Opinion
No. 18744.
July 7, 1961. Rehearing Denied July 25, 1961.
Max N. Osborn, Thornton Hardie, Jr., Midland, Tex. (Turpin, Kerr, Smith Dyer, Midland, Tex., of counsel), for appellant.
John J. Watts, Odessa, Tex., for appellee.
Before TUTTLE, Chief Judge, and CAMERON and JONES, Circuit Judges.
Plaintiff-appellee, the husband of the injured party, brought this action in the District Court for the Western District of Texas, Pecos Division, for the personal injuries allegedly suffered as a result of Mrs. Bell's falling in a store owned and operated by appellant. A motion for a directed verdict for the defendant was denied and the case was allowed to be considered by the jury. A judgment was awarded appellee in the amount of $30,000.00. From the entry of that judgment the appellant brings this appeal.
The motion, so far as here relevant, was based on the grounds:
The facts may be briefly summarized. Mrs. Bell, the plaintiff's wife, testified that on January 5, 1958, she entered appellant's store for the purpose of purchasing a cup of coffee. It had been raining and the streets were quite wet. After entering the store, she walked about half way to the coffee counter, then slipped and fell. She testified that after her fall she noticed a puddle of water where she fell and some other water nearby being mopped up by a porter. Other witnesses, the employees of the store, testified that the floor was completely dry at the point of her fall.
It is well established by the Courts of Texas that "when injury is caused by a foreign substance upon a floor which rendered it slippery or unsafe for use" the party asserting the liability of the owner of the premises must establish:
"1. That the defendant put the foreign substance upon the floor, or
"2. That the defendant knew the foreign substance was on the floor and wilfully or negligently failed to remove it, or
"3. That the foreign substance had been upon the floor for such a period of time that it would have been discovered and removed by the defendant, had the defendant exercised ordinary care." H.E. Butt Grocery Co. v. Johnson, Tex.Civ. App., 226 S.W.2d 501, at page 502; see also Beard v. Henke Pillot, Inc., Tex.Civ.App., 314 S.W. 844, at page 845; O'Neal v. J. Weingarten, Inc., Tex.Civ.App., 328 S.W.2d 793, at page 794.
Upon a careful reading of the testimony offered during the course of the trial, we are forced to the conclusion that the appellee totally failed to introduce evidence which might satisfy the requirements of the Texas rule which we have set out above. There was no proof of any kind that the management knew of the presence of the water; nor was there any proof showing how long the water had been on the floor. Having failed to meet that burden placed upon him, it must follow that the appellee was not entitled to recover for the injuries suffered by his wife and that the trial court erred in refusing to grant the appellant's motion for an instructed verdict.
Accordingly the judgment entered by the District Court must be Reversed and the cause Remanded for the entry of a judgment for the defendant.