Opinion
Civil No. 01-5815 (JBS).
March 3, 2003
Gregg L. Zeff, Esquire, Frost Zeff, Cherry Hill, New Jersey, Counsel for Plaintiff Diane Gabriel.
Matthew B. Wieliczko, Esquire, Zeller Bryant, L.L.P., Cherry Hill, New Jersey, Counsel for Defendant Delaware River Port Authority.
Tracy Asper Wolak, Esquire, Archer Greiner, P.C., Haddonfield, New Jersey, Counsel for Defendant Jack Bruder.
OPINION
Plaintiff Diane Gabriel brings this action alleging that her employer, the Delaware River Port Authority ("DRPA"), and her supervisor Jack Bruder ("Bruder"), sexually harassed and discriminated against her during the course of her employment. In her complaint, plaintiff alleged that the defendants violated New Jersey's Conscientious Employee Protection Act, N.J.S.A. 34:19-1 (Count I); New Jersey public policy (Count II); the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination, N.J.S.A. 10:5-1, et seq. (Count III); Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e et seq. (Count IV-VI); and her Fourteenth Amendment right to equal protection pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Count VII). The DRPA was named in the first six of the plaintiff's claims, while Bruder was named in Counts I-III, V, and VII. Gabriel sought injunctive relief, and compensatory and punitive damages.
Each defendant individually filed a motion pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) to dismiss plaintiff's complaint against it. On July 3, this Court granted in part, and denied in part, each defendant's motion to dismiss. (Order 7/3/02.)
This Court dismissed, with prejudice, all of the plaintiff's state law claims (Counts I-III); her Title VII unlawful retaliation claim against the DRPA (Count VI); and her allegation that Bruder violated Title VII's prohibitions against discriminatory employment practices (Count V). (Id.) The Court denied the defendants' motions to dismiss Counts IV and V against the DRPA and Count VII against Bruder. (Id.)
Presently before this Court is the Plaintiff's motion for partial reconsideration of this Court's Order and Opinion of July 3, 2002, as amended July 9, 2002. Plaintiff requests that this Court reinstate Count VI of her complaint, which alleges that defendant DRPA violated Title VII by retaliating against her after she had complained about Bruder's actions. In the alternative, Gabriel requests that she be allowed to amend her complaint to specifically plead the adverse employment action for her Title VII claim. Defendant DRPA filed its brief in opposition on November 15, 2002, and defendant Bruder, by letter dated November 21, 2002, joins in DRPA's opposition. For the reasons forth below, this Court grants the plaintiff's motion for reconsideration and reinstates Count VI of her complaint.
I. DISCUSSION
A. Motion for Reconsideration
Plaintiff moves for reconsideration under Local Civil Rule 7.1(g), alleging that this Court "overlooked" the holding of Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506 (2002), in its decision to dismiss Count VI. (Pl. Br. at 1.) Gabriel contends that this Court held her Title VII retaliation claim (Count VI) to a heightened pleading standard, which is contrary to the holding in Swierkiewicz. (Pl. Br. at 1.)
In her brief, plaintiff moves for reconsideration under Local Rule 12I. (Pl. Br. 7/18/02, at 1.) Effective April 1, 1997, Rule 12I, which governed motions for reargument in the District of New Jersey was renumbered Rule 7.1(g). Damiano v. Sony Music Entertainment, 975 F. Supp. 623, 634 n. 1 (D.N.J. 1996). This Court assumes that Plaintiff is relying on Local Rule 7.1(g) to bring her motion for reargument.
Local Civil Rule 7.1(g) governs motions for reargument in the District of New Jersey. Counsel is required to submit to the court, within 10 days of the entry of judgment that she would like reconsidered, a brief outlining the "matters or controlling decisions which counsel believes the Judge . . . has overlooked." L. Civ. R. 7.1(g). Whether to allow reargument is a matter solely within the discretion of the court. Williams v. Sullivan, 818 F. Supp. 92, 93 (D.N.J. 1993).
A controlling decision is one that is binding upon this court. Polizzi Meats v. Aetna Life Ins., 931 F. Supp. 328, 340 (D.N.J. 1996).
Rule 7.1(g) "does not contemplate a Court looking to matters which were not originally presented." Damiano v. Sony Music Entertainment, 975 F. Supp. 623, 634 (D.N.J. 1996) (citingOritani Sav. Loan Ass'n v. Fidelity Deposit Co of Md., 744 F. Supp. 1311, 1314 (D.N.J. 1990)). Rather, motions for reargument succeed only where a "dispositive factual matter or controlling decision of law was presented to the Court but not considered." Damiano, 975 F. Supp. at 634 (citing Pelham v. United States, 661 F. Supp. 1063, 1065 (D.N.J. 1987)); see also Williams, 818 F. Supp. at 93. However, reargument will only be granted when the matters overlooked might reasonably have resulted in a different conclusion if the court had considered them. Panna v. Firstrust Savings Bank, 760 F. Supp. 432, 435 (D.N.J. 1991).
Here, the issue of Swierkiewicz's rejection of a heightened pleading requirement for suits brought under Title VII was addressed in the plaintiff's memorandum in opposition to the defendants' motions for dismissal under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). (Pl. Mem. 4/5/02, at 17.) However, in this Court's Opinion dismissing Count VI of the complaint, this Court did not discuss the effect of Swierkiewicz on that claim. This Court exercises its discretion to do so now, and will reinstate plaintiff's Count VI.
B. Title VII Pleading Requirements
In Swierkiewicz, the Supreme Court held that Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)'s simplified pleading standard applies to claims of discrimination under Title VII. 534 U.S. at 513. Rule 8(a)(2) only requires that a plaintiff provide a "short, plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief."Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 512 (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2)). The purpose of allegations laid out in the complaint is to "give the defendant fair notice of what the plaintiff's claim is and the grounds on which it rests." Id.
Even if it may appear from the face of the complaint that recovery by the plaintiff is very remote, as long as the allegations satisfy Rule 8(a)'s requirements, then they survive a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). Id. at 515. Dismissal of a claim is allowed "only if it is clear that no relief could be granted under any set of facts that could be proved consistent with the allegations."Id. at 514 (quoting Hishon v. King Spaulding, 467 U.S. 69, 73 (1984)).
In Swierkiewicz, the plaintiff brought suit against his employer, asserting claims of racial discrimination in violation of Title VII, and under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA). 534 U.S. at 509. The Supreme Court reversed the Second Circuit's affirmance of the district court's order dismissing the complaint for failure to allege a prima facie case of employment discrimination under McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973). Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 510. The Court rejected the Second Circuit's determination that because the petitioner "ha[d] not adequately alleged a prima facie case, in that he ha[d] not adequately alleged circumstances that support an inference of discrimination," dismissal was appropriate. Id. at 509. The Supreme Court held that a "prima facie case is an evidentiary standard, not a pleading requirement," and it was inappropriate to require a plaintiff to make out a prima facie case in his pleadings. Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 510.
To make out a prima facie case of employment discrimination under Title VII, a complainant must show "(i) that he belongs to a racial minority; (ii) that he applied and was qualified for a job for which the employer was seeking applicants; (iii) that, despite his qualifications, he was rejected; and (iv) that, after his rejection, the position remained open and the employer continued to seek applicants from persons of complainant's qualifications." McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973).
As the Supreme Court discussed, a federal court's review of the sufficiency of a complaint is limited to whether a claimant is entitled to offer proof in support of her claims, not whether the claimant will ultimately succeed. Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 511 (citing Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974)). Rule 8(a)'s simplified notice pleading standard relies upon liberal discovery to define disputed facts and issues, and summary judgment proceedings, Fed.R.Civ.P. 56, to dispose of unmeritorious claims. Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 512 (citingConley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47-48 (1957)).
In its opinion dated July 3, 2002, this Court found that Gabriel had not stated a claim for Title VII retaliation underCharleton v. Paramus Bd. of Educ., 25 F.3d 194, 201 (3d Cir. 1994). (Opinion 7/3/02, at 18.) In Charleton, which was decided before Swierkiewicz, the Third Circuit examined a district court's granting of summary judgment in favor of the employer on an employee's Title VII retaliation claim. Id. at 195. In that case, the court of appeals applied a "prima facie" case standard to test the evidentiary sufficiency of the plaintiff's claims [allegations], a standard specifically rejected in Swierkiewicz. Charleton, 25 F.3d at 201.
In order to state a claim for retaliation, a plaintiff must establish facts that could show plaintiff: 1) engaged in a protected employee activity; 2) suffered an adverse employment decision; and 3) that there was a causal connection between the protected activity and the adverse employment decision. See Charlton v. Paramus Bd. of Educ., 25 F.3d 194, 201 (3d Cir. 1994).
In reconsidering Gabriel's allegation of unlawful retaliation under Title VII, in light of Swierkiewicz, this Court finds that plaintiff's Count VI satisfies the requirements of Rule 8(a)(2).
Count VI of plaintiff's complaint reads "[t]he actions of [DRPA] in retaliating against Plaintiff violate [Title VII]." (Compl't at 9.) An employer may not retaliate against an employee for opposing a practice that is unlawful under Title VII. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a).
In the body of her complaint, Gabriel alleges that beginning in 1994, defendant Bruder, her supervisor, sexually harassed her and created a hostile work environment. (Compl't at 2-4.) She alleges that after she formally complained to DRPA officials about Bruder's conduct, and they addressed his conduct, Bruder continued in his capacity as her supervisor and engaged in retaliatory acts, because she had complained about his behavior. (Compl't at 3-4.) These "retaliatory acts" included, but were not limited to, that Bruder accused plaintiff of tampering with a software program; that Bruder made daily comments to her co-workers about her work and how her complaints had limited his career; that Bruder excessively scrutinized plaintiff's work; and that Bruder continued as plaintiff's supervisor. (Id.)
The law in this Circuit is clear that individual employees cannot be liable under Title VII. See Sheridan v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours and Co. 100 F.3d 1061, 1077-78 (3d Cir. 1996) (en banc), cert. denied, 521 U.S. 1129 (1997). Liability is imputed to an employer for an "actionable hostile work environment created by a supervisor with immediate (or successively higher) authority over the employee." Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 807 (1998)). Thus, this Court imputes to the DRPA, for purposes of this motion, the allegations that Bruder retaliated against Gabriel in violation of Title VII.
The gravamen of this motion for reargument is whether, underSwierkiewicz, Gabriel has included enough in her complaint to give sufficient notice to the DRPA of her Title VII retaliation claim and the grounds upon which it rests. See Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 513 (citing Conley, 355 U.S. at 47). Plaintiff has adequately provided DRPA with notice that she intends to sue for retaliation under Title VII. She has listed instances on which she is basing that claim. Whether or not the claim turns out to have merit, Count VI satisfies the liberal notice pleading standard of Rule 8(a). Unmeritorious claims which pass muster under Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a) are to be addressed at summary judgment proceedings. Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 512 (citingConley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47-48 (1957)).
Because this court grants plaintiff's motion for reconsideration and will reinstate Count VI of her complaint, plaintiff's request for leave to amend her complaint to plead her claim in Count VI with more specificity will be dismissed as moot.
II. CONCLUSION
For the reasons discussed above, plaintiff's motion for reconsideration will be granted, and Count VI of her complaint reinstated. In addition, her request for leave to file her proposed Second Amended Complaint will be dismissed as moot. The accompanying Order will be entered.
ORDER
THIS MATTER comes before the Court upon plaintiff's motion for reconsideration of this Court's Opinion and Order of July 3, 2002, as amended July 9, 2002, with respect to the dismissal of Count VI as to defendant Delaware River Port Authority of Pennsylvania and New Jersey, and, in the alternative, for leave to file an amended complaint [Docket Item 17-1]; and the Court having reviewed the parties's submissions, and for the reasons stated in the Opinion of today's date,
IT IS on this ____ day of March, 2003, hereby
ORDERED that plaintiff's motion for reconsideration be, and hereby is, GRANTED; and
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Claim VI of the plaintiff's complaint be, and hereby is, REINSTATED. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that plaintiff's request for leave to file an amended complaint be, and hereby is, DISMISSED AS MOOT.