Opinion
C. A. 0:22-1954-BHH-PJG
10-11-2023
Maleek Fulton, Plaintiff, v. Sgt. Terry Mack; Officer Young, Defendants.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
PAIGE J. GOSSETT UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
The plaintiff, Maleek Fulton, a self-represented pretrial detainee, filed this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against two detention center officers. This matter is before the court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2) (D.S.C.) for a Report and Recommendation on the defendants' motion for summary judgment, as supplemented. (ECF Nos. 79 & 93.) Pursuant to Roseboro v. Garrison, 528 F.2d 309 (4th Cir. 1975), the court advised Plaintiff of the summary judgment and dismissal procedures and the possible consequences if he failed to respond adequately to the defendants' motion. (ECF Nos. 48.) Plaintiff filed a response in opposition (ECF No. 84), and the defendants replied (ECF No. 87). Having reviewed the parties' submissions and the applicable law, the court recommends that the defendants' motion be granted in part and denied in part.
Plaintiff also filed a sur-reply. (ECF No. 89.) The court observes that the Local Rules make no provision for sur-reply memoranda and Plaintiff did not seek leave of the court to file a sur-reply. Accordingly, the sur-reply was not considered in the court's recommendation. However, consideration of the sur-reply would not have changed the court's recommendation.
BACKGROUND
The following facts are either undisputed or are taken in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, to the extent they find support in the record. Factual disputes are expressly noted. During the incident alleged in the Complaint, Plaintiff was housed in the Alpha Unit at the Florence County Detention Center. Plaintiff alleges that, on the morning of May 13, 2022, he did not attend the required morning briefing in his unit which, per detention center policy, meant that he had to remain in his cell. The defendants note that, following the morning briefing, Plaintiff became loud, disruptive, and disrespectful about being required to remain in his cell. When Defendant Sergeant Mack entered the unit to assist with the distribution of medication, Plaintiff asked him if he could leave his cell to take a shower, but Mack told him he could not. Plaintiff admits that he disobeyed Mack's instructions and left his cell to take a shower. (Compl., ECF No. 1 at 8.) Detention center officers waited for Plaintiff to finish his shower and get dressed, then proceeded to handcuff Plaintiff and escort him to the Maximum Segregation Unit.
The next sequence of events is disputed by the parties. Plaintiff alleges that he physically complied with the officers as he was handcuffed, (id.); however, the defendants contend that Plaintiff continued to be loud, disruptive, and disrespectful as Sergeant Mack, Officer Reed, and Officer Young escorted Plaintiff to the Maximum Segregation Unit through the sally port doors leading out of the Alpha Unit. (Defs.' Mot. Summ J., ECF No. 79 at 4.) Plaintiff alleges that he and Officer Young had reached the first sally port door when Plaintiff turned back to ask a question of Sergeant Mack, who he alleges was at the A-Pod officer's desk. He alleges that, in response to his question, Sergeant Mack “charged toward [him] aggressively” while yelling at him, grabbed him, and “slammed [him] up against the sally port door.” (Compl., ECF No. 1 at 9.) Plaintiff further alleges that, when Mack let go of him, Officer Young “power slammed” Plaintiff onto his back, slammed his forearm into Plaintiff's face and jaw, picked him up off the floor, and then slammed Plaintiff onto his stomach and put his knee in his back. (Id. at 9-10.) Plaintiff alleges that all of this occurred while he was handcuffed with his hands behind his back.
In contrast, the defendants allege that as Sergeant Mack, Officer Reed, and Officer Young reached the sally port, Plaintiff made a sudden aggressive movement toward Sergeant Mack. In response, “Officers Reed and Young were required to use minimal force to restrain the Plaintiff.” (Defs. Mem. Supp. Summ. J., ECF No. 79 at 4.) As part of their efforts, Reed and Young pressed Plaintiff against the sally port door, which at that moment was opened by the central room operator, causing Officer Young and Plaintiff to fall to the floor. Officers Reed and Young then restrained Plaintiff on the floor until a restraint chair was brought in.
Prior to being placed in the restraint chair, Plaintiff concedes that a nurse was present and observed him but “said nothing.” (Compl., ECF No. 1 at 10.) Plaintiff alleges he was kept in the restraint chair for two hours. He alleges that, as a result on the incident, he suffered a twisted right ankle, bruising and swelling to his left knee, bruising and swelling to his jaw, and back pain, but was not taken to the medical department until three days later to be seen for his injuries.
Although Plaintiff alleges in his Complaint that he was not seen for injuries until four days after the incident, he concedes in his deposition that the medical records demonstrate it was only three days later, on May 16, 2022. (Pl.'s Dep. 51-52, ECF No. 79-5 at 15.)
Following initial review, the court construed Plaintiff's Complaint as alleging the following claims:
The court also construed a claim of bystander liability against two defendants who have since been dismissed from the case pursuant to a joint stipulation of dismissal. (ECF No. 64.)
• Excessive force in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Defendants Mack and Young.
• Deliberate indifference to serious medical needs in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against all defendants.
• Gross negligence pursuant to the South Carolina Tort Claims Act against all defendants.(Order, ECF No. 15 at 1.) No party objected to the court's construction of claims. (ECF Nos. 23, 25, & 26.) Plaintiff seeks declaratory and monetary relief. (Compl., ECF No. 1 at 15.)
DISCUSSION
A. Summary Judgment Standard
Summary judgment is appropriate only if the moving party “shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the [moving party] is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). A party may support or refute that a material fact is not disputed by “citing to particular parts of materials in the record” or by “showing that the materials cited do not establish the absence or presence of a genuine dispute, or that an adverse party cannot produce admissible evidence to support the fact.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)(1). Rule 56 mandates entry of summary judgment “against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986).
In deciding whether there is a genuine issue of material fact, the evidence of the nonmoving party is to be believed and all justifiable inferences must be drawn in favor of the nonmoving party. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986). However, “[o]nly disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment. Factual disputes that are irrelevant or unnecessary will not be counted.” Id. at 248.
The moving party has the burden of proving that summary judgment is appropriate. Once the moving party makes this showing, however, the opposing party may not rest upon mere allegations or denials, but rather must, by affidavits or other means permitted by the Rule, set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c), (e); Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 322. Further, while the federal court is charged with liberally construing a complaint filed by a pro se litigant to allow the development of a potentially meritorious case, see, e.g., Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319 (1972), the requirement of liberal construction does not mean that the court can ignore a clear failure in the pleadings to allege facts which set forth a federal claim, nor can the court assume the existence of a genuine issue of material fact where none exists. Weller v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 901 F.2d 387 (4th Cir. 1990).
B. Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment
1. Official Capacity Claims
To the extent Plaintiff is suing the defendants in their official capacities for monetary relief, they are entitled to summary judgment. The Eleventh Amendment states that “[t]he Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.” U.S. Const. amend. XI. Sovereign immunity protects both the State itself and its agencies, divisions, departments, officials, and other “arms of the State.” See Will v. Michigan Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 70 (1989); see also Regents of the Univ. of California v. Doe, 519 U.S. 425, 429 (1997) (“[I]t has long been settled that the reference [in the Eleventh Amendment] to actions against one of the United States encompasses not only actions in which a State is actually named as the defendant, but also certain actions against state agents and state instrumentalities.”) (internal quotation marks omitted). As arms of the state, the defendants-two detention center officers employed with the Florence County Sheriff's Office-are entitled to sovereign immunity and cannot constitute “persons” under § 1983 in that capacity. See Will, 491 U.S. at 70-71; see also Gulledge v. Smart, 691 F.Supp. 947, 954-55 (D.S.C. 1988) (concluding that sheriffs and deputy sheriffs are agents of the state and cannot be sued in their official capacities), aff'd, 878 F.2d 379 (4th Cir. 1989). Although a State may waive sovereign immunity, Lapides v. Board of Regents, 535 U.S. 613 (2002), the State of South Carolina has specifically denied this waiver for suit in federal district court. See S.C. Code Ann. § 15-78-20(e). Accordingly, to the extent the defendants are sued in their official capacities for monetary damages, they are immune from suit. Will, 491 U.S. at 70-71; see also Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 343 (1979) (recognizing that Congress did not override the Eleventh Amendment when it created the remedy found in 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for civil rights violations).
2. Fourteenth Amendment-Due Process
It is well settled that pretrial detainees possess a constitutional right “to be free from punishment,” and this right, as derived from the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, protects such detainees from any form of punishment “prior to an adjudication of guilt in accordance with due process of law.” See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535 & n.16 (1979). This settled principle applies “to substantive and procedural due process claims pursued by pretrial detainees.” Williamson v. Stirling, 912 F.3d 154, 174 (4th Cir. 2018); see Dilworth v. Adams, 841 F.3d 246, 251-53 (4th Cir. 2016) (applying Bell to a pretrial detainee's procedural due process claim); Ford v. Bender, 768 F.3d 15, 24-27 (1st Cir. 2014) (distinguishing types of due process claims); Slade v. Hampton Roads Reg'l Jail, 407 F.3d 243, 250 (4th Cir. 2005) (assessing a pretrial detainee's substantive due process claim under the principles in Bell). Here, Plaintiff's allegations that the defendants violated his due process rights when they used excessive force against him and were deliberately indifferent to his medical needs implicate substantive due process. See Williamson, 912 F.3d at 175-76 (noting that, “although jail officials are entitled to impose discipline and promote internal security by placing restrictions on pretrial detainees,” disproportionate, gratuitous, or arbitrary treatment of a detainee can rise to the level of prohibited punishment that will sustain a substantive due process claim).
A substantive due process claim pursued by a pretrial detainee typically challenges the general conditions of confinement or the treatment of all detainees in a specific facility. See Williamson, 912 F.3d at 174; see, e.g., Slade, 407 F.3d at 250 (evaluating a pretrial detainee's substantive due process claim challenging fees charged for jail upkeep under the Due Process Clause and Bell); Martin v. Gentile, 849 F.2d 863, 870 (4th Cir. 1988) (assessing a pretrial detainee's claim alleging unconstitutional conditions of confinement under the Due Process Clause and Bell). “The controlling inquiry for such a claim is whether the conditions imposed on the pretrial detainee constitute ‘punishment,' ” which advances Bell's central purpose of ensuring that a detainee is not punished before he has been found guilty. Williamson, 912 F.3d at 174; see Bell, 441 U.S. at 535-39. “To prevail on a substantive due process claim, a pretrial detainee must show that a particular restriction was either: ‘(1) imposed with an expressed intent to punish or (2) not reasonably related to a legitimate nonpunitive governmental objective, in which case an intent to punish may be inferred.' ” Williamson, 912 F.3d at 174 (quoting Slade, 407 F.3d at 251).
a. Excessive Force
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment “protects a pretrial detainee from the use of excessive force that amounts to punishment.” Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 576 U.S. 389, 405 (2015) (quoting Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 n.10 (1989)). “[T]he appropriate standard for a pretrial detainee's excessive force claim is solely an objective one,” and “a pretrial detainee must show only that the force purposely or knowingly used against him was objectively unreasonable,” regardless of the officer's state of mind. Kingsley, 576 U.S.at 397. In determining whether the force was objectively unreasonable, the court must consider the evidence “from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, including what the officer knew at the time, not with the 20/20 vision of hindsight.” Id. (citing Graham, 490 U.S. at 396). “A court must also account for the legitimate interests that stem from the government's need to manage the facility in which the individual is detained, appropriately deferring to policies and practices that in the judgment of jail officials are needed to preserve internal order and discipline and to maintain institutional security.” Kingsley, 576 U.S. at 397 (citing Bell, 441 U.S. at 540) (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted). Importantly, “objective reasonableness turns on the “ ‘facts and circumstances of each particular case,' ” including many considerations that may bear on the reasonableness or unreasonableness of the force used, such as “the relationship between the need for the use of force and the amount of force used; the extent of the plaintiff's injury; any effort made by the officer to temper or to limit the amount of force; the severity of the security problem at issue; the threat reasonably perceived by the officer; and whether the plaintiff was actively resisting.” Kingsley, 576 U.S. at 397 (quoting Graham, 490 U.S. at 396).
As described above, the parties strongly disagree about the events that occurred as Plaintiff was being escorted through the sally port door. In support of their motion for summary judgment, the defendants have provided affidavit testimony from the two defendants as well as from Officer Reed, who was assisting in escorting Plaintiff. (Mack Aff., ECF No. 79-2 at 2-6; Reed Aff., ECF No. 79-3 at 2-5; Young Aff., ECF No. 79-4 at 2-5.) Each of these affiants swears that Plaintiff “moved in an aggressive manner” toward Mack, and that in response, Reed and Young used “minimal force” to restrain him. (Id.) Such force involved pinning Plaintiff to the door of the sally port which suddenly opened, causing Plaintiff and Young to fall to the floor. The affiants agree that, at that time, Reed and Young restrained Plaintiff on the floor until the restraint chair arrived. (Id.)
In opposition to the defendants' evidence, Plaintiff provides affidavit and deposition testimony reiterating the allegations in his Complaint. Specifically, Plaintiff testifies to asking Mack, who was behind him at the officer's desk in Alpha Pod, how long he would be in lock-up, but Plaintiff denies that he was yelling at or using foul language toward Mack, and also denies that he lunged at Mack. (Pl.'s Aff., ECF No. 84-1 at 2; Pl.'s Dep. 37:1-11, 41:11-12, ECF No. 79-5 at 11, 12.) He also swears that Mack charged at him, grabbed him by his collar, and “jacked” him up against the sally port door. (Pl.'s Aff., ECF No. 84-1 at 2; Pl.'s Dep. 36:13-25, 41:11-17, ECF No. 79-5 at 11, 12.) As to Officer Young, Plaintiff provides testimony that Young “slammed” him multiple times-first on his back, then against the wall, and then on his stomach; put his forearm against Plaintiff's chin; and pressed his knee into Plaintiff's lower back. (Pl.'s Aff., ECF No. 841 at 2; Pl.'s Dep. 37:12-17, 39:12-13, 41:16-19, ECF No. 79-5 at 11, 12.)
The defendants argue in their reply that Plaintiff's affidavit should not be considered because it is not sworn under penalty of perjury. (Defs.' Reply, ECF No. 87 at 2-4.) Review of Plaintiff's affidavit shows that it was signed in the presence of a South Carolina notary. (ECF No. 84-1 at 2.) Importantly, the notary's certificate contains a jurat that states that the document was “Subscribed and sworn to (or affirmed) before me this [date].” (Id.) The presence of a jurat establishes that an oath or affirmation was administered and that the following occurred:
(a) an individual appeared in person before the notary;
(b) the individual was personally known to the notary or identified by the notary through satisfactory evidence; and
(c) the individual made a vow of truthfulness on penalty of perjury, based on personal honor and without invoking a deity or using a form of the word “swear”.S.C. Code § 26-1-5 (emphasis added). Accordingly, the court considers Plaintiff's submission as a sworn affidavit. See, e.g., Strong v. Johnson, 495 F.3d 134, 140 (4th Cir. 2007) (finding that the state supreme court was not unreasonable when it treated the plaintiff's letter as an affidavit because the letter contained the notary's jurat stating the document was “subscribed and sworn”).
Although the Plaintiff has made multiple unsuccessful attempts to obtain videotape and body camera evidence of the incident through the discovery process, the defendants have stated that no video exists of this incident. (See ECF No. 68.) Accordingly, as the record contains contrasting sworn testimony, the court is left with a dispute of fact on what force was used during the incident in the sally port. If the events at issue occurred as sworn to by Plaintiff, a reasonable jury could find that the defendants' use of force against Plaintiff was objectively unreasonable. Kingsley, 576 U.S. at 397. Accordingly, on this record, the defendants are not entitled to summary judgment on this claim.
Accordingly, to the extent Plaintiff's filing at ECF No. 85 could be construed as a motion to compel or an affidavit pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(d) stating that he cannot respond without such videos, his relief must be denied.
b. Qualified Immunity
The defendants also argue that, to the extent they are sued in their individual capacities, they are entitled to qualified immunity. Under the defense of qualified immunity, “governmental officials performing discretionary functions generally are shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). To resolve a qualified immunity defense, the court must (1) determine whether the facts alleged, taken in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, show that the defendants' conduct violated a constitutional right, and (2) determine whether the right was clearly established at the time of the alleged misconduct. Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231-32 (2009). Courts may address the two prongs of the qualified immunity analysis in whichever order is appropriate in light of the circumstances of the particular case at hand. Id. at 235, 242.
At the time of the events giving rise to Plaintiff's claims, it was clearly established that the Fourteenth Amendment “protects a pretrial detainee from the use of excessive force that amounts to punishment.” Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 576 U.S. 389, 405 (2015). Based on Plaintiff's allegations and the record in this matter, there is a dispute of fact as to whether the defendants' use of physical force was objectively unreasonable. Accordingly, if Plaintiff's version of events is accepted, a trier of fact could conclude that a clearly established Fourteenth Amendment due process right was violated. See id. at 397. Thus, the defendants are also not entitled to qualified immunity on this claim.
c. Deliberate Indifference to Medical Needs
Plaintiff also raises a Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process claim alleging that the detention center officials were deliberately indifferent to his medical needs. See Hill v. Nicodemus, 979 F.2d 987, 990-91 (4th Cir 1992). “The Fourteenth Amendment right of pretrial detainees, like the Eighth Amendment right of convicted prisoners, requires that government officials not be deliberately indifferent to any serious medical needs of the detainee.” Belcher v. Oliver, 898 F.2d 32, 34 (4th Cir. 1990). Although these claims are analyzed under the Fourteenth Amendment, case law interpreting the standard of “deliberate indifference” under the Eighth Amendment is instructive. See, e.g., Brown v. Harris, 240 F.3d 383, 388 (4th Cir. 2001) (stating that whether the plaintiff is a pretrial detainee or a convicted prisoner, the “standard in either case is the same-that is, whether a government official has been ‘deliberately indifferent to any [of his] serious medical needs' ”) (quoting Belcher, 898 F.2d at 34).
Generally, to establish a claim based on alleged deliberate indifference, an inmate must establish two requirements: (1) objectively, the deprivation suffered or injury inflicted was “sufficiently serious,” and (2) subjectively, the prison officials acted with a “sufficiently culpable state of mind.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994); Williams v. Benjamin, 77 F.3d 756, 761 (4th Cir. 1996). “What must be established with regard to each component ‘varies according to the nature of the alleged constitutional violation.' ” Williams, 77 F.3d at 761 (quoting Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 5 (1992)). To satisfy the subjective prong, an inmate must show that the prison official's state of mind was “deliberate indifference” to the inmate's health and safety. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834. A prison official is deliberately indifferent if he has actual knowledge of a substantial risk of harm to an inmate and disregards that substantial risk. Id. at 847; Parrish v. Cleveland, 372 F.3d 294, 302 (4th Cir. 2004). To be liable under this standard, the prison official “must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837.
As discussed above, the United States Supreme Court has held that for a pretrial detainee to establish an excessive force claim under the Fourteenth Amendment, he need not show that the officer was subjectively aware that the use of force was excessive; rather, he need only show that the force purposely, knowingly, or possibly recklessly used against him was objectively unreasonable. Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 576 U.S. 389 (2015). However, Kingsley did not address whether this standard applies to other claims by pretrial detainees pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment, and, to date, the Fourth Circuit has not considered this issue. See Mays v. Sprinkle, 992 F.3d 295, 300 (4th Cir. 2021) (declining to decide whether a pretrial detainee must satisfy the subjective component of the Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference standard); cf. Gordon v. Cty. of Orange, 888 F.3d 1118 (9th Cir. 2018) (extending Kingsley to medical claims by pretrial detainees pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment); Darnell v. Pineiro, 849 F.3d 17, 35 (2d Cir. 2017) (extending Kingsley to conditions of confinement claims by pretrial detainees pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment); Castro v. Cty. of Los Angeles, 833 F.3d 1060, 1070 (9th Cir. 2016) (en banc) (extending Kingsley to failure-to-protect claims by pretrial detainees pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment); see also Richmond v. Huq, 885 F.3d 928, 938 n.3 (6th Cir. 2018) (noting a split among the circuit courts of appeal and collecting cases). Here, even if the Fourth Circuit were to extend Kingsley to eliminate the subjective component previously required for Plaintiffs claims, he still fails to satisfy the objective component on this record.
Not “every claim by a prisoner [alleging] that he has not received adequate medical treatment states a violation of the Eighth Amendment.” Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 105 (1976). To establish deliberate indifference, the treatment “must be so grossly incompetent, inadequate or excessive as to shock the conscience or to be intolerable to fundamental fairness.” Miltier v. Beorn, 896 F.2d 848, 851 (4th Cir. 1990). Mere negligence, malpractice, or incorrect diagnosis is not actionable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See Estelle, 429 U.S. at 106. While the Constitution requires a prison to provide inmates with medical care, it does not demand that a prisoner receive the treatment of his choice. Jackson v. Fair, 846 F.2d 811, 817 (1st Cir. 1988). “[A] prisoner's mere difference of opinion over matters of expert medical judgment or a course of medical treatment fail[s] to rise to the level of a constitutional violation.” Nelson v. Shuffman, 603 F.3d 439, 449 (8th Cir. 2010) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted) (alterations in original); see also Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841, 849 (4th Cir. 1985).
Courts have recognized that “lay people are not qualified to determine . . . medical fitness, whether physical or mental; that is what independent medical experts are for.” O'Connor v. Pierson, 426 F.3d 187, 202 (2d Cir. 2005); see also Nelson, 603 F.3d at 449 (“A prisoner's disagreement as to the appropriate treatment fails to rise to the level of a constitutional claim and fails to create a genuine issue of material fact.”); Dulany v. Carnahan, 132 F.3d 1234, 1240 (8th Cir. 1997) (“In the face of medical records indicating that treatment was provided and physician affidavits indicating that the care provided was adequate, an inmate cannot create a question of fact by merely stating that she did not feel she received adequate treatment.”); Fleming v. Lefevere, 423 F.Supp.2d 1064, 1070 (C.D. Cal. 2006) (“Plaintiff's own opinion as to the appropriate course of care does not create a triable issue of fact because he has not shown that he has any medical training or expertise upon which to base such an opinion.”).
As an initial matter, the defendants specifically named by Plaintiff are non-medical personnel. To establish a claim for denial of medical care against non-medical personnel, a plaintiff must show that they failed to promptly provide for needed medical treatment, deliberately interfered with prison doctors' treatment, or tacitly authorized or were indifferent to the prison physicians' misconduct. Miltier, 896 F.2d at 854. Because most prison officials are not trained medical personnel, they are entitled to rely on the opinions, judgment, and expertise of medical personnel concerning the course of treatment which the medical personnel deemed necessary and appropriate for the prisoner. See id.
Plaintiff has failed to provide evidence from which a reasonable jury could find deliberate indifference to his medical needs. The crux of Plaintiff's claim is that he was not timely seen by the medical staff for his injuries sustained during the incident at issue, which he alleges included a twisted right ankle, bruising and swelling to his left knee, bruising and swelling to his jaw, and back pain. He further alleges that he continues to suffer from pain in his ankle, left knee, and back. (Compl., ECF No. 1 at 11-12.)
In support of their motion, the defendants have provided Plaintiff's relevant medical and mental health records as well as affidavit testimony from Eric McDaniel, a registered nurse and the Director of Nursing for the Florence County Detention Center, who treated Plaintiff on May 16, 2022-three days after the incident at issue. (See ECF No. 80-1.) McDaniel testifies that, on May 16, 2022, Plaintiff complained of a sprained right ankle, left knee pain, and a chipped tooth as a result of the May 13, 2022 incident. (McDaniel Aff. ¶ 7, ECF No. 80-1 at 3.) McDaniel avers that, upon his examination of Plaintiff, he found no evidence of bruising or swelling in Plaintiff's right ankle or left knee. (Id. ¶ 8.) He further avers that examination of Plaintiff's tooth showed that it had been broken previously and long enough to show decay around the tooth, and with no fresh damage to the tooth itself. (Id.) He testifies that he provided Plaintiff with ibuprofen. (Id. ¶ 9.) According to the medical encounter, when McDaniel asked Plaintiff if he wanted to see the nurse practitioner for further evaluation, Plaintiff responded “No, I don't think I need to[]. I'm just a little sore.” (Med. Recs., ECF No. 80-1 at 7.)
Review of the medicals records shows that, following his May 16, 2022 examination by McDaniel, Plaintiff did not request further medical care until two months later on July 21, 2022 when he complained of headaches and back pain. (Med. Recs., ECF No. 80-1 at 39.) Although the medical note indicates that the back pain was from “prior injuries,” it is unclear if the referenced injuries stem from the May 13, 2022 incident or if they are related to the severe injuries sustained in November 2020 when Plaintiff was involved in a car accident and was ejected from the vehicle. McDaniel testifies that, as a result of the injuries sustained in the car accident, Plaintiff was prescribed and received various pain and anti-inflammatory medications throughout the period of his incarceration. (McDaniel Aff. ¶ 15, ECF No. 80-1 at 3.)
In response, Plaintiff reiterates his argument that he did not receive medical care until three days following the May 13, 2022 incident. (Pl.'s Resp. Opp'n, ECF No. 84 at 7.) He argues that McDaniel's examination did not reveal any swelling because three days had elapsed since the incident, giving his injuries time to heal. (Id.) Importantly, Plaintiff does not allege that in the aftermath of the incident he requested medical care or notified any detention center or medical staff of any injuries. Rather, he alleges that he called his mother and told her about the incident, and she called the detention center requesting that Plaintiff be seen by the medical department, at which point Plaintiff was examined by Nurse McDaniel. (Compl, ECF No. 1 at 11-12.)
Although Plaintiff acknowledges in his Complaint that Nurse Hope Hatchell was present immediately following the incident, he alleges that she “just stared at [him].” (Compl., ECF No. 1 at 10.)
Here, the record indisputably shows that Plaintiff had access to medical care and treatment on a continuous basis while housed within the detention center during the relevant time period and received medication for pain. Although it appears Plaintiff may not have been examined immediately following the May 13, 2022 incident, there is no evidence in the record that Plaintiff requested medical care and was denied such care or that he alerted anyone that he had suffered any injury and was not seen by the medical department. The record is clear, however, that each time the detention center officials were alerted to Plaintiff's concerns-either by Plaintiff submitting a medical request or even by Plaintiff's mother contacting the detention center-the medical department responded promptly in providing Plaintiff with examination and treatment. Moreover, Plaintiff has provided no admissible evidence supporting a finding that he faced “a substantial risk of serious harm” from any of his alleged ailments while he was detained at the detention center as required to establish the objective component of a deliberate indifference claim under the Fourteenth Amendment. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837. Plaintiff does not have a constitutional claim against the defendants merely because he disagrees with the course of treatment he received. See Jackson, 846 F.2d at 817; Nelson, 603 F.3d at 449; see also O'Connor, 426 F.3d at 202; Dulany, 132 F.3d at 1240; Fleming, 423 F.Supp.2d at 1070. Accordingly, based on the record presented in this case, no reasonable jury could find that the defendants were deliberately indifferent to Plaintiff's medical needs. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837.
3. Gross negligence
Although Plaintiff attempts to raise a claim of gross negligence against the defendants, the defendants are immune from suit. State law tort claims against state employees must be brought pursuant to the South Carolina Tort Claims Act, see S.C. Code § 15-78-70(a). The Act provides, “This chapter constitutes the exclusive remedy for any tort committed by an employee of a governmental entity. An employee of a governmental entity who commits a tort while acting within the scope of his official duty is not liable therefor except as expressly provided for in subsection (b).” S.C. Code § 15-78-70(a). However, under the Act, the State expressly consents to suit only in a South Carolina state court, and does not consent to suit in a federal court or in a court of another state. S.C. Code § 15-78-20(e); see also Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 100, n.9 (1984) (recognizing that a state must expressly consent to suit in a federal district court). Therefore, because the waiver of immunity extends only to suit in state courts, Plaintiff cannot bring a claim pursuant to the South Carolina Tort Claims Act in federal court. See, e.g., Gaskins v. South Carolina, C/A No. 8:15-4456-JMC-JDA, 2016 WL 8677201, at *3 (D.S.C. Jan. 8, 2016) (observing that a claim sought to be filed initially in federal court under the South Carolina Tort Claims Act “is not permitted in this federal court”), adopted by 2016 WL 3207855 (D.S.C. June 10, 2016); cf.Lapides v. Bd. of Regents, 535 U.S. 613, 622 (2002) (holding that a State that voluntarily invokes the jurisdiction of the federal court by removing a case waives immunity for claims in which it has consented to suit in its own courts). Therefore, Plaintiff's South Carolina Tort Claims Act claim of gross negligence against the defendants should be dismissed.
RECOMMENDATION
Based on the foregoing, the court recommends that the defendants' motion for summary judgment be granted in part and denied in part. (ECF No. 79.) Specifically, summary judgment should be denied as to Plaintiff's Fourteenth Amendment due process claim alleging excessive force and granted as to all other claims.
Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation
The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. “[I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must ‘only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.' ” Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 72 advisory committee's note).
Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b); see Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:
Robin L. Blume, Clerk
United States District Court
901 Richland Street
Columbia, South Carolina 29201
Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).