Opinion
1D21-3552
10-04-2023
Shanta Freeman, Appellant, v. State of Florida, Appellee.
Jessica J. Yeary, Public Defender, and Megan Long, Assistant Public Defender, Tallahassee, for Appellant. Ashley Moody, Attorney General, and Michael L. Schaub, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
Not final until disposition of any timely and authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or 9.331.
On appeal from the Circuit Court for Escambia County. Jennie Kinsey, Judge.
Jessica J. Yeary, Public Defender, and Megan Long, Assistant Public Defender, Tallahassee, for Appellant.
Ashley Moody, Attorney General, and Michael L. Schaub, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
ROWE, J.
Shanta Freeman appeals her conviction for aggravated battery with great bodily harm and with a weapon following her no contest plea. She argues that the trial court reversibly erred when it denied her motions to: (1) dismiss on grounds of immunity from prosecution under section 776.032, Florida Statutes (2021), and (2) suppress statements she made to law enforcement. We affirm as to both issues and write only to address Freeman's argument on the immunity motion.
The trial court denied the motion after concluding that the State overcame Freeman's prima facie claim of self-defense immunity by clear and convincing evidence. We affirm the trial court's ruling for a different reason-the State had no burden to overcome Freeman's prima facie claim because Freeman failed to raise a prima facie claim in the first place. Dade Cnty. Sch. Bd. v. Radio Station WQBA, 731 So.2d 638, 644 (Fla. 1999) ("[I]f a trial court reaches the right result, but for the wrong reasons, it will be upheld if there is any basis which would support the judgment in the record."). The record provides an adequate basis for this Court to conclude as a matter of law that Freeman's boilerplate motion to dismiss and her arguments at the immunity hearing did not raise a prima facie claim of self-defense immunity.
Facts
In May 2016, while at her mother's home, Freeman received a phone call from her son's school. Freeman's son was misbehaving and needed to be picked up. After Freeman picked up her son, she was observed in front of the school grabbing him by the arm and "popping him on his butt." Soon after, a Department of Children and Families worker appeared at Freeman's mother's home to check on the welfare of Freeman's son. Freeman became upset and frustrated and began cursing at her mother. Freeman's actions upset the victim, a friend of Freeman's mother, who was present during the confrontation.
The victim chastised Freeman for being disrespectful to her mother. An argument ensued. The victim and Freeman began exchanging punches. But the victim tried to walk away from the argument by leaving the house to go to her car. Freeman blocked the victim from closing the door to her car. Freeman then stabbed the victim with a pocketknife, piercing her right earlobe and her neck. Afterward, Freeman tossed the knife towards the street.
Soon, law enforcement arrived on the scene. An officer informed Freeman of her Miranda rights. Freeman confirmed that she understood her rights. Freeman then stated to the officer, "I hope she dies," and "I hope I go to jail for life or even be killed. I don't care because nothing matters." Freeman told officers that she and the victim had verbal arguments in the past. But that day, Freeman explained that she was in the mood to stab someone.
The State charged Freeman with aggravated battery with great bodily harm and with a weapon. In response, Freeman moved to suppress her statements to law enforcement, arguing she did not freely and intelligently waive her Miranda rights because mental health problems prevented her from making the necessary waiver. At the suppression hearing, the parties presented competing expert testimony on Freeman's competency. The court also reviewed Freeman's recorded police interview. The court denied the motion to suppress.
Freeman also moved to dismiss, claiming immunity from prosecution under section 776.032. She asserted that her use of force against the victim was justified and necessary to prevent the victim from harming her. After considering the testimony from the witnesses and Freeman's police interview, the trial court denied that motion, too.
Freeman then pleaded no contest to the charged offense. But she expressly reserved the right to appeal the trial court's orders denying the motion to dismiss and the motion to suppress. The trial court sentenced Freeman to fifteen years in prison, followed by ten years of probation. This timely appeal follows.
Analysis
Freeman argues that the trial court erred in denying her motion to dismiss because the State failed to overcome her prima facie claim of self-defense immunity with clear and convincing evidence. We affirm because Freeman failed to raise a prima facie claim in the first place. See Robertson v. State, 829 So.2d 901, 906 (Fla. 2002) ("[T]he 'tipsy coachman' doctrine[] allows an appellate court to affirm a trial court that 'reaches the right result, but for the wrong reasons' so long as 'there is any basis which would support the judgment in the record.'" (quoting Dade Cnty. Sch. Bd, 731 So.2d at 644)). The record before us provides an adequate basis to conclude as a matter of law that Freeman failed to raise a prima facie claim of self-defense immunity in her motion to dismiss, and thus we affirm under the tipsy coachman doctrine. Cf. Fort v. Fort, 951 So.2d 1020, 1022 (Fla. 1st DCA 2007) (affirming under the tipsy coachman doctrine a trial court's order dismissing a pleading for lack of jurisdiction and reasoning that the pleading "failed to state a cause of action").
The concurring in result opinion questions the majority's decision to address what is required to raise a prima facie claim of self-defense immunity before the burden shifts to the State to overcome the prima facie claim with clear and convincing evidence. Judge Lewis points out that-in two decisions written by the author of this opinion-this Court expressly declined to reach the issue. (Lewis Opinion at 6-7.) That the Court passed on the issue in prior cases is unremarkable. The majority has addressed the issue in this case because the record provides a clear example of a movant seeking dismissal on grounds of self-defense immunity and wholly failing to meet their burden to raise a prima facie claim.
Judge Lewis contends that "the majority improperly relies on the tipsy coachman doctrine to affirm based on an issue that is not before this Court." (Lewis Opinion at 1.). Under the tipsy coachman doctrine, an appellate court may affirm a trial court's ruling on any ground supported by the record. See Robertson v. State, 829 So.2d 901, 906-07 (Fla. 2002) ("The key to the application of this doctrine of appellate efficiency is that there must have been support for the alternative theory or principle of law in the record before the trial court."); see also Muhammad v. State, 782 So.2d 343, 359 (Fla. 2001) ("[T]he trial court's ruling on an evidentiary matter will be affirmed even if the trial court ruled for the wrong reasons, as long as the evidence or an alternative theory supports the ruling."). But see Bueno v. Workman, 20 So.3d 993, 998 (4th DCA 2009) (explaining that the tipsy coachman doctrine will not support affirmance when the record shows that the trial court failed to make factual findings on a matter at issue). Fundamental principles of appellate practice undergird our application of the tipsy coachman doctrine here. Initially, a trial court's ruling is entitled to a presumption of correctness on appeal, and the appellant carries the burden to demonstrate reversible error. Applegate v. Barnett Bank of Tallahassee, 377 So.2d 1150, 1152 (Fla. 1979) ("In appellate proceedings the decision of a trial court has the presumption of correctness and the burden is on the appellant to demonstrate error."). Next, an appellee need not present to the trial court the grounds on which the appellate court affirms the trial court's ruling. Dade Cnty. Sch. Bd. v. Radio Station WQBA, 731 So.2d 638, 644 (Fla. 1999) ("[A]n appellee, in arguing for the affirmance of a judgment, is not limited to legal arguments expressly asserted as grounds for the judgment in the court below. It stands to reason that the appellee can present any argument supported by the record even if not expressly asserted in the lower court."); see also Hicks v. State, 277 So.3d 153, 156 n.3 (Fla. 1st DCA 2019) ("There is a difference between raising new grounds for reversal (which we should not do) and affirming based on any basis the record supports (which we must do)." (citations omitted)). And an appellee need not present to the appellate court the grounds for affirming the judgment of the trial court. See MacNeill v. O'Neal, 238 So.2d 614, 615 (Fla. 1970) ("[A] party who is content with the judgment below need not assign error in order to support that judgment and is not limited in the appellate courts to the theories of recovery stated by the trial court."). Indeed, the appellate court may affirm even when the appellee does not serve an answer brief. See Powell v. State, 120 So.3d 577, 592 (Fla. 1st DCA 2013).
A prima facie claim "is an assertion that, at first glance, is sufficient to establish a fact or right but is yet to be disproved or rebutted by someone." Jefferson v. State, 264 So.3d 1019, 1027 (Fla. 2d DCA 2018). This Court has explained that prima facie claim of self-defense immunity must include facts that show or tend to show that the movant:
(1) used deadly force; (2) reasonably believed deadly force was necessary to prevent imminent death or great bodily harm to himself or another; (3) used such deadly force while resisting the victim's attempt to murder him,
to commit a forcible felony on him, or to commit a forcible felony on or in Edwards' dwelling; and (4) was not otherwise engaged in criminal activity and was in place he had a right to be.Edwards v. State, 351 So.3d 1142, 1149 (Fla. 1st DCA 2022).
As depicted below, Freeman's motion was merely a boilerplate recitation of the applicable statutes and court decisions and devoid of any allegation of fact:
(Image Omitted)
Freeman never argued that the victim used force against her or threatened to use force against her. Freeman merely asserted, without elaboration, that "any force or threat of force or force used by Defendant would have been justified under section 776.032 as it was necessary to prevent the alleged victims from causing unlawful harm ...." Freeman's assertions fall far short of what was required to raise a prima facie claim of self-defense immunity. See State v. Moore, 337 So.3d 876, 881-82 (Fla. 3rd DCA 2022) (explaining that to raise a prima facie claim of self-defense immunity, the defendant must allege "specific facts that show or tend to show that [the defendant] used deadly force because he had a reasonable belief that such force was necessary to prevent imminent death or great bodily harm" to himself or another). Because Freeman failed to raise a prima facie claim of self-defense immunity, we affirm the trial court's denial of her motion to dismiss.
We also write to address the confusion surrounding when the burden of proof shifts to the State to present clear and convincing evidence to overcome a movant's prima facie claim of self-defense immunity. Section 776.032(4), Florida Statutes (2021), requires a defendant to raise a prima facie claim of self-defense immunity "at a pretrial immunity hearing." Only then must the State seek to overcome the immunity claim by clear and convincing evidence. Freeman presented no evidence at the pretrial immunity hearing in support of her motion to dismiss. Rather, she rested on the boilerplate allegations set forth in her motion. Indeed, at an earlier hearing, that is all her counsel argued Freeman had to do: "our position is that what we've asserted in our motion puts it to the Government to carry the burden."
This was the third hearing on Freeman's self-defense immunity claim. The first hearing was held in 2018. The trial court denied Freeman's motion, concluding that she did not show by a preponderance of the evidence that she acted in self-defense. Freeman petitioned for a writ of prohibition, arguing that the trial court erred when it required her to prove her self-defense claim by a preponderance of the evidence. This Court granted Freeman's petition, applying the supreme court's recent decision in Love v. State, 286 So.3d 177 (Fla. 2019), and holding that once a prima facie claim of immunity has been raised, the State must overcome the claim by clear and convincing evidence. See Freeman v. State, 292 So.3d 832 (Fla. 1st DCA 2020). A second immunity hearing was held in 2021. But the victim had a panic attack at the beginning of the hearing. Because of this, the hearing was reset and scheduled a third time.
The State argued at the final immunity hearing that Freeman had to do more than just rely on the allegations set out in her motion to dismiss, but to avoid creating a potential reversible error on appeal, the State agreed to proceed first in presenting evidence at the immunity hearing:
A split of authority exists among the district courts as to which party has the initial burden of proof at a self-defense immunity hearing. See, e.g., Jefferson v. State, 264 So.3d 1019, 1027-28 (Fla. 2d DCA 2018) (holding that the State bears the burden of proof); Langel v. State, 255 So.3d 359, 363 (Fla. 4th DCA 2018) (holding that the person seeking immunity must present or point to evidence from which the elements of justifiable use of force may be inferred); Boutiette v. State, 281 So.3d 572 (Fla. 5th DCA 2019) (holding that the State bears the burden of proof).
[T]he defense's motion wasn't enough, however, we will still take on the burden despite that and not risk another appellate issue and treat the defendant's motion as if it were a prima facie argument. I still take the position that it is not. They have not presented nearly enough to establish a prima facie case of Stand Your Ground.
The State clearly placed the sufficiency of Freeman's motion at issue in the trial court and was correct in arguing that Freeman could not raise a prima facie claim of self-defense immunity at the pretrial hearing by relying only on the conclusory allegations set out in her motion. The plain language of section 776.032(4) requires a person seeking immunity to raise their prima facie claim at a pretrial immunity hearing. The Legislature's clear directive that the person seeking immunity must raise "a prima facie claim . . . at a pretrial hearing" cannot mean that the person seeking immunity may simply rest on the unsworn allegations in their earlier-filed immunity motion. § 776.032(4), Fla. Stat.. Rather, consistent with well-established authority, to raise a prima facie claim that could be rebutted by clear and convincing evidence, a defendant seeking immunity must present "evidence sufficient to establish a fact unless and until rebutted." State v. Kahler, 232 So.2d 166, 168 (Fla. 1970). This is the logical reading of the statute-particularly considering the context. The next clause of the statute then places "the burden of proof" on the State "to overcome the immunity" claim "with clear and convincing evidence." § 776.032(4), Fla. Stat. Thus, before the State bears the burden to overcome the immunity claim with evidence, it follows that the defendant seeking self-defense immunity bears the initial burden of presenting evidence at the pretrial immunity hearing sufficient to raise a prima facie claim.
And so, Freeman could not raise a self-defense immunity claim by pointing to the unsworn, boilerplate allegations in her motion filed before the hearing. See Edwards, 351 So.3d at1148-49 (explaining it was questionable whether the defendant raised a prima facie claim of self-defense immunity when he presented no evidence at the pretrial immunity hearing). But see Jefferson, 264 So.3d at 1027(explaining that a defendant seeking self-defense immunity does not have an evidentiary burden and can raise a prima facie claim in the pretrial motion); Casanova v. State, 335 So.3d 1231, 1232 (Fla. 3d DCA 2021) (holding that a motion to dismiss can raise a prima facie claim of self-defense immunity "even though the motion to dismiss is not sworn to by someone with personal knowledge or supported by evidence or testimony establishing the facts in the motion to dismiss"). Rather, Freeman had to come forward with evidence at the hearing to raise a prima facie claim of self-defense immunity. Given her decision to present no evidence at the pretrial hearing, the trial court did not err when it denied Freeman's immunity motion.
Because Freeman failed to allege a prima facie claim of selfdefense immunity in her motion to dismiss, we affirm the trial court's order denying the motion. Freeman's judgment and sentence are AFFIRMED.
LONG, J., concurs with opinion; LEWIS, J., concurs in result with opinion.
LONG, J., concurring.
I join the majority opinion in full. I address here a question raised by Freeman's other issue on appeal. Freeman argues the trial court erred in denying her motion to suppress statements she made during a post-incident law enforcement interview. Freeman argues a Miranda violation warranted suppression. I write to discuss the latest Miranda developments, why they warrant our renewed attention, and why, ultimately, Freeman's Miranda claim fails.
Let us begin with Miranda itself. Thanks in large part to Hollywood movies and television programs, but with no small contribution from real-world criminal cases, the warnings have developed into a sort of American legal and cultural sacred cow. It has created a strange paradox. The average American can recite the warnings, yet few can explain where they came from. Most assume the warnings are required by the constitution. Even some lawyers have seemingly forgotten the warnings' genesis. And so we start there. Miranda warnings are extraconstitutional. They are a creation of the U.S. Supreme Court. Miranda did not claim to apply the constitutional text. The Fifth Amendment says that "[n]o person . . . shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself." The Constitution deals with government compulsion. Rather than apply the controlling law, the Court claimed, quite plainly, that it had discovered what it considered was a "necessity for procedures" and then unilaterally created "guidelines for law enforcement agencies" to follow. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 439-442 (1966). It acknowledged that Miranda's statements may have been voluntary, and therefore lawfully obtained, under a traditional constitutional test. Id. at 457 ("In these cases, we might not find the defendants' statements to have been involuntary in traditional terms.").
Miranda, as a judicial policy creation, purports to protect against potential police compulsion. It "adopted a set of prophylactic measures to protect a suspect's Fifth Amendment right from the 'inherently compelling pressures' of custodial interrogation." Maryland v. Shatzer, 559 U.S. 98, 103 (2010) (citing Miranda, 384 U.S. at 467). The warnings are "employed to dispel the compulsion inherent in custodial surroundings" and ensure the statement is obtained from the defendant as a "product of his free choice." Miranda, 384 U.S. at 458.
Long before Miranda, law enforcement was prohibited from using physical or psychological force or abuse to obtain confessions. See Hopt v. People, 110 U.S. 574, 584 (1884); Ziang Sung Wan v. United States, 266 U.S. 1, 14 (1924).
Since Miranda issued, the Court has been busy restricting its use and admonishing lower courts for its overzealous application. See, e.g., Beckwith v. United States, 425 U.S. 341, 347 (1976) (holding that an interrogation did "not present the elements which the Miranda Court found so inherently coercive as to require its holding."); Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 437 (1984) ("declin[ing] to accord talismanic power to the phrase in the Miranda opinion emphasized by respondent. Fidelity to the doctrine announced in Miranda requires that it be enforced strictly, but only in those types of situations in which the concerns that powered the decision are implicated."); Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 166 (1986) (holding that when a defendant's mental health condition prevents a voluntary Miranda waiver but there is no coercive government conduct, "suppressing [the defendant's] statements would serve absolutely no purpose in enforcing constitutional guarantees."); Illinois v. Perkins, 496 U.S. 292, 298 (1990) (rejecting Miranda-based suppression, even when there is a custodial interrogation "in a technical sense," if there is no government coercion).
While cautioning lower courts on its use, the Court has clarified that Miranda warnings are a court-created prophylactic rule and are not required by the constitution. New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 653 (1984) (holding that in some cases "adherence to the literal language of the prophylactic rules enunciated in Miranda" is not required). Instead, Miranda simply "adopted a set of prophylactic measures to protect a suspect's Fifth Amendment right." Maryland v. Shatzer, 559 U.S. 98, 103 (2010).
The Court's work to limit Miranda reached its most recent zenith with last year's Vega v. Tekoh, 142 S.Ct. 2095 (2022). Vega works to better align Miranda jurisprudence with that of other court-created prophylactic rules. It again noted that "a Miranda violation [is not] tantamount to a violation of the Fifth Amendment." Id. at 2101. That Miranda "adopted prophylactic rules designed to protect against constitutional violations." Id. at 2100. And that "the decision did not hold that the contravention of those rules necessarily constitutes a constitutional violation." Id. But the Court also built on Shatzer's earlier holding that Miranda must be evaluated like other "judicially crafted prophylactic rule[s and] should apply only where its benefits outweigh its costs." Id. at 2107 (internal quotation omitted); see also Shatzer, 559 U.S. at 106 ("[a] judicially crafted rule is justified only by reference to its prophylactic purpose, and applies only where its benefits outweigh its costs") (internal citations omitted). As the Court continues to reevaluate Miranda and bring its jurisprudence in line with the Court's broader exclusionary rule doctrines, it is incumbent on lower courts to, in turn, carefully reevaluate our own Miranda practices.
Vega's holding has significant implications. In short, it emphasizes that courts should not robotically apply Miranda just by identifying an imperfection in the provision of the warnings. Instead, the Court has instructed us to treat Miranda the way we treat other court created prophylactic rules-by carefully balancing their costs against their benefits. And so, let us now examine what that looks like in the context of Miranda warnings.
To determine whether an otherwise relevant statement should be excluded on Miranda-based prophylactic grounds, courts must make case-specific inquiries into the circumstances of the alleged improper government conduct. Cf. United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 908 (1984) (holding that the exclusionary rule, as a judicially created prophylactic measure, should be applied only when it serves its purpose to deter unconstitutional police conduct). Before excluding relevant evidence, courts must: 1) identify government misconduct, 2) conclude that exclusion will deter that misconduct, and 3) conclude that the benefit of exclusion outweighs its costs. Wingate v. State, 289 So.3d 566, 568 (Fla. 1st DCA 2020) (citing United States v. Herring, 492 F.3d 1212, 1217 (11th Cir. 2007)). But to weigh the benefits of a Miranda-based suppression, courts must understand its purpose.
"The sole concern of the Fifth Amendment, on which Miranda was based, is governmental coercion." Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 170 (1986). Miranda-based suppression, then, may be applied only to cases when it can conceivably act in furtherance of this goal. Now, as with the application of every other court-created prophylactic rule, courts must evaluate the circumstances at issue and the relevant police conduct. If a Miranda-based suppression would not protect against government compelled selfincrimination, it should no longer be used.
Because the Fifth Amendment is only applicable in a "criminal case," there is much dispute about applying the provision beyond the scope of a criminal trial. See Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 447 (2000) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination . . . in the context of extrajudicial custodial interrogation" is "a doubtful proposition as a matter both of history and precedent"); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 510 (1966) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (explaining there is "no adequate basis for extending the Fifth Amendment's privilege against self-incrimination to the police station"). The Florida Constitution uses broader language, prohibiting compelled self-incrimination "in any criminal matter." Art. I, § 9, Fla. Const.
But even when a court finds the possibility of a coerciondeterrent benefit, that benefit alone is not enough to support suppression. Courts must also determine that the costs of evidence exclusion are outweighed by the prospective benefits. Shatzer, 559 U.S. at 106 (holding a "judicially crafted rule . . . applies only where its benefits outweigh its costs"). This burden is heavy. The Court has cautioned us against the "substantial social costs exacted by" excluding relevant evidence "to enforce ideals" not commanded by the constitution. Leon, 468 U.S. at 907. Suppressing relevant evidence interferes "with the criminal justice system's truthfinding function" and may permit "guilty defendants [to] go free or receive reduced sentences." Id. "[W]hen law enforcement officers have acted in objective good faith or their transgressions have been minor, the magnitude of the benefit conferred on such guilty defendants offends basic concepts of the criminal justice system." Id. at 908. Suppressing relevant evidence can also have the "effect of generating disrespect for the law and administration of justice." Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 491 (1976).
Miranda is also unique among the Court's prophylactic rules in that its application can involve the suppression of lawfully obtained evidence and the reversal of lawful convictions without a basis in substantive law. The suppression of a confession on Miranda-noncompliance-grounds, but without an underlying violation of the Fifth Amendment, is an extraordinary judicial act. Vega acknowledged that the holdings in Miranda and its progeny were a "bold and controversial claim of authority." Vega, 142 S.Ct. at 2106. And so when we engage in our three-pronged exclusion analysis and address the first question-Was there government misconduct?-we must also ask whether the misconduct involves an actual constitutional violation (i.e., a violation of the law) or only a violation of a court-created prophylactic rule. The answer to this inquiry impacts the later benefit and cost analysis of the second and third prongs. We will bear the weight of greater costs if the misconduct is constitutional. Considering its own "controversial claim of authority," Vega rejected Miranda's mechanical application. It is not hard to see why. Without this guidance, the Southern Reporter has filled with cases employing Miranda-suppression without regard to the substantive law or suppression's heavy costs.
• Ramirez v. State, 739 So.2d 568 (Fla. 1999) (reversing Ramirez's first-degree murder conviction in the brutal rape, kidnapping, and murder of Mildred Boroski and requiring the suppression of his "otherwise indisputably voluntary confession"
because his Miranda warnings were read five minutes into the interrogation instead of at the start);
• Almeida v. State, 737 So.2d 520 (Fla. 1999) (reversing Almeida's first-degree murder conviction on Miranda grounds because during his voluntary confession to committing three separate murders he said, "Well, what good is an attorney going to do?");
• Deviney v. State, 112 So.3d 57 (Fla. 2013) (reversing Deviney's first-degree murder conviction-he confessed that he, unprovoked, cut sixty-five-year-old Delores Futrell's throat from ear to ear with a fish filleting knife-because, even though he was read Miranda warnings at the start of the interview, police should have "re-administer[ed] Miranda warnings" after he was told he was no longer free to leave);
• Thompson v. State, 595 So.2d 16 (Fla. 1992) (reversing Thompson's murder conviction because, although the police gave thorough Miranda warnings, including the right to a lawyer, the warnings provided did not specify that he had a right to a free lawyer);
• Martinez v. State, 564 So.2d 1071 (Fla. 1990) (reversing Martinez's conviction and suppressing his taped murder confession, even though police read him his Miranda warnings four separate times and he had signed a waiver-of-rights form, because he responded when hearing his right to counsel in a way that the court deemed "equivocal");
• Ross v. State, 45 So.3d 403 (Fla. 2010), as revised on denial of reh'g (Sept. 8, 2010) (reversing Ross' first-degree murder and robbery convictions despite the police providing him full Miranda warnings, because the police "downplayed" their significance);
• Carlisle v. State, 164 So.3d 69 (Fla. 2d DCA 2015) (reversing Carlisle's burglary conviction, even though he made an incriminating statement without prompting, because the statement occurred before Miranda warnings);
• Dixon v. State, 816 So.2d 172 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002) (reversing Dixon's first-degree murder conviction- where he and another shot and killed the victim in front of his 11-year-old son, pulled the son and the victim's body out of their car, and drove off in the stolen car-on Miranda grounds, even though Dixon made the statements without any police questioning);
• Wright v. State, 161 So.3d 442 (Fla. 5th DCA 2014) (reversing Wright's first-degree murder conviction when police made "an honest mistake" and did not read Miranda warnings immediately after a consensual interview became custodial);
• West v. State, 876 So.2d 614, 616 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004) (reversing West's first-degree murder conviction, even though she was read Miranda warnings prior to confessing, because she was not told she had the right to counsel during questioning--the language of the warnings used said that she had the right to counsel before questioning-even though she affirmed she was "willing to answer questions without a lawyer present").
In case after case, we find voluntary confessions excluded and convictions reversed in the name of Miranda. Moving forward, courts must be more circumspect. We must carefully evaluate the alleged government misconduct, ensure that exclusion will protect against government coercion, and confirm that exclusion will be worth its heavy costs.
I take no position on this catalog of cases. Some may have resulted in suppression even when evaluated under the Vega rubric for exclusion. The selection is provided not to critique the decisions, but to illustrate the vast criminal justice impact from a Miranda jurisprudence that has been untethered from its purpose.
Let us turn now to Freeman's argument on appeal. Freeman claims we must reverse, but not because law enforcement failed to provide thorough and timely warnings. They did. And not because they failed to obtain a waiver. They did. The whole interview is on video. Freeman heard the warnings, discussed them, verbally indicated her waiver, and completed a written waiver. Freeman acknowledges all of this. Yet she argues it was still not enough to satisfy Miranda because she is bipolar, and that condition impaired her waiver. But the Fifth Amendment protects against government compelled self-incrimination. There is no allegation that law enforcement or any other government actor compelled Freeman's statement. The police officer actually stopped Freeman from making a statement until he could fully explain all of the Miranda warnings. When he was done, she took the pen and rights waiver and, as she signed, said, "I really don't care. I hope she dies." She then provided a full and frank statement about what occurred. "[T]he Fifth Amendment privilege is not concerned 'with moral and psychological pressures to confess emanating from sources other than official coercion.'" Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 170 (1986) (citing Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 305 (1985)). "Only if we were to establish a brand new constitutional right-the right of a criminal defendant to confess to his crime only when totally rational and properly motivated- could respondent's present claim be sustained." Id. at 166 (1986).
When we apply the exclusion rubric to Freeman's claim, we see that it fails on the first inquiry. There is no government misconduct. We in turn need not reach any analysis on the benefit and cost prongs. Because Freeman does not allege any improper police conduct, suppression would not serve its purpose. For this reason, the trial court's decision to deny the motion to suppress must be affirmed.
LEWIS, J., concurring in result.
I concur in the result reached by the majority because the trial court correctly denied Appellant's motion to dismiss asserting immunity from prosecution under section 776.032, Florida Statutes, upon finding that the State met its burden to prove by clear and convincing evidence that Appellant is not entitled to immunity. I write separately to explain that because the State assumed the burden of proof and the trial court's reasoning for denying the motion is inarguably correct, the majority improperly relies on the tipsy coachman doctrine to affirm based on an issue that is not before this Court.
Background
Appellant was charged with the aggravated battery of Joshula Williams with great bodily harm and with a weapon in 2016. Appellant filed a motion to dismiss, claiming immunity from prosecution under section 776.032, Florida Statutes, on the ground that any force she used was justified as it was necessary to prevent Williams from unlawfully harming her. The trial court conducted three pretrial immunity hearings.
At the initial immunity hearing that was held in 2018, the parties disagreed about who carried the burden of proof and whether section 776.032(4), Florida Statutes (2017), which altered the burden of proof at pretrial immunity hearings under Florida's Stand Your Ground law, applied retroactively. The trial court agreed with the State that the statute did not apply retroactively and that the defense carried the burden of proof by a preponderance of the evidence. Following Appellant's testimony for the defense and the testimony of several witnesses for the State, the trial court denied Appellant's motion to dismiss upon concluding that she did not meet her burden of proof. Appellant petitioned for a writ of prohibition, which this Court granted pursuant to the Florida Supreme Court's recent holding in Love v. State, 286 So.3d 177 (Fla. 2019), that section 776.032(4) applies to all immunity hearings conducted on or after the statute's effective date, including in pending cases. See Freeman v. State, 292 So.3d 832 (Fla. 1st DCA 2020) (remanding for a new immunity hearing).
The trial court began the second immunity hearing, which was held on remand in February 2021, with a discussion of the split of authority among the Second and Fourth Districts as to which party has the initial burden of proof at a self-defense immunity hearing. When the court inquired whether the parties might have an agreement in that regard, the State responded as follows:
Your Honor, [the] plain reading of the statute does indicate the defense would need to make a prima facie showing before the Stand Your Ground needs to be heard, however, based on the conflict in those cases I am prepared to take on that burden. I don't think thatthe motion does meet that prima facie case, however, I think that even for the sake of argument the bare assertion of that immunity, that that does place the burden on us, then I would rather err on the side of going forward with the factual presentation than err on the side of having the Court dismiss it without that and being here another two years.
(Emphasis added.) Defense counsel agreed, and the trial court stated that "[o]ut of an abundance of caution with the conflict [] the State will go first today." Because the victim had a panic attack at the beginning of the hearing, however, the immunity hearing was reset.
At the ensuing third immunity hearing, held in March 2021, Appellant's recorded police interview from the day of the incident was admitted into evidence and reflected in part as follows. When asked what happened, Appellant recounted that the Florida Department of Children and Families ("DCF") went to her mother's house because she had grabbed her son by the arm and "popped him on his butt" in front of the school. Appellant got upset when Williams, a friend of her mother, reprimanded her for talking disrespectfully to her mother as her mother tried to find out what was happening. Appellant's sister, Mari, told Appellant to calm down and pushed her out the door. Appellant did not know if Williams went outside to fight like she had told Williams to do, but she confronted Williams about her comments inside the house, to which Williams responded that she did not have time. At that point Appellant punched Williams, and Williams punched back. Williams then got into Mari's car to leave and told Appellant that they were not "going to do this" because she loved Appellant like a sister. When Williams "touched" or "pushed" Appellant's arm with the car door, Appellant pulled out a pocketknife and stabbed her as she was sitting in the car, ready to go home. Appellant stated that she and Williams had gotten into verbal fights in the past, "[b]ut today I felt like I want to jug [stab] the s[***] out of somebody, so she was it. I was already in that mood, pissed off all day." Appellant explained that she stabbed Williams because she was mad, adding, "there is no justification for what I did." Appellant later apologized to the detective, saying she could have handled the situation differently and would leave it alone if she could go back in time.
Appellant's mother, Sabrina Fountain, testified that Williams became upset over the way Appellant spoke to Fountain after DCF's visit and that Williams started throwing plates and pots at Appellant in the kitchen. After the women were separated, Williams indicated that she wanted to leave. The next thing Fountain knew, Williams was returning to her house, bleeding from the neck and saying that she and Appellant fought outside and Appellant cut her.
Joshula Williams testified that after speaking with DCF on the day of the incident, Appellant was angry and started acting aggressively toward her mother. When Williams questioned Appellant about that behavior they argued, but nothing physical happened between them inside the house - Williams did not throw any dishes or hit Appellant with anything. Appellant and Williams separated, but when Williams decided to leave with Mari and exited the house, Appellant was on the front porch and their argument resumed. Appellant swung at Williams first, and Williams swung back. When the two separated after that fight, Williams got into Mari's car on the passenger side. Williams recalled, "As I was trying to close the [car] door she [Appellant] came up, stopped me from closing the door. We were saying words back and forth," and then "I went to close the door and she said something along the lines of don't close the f[******] door on me. And I see her hand going up and coming down to stab me." Appellant stabbed Williams with a knife through her right earlobe and into her neck.
Lastly, the detective who had interviewed Appellant testified that Appellant never stated that she feared the victim or that she was acting in self-defense. During their arguments, both parties acknowledged that the State had taken on the burden of proof, with the State asserting in part as follows:
Your Honor, I'm going to start with the issue that we began with last time, which is what does the defense need to present to make a prima facie case in a Stand Your Ground argument. And as I indicated, there is a little bit
of a split as to what they need to put forth. My initial position was that the defense's motion wasn't enough, however, we will still take on her burden despite that and not risk another appellate issue and treat the defendant's motion as if it were a prima facie argument. I still take the position that it is not.(Emphasis added.) Defense counsel similarly noted that "the government has allowed for us to go forward, taking on a burden."
The trial court denied the motion to dismiss upon concluding that "the State met it's [sic] burden" based on all the evidence, including the witness testimony and Appellant's statements to the police. Appellant subsequently entered an open plea of no contest, expressly reserving the right to appeal the denial of her motion. The trial court adjudicated Appellant guilty and sentenced her to fifteen years of imprisonment, followed by ten years of probation. This appeal followed.
Analysis
Section 776.032(1), Florida Statutes (2016), confers immunity from prosecution if a person's use of force is justified under section 776.012. A person is justified in using non-deadly force when and to the extent she reasonably believes that such conduct is necessary to defend herself against the other's imminent use of unlawful force. § 776.012(1), Fla. Stat. (2016). Once a defendant raises a prima facie claim of self-defense immunity at a pretrial immunity hearing, the burden of proof shifts to the State to prove by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant is not entitled to immunity. § 776.032(4), Fla. Stat. (2017). We review the trial court's findings of fact for competent, substantial evidence and its legal conclusions de novo. Swift v. State, 342 So.3d 852, 854 (Fla. 1st DCA 2022); see also Edwards v. State, 257 So.3d 586, 588 (Fla. 1st DCA 2018) ("Even if the appellate court may have decided this case differently had we been the trier of fact, it is not the function of this court to reweigh the evidence and substitute our judgment for that of the trial court.").
Appellant argues on appeal that the trial court erred by concluding that the State satisfied its burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that she is not immune from prosecution.
However, the victim's testimony and Appellant's admissions clearly show that Appellant was the initial aggressor both on the porch and at the car as she continued to confront and use force against the victim when all the victim tried to do was leave. A reasonable person under these circumstances would not have believed that the use of such force was necessary to avoid danger. Nothing in the evidence suggests that Appellant feared the victim during their interactions or that she was acting in self-defense. To the contrary, by Appellant's own admission, she stabbed the victim because she was mad. Thus, as the State contends, the trial court correctly concluded that the State presented clear and convincing evidence to overcome Appellant's self-defense claim.
The majority does not disagree with the above conclusion and does not find that the State failed to meet its burden of proof. Instead, the majority finds that Appellant failed to raise a prima facie claim in the first place so as to shift the burden of proof to the State. The majority's analysis ignores the fact that the parties agreed to, and the trial court approved, the procedure that was utilized at the immunity hearing, with the State explicitly taking on the burden of proof to avoid it becoming an appellate issue, leaving for the trial court's consideration only the question of whether the State met its burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that Appellant is not entitled to immunity. The majority improperly addresses an issue the State overtly sought to avoid on appeal and did not raise in its answer brief, and in doing so, it creates precedent for this Court concerning the initial burden of proof at a self-defense immunity hearing. Cf. Rogers v. State, 301 So.3d 1083, 1084 (Fla. 1st DCA 2020) (writing for the majority, Judge Rowe denied the defendant's certiorari petition, in which he sought to quash the trial court's ruling on his motion for Stand Your Ground Immunity on the ground that the court erroneously required him to present evidence at the immunity hearing in order to raise a prima facie claim, reasoning that "[b]ecause Rogers did not object to, but agreed with, the trial court's suggestion at the immunity hearing that he needed to present evidence in support of his prima facie claim, he cannot now be heard to complain that the procedure employed by the trial court departed from the essential requirements of law," noting that "we have not considered the question whether a party seeking immunity must present evidence to raise a prima facie claim," discussing the conflict among the district courts on the matter, and declining to "reach the question here"); Edwards v. State, 351 So.3d 1142, 1149 (Fla. 1st DCA 2022) (writing for the majority, Judge Rowe explained, "Edwards did not present any evidence in support of his motion to dismiss. And the unsworn allegations in Edwards' motion lack evidentiary value....Thus, it is questionable whether Edwards 'raised' a prima facie claim of self-defense immunity sufficient to shift the burden to the State under section 776.032. . . . Even so, the State does not challenge whether Edwards raised a prima facie claim of self-defense immunity at the pretrial hearing. And thus, we leave for another day what is required for a defendant to 'raise' a prima facie claim of immunity at 'a pretrial immunity hearing' under section 776.032. Instead, we consider only Edwards' argument that the State did not meet its burden to overcome his self-defense claim by clear and convincing evidence."). This is not the proper case for resolving the question the Court declined to answer in Rogers and Edwards.
The majority seeks to justify its analysis with the tipsy coachman doctrine, resort to which is unnecessary where, as here, the trial court reached the right result and its reasoning was correct. See Robertson v. State, 829 So.2d 901, 906 (Fla. 2002) (explaining that the tipsy coachman doctrine "allows an appellate court to affirm a trial court that 'reaches the right result, but for the wrong reasons' so long as 'there is any basis which would support the judgment in the record.'" (internal citation omitted)). The only disputed issue before the trial court and now before this Court is whether the State proved by clear and convincing evidence that Appellant was not entitled to immunity. Because the trial court correctly concluded that the State met its burden of proof, we should not consider an issue that was not raised by the parties as an alternative basis for affirmance.[*]
Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, I concur in the result reached by the majority and would affirm the trial court's denial of Appellant's motion to dismiss because the court correctly concluded that the State met its burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that she is not immune from prosecution.
[*] The caselaw on the tipsy coachman doctrine cited by the majority does not support its application in this case. To the contrary, the caselaw shows that the majority cannot rely on the tipsy coachman doctrine without first determining that the trial court erroneously concluded that the State proved by clear and convincing evidence that Appellant is not entitled to immunity. In other words, the majority would have to first conclude that the State failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that Appellant is not entitled to immunity, requiring reversal of the trial court's denial of her motion to dismiss. Only then could the majority consider whether affirmance is nevertheless warranted on an alternative theory that is supported in the record before the trial court.