Summary
dismissing plaintiff's claim for deprivation of his legal documents and medical records
Summary of this case from Keesh v. GoordOpinion
9:98-CV-1224 (HGM/DEP)
May 10, 2002
CARTER, CONBOY, CASE, BLACKMORE, MALONEY LAIRD, P.C., OF COUNSEL: BLAIR WILLIAMS TODT, ESQ., Albany, New York, Attorneys for Plaintiff.
HON. ELIOT SPITZER, Attorney General of the State of New York, SEAN M. SEELY, ESQ., Assistant Attorney General, Albany, New York, Attorney for Defendants.
MEMORANDUM-DECISION AND ORDER
Plaintiff, a former prison inmate, instituted this action, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, on July 30, 1998, alleging various constitutional violations of his civil rights while he was incarcerated at the Coxsackie Correctional Facility. By order entered February 1, 2001, Chief Judge F.J. Scullin, Jr., accepted the Report and Recommendation of Magistrate Judge David Peebles, and granted summary judgment dismissing the complaint's claims against all defendants, except for the excessive force and assault claims made against defendants Fortier and Manna.
Plaintiff alleges that on July 29, 1996, defendants Fortier and Manna came to his room and while defendant Manna held his room door open, defendant Fortier assaulted him with a hard plastic food tray, inflicting a bloody gash above his right eye.
Presently before the court is a supplemental motion for summary judgment filed by defendants Fortier and Manna, pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 56, seeking dismissal of the complaint upon the ground that plaintiff did not exhaust his administrative remedies concerning his alleged assault and that these defendants are entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
At the time of the assault incident in question, the Prison Litigation Reform Act ("PLRA") was in full force and effect. According to this statute, "[n]o action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions under § 1983 of this title, or any other Federal law, by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility until such administrative remedies as are available are exhausted." 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). The Supreme Court recently decided that "PLRA's exhaustion requirement applies to all inmate suits about prison life, whether they involve general circumstances or particular episodes, and whether they allege excessive force or some other wrong." Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 122 S.Ct. 983, 992, 152 L.Ed.2d 12 (February 26, 2002). Therefore, plaintiff was required to exhaust his administrative remedies. Since plaintiff maintains that he exhausted his administrative remedies, the court must examine the efforts made by plaintiff to see if they meet the exhaustion requirements of the PLRA.
In an attachment to his complaint, plaintiff states that after his alleged assault by defendant Fortier, he was instructed to file a complaint of what had taken place with Deputy Superintendent/Security R. Vanderbeck. A copy of his complaint, signed and dated August 1, 1996, regarding the incident is attached to the complaint marked Exhibit "A." In his reply to plaintiff's complaint dated August 15, 1996, Exhibit "A-5," Deputy Superintendent/Security Vanderbeck notified plaintiff that his "complaint letter reporting physical abuse and harassment by C.O.'s Fortier and Manna was extensively investigated. Upon review, evidence to substantiate your claim is lacking." The notification document did not contain an appeal statement or otherwise indicate that the decision could be appealed.
Plaintiff's other attachments to the complaint include copies of ten letters to Dominic Mantello, Superintendent of Coxsacki Correctional Facility, two letters to Glenn S. Good, Acting DOCS Commissioner complaining about mistreatment by defendants Forties and Manna, two letters to DOCS Commissioner Glenn S. Good, complaining about his assault, and two felony complaints made to the District Attorney of Green County accusing defendants Forties, Manna and Sheedy of conspiring to assault, and assaulting plaintiff. The District Attorney declined to prosecute the cases because of the nature of the allegations, and forwarded the complaints to the New York State Inspector General, who, plaintiff alleges, took no action.
New York provides an elaborate administrative grievance process for inmates in New York State correctional facilities. See New York Correction Law § 138, Official Compilation of Codes Rule and Regulations of the State of New York ("NYCCRR") Title 7, § 710, et seq. This process sets forth both a formal grievance procedure, 7 NYCCRR § 701.7, and an expedited, less formalized grievance procedure for "harassment" put forward in 7 NYCCRR 7 § 701.11.
The expedited procedure is applicable to grievances which arise "as a result of employee misconduct meant . . . to harm an inmate." See 7 NYCCRR 7 § 701.11(a). An inmate can file a grievance concerning an assault upon a prisoner by correctional officers by following the less formalized procedure elaborated in § 701.11. Under this expedited procedure for harassment, an inmate need only "report" the purported harassment "to the immediate supervisor of the employee" who allegedly committed the misconduct in order to trigger the expedited grievance process. § 711.(b)(1). The inmate's "allegations" must be given a grievance number and recorded in sequence. § 701.11(b)(2). Thereafter, the Superintendent or his designee must determine whether the grievance, if true, would represent a bona fide case of harassment. § 710.11(b)(3). The Superintendent must make a decision within twelve working days of receipt of the grievance and transmit the decision, with reasons stated, to the grievant. § 701.11((b)(5). If the grievant wishes to appeal the decision, he must file a notice of decision to appeal with the inmate IPG clerk within four working days of receipt of the decision. § 701.11(b)(7).
Nothing in the applicable regulations indicates that the inmate's "report" must consist of a formal grievance complaint such as that required pursuant to the normal grievance procedure enumerated in § 701.7(a)(1). In fact, § 701.11(b)(1) states that the inmate's report will not preclude the submission of a formal grievance procedure pursuant in § 701.7, See § 701.11(b)(1). Furthermore, where § 701.7(a)(1) specifically requires that the inmate's complaint be submitted on Inmate Grievance Complaint Form # 2131, and § 701.7(a)(1)(i) outlines the specific content that the inmate must include on that form, § 710.11(b)(2) refers to the required report as the "inmate's allegations of misconduct and does not specify that those allegations should be submitted on a particular form or should discuss particular information. The grievance provisions suggest that the "report" does not represent a formal grievance and that the report may consist of allegations of employee harassment and does not have to be set forth in the same type of the more formal dictates of § 701.7. Permitting inmates to complain about harassment in this way without compelling them to submit a "formal grievance" is completely in line with the intent of § 701.11, which provides for an expedited procedure precisely because "[a]llegations of employee harassment are of particular concern to the administrators of the department facilities." § 710.11.
In the instant case, plaintiff's letter of July 29, 1996, plainly reported his alleged assault on that date by defendants Forties and Manna, and clearly met the employee misconduct requirements for setting in motion an informal grievance proceeding. Why then, were the mandated directions of § 701.11(b)(2) not followed that "All allegations of employee misconduct shall be given a grievance number and recorded in sequence. All documents submitted with the allegations must be forwarded to the superintendent by close of business that day"? (emphasis added). If prison personnel had properly adhered to the informal grievance procedures, the grievance denial form plaintiff received would have contained an appeal statement box in which plaintiff could set out his appeal arguments, thereby exhausting his administrative remedies. The Second Circuit has explained that the resolution of a grievance "through informal channels satisfies the exhaustion requirement, as under the administrative scheme applicable to New York prisoners, grieving through informal channels is an available remedy." Marvin v. Goord, 255 F.3d 40, 43 n. 3 (2d Cir. 2001)
Prison authorities cannot have it both ways — they cannot obstruct an inmate's pursuit of administrative remedies exhaustion by failing to comply with statutory procedure on the one hand, and then claim that the inmate did not properly exhaust these remedies on the other.
Accordingly, the supplementary summary judgment motion made by defendants Fortier and Manna is DENIED.
This case was originally scheduled for trial on May 6, 2002. It will be rescheduled for trial on June 3, 2002, at the Federal District Courthouse in Syracuse, New York
IT IS SO ORDERED.