Opinion
23A-CR-2718
08-09-2024
Michael S. Funkhouser, Appellant-Defendant v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT John P. Brinson Evansville, Indiana. ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE Theodore E. Rokita, Attorney General of Indiana George P. Sherman, Supervising Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana.
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this Memorandum Decision is not binding precedent for any court and may be cited only for persuasive value or to establish res judicata, collateral estoppel, or law of the case.
Appeal from the Posey Circuit Court The Honorable Craig S. Goedde, Judge Trial Court Cause No. 65C01-2108-F2-469
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT John P. Brinson Evansville, Indiana.
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE Theodore E. Rokita, Attorney General of Indiana George P. Sherman, Supervising Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana.
MEMORANDUM DECISION
FOLEY, JUDGE.
[¶1] Michael S. Funkhouser ("Funkhouser") pleaded guilty to six counts, the most serious of which was Level 3 felony possession of methamphetamine, and he received an aggregate sentence of twelve years in the Indiana Department of Correction ("the DOC"), with eight years suspended to community corrections. Funkhouser now appeals and presents two issues, which we restate as follows:
I. Whether Funkhouser was entitled to credit time for his placement on pretrial home detention when Funkhouser violated the conditions of that pretrial placement; and
II. Whether remand is warranted because the trial court improperly retained $12,988 of the cash bond for the payment of community corrections fees due in the future.
[¶2] We conclude that the trial court properly denied Funkhouser credit time based on his violations of pretrial home detention. However, applying Sandoval v. State, 70 N.E.3d 889 (Ind.Ct.App. 2017), we conclude that the court erred in retaining a portion of the bond for prospective community corrections fees. We therefore vacate that portion of the order retaining $12,988 for prospective fees.
Facts and Procedural History
[¶3] On August 12, 2021, the State filed an eight-count information against Funkhouser consisting of: Count 1-dealing in methamphetamine as a Level 2 felony; Count 2-possession of methamphetamine as a Level 3 felony; Count 3-disarming a law enforcement officer as a Level 5 felony; Count 4-battery against a public safety official as a Level 6 felony; Count 5-resisting law enforcement as a Level 6 felony; Count 6-dealing in a Schedule II controlled substance as a Level 6 felony; Count 7-possession of a controlled substance as a Level 6 felony; and Count 8-possession of paraphernalia as a Class C misdemeanor. The trial court initially set a cash bond of $100,000. See Appellant's App. Vol. 2 p. 47. At a status conference, Funkhouser requested a bond reduction. The trial court took the request under advisement and later reduced the cash bond to $25,000, specifying that a "condition of bond [was] that [Funkhouser] shall immediately report to Posey County Probation for electronic monitoring and pre-trial services." Id. at 7. On September 27, 2021, Funkhouser's mother, Kimberly Bauer ("Bauer"), posted the $25,000 cash bond on behalf of Funkhouser. In doing so, Bauer executed a written agreement acknowledging the terms of the bond. Specifically, Bauer acknowledged that, "pursuant to I.C. [§] 35-33-8-3.2(a)(2), upon disposition of [the] case, the bond will be subject to deduction of" certain amounts "if applicable[.]" Id. at 59. The document listed "[f]ines, [j]udgments, and/or [c]ourt [c]osts[.]" Id. The document also listed "[p]robation user fees," and there was a clause for "[a]ny other fees, costs, or deductions authorized, or required, by Indiana law." Id.
I.C. § 35-48-4-1.1(a)(2).
I.C. § 35-44.1-3-2(b).
I.C. § 35-42-2-1(c)(1).
I.C. § 35-44.1-3-1(a)(1).
I.C. § 35-48-4-2(a)(1).
I.C. § 35-48-4-7(a).
I.C. § 35-48-4-8.3(b)(1).
The written bond agreement referred to Funkhouser as the defendant and contained a line for "Defendant Signature," however, there is no signature on that line. See Appellant's App. Vol. 2 p. 59.
[¶4] In February 2022, the parties requested a change of plea hearing. The trial court scheduled the hearing and ordered the preparation of a presentence investigation report. However, plea negotiations fell through. Meanwhile, on April 13, 2022, the State petitioned to revoke Funkhouser's bond based on travel to unapproved locations. See id. at 98-105. The trial court issued a bench warrant, and Funkhouser was arrested. The trial court held an evidentiary hearing on the petition to revoke, which it granted in July 2022. See id. at 122. The court increased Funkhouser's bond by $2,500 and specified that, "[a]s a condition of bond, [Funkhouser] shall immediately report to Posey County Community Corrections for supervision (including drug testing) and to be placed on electronic monitoring." Id. The trial court also said that it would "have no tolerance for any future violations of bond." Id. On July 27, 2022, Funkhouser posted the additional $2,500, with Bauer serving as surety. In doing so, Funkhouser and Bauer executed a differently worded agreement wherein they acknowledged the bond "shall be posted in [Funkhouser's] name only," and was "subject to payment of court costs, fines, restitutions, probation fees, public defender fees, and any other cost[s] or fees ordered by the Court in this or any other cause wherein [Funkhouser] is a party[.]" Id. at 123.
[¶5] In August 2022, the Director of the Posey County Community Corrections filed a notice stating Funkhouser admitted he used alcohol in violation of his pretrial placement. See id. at 127. At that point, the trial court approved Funkhouser's temporary placement in the Posey County Jail. Shortly thereafter, the State petitioned to revoke Funkhouser's bond. On August 5, 2022, the trial court issued a bench warrant, ordered cash bail to be set at $25,000, and noted that the State's petition to revoke "shall be set for hearing within a reasonable time following [Funkhouser's] arrest pursuant to [the] order." Id. at 131.
[¶6] On May 17, 2023, the trial court held a hearing and scheduled the matter for a jury trial. At the hearing, Funkhouser moved for a bond reduction. The trial court took the matter under advisement. The following day, the trial court issued an order denying Funkhouser's motion. The court explained that it was denying the motion because it "ha[d] placed certain conditions upon [Funkhouser's] release under bail previously posted and [Funkhouser] ha[d] violated those conditions." Id. at 19. In denying the motion, the court referred to the State's petitions to revoke bond filed in April 2022 and August 2022.
[¶7] Funkhouser and the State eventually reached a plea agreement under which Counts 1 and 6 would be dismissed, Funkhouser would plead guilty to the remaining six counts, and the State would recommend fully concurrent sentences with an aggregate sentence of twelve years. See id. at 209. Under the agreement, Funkhouser's placement was left to the discretion of the trial court. The agreement also contained the following terms regarding the posted bond:
[Funkhouser] agrees and requests that his/her posted bond be applied to Attorney fees, Court costs, fines any [sic] Restitution, Administrative fees, Initial and Monthly Probation fees, Community Corrections fees, Work Release costs, Electronic Monitoring costs, Counseling, Drug Testing[,] and any and all costs imposed by the Indiana Legislature and[/]or the [c]ourt due to [Funkhouser's] conviction and plea in this cause or any related cause. Should there be any balance left from the bond after the payment of all fees, and costs, [Funkhouser] requests it be paid to the holder of the Bond Receipt.Id. at 210. On July 5, 2023, Funkhouser pleaded guilty pursuant to the plea agreement. The trial court accepted the plea agreement; entered judgments of conviction upon Counts 2, 3, 4, 5, 7, and 8; and dismissed Counts 1 and 6.
[¶8] The trial court held a sentencing hearing on August 3, 2023, at which it imposed fully concurrent sentences and an aggregate sentence of twelve years. The court ordered Funkhouser to serve four years in the DOC, with the balance of the time suspended to community corrections. The court specified that after Funkhouser completed the executed portion of his sentence, he was to complete inpatient, outpatient, and ongoing treatment programming that was "acceptable [to] the Community Corrections [D]epartment." Appellant's App. Vol. 3 p. 12.
[¶9] As for credit time, the trial court stated that Funkhouser "violated multiple conditions of pretrial home detention and shall be deprived of all accrued time and/or good time credit earned while on pretrial home detention pursuant to [Indiana Code section] 35-50-6-5." Id. Excluding the time associated with pretrial home detention, the trial court awarded Funkhouser a total of 674 days, which consisted of 505 days of actual time and 169 days of "earned time credit prior to sentencing[]" Id. at 11-12. The trial court awarded Funkhouser credit as to the following timeframes: "August 11, 2021, through September 27, 2021[;] April 25, 2022, through July 27, 2022[;] and August 5, 2022, through August 2, 2023[.]" Id. at 12. The trial court ordered Funkhouser to pay a $1 fine, court costs of $189, and a $200 alcohol/drug countermeasure fee. The court also ordered Funkhouser "to pay all Community Corrections fees." Id. The court provided an "Order for Release of Bond" apportioning the $27,500 in the following manner: $100 for the Clerk's Administrative Fee; $190 for court costs and the fine; $200 for the alcohol/drug countermeasure fee; $3,022 for "past due Community Corrections Fees"; $12,988 for "Community Corrections Fees" due in the future; and the remaining $11,000 for defense counsel. Id. at 13.
[¶10] Funkhouser filed a motion to correct error. See id. at 18. In a supporting memorandum, Funkhouser argued that the trial court erred in depriving him of credit for the time he served on pretrial home detention. He asserted that "the law contemplates a hearing on deprivation of credit time and/or good time" and that "there never was a hearing dedicated to" these issues. Id. at 24. Funkhouser also argued that the trial court erred in retaining $12,988 for prospective community corrections fees. Funkhouser claimed that the court erred under the circumstances by essentially placing those funds "in trust[.]" Id. at 29.
[¶11] On September 28, 2023, the trial court issued an order stating that "a hearing should be set on [Funkhouser's] motion and the issues contained therein." Id. at 40. The trial court referred to the credit time issue and said it "intend[ed] to conduct a hearing (in conjunction with the hearing on the [m]otion) to determine whether [Funkhouser] committed the specified violations of his conditions of home detention and whether the same justif[ied] deprivation of all accrued time earned and/or good time credit while on pretrial home detention." Id. The court referred to statutory requirements and stated that the hearing would be "conducted with the [required] procedural safeguards[.]" Id.
[¶12] On October 3, 2023, the trial court held the hearing on the motion to correct error. At the outset, the court addressed Funkhouser's contention that the court failed to hold a hearing in connection with the deprivation of his credit time. The court said it believed the requirement was satisfied based on the evidentiary hearing related to the first petition to revoke, and a conversation with the parties during a pretrial conference on June 21, 2023. The court recalled that it "advised both parties . . . that it would . . . deprive [Funkhouser] of his accrued time and good time credit while on home detention based upon that hearing and the facts . . . elicited during that hearing . . . in the event that he did decide to plead open." Tr. Vol. 2 p. 152. The trial court nevertheless noted that, "as a conservative measure . . . to ensure its compliance," the court would address credit time that day. Id. at 152-53. The court indicated that it would "follow the statute" with regard to the entry of special findings "just to make sure" of compliance. Id. at 158. The court then gave the parties the opportunity to present evidence regarding compliance with the conditions of pretrial home detention. The court also indicated that it would take judicial notice of its July 2022 hearing when it first identified a violation and revoked bond. Although neither party presented evidence, both parties presented argument. In arguing that he was entitled to additional credit time, Funkhouser asserted that "he . . . acknowledges he did drink a beer or two on home detention." Id. at 155. Funkhouser largely focused on whether the violations warranted a deprivation of credit time. See id. (arguing that, "on a scale of one to ten," his violation was "a two as far as harm to society or harm to . . . the [c]ourt's . . . dignity").
[¶13] At the hearing, the court also addressed Funkhouser's contention that the trial court erred in its allocation of the bond money. The court took the matter under advisement and, on October 6, 2023, issued a written order denying the motion to correct error. Regarding the deprivation of credit time, the court referred to the statutory hearing requirement. The trial court said it believed "such a hearing [had previously been] held" in the case, but that the recent hearing nevertheless satisfied the statutory requirement. Appellant's App. Vol. 3 p. 51. "Taking judicial notice of its own record," the trial court specifically found that Funkhouser violated the conditions of his pretrial home detention by traveling to unpermitted locations in April 2022 and by consuming alcohol in August 2022. Id. The trial court further found that, "[b]ased on [Funkhouser's] lack of compliance," the court "d[id] not believe that [Funkhouser] should receive any accrued time and/or good time credit" in connection with his pretrial placement. Id. Turning to the bail issue, the court said that, "[b]ased upon the statutory language for posting bonds and the language of the bond agreements themselves, the [c]ourt had the statutory authority to apply [Funkhouser's] bonds to the Community Corrections fees he was ordered to pay." Id. at 52. The trial court noted that the amount of $12,988 would "cover approximately two (2) years and two (2) months' worth of Community Corrections" based on a "$50 initial user fee" and "$16 per day for electronic monitoring," and Funkhouser would "have additional Community Corrections fees to pay before concluding his sentence." Id. Funkhouser now appeals.
Discussion and Decision
[¶14] Funkhouser appeals the denial of his motion to correct error. "[W]e review a trial court's denial of a motion to correct error for an abuse of discretion." Expert Pool Builders, LLC v. Vangundy, 224 N.E.3d 309, 312 (Ind. 2024). In doing so, we consider the standard of review applicable to any underlying ruling. See, e.g., B.A. v. D.D., 189 N.E.3d 611, 614 (Ind.Ct.App. 2022). "A trial court exceeds its discretion when its decision is unlawful, illogical, or otherwise unreasonable." Vangundy, 224 N.E.3d at 312. Moreover, to the extent the trial court's ruling turns on a question of law, we engage in de novo review. Bruder v. Seneca Mortg. Servs., LLC, 188 N.E.3d 469, 471 (Ind. 2022).
I. Credit Time
[¶15] Funkhouser argues that the trial court erred in declining to award him credit for the time he served on pretrial home detention with community corrections. He focuses on whether the proceedings complied with Indiana Code section 35-50-6-5(d), which sets forth parameters for the deprivation of credit time in connection with pretrial home detention. See P.L. 37-2023, § 6. In pertinent part, this subsection states:
If a person on pretrial home detention violates a condition of home detention, . . . the person shall be deprived of all accrued time earned while on pretrial home detention. The person may also be deprived of educational or good time credit in accordance with this section, if applicable. Before a person may be deprived of accrued time, the person must be granted a hearing to determine whether the person committed the specified violation. In connection with the hearing, the person is entitled to the procedural safeguards listed in section 4 of this chapter. The person may waive the person's right to the hearing.Ind. Code § 35-50-6-5(d). Regarding the requirement that the trial court hold a hearing, Indiana Code section 35-50-6-4(f) sets forth the following procedures:
In connection with the hearing . . ., the person is entitled to:
(1) have not less than twenty-four (24) hours advance written notice of the date, time, and place of the hearing, and of the alleged misconduct and the rule the alleged misconduct is alleged to have violated;
(2) have reasonable time to prepare for the hearing;
(3) have an impartial decisionmaker; (4) appear and speak in the person's own behalf; (5) call witnesses and present evidence;
(6) confront and cross-examine each witness, unless the hearing authority finds that to do so would subject a witness to a substantial risk of harm;
(7) have the assistance of a lay advocate (the department may require that the advocate be an employee of, or a fellow prisoner in, the same facility or program);
(8) have a written statement of the findings of fact, the evidence relied upon, and the reasons for the action taken;
(9) have immunity if the person's testimony or any evidence derived from the person's testimony is used in any criminal proceedings; and
(10) have the person's record expunged of any reference to the charge if the person is found not guilty or if a finding of guilt is later overturned.Any finding of guilt must be supported by a preponderance of the evidence presented at the hearing.
[¶16] Funkhouser argues that "[t]he trial court erred in denying [him] accrued time and credit time for days spent on home detention without notice of a hearing dedicated to that issue, and without a hearing dedicated to that issue, and without advisement of the statutory rights [that] attach to such a hearing." Appellant's Br. p. 10. In so arguing, Funkhouser does not address the effect of the October 2023 hearing, which the court held after Funkhouser raised this issue in his motion to correct error. See, e.g., id. at 14 ("[T]he law contemplates a hearing on deprivation of credit time and/or good time. In this case, there was never a hearing dedicated to the issue of deprivation of accrued time or credit time. There was only a bond revocation hearing."). Rather, Funkhouser largely repeats his arguments from his memorandum supporting the motion to correct error. Compare id. at 11-16 with Appellant's App. Vol. 3 pp. 21-25.
[¶17] The State maintains that the statutory requirements were satisfied prior to the hearing on the motion to correct error. Regardless, the State asserts that the procedures connected to the latter hearing were "more than adequate[.]" Appellee's Br. p. 13. The State points out that, at the October 2023 hearing, the trial court "did not prevent Funkhouser from offering evidence . . . concerning the home detention violations." Id. at 12. The State also points out that Funkhouser "acknowledged at the motion to correct error hearing that he 'did drink a beer or two on home detention,'" thus, "the factual basis for the violations was never in dispute." Id. (quoting Tr. Vol. II p. 155). The State asserts that, "in its order denying Funkhouser's motion to correct error, the trial court specifically identified the factual basis for each violation of home detention[.]" Id. at 12-13. The State ultimately contends that, "because it is undisputed that Funkhouser violated the conditions of his pretrial home detention, the trial court properly declined to award him credit time while on home detention." Id. at 13.
[¶18] We agree with the State. Pursuant to Indiana Code section 35-50-6-5(d), a person is not entitled to credit time associated with in-home detention if the person violated the conditions of in-home detention. In this case, Funkhouser does not dispute that he violated the conditions of pretrial home detention. Furthermore, although Funkhouser complains he was deprived of procedural safeguards set forth in Indiana Code section 35-50-6-4(f) prior to the hearing on the motion to correct error, Funkhouser does not explain how any procedural defect remained, or how he was prejudiced in any way, after the court held the October 2023 hearing and issued special findings. Under the circumstances, we cannot say the court abused its discretion in denying the motion to correct error as to the deprivation of credit time associated with pretrial home detention.
II. Retention of Bond
[¶19] Funkhouser argues the trial court erred "in applying the money posted for [his] bond to future community corrections fees[.]" Appellant's Br. p. 4. We apply "[a]n abuse-of-discretion standard of review . . . to a trial court's sentencing decisions and to the imposition of costs and fees." Spells v. State, 225 N.E.3d 767, 771 (Ind. 2024). However, the trial court's authority to retain bond money is generally controlled by statute. See id.; see also Sandoval, 70 N.E.3d at 890. And to the extent the trial court's decision turns on a question of law, such as the interpretation of a statute, our review is de novo. Spells, 225 N.E.3d at 771.
[¶20] Our legislature authorized the retention of bond money for certain purposes. See I.C. §§ 35-33-8-3.2(a)(2), -7. However, in Sandoval, we explained that these bail statutes "do not anticipate" the retention of bond money for amounts due in the future. 70 N.E.3d at 890. Indeed, in that case, "[t]he trial court ordered that the balance of the bond was to be held in trust to be applied towards possible future appellate public defender fees." Id. In reviewing the order, we turned to caselaw for the proposition that a court "may not hold a portion of a criminal defendant's bond money in trust to be used toward public defender fees not yet incurred." Id. (citing Hendrix v. State, 615 N.E.2d 483, 485 (Ind.Ct.App. 1993)). Relying on this precedent, we reversed the retention of the bond for prospective fees, noting "the statutes governing the ways in which posted bonds may be managed do not anticipate the occurrence of this practice," and the defendant had not "clearly . . . assented to this use of his bond[.]" Id.
[¶21] Here, Funkhouser argues that Sandoval controls, and the trial court improperly retained $12,988 of the cash bond for fees Funkhouser had not yet incurred. The State attempts to distinguish Sandoval by arguing that, in this case, the plea agreement stated that the bond would be applied to "Community Corrections fees" imposed by the trial court. Appellant's App. Vol. 2 p. 210. The State also directs us to the trial court's statutory authority to impose fees in connection with community corrections. See generally Appellee's Br. p. 14-15. The State ultimately argues that the disposition of Funkhouser's bond money was "in conformity with the bond agreement and [the] plea agreement." Id. at 15.
[¶22] We agree with Funkhouser that Sandoval controls, requiring reversal of the $12,988 retained for community corrections fees not yet incurred. To the extent the State focuses on the trial court's statutory authority to impose certain fees, as we explained in Sandoval, those statutes "do not anticipate" the retention of bail money for "fees not yet incurred." 70 N.E.3d at 890. And we cannot say the language contained in the plea agreement-or any other agreement related to the retention of the bond-reflects Funkhouser's "clear[] . . . assent" to the retention of the bond for prospective community corrections fees. Id.
[¶23] For the foregoing reasons, we vacate that portion of the order retaining $12,988 of the cash bond for the payment of prospective community corrections fees.
Conclusion
[¶24] Funkhouser has not demonstrated his entitlement to credit time associated with pretrial home detention. As to the retention of the cash bond, we adhere to Sandoval and vacate that portion of the order retaining the cash bond for the payment of community corrections fees due in the future.
[¶25] Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.
Riley, J., and Brown, J., concur.