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Freund v. Ross-Rodney Housing Corp.

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York, Second Department
Mar 5, 2002
292 A.D.2d 341 (N.Y. App. Div. 2002)

Opinion

2001-07740

Submitted February 8, 2002.

March 5, 2002.

In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, etc., the defendants Ross-Rodney Housing Corp., Bedford Gardens Co., and Kraus Management appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Rappaport, J.), dated July 3, 2001, which denied their motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against them.

Steven G. Fauth, New York, N.Y. (Peter J. Gannon of counsel), for appellants.

Julien Schlesinger, P.C., New York, N.Y. (Mary Elizabeth Burns of counsel), for respondents.

Before: A. GAIL PRUDENTI, P.J., FRED T. SANTUCCI, ANITA R. FLORIO, WILLIAM D. FRIEDMANN, JJ.


ORDERED that the order is affirmed, with costs.

The plaintiff Joseph Freund allegedly was injured when he slipped and fell on a wet floor in the apartment building where the plaintiffs reside. The appellants moved for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against them based on lack of notice of the allegedly dangerous condition.

The Supreme Court properly denied the motion. After the appellants established their prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law, the plaintiffs raised a triable issue of fact. "It is well settled that a plaintiff in a slip and fall case must establish that the defendant either created the defective condition or had actual or constructive notice of it" (Nedd v. Associated Hosp. Servs. of New York, 236 A.D.2d 455, 455-456; see, Kershner v. Pathmark Stores, 280 A.D.2d 583). "A defendant who has actual knowledge of an ongoing and recurring dangerous condition can be charged with constructive notice of each specific reoccurrence of the condition" (Osorio v. Wendell Terrace Owners Corp., 276 A.D.2d 540; see, Lustgarten v. Oceanside Union Free School Dist., 277 A.D.2d 430). Although the appellants' witness denied actual knowledge of the alleged recurring condition, the record contains facts from which the trier of fact could reasonably infer that the appellants had actual notice of such recurring condition (see, Padula v. Big V Supermarkets, 173 A.D.2d 1094, 1095; Kraus v. B. Gertz, 38 A.D.2d 857; cf., Smith v. Funnel Equities, 282 A.D.2d 445).

PRUDENTI, P.J., SANTUCCI, FLORIO and FRIEDMANN, JJ., concur.


Summaries of

Freund v. Ross-Rodney Housing Corp.

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York, Second Department
Mar 5, 2002
292 A.D.2d 341 (N.Y. App. Div. 2002)
Case details for

Freund v. Ross-Rodney Housing Corp.

Case Details

Full title:JOSEPH FREUND, ET AL., respondents, v. ROSS-RODNEY HOUSING CORP., ET AL.…

Court:Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York, Second Department

Date published: Mar 5, 2002

Citations

292 A.D.2d 341 (N.Y. App. Div. 2002)
738 N.Y.S.2d 612

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