Opinion
22A-DC-2817
06-12-2023
In the Matter of the Marriage of, Patricia B. Freije, Appellant-Respondent, v. Peter L. Freije, Appellee-Petitioner.
Appellant Pro Se Patricia B. Freije Indianapolis, Indiana
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this Memorandum Decision is not binding precedent for any court and may be cited only for persuasive value or to establish res judicata, collateral estoppel, or law of the case.
Appeal from the Marion Superior Court The Honorable Sarah Glasser, Magistrate Trial Court Cause No. 49D10-1806-DC-23442
Appellant Pro Se Patricia B. Freije Indianapolis, Indiana
MEMORANDUM DECISION
FOLEY, JUDGE
[¶1] Patricia B. Freije ("Mother") appeals the trial court's order denying her request to relocate to Iowa with the children ("the Children") she shares with Peter L. Freije ("Father"). She raises the following restated issues for our review on appeal:
I. Whether the trial court erred when it concluded that, although Mother's relocation to Iowa was made in good faith and for legitimate purposes, it was not in the best interest of the Children;
II. Whether the trial court erred when it failed to provide Mother any relief, remedy, or recourse based on the fact that Father was not compliant with the trial court's prior order that he receive weekly mental health treatment and participate in substance abuse group therapy; and
III. Whether the trial court erred when it failed to disclose its prior representation of and personal relationship with Father's counsel.
[¶2] We affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
[¶3] Mother and Father were married on July 6, 2002, and had four children born during the marriage, who ranged in age from nine to thirteen years of age at the time of the underlying order. On June 14, 2018, Father filed a Petition for Legal Separation, which commenced the parties' dissolution proceedings. During the marriage, Mother was the primary caretaker, and Father was involved in the Children's lives, although there would be periods of time where he would become disengaged from the family due to his use of alcohol and marijuana. On February 19, 2019, the trial court entered the parties' settlement agreement and dissolution decree. Mother was awarded primary physical custody of the Children, subject to Father's parenting time, and the parties agreed to share joint legal custody.
[¶4] Since the parties' dissolution decree, Mother and Father have experienced difficulties in their co-parenting, which resulted in recurring issues and conflict between them. On March 19, 2020, Mother filed a motion to modify legal custody, and as a result of Father's request for a custody evaluation, the trial court ordered that the parties participate in a custody evaluation conducted by Dr. Bart Ferraro ("Dr. Ferraro"). On October 8, 2020, Dr. Ferraro issued his report on the evaluation that "strongly recommended that [Father] enroll in the group therapy program focusing on addiction and attachment" and engage in individual therapy "on a no less than weekly basis." Appellant's App. Vol. II pp. 231, 232. Dr. Ferraro found that Father had "significant mental health issues which fuel significant conflict with [Mother]." Id. at 228. The report recommended that Mother be awarded sole legal custody and that the parties share joint physical custody.
[¶5] On July 13, 2021, the trial court issued its order granting Mother's modification petition and ordered that Mother have sole legal custody of the Children. The trial court agreed with the custody evaluation report regarding Father's issues and ordered him to "intensify his individual therapy" such that he is "seen no less than a weekly basis" and to enroll in "the group therapy program on addiction and attachment." Appellant's App. Vol. III p. 18.
[¶6] On April 22, 2022, Mother filed a Notice of Intent to Relocate, notifying Father and the trial court of her intent to move to Iowa because she planned to get married and move to live with her new husband in his home in Iowa with an anticipated move of August 2022. On April 25, 2022, Mother filed a motion to modify parenting time in light of her intent to relocate to Iowa. Father filed his objection to Mother's proposed relocation and a motion to modify custody and parenting time. A hearing was held on all of these motions on July 8, 2022.
[¶7] Mother testified that she had been in a serious relationship with her then-fiancé, S.K., for over a year and that they planned to marry in December 2022. S.K. lived in Perry, Iowa, where he is employed and unable to relocate due to his employment. As such, Mother wished to relocate to Iowa with the Children to live with S.K. Mother was employed by a law firm in Indianapolis, and her employer had agreed to allow her to work remotely from Iowa after her move. Mother was not admitted to practice law in Iowa. Perry, Iowa is 509 miles away from Father's residence in Indianapolis, Indiana and is a seven-and-a-half-hour drive from where the Children lived at the time of the hearing. On the date of the hearing, the Children had visited S.K.'s home in Iowa once, ten days prior to the hearing. At that time, the Children met S.K.'s minor child for the first time. Mother testified that S.K. had visited with the Children numerous times in Indiana and that the Children regularly communicate with S.K. and were comfortable in his presence. Mother's whole family live in Arkansas, and she had no other friends or family residing in Iowa. She testified that her parents planned to relocate to Iowa at some point in the future to provide her support.
[¶8] She told the court that she had toured schools in Iowa and determined that the Children would have similar educational and extracurricular opportunities available as in Indiana, with smaller class sizes. All of the Children except for the oldest had lived in Indiana their entire lives, and the parties moved to Indiana when their oldest child was a year old. The Children had gone to the same school system their entire lives, and they did well academically, participated in numerous extracurricular activities, and established strong relationships with friends and teachers. Mother testified that the Children were outgoing, and she did not anticipate them having any trouble making friends in the new community in Iowa.
[¶9] Mother stated that, if she were allowed to relocate, she would be willing to meet Father halfway for parenting exchanges, which would require an approximate four-hour drive. Father suffers from irritable bowel syndrome ("IBS"), which prevents him from driving such distances, and he stated that he would be required to purchase plane tickets for parenting time exchanges, which would be substantially more expensive than driving. Mother testified that she believed that having geographical distance between her and Father would limit the discord between them and bring more stability to their relationship.
[¶10] Father testified that he works as the director of research and development at a family-owned business and lives in Indianapolis in a four-bedroom home, which he shares with his partner, A.S. Father's parents live a few miles from Father's home, and the Children frequently visit them. Father's brother also lives in Indianapolis, and the Children played on the same sports teams as their cousins. At the time of the hearing, Father had been in a relationship with A.S. for two-and-a-half years, and the Children were closely bonded to her. A.S. participates in the Children's lives when they are at Father's home and serves as another important adult in the Children's lives. The Children are involved in many different extracurricular activities through school and in the community, including sports, robotics, and gardening club. Father was involved in many of these activities with the Children as a coach or assistant coach.
[¶11] Father uses CBD oil to treat his IBS and consumes it while he has the Children but testified that he did not use illegal substances. Father testified that he did not know the date of the last time he ingested anything with cannabis in it, but that it was probably in the previous seventy-two hours. At the time of the hearing, Father was in counseling with Chris Bayless ("Bayless"), a Colorado practitioner at Three Stones Wellness. Father had weekly virtual treatment sessions with Bayless and also participated in a "men's support group." Tr. Vol. 2 pp. 151-52. Father testified that his mental health had improved since the last court order and was continuing to improve. Father was not participating in the specific weekly therapy that had been ordered by the trial court on July 13, 2021, but he believed that by participating in the therapy programs he chose, he was compliant with the trial court's order.
[¶12] On October 12, 2022, the trial court issued its findings of fact and conclusions of law, in which it denied Mother's request to relocate the Children to Iowa. Although the trial court concluded that Mother's proposed relocation was made in good faith and for a legitimate purpose, it further concluded that the relocation was not in the Children's best interests because it would alter the nature and quality of the relationship between Father and the Children. The trial court also denied Father's motion to modify custody of the Children because he did not meet his burden to show that a substantial change in circumstances had occurred such that a custody change would be in the best interests of the Children. Mother now appeals.
Discussion and Decision
[¶13] Initially, we note that Father did not file an appellee's brief. When an appellee fails to submit a brief on appeal, we apply a less stringent standard of review with respect to the showing necessary to establish reversible error. In re Paternity of S.C., 966 N.E.2d 143, 148 (Ind.Ct.App. 2012), trans. denied. We may reverse if the appellant establishes prima facie error, which is an error at first sight, on first appearance, or on the face of it. Id. "Moreover, we will not undertake the burden of developing legal arguments on the appellee's behalf." Id. Nevertheless, even under this less stringent standard, we are obligated to correctly apply the law to the facts in the record to determine whether reversal is warranted. Tisdale v. Bolick, 978 N.E.2d 30, 34 (Ind.Ct.App. 2012).
[¶14] Where, as here, the trial court entered findings of fact and conclusions thereon, we must first determine whether the record supports the factual findings, and then whether the findings support the judgment. M.S. v. C.S., 938 N.E.2d 278, 281 (Ind.Ct.App. 2010). On appeal, we will not set aside the findings or judgment unless they are clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given to the opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of witnesses. Id. at 281-82. We therefore consider only the evidence favorable to the judgment and the reasonable inferences flowing therefrom, and we will neither reweigh the evidence nor assess witness credibility. Id. at 282. A judgment is clearly erroneous when there is no evidence to support the findings, the findings do not support the judgment, or the trial court applies the wrong legal standard to properly found facts. Id.
I. Denial of Relocation Request
[¶15] "[O]ur [S]upreme [C]ourt has expressed a 'preference for granting latitude and deference to our trial judges in family law matters.'" T.L. v. J.L., 950 N.E.2d 779, 784 (Ind.Ct.App. 2011) (quoting In re Paternity of Ba.S., 911 N.E.2d 1252, 1254 (Ind.Ct.App. 2009)). We afford such deference because of trial judges' "unique, direct interactions with the parties face-to-face." Best v. Best, 941 N.E.2d 499, 502 (Ind. 2011). "Our trial judges are in a superior position to ascertain information and apply common sense, particularly in the determination of the best interests of the involved children" due to their ability "to assess credibility and character though both factual testimony and intuitive discernment." Id. Thus, we "will not substitute our own judgment if any evidence or legitimate inferences support the trial court's judgment. The concern for finality in custody matters reinforces this doctrine." Baxendale v. Raich, 878 N.E.2d 1252, 1257-58 (Ind. 2008).
[¶16] Mother argues that the trial court erred in determining that although her relocation to Iowa was made in good faith and for legitimate purposes, it was not in the best interest of the Children to relocate with Mother. Under the relocation statutes, a relocating parent must file a notice of intent to relocate with the court that issued the original custody or parenting time order. Ind. Code § 31-17-2.2-1(a). If a nonrelocating parent objects to the relocation of the child, the parent must, not later than twenty days after the receipt of notice from the relocating parent, file a motion in opposition to the motion to relocate. I.C. § 31-17-2.2-5(a). Once a nonrelocating parent has filed a motion in opposition to the relocation of the child, "[o]n the request of either party, the court shall hold a full evidentiary hearing to allow or restrain the relocation of the child and to review and modify, if appropriate, a custody order, parenting time order, grandparent visitation order, or child support order." I.C. § 31-17-2.2-5(d). During this hearing, "[t]he relocating individual has the burden of proof that the proposed relocation is made in good faith and for a legitimate reason." Ind. Code § 31-17-2.2-5(e). "If the relocating individual meets the burden of proof under subsection (e), the burden shifts to the nonrelocating parent to show that the proposed relocation is not in the best interest of the child." I.C. § 31-17-2.2-5(f).
[¶17] In considering the proposed relocation, the trial court shall take into account the following factors:
(1) The distance involved in the proposed change of residence.
(2) The hardship and expense involved for the nonrelocating individual to exercise parenting time or grandparent visitation.
(3) The feasibility of preserving the relationship between the nonrelocating individual and the child through suitable parenting time and grandparent visitation arrangements, including consideration of the financial circumstances of the parties.
(4) Whether there is an established pattern of conduct by the relocating individual, including actions by the relocating individual to either promote or thwart a nonrelocating individual's contact with the child.
(5) The reasons provided by the:
(A) relocating individual for seeking relocation; and
(B) nonrelocating parent for opposing the relocation of the child.
(6) Other factors affecting the best interest of the child.I.C. § 31-17-2.2-1(c). The "[o]ther factors affecting the best interest of the child" include the statutory factors relevant to an initial custody order or modification thereof, such as (1) the child's age and sex; (2) the parents' wishes; (3) the child's wishes; (4) the child's relationship with parents, siblings, and other persons affecting the child's best interests; (5) the child's adjustment to home, school, and the community; (6) the mental and physical health of all of the individuals involved; (7) evidence of a pattern of domestic violence; (8) evidence that the child has been cared for by a de facto custodian; and (9) a designation in a power of attorney of the child's parent. I.C. § 31-17-2-8. In contrast to a modification of child custody pursuant to Indiana Code section 31-17-2-21, a relocation-based modification need not involve a substantial change to one of the original best interest factors. Jarrell v. Jarrell, 5 N.E.3d 1186, 1190 (Ind.Ct.App. 2014) (citing Baxendale, 878 N.E.2d at 1256-57), trans. denied.
[¶18] Here, the trial court found that Mother's request to relocate was made in good faith and for legitimate reasons. However, after reviewing the statutory factors, the trial court found that Mother's proposed relocation was not in the Children's best interest.
[¶19] The first factor to consider under the relocation statute is the distance of the proposed relocation. I.C. § 31-17-2.2-1(c)(1). Evidence was presented that the proposed relocation to Iowa from Indiana involves a significant distance in that it is approximately 500 miles away and would require a seven-and-a-half-hour drive. The trial court found that this distance would make it "impossible for Father to continue exercising his current parenting time scheduled with the [C]hildren." Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 56. This finding was supported by the evidence because with the Children living over 500 miles from him, Father would not be able to exercise the same parenting time as he was currently at the time of the hearing, which was occurring weekly.
[¶20] The next factor is the hardship and expense involved for the nonrelocating parent to exercise parenting time. I.C. § 31-17-2.2-1(c)(2). The trial court found that sharing driving transportation of the Children is not overly burdensome on either Mother or Father and that they are both financially secure such that the burden associated with transportation would not be substantial for either parent. However, the evidence did show that Father would have to pay for a place to stay each time he traveled to Iowa if he wished to have additional time with the Children and visited Iowa. Additionally, Father would bear the total cost of transporting the Children if he chose air travel. The evidence also showed that Father has IBS that would make it difficult for him to drive the long distance involved in visiting Iowa. Therefore, the relocation would cause some hardship and additional expense for Father if he wishes to exercise additional visitation time with the Children.
[¶21] As to the feasibility of preserving the relationship between Father and the Children, including consideration of the financial circumstances of the parties, I.C. § 31-17-2.2-1(c)(3), the trial court found that, if the relocation was granted, Father would not be able to maintain the close relationship he had with the Children due to distance, busy schedules of the Children, and the lack of in-person time together. The trial court also found that most of Father's communication with the Children would be via Facetime or a similar computer application and that the Children were all of an age that there would not be a difficulty in communicating in this manner. The Children's interactions with their grandparents and other relatives, with whom they regularly spend time, would also be primarily through phone calls and Facetime as well. The trial court also found that it would be impossible for Father to continue to exercise the same amount of parenting time and enjoy the same quality of relationship with the Children that he presently does if the relocation occurred. The trial court's findings were supported by the evidence because if Mother were to relocate with the Children, Father would live over 500 miles away and would exercise his parenting time mainly over summer break for up to seven weeks, for a week during winter break, and for a week at spring break. As of the time of the hearing, Father was exercising parenting time weekly and was able to regularly attend the Children's extracurricular activities. He was also able to participate in these activities with the Children as a coach or volunteer, and the Children regularly spent time with their paternal grandparents and other relatives. Therefore, the evidence supported the findings that Father would not be able to maintain the same quality of relationship that he has with the Children in Indianapolis and that he could not exercise the same parenting time if the relocation was granted.
[¶22] The fourth factor is whether there is an established pattern of conduct by Mother, including actions by Mother to either promote or thwart Father's contact with the Children. I.C. § 31-17-2.2-1(c)(4). The only finding touching on this factor stated that there was evidence that "interference with parenting time and communication ha[d] been an issue in the past, but those issues ha[d] improved. Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 57. Therefore, based on the trial court's findings and conclusions, this factor did not seem to be determinant in its decision to deny Mother's request to relocate.
[¶23] As to the fifth factor, the reasons provided by Mother for seeking relocation and provided by Father for opposing the relocation, I.C. § 31-17-2.2-1(c)(5), the trial court found that Mother was seeking to relocate to live with her fiancé and get married. Father was opposing the relocation because it would negatively impact his regular and consistent relationship with the Children. The evidence supported both of these findings.
[¶24] The sixth factor encompasses all "[o]ther factors affecting the best interest of the child." See I.C. §§ 31-17-2.2-1(c)(6), 31-17-2-8. The evidence showed that: (1) most of the Children, whose ages ranged from nine to thirteen, had previously expressed a desire to have equal parenting time with both Mother and Father, but their wishes at the time of the hearing were unknown; (2) the Children had a close and loving relationship with both parents; (3) the Children were bonded to paternal grandparents and had consistent and regular contact with Father's family; (4) the Children had a strong bond with A.S., who Father is in a long-term stable relationship with and who lives in the home with Father; (5) although the Children were beginning to develop a good relationship with S.K., they have had limited personal contact with him and have only traveled to Iowa once prior to the hearing, meeting one of their future step-siblings for the first time; (6) the Children are thriving in their current school, which is the only school they have ever attended, and are familiar and stable in their current school district and community; (7) the Children have best friends that live close to their homes in Indiana, and they are very active and invested in extracurricular activities in Indiana, including sports, gardening, gymnastics, and robotics; (8) the Children have no family in Iowa, although Mother's parents planned to move there in the future; (9) Father suffers from IBS and has well-documented mental health struggles; and (10) the coparenting relationship between Mother and Father is strained due to Father's behaviors.
[¶25] Based on the evidence and its findings thereon, the trial court concluded that "[i]t would be impossible for Father to continue to exercise the same amount of parenting time and enjoy the same quality relationship with the [C]hildren he presently does if the [C]hildren are allowed to relocate" and that, therefore, "[i]t is not in the [C]hildren's best interest to alter the nature and quality of the relationship with Father by allowing them to be relocated." Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 59. After a review of the evidence presented, we conclude that the trial court did not err when it determined that Mother's relocation was not in the best interest of the Children. Distance is a major factor in this case as Mother's proposed home in Iowa is located over 500 miles away from the Children's home in Indiana, resulting in a seven-and-a-half-hour drive. This distance would create a hardship on Father exercising regular parenting time with the Children, and although Mother was open to Father being able to exercise additional parenting time in Iowa, he would bear the expense of accommodations and the cost of travel to Iowa if he wishes to do so or if he wishes to utilize air travel.
[¶26] The evidence further reveals that it would be impossible for Father to maintain the quality of his relationship with the Children if they were relocated because he spends regular weekly time with the Children, attends their extracurricular activities, and participates in their activities as either a coach or volunteer. The Children also have a bonded relationship with A.S., who lives with Father, participates in the Children's lives when they are at Father's home, and serves as an additional important adult in the Children's lives. The Children also have regular contact with their paternal grandparents and other family members, who live nearby. In light of the distance between Iowa and Indiana, most of Father's and the other family members' communication with the Children would be through Facetime or a similar computer application, which is feasible due to the age of the Children, but not ideal. The evidence also showed that the Children were thriving in their current school and were acclimated in their school district and community, which is where they have lived almost their entire lives. They have strong connections with the community both through friends and family, whereas, at the time of the hearing, they had only visited their possible new home in Iowa once, only a few days before the hearing, and had not had extensive personal interactions with S.K. or his family.
We note that Mother's reliance on In re the of Paternity of X.A.S., 928 N.E.2d 222 (Ind.Ct.App. 2010), trans. denied, is misplaced. In that case, this court reversed a trial court's order that both denied the custodial father's request to relocate his son to California and awarded custody of the child to his mother. We specifically concluded that the record "d[id] not contain sufficient evidence to support a change from the status quo" and that, as a result, the child should remain with his father. Id. at 223. Insofar as X.A.S. reversed a modification of custody, its reasoning is inapplicable to the present case where the trial court ordered the parties to maintain the status quo of Mother residing in Indiana and continuing to have primary physical custody of the Children. In addition, in X.A.S., although the father had primary custody and helped the child with homework and attended athletic events, the evidence did not show the more extensive involvement that Father has with the Children in the present case, where he coaches the Children's teams and volunteers in other activities. Therefore, because the present case is factually different from X.A.S. and because procedurally our case did not disrupt the status quo as in X.A.S., we do not find that case controlling here.
[¶27] This evidence supports the trial court's conclusion that relocation was not in the Children's best interest. As a result, the trial court's denial of Mother's petition to relocate and grant of Father's objection to relocation was not clearly erroneous.
II. Lack of Remedy for Father's Non-Compliance
[¶28] Mother next argues that the trial court erred when it failed to provide her any relief, remedy, or recourse based on Father's continued non-compliance with the prior trial court order that he participate in weekly therapy and enroll in a specific group therapy program on addiction and attachment. Initially, we note that it is unclear if Mother is raising this issue as a stand-alone issue of error or if she is raising it as part of her argument that the denial of her relocation was in error. As to the former, we have already determined the issue, and as to the latter, we find that she has waived this issue on appeal. Although Mother testified at the hearing that she was asking the trial court to make Father's parenting time contingent on his compliance with the trial court's previous order, we do not find any explicit request for such relief in either her notice of intent to relocate or her motion to modify parenting time. "The failure to raise an issue at trial waives the issue on appeal." Wilson v. State, 931 N.E.2d 914, 919 (Ind.Ct.App. 2010), trans. denied.
[¶29] Notwithstanding Mother's waiver of this issue on appeal, we note that the trial court did consider Father's non-compliance with the previous trial court order in making its determination reflected in its order, albeit not in the way she wished it to. As part of its order, the trial court denied Father's motion to modify custody and parenting time. In doing so, the trial court made findings and conclusions regarding Father's non-compliance with the previous order, finding that Father had not "participated in weekly therapy as ordered" and that he had "unilaterally chose[n] to participate in a different mental health program." Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 53. The trial court concluded that it had "concern about the legitimacy and qualifications of the therapeutic relationship that Father asserts has been established" and that such relationship was "not in compliance with the [trial court's order]." Id. at 60. The trial court then concluded that this non-compliance "played a significant impact on [its] decision on modification," and it denied Father's modification request. Id. We, therefore, find that, even if Mother did not waive this issue, the trial court did in fact take Father's non-compliance into account in its decision, albeit not in the way that Mother desired.
III. Failure to Disclose Prior Representation
[¶30] Lastly, Mother argues that the trial court erred when it failed to disclose its prior representation of and a personal relationship with Father's counsel. She asserts that Magistrate Glasser should have disqualified herself or, at a minimum, disclosed the fact that, before she became a magistrate, she had represented one of Father's attorneys, Tom Hirschauer III ("Hirschauer"), in a family law matter and also that, prior to becoming a magistrate, she and her husband had been friends and socialized with Hirschauer and his now-former wife.
On March 4, 2022, Tom Hirschauer III ("Hirschauer") filed an appearance with the trial court as counsel for Father. While Hirschauer was one of the two attorneys of record for Father, Hirschauer's associate appeared at all of the hearings in front of the trial court.
[¶31] On appeal, Mother does not provide us with the appropriate standard of review but does cite Bloomington Magazine, Inc. v. Kiang, 961 N.E.2d 61, 63 (Ind.Ct.App. 2012), which explains that a ruling upon a motion to disqualify rests within the sound discretion of the trial judge and will be reversed only upon a showing of abuse of that discretion. "An abuse of discretion occurs when the trial court's decision is against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before it." Id. at 64-64. When reviewing a trial judge's decision not to disqualify himself or herself, we presume that the trial judge is unbiased. Id. at 64. To overcome that presumption, the appellant must demonstrate actual personal bias. Id. The mere appearance of bias and partiality may require disqualification if an objective person, knowledgeable of all the circumstances, would have a rational basis for doubting the judge's impartiality. Id. "Upon review of a judge's failure to recuse, we will assume that a judge would have complied with the obligation to recuse had there been any reasonable question concerning impartiality, unless we discern circumstances which support a contrary conclusion." Id. The Code of Judicial Conduct states, "A judge shall disqualify himself or herself in any proceeding in which the judge's impartiality might reasonably be questioned . . . ." Ind. Judicial Conduct Rule 2.11(A).
We note that Mother never filed a motion to disqualify with the trial court because she discovered the information she asserts required disclosure or recusal after the final order. In Bloomington Magazine, Inc. v. Kiang, 961 N.E.2d 61 (Ind.Ct.App. 2012), when information regarding a possible disqualification of the trial judge was discovered after the final judgment and while an appeal was pending with this court, the Appellant filed with this court a Verified Application for Leave to File Motion to Set Aside Judgment in Trial Court Pursuant to Indiana Trial Rule 60(B)(2), 60(B)(3), or Alternatively 60(B)(8), and we dismissed the appeal without prejudice and the matter was remanded to the trial court for consideration. 961 N.E.2d at 62-63. In the interest of expediency and efficiency, however, we decide Mother's issue here, even though she did not file a motion to disqualify, because she has failed to demonstrate actual personal bias.
[¶32] Here, Mother has not established that Magistrate Glasser was actually biased or that an objective person knowledgeable of all the circumstances would have a rational basis for doubting Magistrate Glasser's impartiality in presiding over this case and issuing the order denying Mother's relocation request. Without more, Mother has not established that Magistrate Glasser erred in not disqualifying herself or in not disclosing her prior representation and prior personal relationship with Hirschauer, one of Father's two attorneys of record, who did not even appear in court for the hearings.
Conclusion
[¶33] We conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it denied Mother's request to relocate and granted Father's objection to relocation. The trial court also did not err when it did not make Father's parenting time contingent on his compliance with the trial court's previous order regarding his therapy, nor did the trial court err in not disqualifying itself or disclosing its past representation of Father's attorney in another matter.
We note that Mother requests she be awarded costs and expenses incurred in bringing this appeal. We deny such request.
[¶34] Affirmed.
Vaidik, J., and Tavitas, J., concur.