Summary
affirming denial of exemption for parsonage and vacant land in the context of approving exemption for other portions of the property
Summary of this case from Grace Cathedral, Inc. v. TestaOpinion
No. 88-487
Submitted September 13, 1989 —
Decided November 15, 1989.
Taxation — Real property taxes — Land contiguous to a house of public worship not exempt from taxation, when.
APPEAL from the Board of Tax Appeals, No. 86-C-88.
Appellant owns fifty-four acres of land improved with three buildings — a church sanctuary or "tabernacle"; a combination parsonage, school, and storeroom; and a youth center. Appellant acquired the property by gift in 1975. The parcel is roughly rectangular. The tabernacle and its two tax-exempt acres sit approximately in the middle of the parcel. The parsonage, school, and youth center and their exempt five acres are located in the left rear corner of the parcel. The remainder of the parcel is mostly a large lawn with a grove of trees along the rear border of the property. Some of this remaining acreage is used for school and church recreation.
Appellant applied to exempt the property from real property taxation for tax year 1983 and for remission of real property taxes and penalties for tax year 1982. The Tax Commissioner exempted the tabernacle and two acres and denied exemption for the remaining fifty-two acres and buildings. Appellant appealed to the Board of Tax Appeals ("BTA"). The BTA exempted the portion of the parsonage devoted to classrooms and storage, the youth center, and five additional acres in connection with these buildings, and denied exemption for the remaining forty-seven acres and the parsonage.
The cause is before this court upon an appeal as a matter of right.
Stephen Swain, for appellant.
Anthony J. Celebrezze, Jr., attorney general, and Floyd J. Miller, Jr., for appellee.
The BTA found insufficient reasons to exempt more than seven acres of appellant's fifty-four acre tract. Necessarily, we are limited to deciding whether the BTA's decision is "reasonable and lawful." R.C. 5717.04. We hold that it is.
On appeal, appellant first argues that the forty-seven acres should be exempt under R.C. 5709.07 as ground attached to a house of public worship "necessary for the proper occupancy, use, and enjoyment thereof, and not leased or otherwise used with a view to profit * * *." (1953 Code Revision.) Its pastor testified that revival meetings are conducted every year on this property, which take up "the biggest portion of it because we have people all throughout the back portion and their cars are parked all over the place to get back there." Appellant also argues that the forty-seven acres should be exempt as a sound barrier to protect neighbors from the noise of its Pentecostal meetings, which are sometimes conducted outside.
In Faith Fellowship Ministries, Inc. v. Limbach (1987), 32 Ohio St.3d 432, 513 N.E.2d 1340, we held that in determining a property's primary use we would not simply measure the "amount of time property is used in a taxable vis-a-vis a nontaxable use," but would look to see whether the property is "used in a principal, primary, and essential way to facilitate the public worship." Id. at 437, 513 N.E.2d at 1345. Thus, in this case, it would not be necessary for appellant to show an exempt use of property for a majority of the time. However, we hold that on this record, appellant has failed to establish its claim to an exemption.
Clearly, the use of the forty-seven acres for outdoor revivals and congregational services is sporadic. Neither the BTA nor we were provided quantitative data on its use. Furthermore, part of the forty-seven acres was normally used for recreation and part of it was farmed for profit during the tax years for which exemption was sought.
Accordingly, appellant did not establish that the forty-seven acres were "used in a principal, primary, and essential way to facilitate the public worship." Faith Fellowship, supra.
In Congregation Brith Emeth v. Limbach (1987), 33 Ohio St.3d 69, 514 N.E.2d 874, we did approve the exemption of three acres which served as a buffer against traffic noise. However, here, appellant claims exemption for a parcel nearly sixteen times as large which serves to protect neighbors against the noise its congregation makes. An insulation theory might be sustained upon presentation of proper evidence, but the record does not support it here.
The decision of the BTA is reasonable and lawful, and it is hereby affirmed.
Decision affirmed.
MOYER, C.J., SWEENEY, HOLMES, WRIGHT and H. BROWN, JJ., concur.
DOUGLAS and RESNICK, JJ., concur in judgment only.