Opinion
No. HHD CV10-5035139
October 19, 2010
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION AND ORDER
I
Judith K. Fusari (Fusari) seeks to institute an action against Perry Zinn-Rowthorn, associate attorney general (Zinn-Rowthorn), through an application for waiver of fees pursuant to General Statutes § 52-259b. Fusari alleges that she is unable to pay the filing fees or marshal fees due to her financial condition. Inasmuch as Fusari meets the financial requirements of subsection (b) of the statute, this court has no discretion and, therefore, waives the filing fee.
Section 52-259b provides: "(a) In any civil or criminal matter, if the court finds that a party is indigent and unable to pay a fee or fees payable to the court or to pay the cost of service of process, the court shall waive such fee or fees and the cost of service of process shall be paid by the state.
"(b) There shall be a rebuttable presumption that a person is indigent and unable to pay a fee or fees or the cost of service of process if (1) such person receives public assistance, or (2) such person's income after taxes, mandatory wage deductions and child care expenses is one hundred twenty-five per cent or less of the federal poverty level. For purposes of this subsection, `public assistance' includes, but is not limited to, state-administered general assistance, temporary family assistance, aid to the aged, blind and disabled, supplemental nutrition assistance and Supplemental Security Income.
"(c) Nothing in this section shall preclude the court from finding that a person whose income does not meet the criteria of subsection (b) of this section is indigent and unable to pay a fee or fees or the cost of service of process. If an application for the waiver of the payment of a fee or fees or the cost of service of process is denied, the court clerk shall, upon the request of the applicant, schedule a hearing on the application."
II
According to documents attached to Fusari's proposed complaint, Fusari has apparently filed multiple claims with the claims commissioner attempting to obtain permission to sue various judges, among others in the judicial branch. In defense of at least some of these claims, Zinn-Rowthorn moved to dismiss them on the grounds of absolute judicial immunity and mootness. Fusari now files a complaint, dated September 21, 2010, against Zinn-Rowthorn for asserting absolute judicial immunity and mootness. Fusari's complaint contains counts labeled as "legal malpractice," "incompetence," "deprivation of justice," "discrimination bias," "denying," "aiding and abetting," "abuse and use," "obstruction of justice," "force," "threatening," "coercion," "hate crime," "abandonment," "cruel and unusual punishment," "rejection," "breach of the Hippocratic oath," "humiliation," "battering," "accessory," "tampering," "torture," "harassing," "bribes," "conspiring," "risk of injury," "risk of endangerment," "empowering criminals," "manipulation," "breaking and entering" and "robbery."
Fusari's complaint refers to this court and "Judge J.B. O'Connell." The papers attached to the complaint contain a partial position statement, presumably authored by Zinn-Rowthorn, addressing actions that this court and "Judge J.B. O'Connell" allegedly took with respect to a few of Fusari's suits or proposed suits.
Zinn-Rowthorn apparently filed position statements along with assistant attorney general, Kirsten S.P. Rigney. Fusari has filed two separate suits against Rigney. One of which seems to contain almost identical allegations to those contained in the present complaint. The other complaint against Rigney refers to Andrew Holden, assistant clerk in the judicial district of New Britain, and "judges," but does not specify which judges. The papers attached to the complaint contain a position statement by Zinn-Rowthorn and Rigney addressing different actions that Judges Pittman, Graham, D'Addabbo, Aurigemma and Sheldon have allegedly taken on some of Fusari's suits or proposed suits.
"[I]t is the established policy of the Connecticut courts to be solicitous of pro se litigants and when it does not interfere with the rights of other parties to construe the rules of practice liberally in favor of the pro se party . . . Although we allow pro se litigants some latitude, the right of self-representation provides no attendant license not to comply with relevant rules of procedural and substantive law." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Solomon v. Connecticut Medical Examining Board, 85 Conn.App. 854, 861, 859 A.2d 932 (2004), cert. denied, 273 Conn. 906, 868 A.2d 748 (2005).
In In re 34 Fee Waiver Applications by Frank Perrelli, Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven (October 27, 2008, Lager, J.), the court stated: "Practice Book § 10-1 requires each pleading to `contain a plain and concise statement of the material facts' and a signature on a pleading constitutes `a certificate . . . that to the best of the signer's knowledge, information and belief there is good ground to support it.' Practice Book § 4-2(b). This court possesses inherent authority to limit the filing of frivolous or repetitive lawsuits that ultimately are destined for withdrawal or dismissal . . . As the United States Supreme Court has observed in a somewhat analogous setting, a finding of factual frivolousness is appropriate when the facts alleged rise to the level of the irrational or the wholly incredible." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.)
In the present case, the proposed suit interferes with the rights of the other party, Zinn Rowthorn, and fails to comply with our rules. It is clear from a review of the above allegations, reading them in the light most favorable to Fusari, she seeks to institute this suit because she disagrees with Zinn Rowthorn's assertion of absolute judicial immunity and mootness as grounds to dismiss Fusari's claims. This should be addressed in her claims. See generally Hatch v. Spofford, 22 Conn. 485, 494 (1853). Additionally, Fusari's allegations, particularly those that are of a more criminal nature, are clearly irrational and improper. Furthermore, the court has no subject matter jurisdiction in a money damages action against a state employee because the state, through the claims commissioner, has not waived its sovereign immunity. See Miller v. Egan, 265 Conn. 301, 317-18, 828 A.2d 549 (2003). Therefore, the court dismisses this case. See Soracco v. Williams Scotsman, Inc., 292 Conn. 86, 91, 971 A.2d 1 (2009) ("concerns regarding subject matter jurisdiction implicate the court's fundamental authority and may properly be raised and decided by the court sua sponte").
Fusari seeks $300 million in damages among other things.
This court is mindful that Fusari has brought claims with the claims commissioner complaining about this court's actions. It is also aware that Fusari is indiscriminately filing suits and claims against any judicial authority or employee that has taken any action in any of her cases. See footnote 3. Based upon the myriad cases and claims that she has filed, there is no reason to believe that this pattern will end.
This court cannot allow Fusari to impede the administration of justice by bringing claims or suing every judge, among others, in the judicial district or in the state. See Andersen v. Roszkowski, 681 F.Sup. 1284, 1289 (N.D.Ill. 1988) ("[t]he Court will not allow plaintiffs to impede the administration of justice by suing every district court judge [in this district] until their case is transferred out of the Seventh Circuit"), aff'd, 894 F.2d 1338 (7th Cir. 1990). It has long been said that "where all [judges] are disqualified, none are disqualified." See State v. Fuller, 56 Conn.App. 592, 630, 744 A.2d 931 (agreeing with reasoning and result reached by trial judge on defendant's pretrial motion to disqualify him), cert. denied, 252 Conn. 949, 748 A.2d 298, cert. denied, 531 U.S. 911, 121 S.Ct. 262, 148 L.Ed.2d 190 (2000). Given Fusari's current practice, no judge in the Hartford judicial district, or other districts, will soon be able to decide anything involving Fusari if this court and others recuse themselves because of Fusari's filing of indiscriminate claims. Thus, this court decides this matter and will decide others out of necessity.
III
In memoranda of decision, dated March 30, 2010, in Fusari v. Urbaniak, Superior Court, judicial district of Hartford, Docket No. CV 10 5034720, and Fusari v. Merck, Sharp Dohme, Superior Court, judicial district of Hartford, Docket No. CV 10 5034719, this court noted a troubling escalation in the number of suits filed by Fusari in recent years. At that time, the court counted more than seventy actions filed since 2008. Since then, Fusari has filed several more actions bringing her total to over 100 cases filed since 2008. So far in 2010, she has filed dozens of actions in three different judicial districts, not including the many cases she initiates today.
But for the specific language of § 52-259b that gives the court no discretion on the waiver of the filing fee upon a proper showing of indigency, many of her complaints would presumably not have been filed. Yet, because of the statute, Fusari's filing fees are waived, her cases are filed and the state's resources are wasted.
From the sheer volume of the cases initiated, it would appear that Fusari is unwilling or incapable of considering the merits of her proposed claims or of abiding by the procedures that all must follow in bringing and prosecuting a claim. This may be occurring because the state's taxpayers carry the financial burden of her filing the proposed claims. See In re Sindram, 498 U.S. 177, 180, 111 S.Ct. 596, 112 L.Ed.2d 599 (1991) ("[p]ro se petitioners have a greater capacity than most to disrupt the fair allocation of judicial resources, because they are not subject to the financial considerations — filing fees and attorneys fees — that deter other litigants from filing frivolous petitions"). This court in no way wishes to prevent Fusari from seeking to file legitimate claims, but it cannot tolerate redundant or frivolous ones in light of its limited resources and its obligation to ensure that its resources "are allocated in a way that promotes the interests of justice." See In re McDonald, 489 U.S. 180, 184, 109 S.Ct. 993, 103 L.Ed.2d 158 (1989).
As stated above, "[t]he policy of the court is to be solicitous to the self-represented. However, the right of self-representation provides no attendant license not to comply with relevant rules of procedural and substantive law . . . Practice Book § 10-1 requires each pleading to `contain a plain and concise statement of the material facts' and a signature on a pleading constitutes `a certificate . . . that to the best of the signer's knowledge, information and belief there is good ground to support it.' Practice Book § 4-2(b). This court possesses inherent authority to limit the filing of frivolous or repetitive lawsuits that ultimately are destined for withdrawal or dismissal." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) See In re 34 Fee Waiver Applications by Frank Perrelli, supra, Superior Court.
In light of these principles, the court finds that Fusari's proposed pleadings have become unduly burdensome. The court takes judicial notice that most of Fusari's cases have been dismissed and that she has brought several suits claiming to enforce judgments rendered in her favor in other suits when in fact the underlying suits were dismissed. Consequently, the court concludes that it has the inherent authority to review and dismiss, sua sponte, all proposed complaints that are frivolous or redundant or that do not state a cognizable claim. Although there is nothing this court can do about the entry and filing fees that Fusari has incurred; see footnote 6; the taxpayers of this state have at least been saved, and should not have to bear the cost of, the fees for service of process. A copy of this memorandum of decision and order shall be forwarded by the clerk to Fusari, Zinn-Rowthorn and the chief clerk of every judicial district in the state.