Opinion
FBT156053297S
03-19-2019
Aaron FRIEDMAN PPA Laure Friedman and David Friedman et al. v. HARBOR YARD SPAND ENTERTAINMENT, LLC
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
OPINION
Richard E. Arnold, Judge Trial Referee
On December 7, 2018, after trial in this personal injury action, the jury rendered a verdict in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendants for the sum of $ 200, 000.00 in non-economic damages. The plaintiffs, pursuant to Connecticut Practice Book 18-5 and as authorized by the statutes provided below, have submitted the following proposed bill of costs, as amended by the plaintiff’s Response to the Defendants’ Objection to Bill of Costs.
The plaintiff did not claim or argue for any award of economic damages. The plaintiff’s claims were limited solely to an award of non-economic damages.
The plaintiff’s original Bill of Costs is dated December 20, 2018 and totaled $ 65, 997.36. The defendants filed an objection dated December 28, 2018. Thereafter, the plaintiff filed a "Response" to the defendants’ objection. The Response reduced the plaintiff’s total claims to a sum of $ 31, 910.96. That is the sum being considered by the court.
1. Complaint (CGS § 52-257(a)):
Complaint filed 10/23/15 (4 pages) $ 11.00
Amended Complaint 10/24/18 (4 pages) $ 11.00
2. Indemnity Fees:
Proceedings Before Trial (CGS § 52-257(a)(1)) $ 50.00
Trial of an Issue of Fact (CGS § 52-257(a)(2)) $ 75.00
3. Expert Witnesses § 52-260(f):
Christine McCarthy $ 7, 750.00
Jennifer Werely, MD $ 7, 800.00
Bridget Perry, MD $ 1, 800.00
4. Depositions § 52-257(b)(2) (In-State):
Aaron Friedman $ 30.00
David Friedman $ 30.00
Laure Friedman $ 30.00
Alberto Barbosa $ 30.00
Brett Steinberg, MD $ 30.00
Cliff Lydiksen $ 30.00
Charles J. Dowd $ 30.00
Jennifer Werely, MD $ 30.00
Julian Fisher, MD $ 30.00
Christine McCarthy $ 30.00
William Tenca $ 30.00
5. Evidence/Exhibits § 52-257(b)(5)(6):
HB Live, Inc. $ 12, 177.08
Copying $ 581.79
Marshals’ Fee § 52-257(b)(7) $ 550.09
Court and Clerk Fees § 52-257(b)(6) $ 350.00
$ 425.00
TOTAL: $ 31, 910.96
The defendants, in their objection, disputed several categories of claimed costs. The plaintiff in response, withdrew certain claims and has proceeded with the categories and amounts shown above. The current dispute involves costs associated with the trial testimony of expert witnesses Dr. McCarthy ($ 7, 750.00), Dr. Werely ($ 7, 800.00) and Dr. Perry ($ 1, 800) and deposition preparation time for Dr. McCarthy and Dr. Werely, as well as, allowances for audio visual services ($ 12, 177.08), copying ($ 581.79), marshals’ fees ($ 550.09), court fees ($ 350.00) and clerk’s fees ($ 425.00).
Regarding the claimed expert witness fees for McCarthy and Werely, the defendants argue that the fees claimed are excessive and unreasonable. Regarding Dr. Perry, the defendants argue the plaintiff is not entitled to any portion of this fee as Perry was never deposed and the plaintiff did not call her as a witness at trial. Perry was served with a trial subpoena by the defendants and she testified pursuant to that subpoena. Additionally, the defendants state that the plaintiff has not provided documentation regarding charges paid to Perry to substantiate the claim.
The defendants next object to the plaintiff’s claimed costs for HB Live, Inc. in the amount of $ 12, 177.08. Pursuant to General Statutes § 52-257(b)(5), the prevailing party is entitled to recover "for maps plans, mechanical drawings and photographs, necessary or convenient in the trial of any action, a reasonable sum." The defendants argue this claimed cost is unsubstantiated by any documentation. Additionally, the defendants argue that § 52-257(b)(5) does not include costs for audio-visual services at trial.
Regarding the plaintiff’s claimed costs for copying pursuant to General Statutes § 52-257(b)(6), the defendants argue that the plaintiff has not substantiated this claim, and there is no evidence the plaintiff, in fact, incurred this cost. As to the claim for marshals’ fees, the defendants concede that while the plaintiff may be entitled to costs pursuant to General Statutes § 52-257(b)(7), the plaintiff has not provided documentation or evidence to support this claim. The defendants raise an identical objection to the plaintiff’s claims for Court and Court Clerk Fees pursuant to § 52-257(b)(6).
As noted, herein, since the defendants filed their objection to the plaintiff’s proposed Bill of Costs, the plaintiff filed a "Response" and has submitted bills, invoices and documentation for their claimed costs. The court heard oral argument by the parties on March 7, 2019.
A.
Expert Witness Fees
The plaintiff claims expert witness fees for the trial testimony of Dr. Christine McCarthy in the amount of $ 7, 750.00. This claim includes the sum of $ 1, 550.00 for two hours of court preparation time on November 27, 2018, and a "full-day" of trial testimony on November 29, 2018. A review of the trial transcript and the court’s own trial notes reveals that Dr. McCarthy began her testimony at approximately 10:15 a.m. on November 29, 2018 and completed her testimony at 3:15 p.m. on the same day. Although her hourly rate is not stated on her invoice, it appears she is charging $ 775.00 per hour for her services in and out of court.
Dr. Jennifer Werely commenced her trial testimony on November 30, 2019 at approximately 10:20 a.m. and completed her testimony at approximately 3:55 p.m. that same day. Dr. Werely has submitted a bill for five hours of trial preparation in the amount of $ 3, 000.00 and eight hours for trial testimony in the amount of $ 4, 800.00. The claimed hourly rate for her services is $ 600.00 per hour. Her total bill is $ 7, 800.00.
On December 6, 2018, Dr. Bridget Perry was called to the stand by the defendants to testify at trial at approximately 10:00 a.m. Her testimony was completed by 1:00 p.m. Dr. Perry has submitted a bill which includes: (1) On site meeting with the plaintiff’s attorney (2 hours) for a total of $ 400.00; four hours of trial preparation for a total of $ 800.00; and (3) her in court trial testimony for three hours for a total of $ 600.00. Her hourly rate is $ 200.00 per hour. Her total bill submitted is $ 1, 800.00.
The plaintiff claims fees for Dr. McCarthy and Dr. Werely pursuant to General Statutes § 52-260(f). Dr. McCarthy is a pediatric neuropsychologist and she treated the minor plaintiff Aaron Friedman. Dr. Werely is a neurologist and specializes in the treatment of concussions, headaches and other neurological conditions. She was the minor plaintiff’s treating neurologist for approximately five years. At trial, neither Dr. McCarthy or Dr. Werely were questioned by either party regarding their fees for testifying or the reasonableness of such fees. Plaintiff argues there was no obligation of the plaintiff to inquire about their fees or to present such evidence and the lack of inquiry has no bearing on the reasonableness of those fees or if those fees were incurred. The plaintiff notes that the defendants’ counsel also did not inquire about any fees for these witnesses and if defense counsel did, it was only in passing as it regarded Dr. McCarthy.
General Statutes § 52-260(f) reads in relevant part:
The reasonableness of an expert’s fee is a question of fact which is subject to the trial court’s discretion. Altschuler v. Mingrone, 98 Conn.App. 777, 781 (2006). In considering and possibly reducing submitted expert witness fee requests, the trial courts have frequently applied a multi-factor test: "(1) the [witness’] area of expertise; (2) the education and training required to provide the expert insight that is sought; (3) the prevailing rates of other comparably respected available experts; (4) the nature, quality, and complexity of the discovery responses provided; (5) the fee actually charged to the party who retained the expert; (6) fees traditionally charged by the expert on related matters; and (7) any other factor likely to assist the court in balancing the interest implicated by [the applicable rule] ... Ultimately, however, it is in the court’s discretion to set an amount that it deems reasonable." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Holmes v. Hartford Hosp., 147 Conn.App. 713, 727, 84 A.3d 885 (2014); Rose v. Jolly, 48 Conn.Supp. 606, 607, 854 A.2d 824 (2004) .
At trial, the court heard testimony on both direct and cross examination as to the experts’ experience and qualifications. Also, throughout the trial, the court independently observed the length, content, and complexity of each witness’ testimony. In the present case, the court’s determination as to the reasonableness of the defense experts’ fees is based on the experts’ expertise and experience, insofar as the court considered their trial testimony, as well as representations made by counsel for the plaintiff and the defendants at the oral argument during the hearing on the Bill of Costs. Counsel for the plaintiff has recited the particular specialties, years of experience, and length and contents of each expert’s testimony. The court does not rely solely upon the experts’ invoices in determining that their fees were reasonable or unreasonable. Rather, the court’s determination is guided by evidence of the experts’ expertise and experience. Holmes v. Hartford Hosp., supra, 147 Conn.App. 728.
First, the defendants contest an award of costs for the plaintiff’s experts’ non-testimonial work for trial preparation time. "No statute expressly authorizes these costs." Smith v. Andrews, 289 Conn. 61, 86, 959 A.2d 597 (2008). The parties agree that § 52-260(f) is the relevant statute. "It is clear that the language of § 52-260(f) neither authorizes a reasonable fee for an expert’s trial preparation time as distinguished from his or her in-court trial testimony, nor expressly authorizes costs for an expert’s travel, transportation and hotel costs." Id. "In the present action, ... there is no applicable provision within the rules of practice to authorize the cost expressly, nor is there a corollary federal rule to support a different interpretation of § 52-260(f) than the one derived from its plain meaning." Therefore, the award of costs for non-testimonial work performed by the plaintiff’s expert witnesses would be improper. Id., 88. Having determined that an award for costs for non-testimonial services is improper, the court next reviews those charges by Dr. McCarthy and Dr. Werely for their trial testimony.
Both Dr. McCarthy and Dr. Werely each testified for one full day. While each of them concluded their testimony prior to the end of the afternoon court sessions, the defendants have agreed that the court should view their services as having been rendered for a full court day. The court, therefore, concludes that each should be compensated for six hours of time. The court awards the plaintiff costs for the testimony of Dr. McCarthy and Dr. Werely in the sum of $ 3, 600.00 each, which computes to a rate of $ 600.00 per hour.
Regarding the bill for the testimony of Dr. Perry, a treating physician for the minor plaintiff, it has been previously noted that Dr. Perry was called to testify by the defendants, not the plaintiff. At oral argument, the plaintiff represented that Dr. Perry billed the plaintiff and, in fact, the plaintiff paid Dr. Perry $ 1, 800.00, the entirety of her bill, which included $ 1, 200.00 for preparation fees. Her stated hourly rate is $ 200.00, which is reasonable. A review of the record and court transcripts indicates Dr. Perry testified for three hours, which computes to a total of $ 600.00. At oral argument, the defendants conceded that they should bear the cost of her in court testimony. As Dr. Perry testified for three hours at the hourly rate of $ 200.00, the court awards the plaintiff the sum of $ 600.00 for Dr. Perry’s trial testimony.
The plaintiff, by way of a supplemental memorandum of law dated March 12, 2019, has also requested taxable costs associated with preparation time for the depositions of both Dr. McCarthy and Dr. Werely pursuant to Practice Book § 13-4(3). In Levesque v. Bristol Hosp., Inc., 286 Conn. 234, 263 (2008) our Supreme Court held that Practice Book § 13-4(3) encompasses costs associated with time spent by these experts in preparation for their depositions, and the trial court could assess reasonable costs for the preparation to the party that noticed the deposition. Additionally, the Levesque court noted that nothing in General Statutes § 52-260(f) was intended to bar the taxing of costs for deposition preparation time.
At oral argument on the Bill of Costs, held on March 7, 2019, the court gave the parties an additional seven days to file a memorandum of law to address the issue of monetary charges by Dr. McCarthy and Dr. Werely for their testimony at depositions, rather than trial preparation time.
Sec. 13-4.— Experts
General Statutes § 52-260(f) reads as follows:
Dr. McCarthy requests the sum of $ 5, 425.00 for seven hours of deposition preparation time, and Dr. Werely requests the sum of $ 1, 200.00 for two hours of deposition preparation time at the rate of $ 600.00 per hour. The court awards the plaintiff an additional sum of $ 1, 200.00 in taxable cost to reimburse the plaintiff for Dr. Werely’s preparation time. Dr. McCarthy’s request for seven hours of preparation time at $ 775.00 per hour is unreasonable. The court, therefore, awards the plaintiff an additional sum of $ 1, 200.00 in taxable cost to reimburse the plaintiff for Dr. McCarthy’s deposition preparation time.
B.
Audio Visual Fees
The plaintiff requests the costs of audio-visual technology in the courtroom during trial, which was provided by HB Live, Inc. HB Live’s invoice is dated December 14, 2018, and totals $ 12, 177.08 for services rendered, including labor and equipment provided from November 12, 2018, through December 7, 2018. The plaintiff argues that the audio visual services allowed the efficient and necessary display of photographs and documents to the court, jury and counsel. The plaintiff contends that this cost is allowable pursuant to General Statutes § 52-257(b)(5), which allows for fees for "maps, plans, mechanical drawings and photographs, necessary or convenient in the trial of any action." Plaintiff argues that this provision has been construed to include the use of technology that facilitates the necessary display of such materials. See Godfrey v. P&H Industries, Superior Court, judicial district of New London at New London, Docket No. CV17 6028855S (June 22, 2018, Calmar, J.) (holding that Practice Book § 17-13 authorizes such costs for technicians, display of medical records and audio-visual presentation fees).
The bill amount was $ 11, 450.00, plus sales tax for a total of $ 12, 177.08.
Sec. 17-13. Defendant’s Offer Not Accepted
Additionally, the plaintiff argues that Connecticut courts have interpreted Section 52-257(b)(5) to apply to claimed expenses that go beyond the explicitly enumerated examples in the statute. The plaintiff notes that in Abbas v. Avignone, Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven, CV 116021594S (July 18, 2013, Lager, J.); 56 Conn.L.Rptr. 538 (at n.8, the Court approved the reasonable reimbursement of $ 30.00 under Section 52-257(b)(5) for copying of a DVD that was used in the presentation of evidence). The plaintiff also notes that in Mayette v. Froeb, Superior Court, judicial district of New Britain, CV 054006433S, (Feb. 16, 2007, Shapiro, J.), the Court approved the reasonable reimbursement of costs associated with enlarging certain exhibits used at trial, even though "exhibit enlargements" is not included in the statutory text. Lastly, the plaintiff argues that as technology advances in the courtroom, allowable costs for the use of the technology, including audio-visual presentations should be awarded as taxable costs. "[T]he use of technology to improve the presentation of information to the jury and/or to the bench should be supported. Computers, computer graphics, digitized documents, and other technological advancements have become important tools of the modern-day trial lawyer." DiBella v. Hopkins, 407 F.Supp.2d 537, 540 (S.D.N.Y. 2005).
The plaintiff argues that in the District of Connecticut, Local Rule 54(c)(5) governs costs associated with "Maps, Charts, Models, Photographs, Summaries, Computations and Statistical Summaries." In interpreting a comparable local rule for the Southern District of New York, the Court in DiBella v. Hopkins, supra, 407 F.Supp.2d 540 explained that "digital presentations of scanned documents, and other computer graphics serve the same function as exhibits and other papers used at trial, and there is no logical reason to differentiate between the former and the latter in terms of their taxability as costs." Id., 540. "As long as the cost is reasonable and the devices aid in the efficient and effective presentation of evidence, a prevailing party should be allowed to recover their expense." Id. Therefore the Court should apply the same reasoning to Section 52-257(b)(5), the language of which largely mirrors Local Rule 54(c)(5).
Federal Local Rule of Civil Procedure for the District of Connecticut § 54(c)(5) (Amended Sept. 15, 2017) reads as follows:
U.S. Dist. Ct. Rules S. & E.D.N.Y., Local Civil Rule 54.1(c)(6) reads as follows:
The defendants have objected that any such costs are excessive, and further, they state that General Statutes § 52-257(b)(5) does not include the recovery of fees for audio-visual services. The defendants argue that the language of the statute is narrow and outlines the specific costs that a prevailing party is entitled to recover under the statute. "Costs are the creature of statute ... and unless the statute clearly provides for them, courts cannot tax them." Waterbury v. Macken, 100 Conn. 407, 413 (1924).
In DiBella v. Hopkins, supra, 407 F.Supp.2d 537, the District Court confirmed that Local Civil Rule 54.1(c)(6) provides that "[c]osts of maps, charts, and models, including computer generated models, are not taxable except by order of court." The court then utilized its discretion to allow "the cost of charts, blow-ups, and computer graphics used at trial." Id., 539-40. "[B]y local rule, it would appear that the Court has the discretion to allow the cost of charts, blow-ups, and computer graphics used at trial." Id. The DiBella court reasoned that "blow-ups, digital presentations of scanned documents, and other computer graphics serve the same function as exhibits and other papers used at trial, and there is no logical reason to differentiate between the former and the latter in terms of their taxability as costs." Id. The DiBella court then awarded costs to the plaintiff for "the design and production of demonstrative presentations for trial, scanning of exhibits, computer operation, creation of exhibit database, digitizing of audio and visual recordings, and set-up and break-down of technology used during trial." Id.
Regarding Connecticut case law, the plaintiff relies solely upon Godfrey v. P&H Industries, supra, Docket No. CV17 6028855S, which involved a situation where the plaintiff was objecting to the defendant, Corvino’s Groceria Italiana, LLC’s Bill of Costs after a jury trial where the jury did not find any liability against Corvino. The costs submitted involved audio-visual presentation fees. The plaintiff objected to the bill of costs on the grounds of Practice Book § 17-13, arguing that he did not have the required sixty days to accept or reject the offer of compromise and should not be required to pay the defendant’s bill of costs from the date when the defendant made its offer. The plaintiff also argued that he was the prevailing party. "A prevailing party is one in whose favor a judgment is rendered, regardless of the amount of damages awarded." Yeager v. Alvarez, 134 Conn.App. 112, 123, 38 A.3d 1224 (2012).
The plaintiff had pleaded alternative theories of liability against defendants P&H Industries and Corvino’s.
The jury found for the plaintiff as against the defendant P&H Industries. The jury found that the plaintiff was 25% negligent for his own injuries and the defendant P&H Industries was 75% negligent for the plaintiff’s injuries. The jury additionally found that the co-defendant Corvino’s was not in control of the subject premises and that Corvino’s was 0% negligent.
In this matter the jury found that the defendant Corvino’s did not control the premises. Thus, the plaintiff failed to prove his case against Corvino’s and the defendant Corvino’s was a prevailing party as to the plaintiff claims against it. Accordingly, the court found that the defendant Corvino’s was a prevailing party, as well. The court then relied upon Practice Book § 17-13 to award costs for the display of medical records and a technician from Geomatrix Productions, Inc. relevant to the presentation of the defendant Corvino’s case, based on an invoice supplied to Corvino’s by Geomatrix, the audio-visual company.
However, in Godbout v. Hartford Insurance Group et al., Superior Court, judicial district of Hartford at Hartford, Docket No. HHDCV13 6046630S, (May 30, 2018, Shapiro, J.) , the court rejected a request contained in a bill of costs filed by the prevailing plaintiff, for the amount of $ 697.66 contained in an invoice for audio-visual services from VIP Studios. The audio-visual services consisted of renting screen and projection equipment used by the plaintiff at trial. The court, specifically citing to General Statutes § 52-257(b)(5) rejected that cost, stating that "[t]hese services are not within the parameters of the cited statute and, accordingly, are not awarded." Id.
The jury, after trial, rendered a verdict in favor of the plaintiff against defendants Metropolitan District Commission and Twin City Fire Insurance Company in an underinsured motorist accident matter.
The court in the present matter agrees with the decision in Godbout v. Hartford Insurance Group et al., supra, Docket No. HHDCV13 6046630S, (May 30, 2018, Shapiro, J.) and finds that General Statutes § 52-257(b)(5), by its plain language does not authorize an award of costs to the plaintiff for the audio-visual services of HB Live, Inc. "The law expects parties to bear their own litigation expenses, except where the legislature has dictated otherwise by way of statute. Costs are the creature of statute ... and unless the statute clearly provides for them courts cannot tax them." (Internal citations omitted.) Traystman, Coric and Keramidas, P.C. v. Daigle, 282 Conn. 418, 429, 922 A.2d 1056 (2007). "[I]t is implicit in our statutes governing recoverable costs, and our rules of practice expressly contemplate, that the costs requested in a bill of costs generally are intended to be of a type that the court clerk may grant automatically." Id., 430; See Practice Book § 18-5(a) ("costs may be taxed by the clerk in civil cases" [emphasis added]).
"The principles that govern statutory construction are well established. When construing a statute, [o]ur fundamental objective is to ascertain and give effect to the apparent intent of the legislature ... In other words, we seek to determine, in a reasoned manner, the meaning of the statutory language as applied to the facts of [the] case, including the question of whether the language actually does apply ... In seeking to determine that meaning, General Statutes § 1-2z directs us first to consider the text of the statute itself and its relationship to other statutes. If, after examining such text and considering such relationship, the meaning of such text is plain and unambiguous and does not yield absurd or unworkable results, extratextual evidence of the meaning of the statute shall not be considered ... When a statute is not plain and unambiguous, we also look for interpretive guidance to the legislative history and circumstances surrounding its enactment, to the legislative policy it was designed to implement, and to its relationship to existing legislation and common-law principles governing the same general subject matter ..." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) (Citation omitted.) State v. Rodriguez-Roman, 297 Conn. 66, 74-75, 3 A.3d 783 (2010).
"Additional rules apply, as well, to the construction of a statute containing a list or enumeration of things, events, actions or other items subject to the statute’s terms, and instructs that ‘when a legislature expresses items as part of a group or series, an item that was not included was deliberately excluded.’" Monge v. Acabbo, Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven at New Haven, NNHCV146046516 (Nov. 1, 2016, Ecker, J.) 63 Conn.L.Rptr. 340, quoting, DeNunzio v. DeNunzio, 320 Corm. 178, 194 (2016). "For example, a statute containing a particularized enumeration of recoverable costs should be understood to reflect a legislative intention to exclude costs that are not contained in the statutory enumeration." Id.
"The third relevant rule of construction is a cautionary statement to judges regarding their constitutionally limited role in the field of statutory interpretation." Monge v. Acabbo, supra, Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven at New Haven, NNHCV146046516. "[A] court may not by construction supply omissions in a statute simply because it appears that good reasons exist for adding them ..." Battersby v. Battersby, 218 Conn. 467, 470-71 (1991); see also Costantino v. Skolnick, 294 Conn. 719, 736 (2010) ("this court cannot, in the interest of public policy, engraft amendments onto the statutory language" (citations omitted)); PJM and Associates v. City of Bridgeport, 292 Conn. 125, 138 (2009) ("courts must interpret statutes as written, and cannot, by judicial construction, read into them provisions which are not clearly stated") (quotation marks and citations omitted); Doe v. Norwich Roman Catholic Diocesan Corp., 279 Conn. 207, 216 (2006) ("It is axiomatic that the court itself cannot rewrite a statute to accomplish a particular result. That is a function of the legislature." (internal quotation marks omitted)); Johnson v. Manson, 196 Conn. 309, 315 (1985) ("We must construe the act as we find it, without reference to whether we think it would have been or could be improved by the inclusion of other provisions" (citations omitted)). "Judges are not legislators." Monge v. Acabbo, supra, Superior Court, supra -judicial district of New Haven at New Haven, NNHCV146046516.
Unlike Godfrey v. P&H Industries, supra, Docket No. CV17 6028855S, this matter does not involve an award of costs regarding non-acceptance of offers of compromise, and it is uncertain, even if it did, that audio-visual services are an allowable cost within the scope of Practice Book § 17-13. Rather, a reviewing court should defer to the plain language of General Statutes § 52-257(b)(5), which does not enumerate audio-visual services as an allowable taxable cost. Accordingly, the court denies the request of the plaintiff for $ 12, 177.08 for the services of HB Live.
The court acknowledges that the result urged by plaintiff may make good sense in these days of rapid technological advances. It appears reasonable, as a matter of policy, to treat audio-visual fees as a taxable cost. Nonetheless, the court refuses to engage in judicial activism. "The question is not whether the court should improve the statute by supplying an omitted term because it appears that good reasons exist for doing so; that is not the judicial function." (Internal quotation marks omitted) Monge v. Acabbo, supra, NNHCV146046516.
Conclusion
Upon review of the Bill of Costs dated December 20, 2018, submitted by the plaintiff, the revisions to the Bill of Costs made by the plaintiff in her "Response to the Defendants’ Objection to Bill of Costs, which is dated January 11, 2019, and the representations made at oral argument by the respective parties, the court awards the following costs to the plaintiff.
1. Complaint (CGS § 52-257(a)):
Complaint filed 10/23/15 (4 pages) $ 11.00
Amended Complaint 10/24/18 (4 pages) $ 11.00
2. Indemnity Fees:
Proceedings Before Trial (CGS § 52-257(a)(1)) $ 50.00
Trial of an Issue of Fact (CGS § 52-257(a)(2)) $ 75.00
3. Expert Witnesses § 52-260(f):
Christine McCarthy (Trial Testimony) $ 3, 600.00
Jennifer Werely, MD (Trial Testimony) $ 3, 600.00
Bridget Perry, MD (Trial Testimony) $ 600.00
Christine McCarthy (Deposition Preparation Time) $ 1, 200.00
Jennifer Werely (Deposition Preparation Time) $ 1, 200.00
4. Depositions § 52-257(b)(2) (In-State):
Aaron Friedman $ 30.00
David Friedman $ 30.00
Laure Friedman $ 30.00
Alberto Barbosa $ 30.00
Brett Steinberg, MD $ 30.00
Cliff Lydiksen $ 30.00
Charles J. Dowd $ 30.00
Jennifer Werely, MD $ 30.00
Julian Fisher, MD $ 30.00
Christine McCarthy $ 30.00
William Tenca $ 30.00
5. Evidence/Exhibits § 52-257 (b)(5)(6):
Copying $ 581.79
Marshals’ Fee § 52-257(b)(7) $ 550.09
Court and Clerk Fees § 52-257(b)(6) $ 350.00, $ 425.00
TOTAL: $ 12, 583.88
(f) When any practitioner of the healing arts, as defined in section 20-1, ... psychologist ... gives expert testimony in any action or proceeding, including by means of a deposition, the court shall determine a reasonable fee to be paid to such practitioner of the healing arts, ... psychologist ... and taxed as part of the costs in lieu of all other witness fees payable to such practitioner of the healing arts, ... psychologist ...
(3) Except for an expert witness who is a health care provider who rendered care or treatment to the plaintiff, or unless otherwise ordered by the judicial authority or agreed upon by the parties, the party disclosing an expert witness shall, upon the request of an opposing party, produce to all other parties all materials obtained, created and/or relied upon by the expert in connection with his or her opinions in the case within fourteen days prior to that expert’s deposition or within such other time frame determined in accordance with the Schedule for Expert Discovery prepared pursuant to subsection (g) of this section. If any such materials have already been produced to the other parties in the case, then a list of such materials, made with sufficient particularity that the materials can be easily identified by the parties, shall satisfy the production requirement hereunder with respect to those materials. If an expert witness otherwise subject to this subsection is not being compensated in that capacity by or on behalf of the disclosing party, then that party may give written notice of that fact in satisfaction of the obligations imposed by this subsection. If such notice is provided, then it shall be the duty of the party seeking to depose such expert witness to obtain the production of the requested materials by subpoena or other lawful means.
(f) When any practitioner of the healing arts, as defined in section 20-1, dentist, registered nurse, advanced practice registered nurse or licensed practical nurse, as defined in section 20-87a, psychologist or real estate appraiser gives expert testimony in any action or proceeding, including by means of a deposition, the court shall determine a reasonable fee to be paid to such practitioner of the healing arts, dentist, registered nurse, advanced practice registered nurse, licensed practical nurse, psychologist or real estate appraiser and taxed as part of the costs in lieu of all other witness fees payable to such practitioner of the healing arts, dentist, registered nurse, advanced practice registered nurse, licensed practical nurse, psychologist or real estate appraiser.
If the plaintiff does not, within the time allowed for acceptance of the offer of compromise and before any evidence is offered at the trial, file the plaintiff’s notice of acceptance, the offer shall be deemed to be withdrawn and shall not be given in evidence; and the plaintiff, unless recovering more than the sum specified in the offer, with interest from its date, shall recover no costs accruing after the plaintiff received notice of the filing of such offer, but shall pay the defendant’s costs accruing after said time. Such costs may include reasonable attorneys fees in an amount not to exceed $ 350. Nothing in this section shall be interpreted to abrogate the contractual rights of any party concerning the recovery of attorneys fees in accordance with the provisions of any written contract between the parties to the action. The provisions of this section shall not apply to cases in which nominal damages have been assessed upon a hearing after a default or after a motion to strike has been denied. (See General Statutes § 52-195 and annotations.)
(c)(5) Maps, Charts, Models, Photographs, Summaries, Computations and Statistical Summaries.
The cost of maps and charts are taxable as costs only if admitted into evidence and only if they are not greater than 8 1/2" x 11" in size. Costs for enlargements greater than 8 1/2" x 11" or for models, are not taxable unless by order of the Court. Compilations of summaries, computations and statistical comparisons are also not taxable unless by order of the Court.
(c) Items Taxable as Costs.
(6) Maps, Charts, Models, Photographs and Summaries. The cost of photographs, 8" x 10" in size or less, is taxable if used or received in evidence. Enlargements greater than 8" x 10" are not taxable except by order of the Court. Costs of maps, charts, and models, including computer generated models, are not taxable except by order of the Court. The cost of compiling summaries, statistical comparisons and reports is not taxable.