Opinion
1210304
01-06-2023
Dalen GAINES v. Nick SMITH, individually and in his official capacity as sheriff of Walker County, and Christopher Doeur, individually and in his official capacity as a deputy sheriff of Walker County
Charles C. Tatum, Jr., and Seth Diamond, Jasper, for appellant. Jamie Helen Kidd Frawley and J. Randall McNeill of Webb McNeill Walker, PC, Montgomery, for appellees.
* Note from the reporter of decisions: Judge Vance, circuit judge, Jefferson County, was appointed to preside over this case upon the recusal of the circuit judges in 14th Judicial Circuit.
Charles C. Tatum, Jr., and Seth Diamond, Jasper, for appellant.
Jamie Helen Kidd Frawley and J. Randall McNeill of Webb McNeill Walker, PC, Montgomery, for appellees.
MITCHELL, Justice.
In this appeal, Dalen Gaines seeks monetary and equitable relief against Walker County law-enforcement officers for their role in what Gaines asserts was a delayed bond hearing. The trial court granted the law-enforcement officers’ motion to dismiss, and Gaines asks us to overturn that decision. We decline to do so.
For purposes of this appeal, we view the record in the light most favorable to Gaines, and we resolve factual disputes and ambiguities in his favor to the greatest reasonable extent. See Nelson v. Megginson, 165 So. 3d 567, 571 (Ala. 2014).
After Gaines failed to appear in the Walker Circuit Court to answer criminal charges, the court issued a warrant for his arrest. Three months later, Walker County Sheriff’s Deputy Christopher Doeur executed the warrant and took Gaines into custody. Afterward, Deputy Doeur filed a certificate of execution, informing the Walker Circuit Court that he had arrested Gaines and placed him in the Walker County jail.
After about a month, Gaines remained incarcerated and had not yet appeared in court. Gaines then filed a complaint against Walker County Sheriff Nick Smith and Deputy Doeur ("the Officers"), in both their official and individual capacities. He claimed -- under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 -- that they had violated his civil rights, and he also asserted state-law claims for negligence and wantonness. Gaines sought declaratory relief, injunctive relief, and unspecified monetary damages. The day after Gaines filed his complaint, the Walker Circuit Court set his criminal case for a hearing. Four days later, the trial court issued orders that released him on bond.
[1] Shortly after being released, Gaines was arrested on a separate capital-murder charge in Jefferson County; he is currently being held without bond on that charge. He faces additional charges in Jefferson County, along with a probation-revocation matter in Cullman County.
We take judicial notice of Gaines’s ongoing proceedings in Jefferson County and Cullman County. See Geer Bros. v. Crump, 349 So. 2d 577, 579 (Ala. 1977). Because mootness is an issue in this appeal, " ‘we may receive facts relevant to that issue; otherwise there would be no way to find out if an appeal has become moot.’ " South Alabama Gas Dist. v. Knight, 138 So. 3d 971, 976 (Ala. 2013) (quoting Clark v. K-Mart Corp., 979 F.2d 965, 967 (3d Cir. 1992)).
About four months after Gaines was arrested for capital murder, the Officers filed a motion to dismiss his suit based on theories of insufficiency of process, insufficiency of service of process, and failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Rule 12(b)(4)-(6), Ala. R. Civ. P. In an unexplained order and without a hearing, the trial court granted the Officers’ motion to dismiss with prejudice. Gaines timely appealed to this Court.
Standard of Review
[2–5] This Court reviews a ruling on a motion to dismiss " ‘without a presumption of correctness.’ " Pontius v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 915 So. 2d 557, 563 (Ala. 2005) (quoting Newman v. Savas, 878 So. 2d 1147, 1148-49 (Ala. 2003)). In conducting this review, we must determine "whether, when the allegations of the complaint are viewed most strongly in the pleader’s favor, it appears that the pleader could prove any set of circumstances that would entitle her to relief." Nance v. Matthews, 622 So. 2d 297, 299 (Ala. 1993). Granting a motion to dismiss is proper "only when it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of the claim that would entitle the plaintiff to relief." Id. We may, however, "affirm the circuit court’s judgment for any legal, valid reason, even one not raised in or considered by the circuit court, un- less due-process fairness principles require that the ground have been raised below and it was not." State v. Epic Tech, LLC, 373 So.3d 809, 812 (Ala. 2022).
Analysis
Gaines makes two primary arguments on appeal. First, he says that the trial court erred when it granted the Officers’ motion to dismiss without holding a hearing. Second, he argues that the trial court erred by dismissing the case for failure to state a claim. We reject both arguments.
A. The trial court’s failure to hold a hearing before granting the Officers’ motion to dismiss was harmless error
Gaines first argues that the trial court erred by failing to hold a hearing on the Officers’ motion to dismiss. Gaines contends that the language of Rule 78, Ala. R. Civ. P., the accompanying committee comments to that rule, and this Court’s previous interpretation of that rule require the trial court to conduct a hearing before granting a motion to dismiss.
[6] We begin with the text of Rule 78, which provides that "the court may enter an order denying a motion to dismiss without oral hearing." (Emphasis added.) The significance of the word "denying" in that rule is made clear by the negative-implication canon of interpretation, which indicates that " ‘[t]he expression of one thing implies the exclusion of others.’ " Martin v. Martin, 329 So. 3d 1242, 1245 (Ala. 2020) (quoting Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts § 10 at 107 (Thomson/West 2012)). Based on that canon, it follows that because Rule 78 allows a court to deny a motion to dismiss without an oral hearing, it does not allow a court to grant such a motion without a hearing.
[7] The committee comments accompanying Rule 78 as well as our precedent confirm this interpretation. The committee comments provide that if "the court has any inclination toward the granting of the motion to dismiss, a hearing will continue to be required." Committee Comments on 1973 Adoption of Rule 78, Ala. R. Civ. P. (emphasis added). We upheld this view of Rule 78 in Burgoon v. Alabama Department of Human Resources, 835 So. 2d 131 (Ala. 2002), in which we held that "[u]nder the plain language of [Rule 78] and the comments to the rule, a trial court may not grant a motion to dismiss without a hearing, although, in some circumstances, it may deny such a motion." Id. at 133.
Although the committee comments are " ‘not binding[,]’ " they may " ‘be highly persuasive.’ " Ex parte Aladdin Mfg. Corp., 305 So. 3d 214, 237 n.11 (Ala. 2019) (quoting Iverson v. Xpert Tune, Inc., 553 So. 2d 82, 88 (Ala. 1989)).
[8] Here, the trial court erred by granting the Officers’ motion to dismiss without holding a hearing; but that is not the end of the analysis. Our rules of procedure require us to affirm the decision below if the trial court’s error was harmless. See Rule 45, Ala. R. App. P. (prohibiting reversal of the judgment below unless "the error complained of has probably injuriously affected substantial rights of the parties"). We have consistently held that " ‘ " ‘[t]he burden of establishing that an erroneous ruling was prejudicial is on the appellant.’ " ’ " Pensacola Motor Sales, Inc. v. Daphne Auto., LLC, 155 So. 3d 930, 936 (Ala. 2013) (citations omitted). Therefore, Gaines must demonstrate to this Court that the lack of a hearing prejudiced him in a way that affected his substantial rights. See Rule 45.
Gaines fails to make that showing. In his initial brief to this Court, he focuses his argument on the fact that the trial court did not hold a hearing before granting the Officers’ motion to dismiss. But Gaines does not indicate in that brief how or why that error prejudiced him. Rather, he waits until his reply brief to address the harmless-error argument for the first time. His argument comes too late. See Douglas v. Roper, 374 So.3d 652, 672 (Ala. 2022) ("Arguments not raised in an appellant’s initial brief are deemed waived."). Consequently, Gaines has failed to carry his burden of demonstrating that the trial court’s error was prejudicial.
Even then, however, he makes only conclusory statements that "the trial court’s order dismissing plaintiff’s case with prejudice injuriously affected his substantial rights" and that "the trial court’s error in disregarding plaintiff’s right, under Rule 78[,] Ala. R. Civ. P., to be heard before granting the same was anything but harmless." Gaines’s reply brief at 25, 26, This is plainly insufficient -- and this Court has no duty to search the record on Gaines's behalf. See Chestang v. IPSCO Steel (Alabama), Inc., 50 So. 3d 418, 431 (Ala. 2010).
B. Gaines fails to state a plausible claim against the Officers
Gaines next asserts that the trial court erred by dismissing his case with prejudice based on a failure to state a plausible claim for relief. In his complaint, Gaines seeks monetary and equitable relief against the Officers in both their official and individual capacities. He makes several arguments to our Court in an effort to salvage his claims, but none of them are availing.
Gaines also argues that the trial court could not have granted the Officers’ motion to dismiss due to insufficient service of process. We need not address that argument, however, because we can resolve this appeal on the plausibility of Gaines's claims.
1. Gaines cannot assert a claim for damages against the Officers in their official capacities
[9] We begin by examining Gaines’s claims for monetary relief against the Officers in their official capacities under both state and federal law. First, State immunity bars Gaines’s state-law claims. Article I, § 14, of the Alabama Constitution of 1901 (Off. Recomp.) declares that "the State of Alabama shall never be made a defendant in any court of law or equity" and acts as a jurisdictional bar that "strips courts of all power to adjudicate claims against the State." Ex parte Pinkard, 373 So.3d 192, 198-99 (Ala. 2022). Our statutes likewise reinforce that any "officer, employee, or agent of the state … acting in his or her official capacity is immune from civil liability in any suit pursuant to Article I, Section 14, of the Constitution of Alabama of 1901." § 36-1-12(b), Ala. Code 1975. Therefore, those claims fail.
In his initial brief to our Court, Gaines implicitly renounces any claim for monetary relief against the Officers in their official capacities. But, because his complaint does not make a distinction between the Officers’ official and individual capacities with respect to his claims for monetary relief, we address this issue to clarify the scope of our and the trial court's subject-matter jurisdiction.
[10] Second, Gaines is prohibited from making § 1983 claims that seek monetary relief against the Officers in their official capacities. Our precedent plainly states that plaintiffs may not "assert a § 1983 claim for money damages against [State officials] in their official capacities." Ex parte Ruffin, 160 So. 3d 750, 757 (Ala. 2014) (citing Will v. Michigan Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71, 109 S.Ct. 2304, 105 L.Ed.2d 45 (1989)) (holding that a State official sued in his official capacity for damages is not a "person" under § 1983). We thus affirm the trial court’s decision to dismiss this category of Gaines’s § 1983 claims.
2. Gaines’s claims seeking equitable relief against the Officers are moot
[11] In his complaint, Gaines seeks two forms of equitable relief against the Officers in their official and individual capacities -- a declaratory judgment that the Officers’ actions violated his constitutional rights and "[p]rospective injunctive relief requiring defendants to comply with the express language of the writ and bring the plaintiff and those who are similarly situated immediately before the court so that they may secure their release …. " Unlike the claims for monetary relief against the Officers in their official capacities, which are impermissible, claims for equitable relief against State officers are permitted under certain circumstances. See Ex parte Moulton, 116 So. 3d 1119, 1131 (Ala. 2013) (furnishing causes of actions that fall outside of § 14’s prohibition on actions brought against the State); Alexander v. Hatfield, 652 So. 2d 1142, 1143 (Ala. 1994) (providing exceptions to State immunity enjoyed by sheriffs and deputy sheriffs for equitable-relief claims). Thus, the Officers do not have § 14 immunity against Gaines’s claims for equitable relief.
[12–14] But those claims still fail because they are moot. A case that is moot is nonjusticiable. Rogers v. Burch Corp., 313 So. 3d 555, 560 (Ala. 2020). And though the Officers did not move to dismiss Gaines’s complaint for a lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, " ‘[t]his Court must sua sponte recognize and address the lack of subject-matter jurisdiction owing to the lack of justiciability.’ " Id. (quoting Surles v. City of Ashville, 68 So. 3d 89, 92 (Ala. 2011)). We do so because a case must remain justiciable at all stages of review. South Alabama Gas Dist. v. Knight, 138 So. 3d 971, 974-75 (Ala. 2013). Here, Gaines’s requests for equitable relief became moot just four days after he filed the complaint because the trial court released him on bond, meaning that the trial court could no longer order Sheriff Smith (or Deputy Doeur) to release Gaines from jail.
[15] Gaines nonetheless argues that his claims for prospective injunctive relief are not moot because they fall under the exception for claims that are capable of repetition but evading review. See Veitch v. Friday, 314 So. 3d 1232, 1236 (Ala. 2020) ("Alabama law recognizes an exception to the mootness doctrine for questions capable of repetition but evading review …."). Gaines contends that he has failed to appear for court hearings on numerous occasions. Therefore, his argument goes, because he is a self-proclaimed dyed-in-the-wool bail-jumper, he asserts that he faces a realistic threat of future injury -- another arrest for failure to appear leading to a stay inside the Walker County jail.
We reject that argument for several reasons. First, we have previously held that injunctive relief is improper when "the likelihood of future harm is speculative." Poiroux v. Rich, 150 So. 3d 1027, 1043 (Ala. 2014). Here, the prospect that Gaines will encounter the same scenario is, at best, extremely remote. Gaines is currently being held without bond in Jefferson County while facing a capital-murder charge. Therefore, to encounter the same set of circumstances that produced this appeal, Gaines would first need to obtain a not-guilty verdict in his upcoming capital-murder case or complete his sentence if he is found guilty. He would then need to re- solve the other criminal matters in Jefferson County as well as the probation-revocation matter in Cullman County. After that, he would have to fail to appear to face criminal charges in Walker County. Even at that point, there is nothing that indicates how long Gaines would wait for a hearing after a hypothetical future arrest for failing to appear. It is exceedingly unlikely that he will ever face this issue again. Consequently, Gaines has failed to meet his burden of establishing that his claims for prospective injunctive relief meet the exception to mootness for claims that are capable of repetition yet evading review. For that reason, his claims seeking prospective injunctive relief are moot, and we affirm the trial court’s motion to dismiss those claims.
Section 13A-5-39(1), Ala. Code 1975, provides that adult defendants convicted of capital murder "shall be punished by a sentence of death or life imprisonment without parole …." Therefore, absent executive clemency or a guilty plea on a lesser offense, Gaines could never face the same issue again in Walker County if he is convicted of capital murder.
3. Gaines cannot obtain relief against the Officers under our separation-of-powers framework
[16] Gaines’s surviving claims seek monetary relief against the Officers in their individual capacities. To explain why it is impossible for Gaines to prevail on those claims, we must outline our law on the separation of powers in Alabama. In this State, "separation of powers is not merely an implicit ‘doctrine’ but rather an express command; a command stated with a forcefulness rivaled by few, if any, similar provisions in constitutions of other sovereigns." Ex parte James, 836 So. 2d 813, 815 (Ala. 2002). Indeed, Article III, § 42(a), of the Alabama Constitution of 1901 (Off. Recomp.) provides that "[t]he powers of the government of the State of Alabama are legislative, executive, and judicial." Likewise, "[t]he government of the State of Alabama shall be divided into three distinct branches: legislative, executive, and judicial." § 42(b). And, because we remain "a government of laws and not of individuals, … the legislative branch may not exercise the executive or judicial power, the executive branch may not exercise the legislative or judicial power, and the judicial branch may not exercise the legislative or executive power." § 42(c).
With that understanding, we must determine which branch of State government houses Sheriff Smith and Deputy Doeur. Article V, § 112, of the Alabama Constitution of 1901 (Off. Recomp.) provides that "[t]he executive department shall consist of … a sheriff for each county." Therefore, § 112 of our Constitution squarely classifies Sheriff Smith as an executive-branch officer. And our cases confirm that the same is true for Deputy Doeur. See Alexander, 652 So. 2d at 1144 (restating the principle that " ‘[t]he deputy sheriff is the alter ego of the sheriff’ " and that a " ‘deputy is legally an extension of the sheriff’ " (quoting Carr v. City of Florence, 916 F.2d 1521, 1526 (11th Cir. 1990))). Because the Officers are part of the State’s executive branch, the Alabama Constitution forbids them from exercising the legislative or judicial power. See § 42.
[17] Gaines argues that the Officers, namely, Sheriff Smith, "incarcerate indigent criminal defendants, such as Gaines, and allow them to remain incarcerated in the Walker County Jail for an indeterminable amount of time, or until such time the Warrant is recalled or the defendant is ordered to appear at a trial or a proceeding." Gaines’s brief at 8. But neither of the Officers has the authority to order him to appear -- only the trial judge does. And, trial judges -- in this case, a circuit judge -- are part of the judicial branch and exercise the judicial power. See Art. VI, § 139(a), Ala. Const. 1901 (Off. Recomp.) ("The judicial power of the state shall be vested exclusively in a unified judicial system which shall consist of [, among other courts,] … a trial court of general jurisdiction known as the circuit court …."). That power includes "the authority [of the trial court] to manage and control its docket." Ex parte Watters, 220 So. 3d 1093, 1098 (Ala. 2016); see also Rule 16(a), Ala. R. Jud. Admin. ("The presiding judges of the circuit court and district court, or their designees over whom they have supervisory authority, shall determine the calendaring of cases within their respective courts."). And the "power to decide whether a defendant is entitled to remain at large on bail is a judicial power." Ex parte State ex rel. Patterson, 268 Ala. 524, 528, 108 So. 2d 448, 451 (1958).
Contrary to Gaines’s allegations, the Officers have no authority to "bring Gaines, and other similarly situated indigent criminal defendants, immediately before the Court" for a hearing. Gaines’s brief at 8. Instead, the trial judge sets and conducts the hearing and makes the ultimate determination at the conclusion of that hearing. The judicial power is distinct from the authority exercised by executive-branch officers such as Sheriff Smith and Deputy Doeur. Gaines asks us to blend those roles together. We cannot, and instead must remain faithful to the separation of powers mandated by the Alabama Constitution. Because the Officers had neither the obligation nor the authority to schedule a hearing for Gaines, Gaines’s claims against the Officers in their individual capacities fail as a matter of law.
Conclusion
We affirm the trial court’s judgment. Although the trial court erred by not holding a hearing before granting the Officers’ motion to dismiss, the error was harmless. As to the claims against the Officers: Gaines may not bring claims against State officials in their official capacities seeking monetary relief; the claims for equitable relief are moot; and the separation-of-powers framework embedded in our State Constitution precludes Gaines from obtaining relief from the Officers in their individual capacities.
AFFIRMED.
Parker, C.J., concurs.
Shaw, Bryan, and Mendheim, JJ., concur in the result.