unauthorized deductions of funds gifted to him from his WCP inmate account. Plaintiff alleges that absent his specific authorization or a court order, Defendants are illegally confiscating money for the payment of fines and court costs previously imposed by the Westmoreland County. Id. ¶¶ 17-20. As relief, Plaintiff seeks permanent injunctions against the itemized unconstitutional policies and conduct, a judicially imposed prison grievance system, and compensatory and punitive damages.
B. LEGAL STANDARD
1. Motion to Dismiss
In assessing the sufficiency of a complaint pursuant to a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), the Court must accept as true all material allegations in the complaint and all reasonable factual inferences must be viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Odd v. Malone, 538 F.3d 202, 205 (3d Cir. 2008). The Court, however, need not accept bald assertions or inferences drawn by the plaintiff if they are unsupported by the facts set forth in the complaint. See Cal. Pub. Employees' Ret. Sys. v. The Chubb Corp., 394 F.3d 126, 143 (3d Cir. 2004) (citing Morse v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 132 F.3d 902, 906 (3d Cir. 1997)). Nor must the Court accept legal conclusions set forth as factual allegations. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). Rather, "[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level." Id. (citing Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986)). Indeed, the United States Supreme Court has held that a complaint is properly dismissed under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) where it does not allege "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face," id. at 570, or where the factual content does not allow the court "to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009); see also Phillips v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 231 (3d Cir. 2008) (finding that, under Twombly, "labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action" do not suffice. Rather, the complaint "must allege facts suggestive of [the proscribed] conduct" and that are sufficient "to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of the necessary element[s] of his claim."). Id. at 233- 234.
2. Pro Se Pleadings and Filings
Pro se pleadings and filings, "however inartfully pleaded," must be held to "less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers" Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972). If the court can reasonably read pleadings to state a valid claim on which the litigant could prevail, it should do so despite failure to cite proper legal authority, confusion of legal theories, poor syntax and sentence construction, or litigant's unfamiliarity with pleading requirements. Boag v. MacDougall, 454 U.S. 364 (1982); United States ex rel. Montgomery v. Brierley, 414 F.2d 552, 555 (3d Cir. 1969) (A "petition prepared by a prisoner ... may be inartfully drawn and should ... be read 'with a measure of tolerance'"); Freeman v. Department of Corr., 949 F.2d 360 (10th Cir. 1991). Under our liberal pleading rules, a district court should construe all allegations in a complaint in favor of the complainant. Gibbs v. Roman, 116 F.3d 83 (3d Cir. 1997) (overruled on other grounds); see also Nami v. Fauver, 82 F.3d 63, 65 (3d Cir. 1996) (discussing Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) standard); Markowitz v. Northeast Land Co., 906 F.2d 100, 103 (3d Cir. 1990) (same).
Still, there are limits to the court's procedural flexibility — "pro se litigants still must allege sufficient facts in their complaints to support a claim .... they cannot flout procedural rules — they must abide by the same rules that apply to all other litigants." Mala v. Crown Bay Marina, Inc., 704 F.3d 239, 245 (3d Cir. 2013) (citations omitted). Thus, because Galloway is a pro se litigant, this Court will consider the facts and make inferences where it is appropriate.
C. DISCUSSION
1. Exercise of Religion Claims
Defendants contend that Plaintiff's First Amendment exercise of religion claims should be dismissed because he has not sufficiently alleged interference with sincerely held religious beliefs. ECF No. 47 at 7-9. The law regarding a prisoner's ability to practice his or her faith is well-settled and, at this stage of the litigation, warrants denial of the Motion to Dismiss.
The First Amendment provides that "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof...." U.S. Const. amend. I. Prisoners do not forfeit this right by reason of their conviction and confinement in prison. See DeHart v. Horn, 227 F.3d 47, 50 (3d Cir. 2000). For a prisoner, this right, however, is more limited. Id. at 50-51. To establish a violation of the Free Exercise Clause, [a prisoner] must show that defendants prevented him from engaging in his religion without any justification reasonably related to legitimate penological interests. Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89, 107 S.Ct. 2254, 96 L.Ed.2d 64 (1987).Williams v. Sec'y Pennsylvania Dep't of Corr., 450 F. App'x 191, 194 (3d Cir. 2011).
The United States Supreme Court has identified several factors to consider when determining the reasonableness of a regulation or policy that impinges on a constitutional right, including: 1) whether there is a "valid, rational connection" between the prison regulation and the legitimate governmental interest put forth to justify it; 2) whether there are alternative means of exercising the right that remain open to the prisoner; 3) the impact that an accommodation of the asserted right will have on guards and other inmates and on the allocation of prison resources generally; and 4) whether there are alternatives that fully accommodate the prisoner's rights at a de minimis cost to valid penological interests. Turner, 482 U.S. at 89-91.
In the instant case, Plaintiff alleges that through WCP Policy T-247, Defendants fail to provide religious accommodations for adherents of the Jewish faith such as access to worship services, participation in holiday rites, religious meals, and Jewish texts. In accordance with the accommodation procedure outlined in the WCP policy, Plaintiff states he submitted requests to each named Defendant regarding alternative means to practice his faith, including requests for kosher meals and access to a rabbi, but each request was refused. Plaintiff contends that the blanket failure to grant any of his requests has led to the suppression of his religious beliefs. ECF No. 30 ¶¶ 11-13.
Turning first to Plaintiff's allegations regarding kosher meals, Defendants broadly challenge Plaintiff's request for accommodation of his Jewish faith as "a desire" rather than "a need" for a religious-based diet. Id. at 8 (italics in original). The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has recognized "a clearly established right to a religiously-motivated diet, so long as the views underlying the diet are '(1) sincerely held, and (2) religious in nature, in [his] scheme of things.'" Parkell v. Senato, 704 F. App'x 122, 127 (3d Cir. 2017) (quoting DeHart v. Horn, 227 F.3d 47, 52 (3d Cir. 2000), and Africa v. Pennsylvania, 662 F.2d 1025, 1029 (3d Cir. 1981)). The analysis of Plaintiff's claim therefore requires a factual inquiry that is not appropriate at this initial stage of the litigation given Plaintiff's allegations that the denial of kosher meals substantially interferes with his First Amendment right to exercise his faith.
Defendants next find fault with Plaintiff's failure to identify the Jewish holidays and services he has been denied, and for failing to allege "the denial of access to his Rabbi." ECF No. 47 at 8-9. Defendants do not address Plaintiff's allegation that along with these means of practicing his religion, he also has been denied "books of the Jewish faith" ECF No. 30 ¶ 11. Defendants contend, however, that because he has been offered access to a chaplain and a room to pray, Plaintiff's allegations fail to set forth the denial of an opportunity to practice his faith. ECF No. 47 at 9.
In the context of incarceration, "[a] special chapel or place of worship need not be provided for every faith regardless of size; nor must a chaplain, priest, or minister be provided without regard to the extent of the demand." Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 322 n. 2 (1972) (per curiam); see also Gittlemacker v. Prasse, 428 F.2d 1, 4 (3d Cir. 1970) (no affirmative duty to provide an inmate with a clergyman of his choice). However, when an inmate alleges that he has been denied all recognized means to practice his faith, he has sufficiently alleged a substantial and unconstitutional burden on the practice of religion in violation of the First Amendment. See Robinson v. Superintendent Houtzdale SCI, 693 F. App'x 111, 115 (3d Cir. 2017); Parkell v. Senato, 704 F. App'x 122, 127 (3d Cir. 2017); Sutton v. Rasheed, 323 F.3d 236, 257 (3d Cir. 2003), as amended (May 29, 2003) ("while we believe that a Christian inmate could practice his religion generally even if prevented from attending Christmas or Easter services, we do not believe he could practice his religion if deprived of access to the Bible. The distinction in this example is not between religious commandments and positive expressions of belief, but between the deprivation of a single aspect of religious worship and the removal of any ability to undertake the free exercise of the Christian religion generally").
Thus, it is recommended that the Court deny the Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's First Amendment to permit the parties the opportunity to engage in discovery and submit a developed record related to the requested accommodations, the sincerity of Plaintiff's religious beliefs, and the reasons advanced for the apparent denial of all alternative means to practice his faith.
2. RFRA Claim
Plaintiff also asserts a claim under the RFRA, 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb et seq. ECF No. 30 ¶¶ 10-13, 23. In City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997), the United States Supreme Court held that Congress improperly exceeded its powers under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment when it extended RFRA to states and their subdivisions. Id., at 532-536; see also Holt v. Hobbs, 574 U.S. 352, 357 (2015). Thus, Plaintiff cannot maintain a claim against Defendants under RFRA, and it is recommended that the Court grant the Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's RFRA claim and dismiss this claim with prejudice.
3. Deliberate Indifference - Conditions of Confinement Claim
Plaintiff alleges that Defendants have violated his Fourteenth Amendment rights through the exercise of deliberate indifference to a known "pandemic" of staph infections at the WCP by failing to properly clean the facility and by refusing to provide inmates cleaning products to protect from the likelihood of infection. ECF No. 30 ¶¶ 4, 14-17, 23. As a result, Plaintiff alleges he sustained a large and painful staph infection that has healed but left him scarred. Id. at 10.
Defendants seek dismissal of Plaintiff's deliberate indifference claim based on the absence of allegations that the Defendants had a "sufficiently culpable state of mind to constitute a cruel and unusual punishment regarding the conditions of his confinement," and for failing to "properly plead what right is violated." Defendants frame Plaintiff's claim as one asserted under the Eighth Amendment. ECF No. 47 at 9-12.
As an initial matter, typically a prisoner challenging the conditions of his confinement or the adequacy of his medical treatment asserts claims under the Eighth Amendment's prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment. In this case, however, the Eighth Amendment does not apply because as alleged in the Second Amended Complaint, Plaintiff was a pretrial detainee—not a convicted prisoner. See Natale v. Camden Cty. Corr. Facility, 318 F.3d 575, 581 (3d Cir. 2003) (discussing how the Eighth Amendment applies only "after [the State] has secured a formal adjudication of guilt in accordance with due process of law"). Thus, Plaintiff's claims are evaluated under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 538 (1979).
Under the Due Process Clause, "the proper inquiry is whether [the challenged] conditions amount to punishment of the detainee." Id. at 535. The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has concluded that "[t]he parameters of [a pretrial detainee's Fourteenth Amendment Due Process] interest are coextensive with those of the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment." Keller v. Cty. of Bucks, 209 F. App'x. 201, 205 (3d Cir. 2006) (quoting Surprenant v. Rivas, 424 F.3d 5, 18 (1st Cir. 2005)). The Court therefore applies an Eighth Amendment analysis to evaluate Plaintiff's § 1983 Due Process claims.
"In order for conditions of confinement to be unconstitutional ... the evidence must reveal widespread deprivation of the 'minimal civilized measures of life's necessities.'" Keller, 209 F. App'x. at 205 (quoting Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981)). To be liable, an individual defendant must act with "deliberate indifference" as to those conditions. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 828 (1994). Deliberate indifference is established if the defendant (1) "knows that an inmate faces a substantial risk of serious harm," and (2) "disregards that risk by failing to take reasonable measures to abate it." Id. at 847. "[A]cting or failing to act with deliberate indifference to a substantial risk of serious harm to a prisoner is the equivalent of recklessly disregarding that risk." Id. at 836.
Plaintiff alleges that each of the Defendants "knew" there was a "pandemic" of staph infections at WCP but failed to take reasonable measures to protect him from infection such as properly cleaning the facility or providing cleaning products. These allegations, at this stage of the litigation, are enough to state a claim that Defendants violated Plaintiff's Fourteenth Amendment rights. Accordingly, it is recommended that the Court deny the Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's conditions of confinement claim.
4. Prisoner Account Claims
Plaintiff alleges that because he is currently incarcerated as a pretrial detainee, WCP's withdrawals from his inmate account to pay past due amounts stemming from prior convictions are illegal. ECF No. 30 ¶¶ 17-20. The publicly available docket of Plaintiff's past criminal proceedings reflects that upon conviction and in accordance with Pennsylvania law, Plaintiff was assessed approximately $2800 for restitution, courts costs, and fees, and that he has an outstanding balance of about $2200. Commw. v. Galloway, CP-65-CR-0001174-2010 at 5-6 (CCP Westmoreland County) (docket last checked March 22, 2021). The docket also reflects that WCP processed periodic payments against the outstanding balance in 2018, throughout 2020 and in 2021, presumably from Plaintiff's inmate account.
Plaintiff's allegations to the contrary, Pennsylvania law provides
(ii) The county correctional facility to which the offender has been sentenced shall:42 Pa. C.S. § 9728.
(A) Be authorized to make monetary deductions from inmate wages and personal accounts for the purpose of collecting restitution, costs imposed under section 9721(c.1), filing fees to be collected under section 6602(c) and any other court-ordered obligation or fees owed to the county jail or prison related to the inmate's incarceration.
(B) Deduct an amount sufficient to satisfy any outstanding restitution, costs imposed under section 9721(c.1), filing fees to be collected under section 6602(c) or other court-ordered obligations before releasing funds on deposit.
In Montanez v. Sec'y Pennsylvania Dep't of Corr., 773 F.3d 472, 486 (3d Cir. 2014), the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit held that "the government has an 'important state interest' in collecting restitution, costs, and fines from incarcerated criminal offenders to compensate victims." Id. at 483 (citation omitted). Thus, all funds deposited in inmate accounts regardless of source, and not otherwise exempt, are subject to seizure. Id. at 476-477.
In making these deductions, however, prisoners are entitled to due process:
[a]t a minimum, federal due process requires inmates to be informed of the terms of the DOC Policy and the amount of their total monetary liability to the Commonwealth. In particular, the DOC must disclose to each inmate before the first deduction: the total amount the DOC understands the inmate to owe pursuant to the inmate's sentence, the rate at which funds will be deducted from the inmate's account; and which funds are subject to deduction. Further, inmates must have a meaningful opportunity to object to the application of the DOC Policy to their inmate accounts before the first deductions commence. This opportunity to object is required to protect against the possibility of error in the application of the DOC Policy, such as mistakes in reporting of an inmate's total liability or to ensure that deductions are not made from funds that are exempt.Id. at 486 (internal citation omitted). The opportunity to object, however, does not require the DOC to "provide each inmate with a formal, judicial-like hearing before the onset of deductions." Id. Nor must the DOC offer a chance to be heard prior to each deduction. "Rather, after providing the required initial notice the DOC could provide inmates with an informal opportunity to supply written objections to prison administrators prior to the first deduction." Id.
At this stage of the proceedings, it is not clear whether WCP officials provided Plaintiff notice of all amounts due and owing, the WCP withdrawal policy, or an opportunity to be heard and object prior to initiating deductions from his inmate account. See ECF No. 49-2 (advising that he "may" be charged for room and board but not providing notice or an opportunity to object to the amount and collection of past due amounts). Thus, it is recommended that the Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's due process claim related to Plaintiff's inmate account be denied so as to permit the development of an appropriate factual record.
Defendants argue that dismissal is otherwise appropriate because all deductions from Plaintiff's account were made pursuant to a Court order entered on the Miscellaneous Docket of the Court of Common Pleas of Westmoreland County on December 3, 2012, authorizing WCJ to make monetary deductions from inmates' personal accounts to collect restitution and any other court ordered obligation or costs. ECF No. 47 at 13 and ECF No. 47-2. Whether withdrawals are made pursuant to a court order is of no moment in terms of the process due each inmate. As determined by the Third Circuit, Defendants have an obligation to employ an individualized process to determine each inmate's total obligation prior to the commencement of the deductions and to provide an opportunity to object to correct any potential errors. Montanez, 773 F.3d at 485 ("the mere fact that an inmate's sentence includes a fine, coupled with a state statute compelling prison administrators to deduct funds from the inmate's prison account, does not satisfy the requirements of pre-deprivation due process.").
5. Claims against Defendants in their individual capacities
Defendants next seek dismissal of all claims against them in their individual capacities as insufficiently stated. It is recommended that the Motion to Dismiss on this basis be denied.
"A defendant in a civil rights action must have personal involvement in the alleged wrongs; liability cannot be predicated solely on the operation of respondeat superior" Rode v. Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195, 1207-08 (3d Cir. 1988). "Personal involvement can be shown through allegations of personal direction or of actual knowledge and acquiescence. Allegations of participation or actual knowledge and acquiescence, however, must be made with appropriate particularity." Id.
Plaintiff alleges that each of Defendants "knew about the staph infection that was at a pandemic level" and yet failed to take reasonable measures to protect him from infection. ECF No. 30 ¶ 15. Plaintiff also alleges he submitted requests for religious accommodation to each of the named Defendants, but his requests were denied. Id. ¶¶ 11-12. Finally, Plaintiff alleges that he submitted several request slips and spoke with each of the Defendants for assistance with his claims, all to no avail. Id. ¶ 21. At this early stage of the litigation, Plaintiff sufficiently alleges the personal involvement of each of the named Defendants.
D. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, it is respectfully recommended that the Court grant Defendants' Motion to Dismiss as to Plaintiff's RFRA claim but deny the Motion to Dismiss on all other grounds.
In accordance with the Magistrate Judges Act, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), and Rule 72.C.2 of the Local Rules of Court, the parties are allowed fourteen (14) days from the date of this Order to file an appeal to the District Judge which includes the basis for objection to this Order. Any appeal to be submitted to the Clerk of Court, United States District Court, 700 Grant Street, Room 3110, Pittsburgh, PA 15219. Failure to timely appeal will constitute a waiver of any appellate rights. Dated: March 23, 2021
Respectfully submitted,
/s/ Maureen P . Kelly
MAUREEN P. KELLY
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE cc: The Honorable Nora Barry Fischer
United States District Judge
Thomas R. Galloway, Jr.
3442020
Westmoreland County Prison
3000 South Grand Blvd
Greensburg, PA 15601
All counsel of record via CM/ECF