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observing that the Zoning Board's "entire inquiry became lost on what the Town Council intended"
Summary of this case from GD Richmond Beaver River I, LLC v. Town of Richmond Zoning Bd. of ReviewOpinion
C.A. No. WC-2020-0006
07-15-2020
FREEPOINT SOLAR LLC, Plaintiff, v. RICHMOND ZONING BOARD OF REVIEW and JOSH COMERFORD, JEFFREY VAILLANCOURT, NICHOLAS SOLITRO, BRUCE LANE, and CHELSEA BAITTINGER, in their capacities as members of the RICHMOND ZONING BOARD OF REVIEW, Defendants.
ATTORNEYS: For Plaintiff: Robin L. Main, Esq. Christine E. Dieter, Esq. For Defendant: Karen R. Ellsworth, Esq.
DECISION LICHT , J. Appellant Freepoint Solar LLC (Appellant or Freepoint) appealed the decision of the Town of Richmond Zoning Board of Review (the Zoning Board) denying Freepoint a special use permit to construct a solar energy system. Freepoint asks this Court to reverse the Zoning Board's decision and enter an order directing the Zoning Board to issue Freepoint the special use permit. Jurisdiction is pursuant to G.L. 1956 § 45-24-69.
I
Facts and Travel
Freepoint is the proposed lessee of a 64.7-acre parcel on property located at 36 Woodville Road, Richmond, Rhode Island (the Property) located in an R-3 residential zoning district. On November 20, 2018, Freepoint submitted an application to the Zoning Board for a special use permit under § 18.34.030 of the Richmond Zoning Ordinance (the Application) for construction of a ground-mounted solar energy system (the Project). The Project would include 12,654 panels, mounting substrates, system foundations, wiring, power inverters, service equipment, and connection to the electrical distribution grid of Narragansett Electric Company d/b/a National Grid (National Grid).
At the time Freepoint submitted its application, Chapter 18.16 (Use Regulations) and Chapter 18.34 (Solar Energy Systems) of the Zoning Ordinance allowed for ground-mounted commercial solar energy systems within an R-3 zoning district by special use permit. Section 18.34.030 specified six requirements for issuance of a special use permit:
"A. The entire lot on which the solar energy system is located shall be within two (2) miles of a utility substation.
"B. The security fence shall be located 25 feet from the perimeter of the solar energy system.
"C. The minimum front, side and rear yards required in the zoning district by Sec. 18.20.010 shall not apply. The front, side and rear yards shall be at least fifty (50) feet, measured from the property line to the perimeter of the solar energy system.
"D. A vegetative buffer at least twenty-five (25) feet wide shall be maintained between the security fence and the boundaries of the lot. The zoning board of review shall have the authority to require a wider vegetative buffer if there is sufficient competent evidence in the record to support the increase.
"E. The lot or parcel must be large enough to accommodate a solar energy system that covers at least eleven (11) contiguous acres that are not within the jurisdictional boundaries of a wetland, as that phrase is defined in the current R.I. department of environmental management rules and regulations governing the administration and enforcement of the freshwater wetlands act.
"F. A solar energy system shall not be located on a lot that is protected from development by a conservation easement, preservation easement, or deed restriction, or on a lot or portion of a lot that is classified by the tax assessor as farm land, forest land, or open space land pursuant to title 44, chapter 27 of the general laws." Zoning Ordinance § 18.34.030.
Prior to submitting the Application, Freepoint engaged in numerous discussions with the Richmond Town Planner from July to November 2018 regarding the Project. Certified R. 8 (Pet. of Freepoint to Re-Open Pub. Hr'g, 1-2.) On July 13, 2018, Freepoint informed the Town Planner that it intended to use the Amtrak Station located on Church Street to satisfy the requirement set forth in § 18.34.030(A), which requires "[t]he entire lot on which the solar energy system is located shall be within two (2) miles of a utility substation." The Town Planner never voiced any concerns or raised any questions regarding Freepoint's use of the Amtrak Station or whether its status constituted a "utility substation." Id.
On November 14, 2018, six days before submitting the Application, Freepoint entered into an Interconnection Agreement with National Grid. Certified R. 1J (Interconnection Service Agreement, 32-55). Per that agreement, Freepoint has made payments of almost $600,000 to National Grid. Id. at 41-44. On November 20, 2018, Freepoint submitted the Application to the Zoning Board and identified the Amtrak Station as the utility substation within two miles of the Project. See Certified R. 1A-J (Development Plan Review Application); Certified R. 1G (Compliance with Solar Ordinance); Certified R. 1J (Appendices, Figure 3).
On January 28, 2019, the Zoning Board opened Freepoint's Application for public hearing, referred the Development Plan Review Application to the Richmond Planning Board for an advisory opinion, and continued the matter. (Zoning Bd. of Review Meeting Mins., Jan. 28, 2019). On Apr. 23, 2019, the Planning Board held a hearing on the Application and issued an advisory decision to the Zoning Board, concluding that the Project satisfied all of the requirements of the Zoning Ordinance Chapter 18.34 and was consistent with the purposes of the Town's Comprehensive Community Plan. Certified R. 7 (Advisory Decision, Development Plan Review, Apr. 23, 2019). The Planning Board recommended approval of the Application with certain conditions. Id.
The conditions articulated by the Planning Board in its Advisory Decision are not relevant to this appeal.
The Zoning Board held a public hearing on the Application on May 20, 2019 and a public work session on May 29, 2019. See Certified R. 10E (Zoning Bd. of Review Meeting Mins., May 20, 2019); Certified R. 10F (Zoning Bd. of Review Meeting Mins., May 29, 2019). At the May 20, 2019 hearing, the Project's Senior Project Manager testified on behalf of Freepoint. See Certified R. 10E (Zoning Bd. of Review Meeting Mins., May 20, 2019). She explained that the lot is approximately 64.7 acres, with 22.1 acres to be used for the solar installation. Id. She also stated that the Project complies with the applicable sections of the Zoning Ordinance and that, at the end of the Project, Freepoint would decommission the system and restore the site. Id. Members of the public also offered testimony, particularly voicing concerns that the Project did not comply with the Town's Comprehensive Plan. Id. For example, an abutting property owner who had been a licensed engineer for twenty-five years commented that the Project's solar panels would rotate throughout the day with the position of the sun, resulting in six hours of glare directed toward the homes to the east of the solar energy system. Id. Another property owner suggested that construction of an industrial solar farm goes against the rural character of the Town of Richmond, which the Comprehensive Plan aims to maintain. Id.
The purpose of the May 29, 2019 work session was to discuss the evidence and possible findings of fact for a decision on Freepoint's Application. See Certified R. 10F (Zoning Bd. of Review Meeting Mins., May 29, 2019). At that session, the Zoning Board discussed whether Freepoint had complied with the requirements of a special use permit, including whether the solar energy system is located within two miles of a utility substation. Id. Because it was a work session, there were no findings of fact, but the Zoning Board stated, "if aesthetics are not enough to deny an application, then the only option available is to consider conditions to place on the special use permit." Id. at 2.
The public hearing resumed on July 22, 2019. See Certified R. 12 (Hr'g Tr., July 22, 2019). At that hearing, William Boger, a property owner within 200 feet of the proposed site for the Project questioned whether the Project was located within two miles of a utility substation, noting that the Property was located more than 2.1 miles from the nearest National Grid substation. Id. at 29-30. Mr. Boger noted that the Zoning Ordinance does not provide a definition of utility substation. Instead, he looked to the National Electric Code, which he stated defined utility substation as a substation which is a composite of switches and gears. See id. at 29:16-21. He also stated that when the word "utility" is tagged onto utility substation, the utility is the company that owns and maintains being a provider of that utility service. Id. at 29-30. Because National Grid is the provider of electricity for that area, he argued that the source for a utility substation must be National Grid. Id. at 30:1-5.
As previously noted, one of the special use permit requirements for a solar energy system in the R-3 zoning district was that "[t]he entire lot on which the solar energy system is located shall be within two (2) miles of a utility substation." Zoning Ordinance § 18.34.030(A) (as amended May 15, 2018).
Before the utility substation question came up, Zoning Board members had concluded that the Project satisfied all other requirements for the special use permit. Id. at 94-95. One of the Zoning Board members noted that "[b]efore any of this was introduced, . . . , [the Amtrak Station] was accepted and that was the utility substation." Id. at 95:3-6. Indeed, the Planning Board had already found that the Amtrak Station was compliant with the utility substation requirement. Id. at 98:1-3. Following this exchange, the Zoning Board discussed the utility substation requirement at length, specifically the definition of the term "utility substation," what the Town Council intended the phrase to mean, and how the meaning should be determined. Id. at 96-121. One Zoning Board member looked to § 18.34 of the Zoning Ordinance and the first time that the word utility is used in that section; it stated "[a]ll electrical connection and distribution lines within a solar energy system shall be underground. Electrical equipment between the system and the utility connection may be above ground if required by the utility." Ordinance § 18.34.010(B.1). The Zoning Board member suggested that this provision identifies the utility as the electrical purveyor, and the other members took issue with the fact that Amtrak provides locomotive power and does not provide electricity. See Certified R. 12 (Hr'g Tr., at 105:8-106:16, July 22, 2019). Some members of the Zoning Board then opined that the Town Council did not mean Amtrak when drafting the utility substation requirement but, rather, intended it to mean within two miles of a utility substation that feeds the Town of Richmond, which Amtrak does not do. Id. at 106-107. After these discussions, the Zoning Board closed the public hearing. Id. at 121.
On October 28, 2019, after granting Freepoint's petition to reopen the hearing, the Zoning Board held a further public hearing for the limited purpose of allowing Freepoint to submit testimony that the Project satisfied the utility substation requirement. See Certified R. 13 (Hr'g Tr., at 4, Oct. 28, 2019). To show that the Amtrak Station constituted a utility substation, Freepoint offered the expert testimony of Jeffrey Fenn, P.E., Director of Electrical Engineering at SGC Engineering and senior member of the Institute of Electrical Electronic Engineers (IEEE). Id. at 5, 9. Mr. Fenn testified that "[t]he primary item in a substation that defines it different from another facility is the transformer," and that this definition is "a commonly accepted definition of what a substation is in the industry." Id . at 11, 16. He further testified that
"[the Amtrak Station] is a substation because it has a transformer in it and also has various switching devices, protective devices, controls that we talked about. So these components are all there, but the big item is, it has a transformer and that's, again, what makes it [different] from other types of facilities into a substation facility." Id. at 20.Mr. Fenn compared the Amtrak Station to other substations in the Richmond area, concluding that they all share key characteristics such as transformers, breakers, switches, bus work, and overhead lines. Id. at 23. Mr. Fenn also introduced industry resources, such as the National Electric Safety Code, the U.S. Department of Agriculture's Design Guide for Rural Substations, and the IEEE Standard Dictionary of Electrical and Electronics Terms, to corroborate his testimony and to make clear that the definition he provided applies industry wide. See id. at 20, 26, 28-32. Freepoint's counsel also requested the Zoning Board take administrative notice of Rhode Island's Public Utilities and Carriers statute, G.L. 1956 § 39-1-2, which includes railroads such as Amtrak in its definition of "public utility." Id. at 31-33; Certified R. 9K (Applicant's Exhibit H).
Following Mr. Fenn's testimony, the Town Council's solicitor appeared on behalf of the Town of Richmond to present evidence regarding the definition of substation used in the Ordinance and argue the Town of Richmond's position that "the term 'substation' was intended to be limited to National Grid substations within the Town." See Certified R. 13 (Hr'g Tr., at 36-37, Oct. 28, 2019). The solicitor then offered an affidavit, a videotape of the Town Council meeting where the Ordinance was passed, and the map that was used at that meeting. Id. at 37. Freepoint objected to the admission of these exhibits on grounds that the Ordinance provision in question is clear on its face and, thus, the Zoning Board could not look behind the plain language to determine intent. See Ordinance § 18.34.030(A) ("[t]he entire lot on which the solar energy system is located shall be within two (2) miles of a utility substation"). The Zoning Board disagreed, allowed the exhibits into evidence, and watched the entire videotape of the Town Council public hearing at which Chapter 18.34 of the Ordinance was adopted. Hr'g Tr. at 37-38, 48, Oct. 28, 2019.
This appearance occurred after the Town Council had repealed, on October 15, 2019, the Zoning Ordinance allowing solar farms in R-3 zones. See discussion in Section III A below.
The videotape showed that at no time during the Town Council meeting did any Town Council member state that the term "utility substation" was intended to apply solely to National Grid substations. Id. at 52-53, 73-74 ("The Town Council did not modify that word "utility" with anything pertaining to National Grid."). However, the Town Solicitor also introduced into evidence a map that was an exhibit at the Town Council meeting. The map showed three National Grid utility substations and lots in Richmond within two miles of those three substations where energy system could potentially be built, and the Town Solicitor argued that this evidenced the Town Council's intent to limit solar facilities within those three specific areas. Id. at 42-43.
After hearing public comment on the Project, the Zoning Board closed the public hearing and the only issue discussed was whether the utility substation requirement had been met. Id. at 73-80. Four members of the Zoning Board addressed the issue which one called "a surprise focus." Id. at 73:17. There was frustration with the Town Council's lack of a definition of the term. One member stated, "[T]here wasn't a ton of thought behind it." Id. at 73:23-24. Another said, "I'm just not persuaded enough by the video that we saw that clearly defined what their intent was in regards to why they or what they were referring to as 'utility substation.'" Id. at 75:13-17. Another voiced, "It was torturous listening to that . . . [i]t was a sloppy meeting." Id. at 78:15-16. While no votes were taken, at least four, and arguably the fifth, Zoning Board member commented that the Amtrak Station constituted a "utility substation," satisfying the requirement for a special use permit. See, e.g., id. at 74:21-24 ("left with [the] plain and ordinary meaning of 'utility substation' and in the case of expert testimony that this location, this Amtrak location is a utility substation, I can't go any other way"), 77:8-10 ("this Amtrak station would qualify as a utility substation based on the testimony and evidence we have today"). The Zoning Board continued the matter without adopting any findings of fact or taking a vote. Rather, the Zoning Board's counsel suggested, "Since we've already pretty much discussed it and articulated what you think the decision should be, it probably would make more sense at this point for me to draft a decision for you to discuss at the next meeting then vote on it." Id. at 81:16-20.
On December 16, 2019, the Zoning Board resumed deliberations on the Application and once again had a lengthy discussion about the meaning of "utility substation." At this meeting, counsel to the Zoning Board participated extensively in describing the law as she knew it and the evidence as she recalled it. She urged the Zoning Board to consider the intent of the Town Council and the purpose of the Ordinance. One Zoning Board member stated,
"If I were to go by the letter of this ordinance, I would say they were compliant. . . . If the instruction from our Counselor from the Town to us is that we have to consider [what the intention of the Town Council was at that meeting that we saw for one hour and fifty-two minutes] and not go by what we think the letter of this ordinance is, then [the Application is] non-compliant." Hr'g Tr. at 15-16, Dec. 16, 2019.
The December 16, 2019 hearing transcript was not included in the Certified Record; however, Freepoint attached a complete copy as an exhibit to its papers. See Freepoint Mem., Ex. C.
Another Zoning Board member felt that, "There was not, like I say, enough compelling evidence in that video. In fact, I was more let down by the lack of thought that went into the ordinance by the Town Council." Id. at 11:9-13
After deliberations, the Zoning Board voted on the Application. The Zoning Board's attorney did not draft "a decision" as she said she would do at the October 28, 2019 meeting but rather presented two draft decisions, one to grant the Application and one to deny the Application. A motion was then made to adopt the decision granting the Application with three members voting in favor. Because Ordinance § 18.53.020(C)(3) and G.L. 1956 § 45-24-57(2)(iii) require the concurring vote of four of the five voting members to approve a special use permit, the motion to grant the special use permit failed in a 3-2 vote. Id. at 69. A motion to adopt the decision denying the application was then made and this motion also failed as only two members voted in favor while three voted against. The Zoning Board issued its decision two days later on December 18, 2019 indicating that both motions failed. Certified R. 11 (Zoning Board Recorded Decision, Dec. 18, 2019).
Freepoint filed its appeal on January 6, 2020, claiming the Project was within two miles of a utility substation as required by the Ordinance. The parties entered into a briefing schedule and requested oral argument which was held by WebEx on June 15, 2020.
II
Standard of Review
Pursuant to § 45-24-69, the Superior Court has jurisdiction to review zoning board decisions, but "shall not substitute its judgment for that of the zoning board of review as to the weight of the evidence on questions of fact." Section 45-24-69(d). "The court may affirm the decision . . . or remand the case for further proceedings, or may reverse or modify the decision if substantial rights of the appellant have been prejudiced" by "findings, inferences, conclusions, or decisions" that are:
"(1) In violation of constitutional, statutory, or ordinance provisions;
"(2) In excess of the authority granted to the zoning board of review by statute or ordinance;
"(3) Made upon unlawful procedure;
"(4) Affected by other error of law;
"(5) Clearly erroneous in view of the reliable, probative, and substantial evidence of the whole record; or
"(6) Arbitrary or capricious or characterized by abuse of discretion or clearly unwarranted exercise of discretion." Id.
The Superior Court must "examine the whole record to determine whether the findings of the zoning board were supported by substantial evidence." Lloyd v. Zoning Board of Review for City of Newport, 62 A.3d 1078, 1083 (R.I. 2013) (internal quotation omitted). Substantial evidence is defined as "such relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion, and means [an] amount more than a scintilla but less than a preponderance." Pawtucket Transfer Operations, LLC v. City of Pawtucket, 944 A.2d 855, 859 (R.I. 2008) (internal quotations omitted). If the Court "can conscientiously find that the board's decision was supported by substantial evidence in the whole record," then the decision must stand. Lloyd, 62 A.3d at 1083 (internal quotation omitted).
Moreover, our Supreme Court has emphasized that, with respect to zoning board decisions, "a zoning board of review is required to make findings of fact and conclusions of law in support of its decisions in order that such decisions may be susceptible of judicial review." Bernuth v. Zoning Board of Review of Town of New Shoreham, 770 A.2d 396, 401 (R.I. 2001) (internal quotations omitted). Absent adequate findings of fact, this Court will not scour the record for supporting evidence and will remand the case to the zoning board for additional proceedings. Id.
III
Analysis
A
Is the Application Vested?
As a preliminary matter, the Zoning Board argues that this appeal must be denied because the type of special use permit sought by Freepoint is now prohibited. Indeed, on October 15, 2019, while Freepoint's Application was still pending before the Zoning Board, the Town Council amended Chapters 18.16 and 18.34 to eliminate the sections permitting commercial solar energy systems in an R-3 zoning district by special use permit altogether. The Zoning Board argues that it is a well-established rule that when a town council amends a zoning ordinance to prohibit a use, and an application for that use is before the zoning board, the board does not have the authority to approve the application. See e.g., Campanella Corporation v. Zoning Board of Review of the Town of Middletown, 106 R.I. 495, 496, 261 A.2d 644, 644-45 (1970). It further asserts that this Court must read the ordinance as it is written at the time the case is reviewed. However, this argument fails from the start. All of the cases cited by the Zoning Board, while they may not be explicitly overruled, have been superseded by the plain language of the Rhode Island Zoning Enabling Act of 1991, G.L. 1956 §§ 45-24-27 et seq.
Rhode Island General Laws § 45-24-44, Creation of Vested Rights, states that a zoning ordinance must provide "protection for the consideration of applications for development that are substantially complete and have been submitted for approval to the appropriate review agency in the city or town prior to enactment of the new zoning ordinance or amendment." Section 45-24-44(a). The statute goes on to say that "[a]ny application considered by a city or town under the protection of this section shall be reviewed according to the regulations applicable in the zoning ordinance in force at the time the application was submitted." Id. at (c). Additionally, Richmond's Zoning Ordinance expressly incorporates this statutory provision in § 18.56.010 by vesting rights for "substantially complete" applications submitted prior to zoning ordinance amendments. Thus, the Zoning Ordinance provisions in effect at the time Freepoint submitted its Application govern this proceeding.
B
Utility Substation
i
Principles of Statutory Construction
The merits of this case hinge on the meaning of "utility substation," which is not defined in the Ordinance. The following principles guide the Court in its task.
1. The issue is a question of law.
2. "When interpreting an ordinance, [this Court] employ[s] the same rules of construction that [it] appl[ies] when interpreting statutes." Ruggiero v. City of Providence, 893 A.2d 235, 237 (R.I. 2006).
3. "[A] zoning board's determinations of law are not binding on the reviewing court. . . ." Iadevaia v. Town of Scituate Zoning Board of Review, 80 A.3d 864, 874 (R.I. 2013) (internal quotation omitted). As such, the Court will conduct a de novo review of the Zoning Board's decision. Id. "It is well settled that when the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous, this Court must interpret the statute literally and must give the words of the statute their plain and ordinary meanings." Accent Store Design, Inc. v. Marathon House, Inc., 674 A.2d 1223, 1226 (R.I. 1996).
4. Only if the Court finds the language of an ordinance to be unclear and ambiguous, does it look to the legislative intent behind the enactment. Pawtucket Transfer Operations, LLC v. City of Pawtucket, 944 A.2d 855, 859 (R.I. 2008).
5. Conversely, "when a statute is clear and unambiguous, [the Court is] not required to give any deference to the agency's reading of the statute." Town of Warren v. Bristol
Warren Regional School District, 159 A.3d 1029, 1038 (R.I. 2017) (internal quotation omitted).
6. "Zoning ordinances are in derogation of the common-law right of the owner as to the use of his property and must therefore be strictly construed." Earle v. Zoning Board of Review of City of Warwick, 96 R.I. 321, 324, 191 A.2d 161, 164 (1963). Accordingly, [i]n determining restrictions upon an owner's use of his property in instances where doubt exists as to the legislative intention, the ordinance should be interpreted in favor of the property owner." Id. at 324-25, 191 A.2d at 164.
ii
Finding of the Zoning Board
The Application for a special use permit was denied because there were only three votes in favor and the Ordinance and state statute requires four votes to approve a special use permit. The two motions, however, each contained findings of fact.
On the motion to grant the Application which garnered three favorable votes, the proposed findings of fact included, inter alia:
"9. The proposed system will comply with the requirements of Sec. 18.34.030 of the zoning ordinance for a solar energy system in the R-3 zoning district:
a) Tom Swank of SunEast Development LLC, speaking on behalf of the applicant, said the property is within two miles of an Amtrak substation on Church Street in Wood River Junction. Jeffrey Fenn, P.E., an electrical engineer testifying as an expert witness for the applicant, testified that in his professional opinion, the facility on Church Street is a substation. The applicants' lawyer said the facility is a utility substation because under state law, a railroad is a utility.
. . .
"17. The zoning ordinance does not define 'utility substation.'
. . .
"19. The Town Council did intend to restrict the number of solar energy systems, but the ordinance did not specifically restrict construction of solar energy systems to the five lots discussed during the public hearing on July 25, 2017, and the ordinance did not explicitly identify the substations shown on the applicant's exhibit during public hearing on July 25, 2017.The conclusions of law included the following:
"20. The ordinance did not explicitly exclude the Amtrak substation on Church Street, or any other substation, from being considered a utility substation." Certified R. 11 (Zoning Board Recorded Decision, at 3, 5, 6, Dec. 18, 2019).
"The Zoning Board of Review is unable to find any evidence in the record that the proposed solar energy system, with the conditions imposed, does not satisfy the requirements of the zoning ordinance solely because of the specific location proposed." Id. at 6.
On the motion to deny the Application, which had only two votes in favor, the proposed findings of fact included, inter alia:
"2. [I]f the purpose of requiring the system to be within two miles of a utility substation was to limit the potential sites to lots where interconnection was likely to be more economically feasible, the Town Council intended the term 'utility substation' to refer to a National Grid substation. There is no evidence in the record that the term 'utility substation,' as used in the ordinance, was intended to mean any facility that met the technical definition of a substation and was owned by a utility as that term is defined in the Rhode Island law governing regulation of utilities.
"3. If a 'utility substation' was not intended to mean a substation that could interconnect with a solar energy system, it would be meaningless to require a solar energy system to be located within two miles of a utility substation. Requiring a solar energy system to be located within two miles of an Amtrak electrical substation would make no sense and not would [sic] be consistent with the purpose of Chapter 18.34.
"4. The Woodville Road site where the applicants proposed to construct a solar energy system is not within two miles of a utility substation as that term is used in Chapter 18.34. Therefore, the application does not satisfy the requirements of the zoning ordinance." Id. at 10.
The Zoning Board's decision states that both motions failed. However, there were three members who believed that the Town Council did not intend to limit the number of lots to the five presented at the Town Council meeting and that the Town Council did not exclude the Amtrak Station. At the October 28, 2019 hearing, four, and arguably five, of the Zoning Board members believed Freepoint met all the requirements for a special use permit, but no vote was taken. At the final meeting, after a lengthy discussion with the Zoning Board's counsel, two members concluded that the Town Council did not intend to include the Amtrak Station. The Court believes there is no finding by the Zoning Board as to the intent of the Town Council when using the term "utility substation." Moreover, when queried at oral argument before the Court, the Zoning Board's attorney conceded that because both motions failed there is no finding of fact as to what the Town Council intended.
iii
What is a Utility Substation?
Freepoint argues that the Zoning Board erred in allowing the Town Solicitor to submit evidence about the intent of the solar ordinance because the term "utility substation" is clear on its face and, thus, its plain and ordinary meaning should have been applied. The Zoning Board argues that consideration of the Town Council's intent to determine the meaning of "utility substation" was proper because the Zoning Board members found that the Ordinance was not clear on its face.
In conducting its review of an administrative agency's interpretation of an ordinance provision, the Court "must first determine whether the statutory provision at issue is clear and unambiguous." Power Test Realty Co. Limited Partnership v. Coit, 134 A.3d 1213, 1219 (R.I. 2016). In doing so, the Court "presume[s] that the drafters 'intended each word or provision of a statute to express a significant meaning, and the [C]ourt will give effect to every word, clause, or sentence, whenever possible.'" Prew v. Employee Retirement System of City of Providence, 139 A.3d 556, 561 (R.I. 2016) (quoting State v. Clark, 974 A.2d 558, 571 (R.I. 2009)). This Court will refrain from '"read[ing] into a statute a requirement that the drafters omitted."' Prew, 139 A.3d at 561 (quoting Commerce Park Associates 1, LLC v. Houle, 87 A.3d 1061, 1067 (R.I. 2014); see also Iadevaia, 80 A.3d at 875 (refraining from reading into the ordinance a requirement that the drafters of the ordinance clearly omitted). It will only do so if "the clear purpose of the legislation would fail without the implication," Wehr, Inc. v. Truex, 700 A.2d 1085, 1088 (R.I. 1997) (internal quotation omitted). Furthermore, "[t]he Legislature [or, in this case, the Town Council] is presumed to know the state of existing relevant law when it enacts a statute [or ordinance]." State v. Briggs, 934 A.2d 811, 814 (R.I. 2007).
The Zoning Ordinance does not qualify or define the term "utility substation." It does not specify that the utility substation must be a National Grid substation, nor does it state that the type of utility must be one that provides electricity. Surely, if the drafters had intended such a limited definition of "utility substation" that it must exclusively be a National Grid substation, they would have written in such a requirement. As such, this Court declines to read in terms and requirements that were not included in the plain language of the Ordinance. See Prew, 139 A.3d at 561.
However, although the Ordinance does not define the term utility, existing Rhode Island law does. The Public Utilities Commission (PUC) enabling act defines "public utility" to include "every company that is an electric distribution company and every company operating or doing business in intrastate commerce and in this state as a railroad, street railway, common carrier, gas, liquefied natural gas, water, telephone, telegraph, and pipeline company . . . ." Section 39-1-2(20) (emphasis added). The Zoning Board certainly had knowledge of this provision, particularly because Freepoint's counsel requested the Zoning Board take judicial notice of this definition. With this definition in mind, an Amtrak Station falls squarely within the definition of utility, and there is no dispute that Freepoint's solar project is within two miles of the Amtrak Station.
To go a step further, Merriam-Webster Dictionary defines "substation" as "a subsidiary station in which electric current is transformed." See www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/substation (last visited June 22, 2020). Freepoint's uncontradicted expert explained that this definition is the "commonly accepted definition of what a substation is in the industry." Certified R. 13 (Hr'g Tr., at 11, Oct. 28, 2019). He also referenced numerous other industry-standard definitions all defining utility substations in a similar way, showing that "[t]he primary item in a substation that defines it different from another facility is the transformer." Id. at 16, 17 ("The main key component that defines a substation versus another is the power transformer.").
Specifically, Mr. Fenn cited to the National Electric Safety Code, defining "substation" as "[a]n enclosed assemblage of equipment, e.g., switches, circuit breakers, buses, and transformers, under the control of qualified persons, through which electric energy is passed for the purpose of switching or modifying its characteristics." Certified R. 9G (Applicant's Exhibit D at 5). He cited the U.S. Department of Agriculture's Design Guide For Rural Substations, describing three varieties of substations, all of which include transformers. Certified R. 9H (Applicant's Exhibit E at 2). He also cited the New IEEE Standard Dictionary of Electrical and Electronics Terms defining a "substation" as "[a]n area or group of equipment containing switches, circuit breakers, buses, and transformers for switching power circuits and to transform power from one voltage to another or from one system to another." Certified R. 9I (Applicant's Exhibit F at 2).
Despite the Zoning Board having plenty of evidence defining a utility substation before it, the entire inquiry became lost on what the Town Council intended. Mr. Fenn's testimony and references to Rhode Island General Laws and other reputable sources was the only evidence presented regarding the definition of "utility substation." The Town of Richmond did not present a witness to discuss potential conflicting definitions of the term. Whether the viewing of the tape of the Town Council meeting was proper or not is immaterial. There is no evidence from that meeting that could lead to a conclusion that the Town Council was limiting its definition of utility substations to the ones shown by the proponent of the solar ordinance and, as previously discussed, the Zoning Board made no such finding.
The Court notes that the Town Planner and the Town Planning Board had no difficulty with the utility substation requirement in reviewing Freepoint's Application. Both had already specifically found that the Project satisfied this requirement. Certified R. 8 (Pet. of Freepoint to Re-Open Pub. Hr'g, at 1-2); Certified R. 7 (Advisory Development Plan Review Decision, at 1). The Planning Board recommended approval of the Project and, in its written decision recommending approval, it found "[b]y code, the property is located within two miles of a [utility] substation (located at 530 Church Street, Wood River Junction)." Certified R. 7 (Advisory Development Plan Review Decision, at 1).
Moreover, in the words of one member, the issue of the utility substation was "a surprise focus" of the hearings. Under a de novo review, the fact that the Zoning Board wrestled with the meaning of "utility substation" (without agreeing on a conclusion) because they were advised to ascertain the intent of the Town Council is not afforded deference. See Iadevaia, 80 A.3d at 874. Actually, it was wrong to do so because as one member stated, "If I were to go by the letter of this ordinance, I would say they were compliant." Hr'g Tr., at 15, Dec. 16, 2019. They were so required to go by the letter of the Ordinance. Moreover, if there were any doubt whatsoever, (which in this Court's mind there is not) "[i]n determining restrictions upon an owner's use of his property in instances where doubt exists as to the legislative intention, the ordinance should be interpreted in favor of the property owner." Earle, 96 R.I. at 324-25, 191 A.2d at 164. Accordingly, the Court finds that the language of the Zoning Ordinance clearly and unambiguously delineates the requirements to obtain a special use permit, and the plain meaning of the requirements should be applied. The Zoning Ordinance merely requires "[t]he entire lot on which the solar energy system is located [] be within two (2) miles of a utility substation," such as an Amtrak Station or a National Grid Station. Zoning Ordinance § 18.34.030(A). It does not require a solar energy system to be exclusively within two miles of a National Grid substation.
IV
Conclusion
After review of the entire record, the Court finds that the Zoning Board's December 2019 decision was affected by error of law. Moreover, a review of the entire record and the reliable, probative, and substantial evidence on the record demonstrates that the Amtrak Station falls within the meaning of "utility substation" and since there was no dispute that the other requirements of a special use permit were met, the Application should have been granted. As a result, the substantial rights of Freepoint have been prejudiced.
Accordingly, the decision of the Zoning Board denying Freepoint's Application for a special use permit is reversed. This matter is hereby remanded to the Zoning Board to grant the requested special use permit. Counsel shall submit an appropriate order and judgment for entry in accordance with this Decision.
ATTORNEYS:
For Plaintiff:
Robin L. Main, Esq.
Christine E. Dieter, Esq.
For Defendant:
Karen R. Ellsworth, Esq.