Summary
holding that a jury foreman's unauthorized view of an accident scene, coupled with his taking of distance measurements "could not have influenced the jury, for it appears the distances were all in evidence and all the facts which the jury may have reported were properly before the jury"
Summary of this case from Pratt v. St. Christopher's HospOpinion
January 30, 1934.
March 19, 1934.
Practice — Trial — Jury — Inspection of place of employment by juror — Effect of communication of knowledge — Testimony of statements of jurors as to what transpired in jury room — New trial — Verdict of jury — Oral verdict in open court — Refusal of foreman to permit juror to change vote.
1. The trial court does not abuse its discretion in refusing a new trial on the ground that the foreman personally visited the place where the accident involved occurred, the liability for which was then before the jury, and measured some distances at the scene of the accident and communicated his knowledge to other members of the jury, where it appears that all the facts which the juror allegedly reported were properly before the jury and could not have influenced them, and the testimony offered to show the acts of the foreman are statements of jurors as to what transpired in the jury room. [249-50]
2. The act of a juror in personally viewing the place of an accident or any matter subject to judicial investigation is condemned, except when performed under the security and protection of the court. [249]
3. Statements of jurors as to what transpired in the jury room are not admissible for the purpose of impeaching their own verdict.
4. A verdict which is fully supported by evidence should be set aside and a new trial granted only in clear cases of improper conduct by jurors, evidenced by competent testimony. [249]
5. The only verdict of the jury is its oral verdict given in open court and recorded as its finding. [250]
6. A new trial is properly refused on the ground that the foreman of the jury, after the verdict was sealed, refused to permit a juror to change her vote where the jury's verdict was subsequently orally announced in court without dissent from any juror. [250]
Before FRAZER, C. J., SIMPSON, KEPHART, SCHAFFER, MAXEY, DREW and LINN, JJ.
Appeal, No. 129, Jan. T., 1934, by plaintiff, from judgment of C. P. Northampton Co., June T., 1931, No. 7, in case of Simon Friedman et al. v. Ralph Brothers, Incorporated. Judgment affirmed.
Trespass for personal injuries and property damage. Before STOTZ, J.
The opinion of the Supreme Court states the facts.
Verdict and judgment for defendant. Plaintiff appealed.
Error assigned, inter alia, was refusal of new trial, quoting record.
A. A. Gross, with him Asher Seip and Frank P. McCluskey, for appellant. W. J. Paff, of Smith Paff, for appellee.
Argued January 30, 1934.
Plaintiff requested a new trial in the court below because of the improper conduct of the foreman of the jury in personally visiting the place where the accident occurred, the liability for which was then before the jury, and communicating knowledge learned while at the place of the accident to other members of the jury. The foreman denied some of the charges, and the jurors were not in accord as to what the foreman had related.
We cannot condemn too severely the act of a juror personally viewing the place of an accident or any matter subject to judicial investigation which is not performed under the security and protection of the court. Such acts are improper and a juror should not only be censured for such conduct but, if necessary, punished by the court, and if the act was of sufficient importance, a mistrial should be directed. The particular thing complained of here was that the foreman measured some distances at the scene of the accident; but this could not have influenced the jury for it appears the distances were all in evidence and all the facts which the juror may have reported were properly before the jury. See Com. v. Filer, 249 Pa. 171. What is more important, we cannot accept the statement of jurors as to what transpired in the jury room as to the propriety or impropriety of a juror's conduct: Com. v. Bergdoll, 55 Pa. Super. 186; Com. v. Wilson, 19 Northampton 114. To do so, would destroy the security of all verdicts and go far toward weakening the efficacy of trial by jury, so well grounded in our system of jurisprudence. Jurors cannot impeach their own verdict. Their deliberations are secret and their inviolability must be closely guarded. Only in clear cases of improper conduct by jurors, evidenced by competent testimony, should a verdict, which is fully supported by the evidence, be set aside and a new trial granted.
The second reason for a new trial was that one of defendant's drivers is alleged to have stated to a juror "If you don't win this case for Ralph Brothers [defendants] it means my job." The testimony on this point is so unsatisfactory that we may exclude it entirely from consideration. Moreover, it is flatly denied by the driver and by the juror to whom the witness said the driver talked.
The third reason in support of the motion was a statement that the foreman of the jury, after the verdict was sealed, refused to permit a juror to change her vote. We have held recently, following a long line of cases, that the oral verdict given in open court is the only verdict of the jury: Eastley v. Glenn, 313 Pa. 130. The jury's verdict was orally announced in court without dissent from any juror. This action is final.
The charge that one of the jurors spoke to one of defendant's counsel, without indicating what was said or that any attempt was made to influence the juror, is obviously most trivial.
We do not condone the conduct of the jurors here involved, but we find that the discretion of the trial court was not abused in refusing a new trial.
Judgment affirmed.