Opinion
23A-DR-2197
06-25-2024
Nicolle Cassandra Freeman, a.k.a. Nicolle Cassandra Flynn, Appellant-Petitioner v. Steven William Freeman, Appellee-Respondent
Attorney for Appellant Andrea L. Ciobanu Ciobanu Law, P.C. Indianapolis, Indiana Attorney for Appellee Jonahan R. Deenik Deenik Lowe, LLC Greenwood, Indiana
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this Memorandum Decision is not binding precedent for any court and may be cited only for persuasive value or to establish res judicata, collateral estoppel, or law of the case.
Appeal from the Marion Superior Court The Honorable Geoffrey A. Gaither, Judge Trial Court Cause No. 49D09-1201-DR-1101
Attorney for Appellant Andrea L. Ciobanu Ciobanu Law, P.C. Indianapolis, Indiana
Attorney for Appellee Jonahan R. Deenik Deenik Lowe, LLC Greenwood, Indiana
MEMORANDUM DECISION
PYLE, JUDGE
Statement of the Case
[¶1] Nicolle Freeman ("Mother") appeals the trial court's order that: (1) granted Steven Freeman's ("Father") motion to modify physical custody of the parties' two daughters; (2) denied her petition to establish an extracurricular arrearage; (3) ordered her to pay fifty percent of Parenting Coordinator Robert Shive's ("PC Shive") fees; and (4) ordered her to pay fifty percent of Guardian Ad Litem Clarissa Finnell's ("GAL Finnell") fees. Mother argues that the trial court abused its discretion when it: (1) modified physical custody of the parties' two daughters; (2) denied her petition to establish an extracurricular arrearage; (3) ordered her to pay fifty percent of PC Shive's fees; and (4) ordered her to pay fifty percent of GAL Finnell's fees. Concluding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion, we affirm the trial court's judgment.
[¶2] We affirm.
Issues
1. Whether the trial court abused its discretion when it modified physical custody of the parties' two daughters.
2. Whether the trial court abused its discretion when it denied Mother's petition to establish an extracurricular arrearage.
3. Whether the trial court abused its discretion when it ordered Mother to pay fifty percent of PC Shive's fees.
4. Whether the trial court abused its discretion when it ordered Mother to pay fifty percent of GAL Finnell's fees.
Facts
[¶3] Mother and Father ("Parents"), who were married in October 2000, are the parents of daughter, G.F. ("G.F."), who was born in February 2009, and daughter, C.F. ("C.F.") (collectively "the children"), who was born in April 2011. Mother is a police sergeant detective, and Father is an airline co-pilot.
[¶4] Mother filed a dissolution petition in January 2012, and Parents entered into a mediated final settlement agreement ("the 2012 Agreement") in December 2012. Pursuant to the terms of the 2012 Agreement, Parents agreed to share joint legal custody of the children. Parents further agreed that Mother would have physical custody of the children.
[¶5] In addition, Parents agreed that Father would have reasonable parenting time with the children. Parents further acknowledged that Father's work schedule might prevent him from exercising parenting time in a traditional fashion and agreed to be flexible in arranging Father's parenting time. At the time, Father was exercising two days per week of parenting time with the children and had one overnight visit per week. Pursuant to the terms of the 2012 Agreement, Father was to notify Mother by the 25th of each month which days and overnights he would like to have with the children the following month.
[¶6] Parents also recognized that Father had traditionally had to work on most major holidays and agreed that, in dividing the holiday parenting time, Father's available holidays should be given priority. In addition, Mother agreed to cooperate with Father's reasonable requests to spend time with the children during Father's "on call" days. (App. Vol. 2 at 28). The 2012 Agreement also gave Father five uninterrupted overnight visits in the summer. Parents expected the schedule as set forth in the 2012 Agreement to continue under the work schedule that Father had at that time.
[¶7] The 2012 Agreement further provided as follows:
Section 6. Extra-Curricular Activities. The parties shall share, pro rata ([Father] - 57% and [Mother] - 43%), in the costs for the children's extracurricular activities upon which they have jointly agreed the children should participate. The parties shall not unreasonably withhold their respective agreement for such activities.(App. Vol. 2 at 30) (emphasis added).
[¶8] In the ensuing years, Father married Sara Freeman ("Stepmother"), a registered nurse, who had previously been married and who had one daughter. Mother also remarried, and she and her husband had two children.
[¶9] By 2016, Parents' relationship had become contentious, and they had difficulty agreeing on Father's weekly parenting time days. The trial court appointed PC Shive to a two-year term to assist parents with scheduling parenting time and other issues.
[¶10] In February 2016, PC Shive met with Parents to discuss the issues surrounding the difficult parenting time schedule. Following the meeting, Parents agreed that Father would "have parenting time in alternating weeks of Wednesday/Thursday overnight and Friday/Saturday overnight." (App. Vol. 2 at 41). With a set parenting time schedule, the hope was that Father could "bid his schedule with the airline with an eye towards keeping those days open." (App. Vol. 2 at 42). Parents also agreed that their parenting time would be considered "household" parenting time, which meant "that so long as the parent or the subsequent spouse was at the residence, the parenting time w[ould] occur and no opportunity for additional parenting time would come into play and the 'household' would have the parenting time with the [children], including all responsibility for picking up and taking to school, delivering to activities, and the like." (App. Vol. 2 at 40-41).
[¶11] Six years later, in February 2022, Father filed a motion to modify physical custody of the children. In this motion, Father asked the trial court to modify the children's physical custody "to better reflect the parties' current work schedules and availability for parenting time and the children's wishes." (App. Vol. 2 at 45). Father specifically listed the following substantial changes in circumstances that warranted the custody modification:
a. Mother has taken a new position that requires her to work from noon to 9 pm. Mother also is no longer married. Therefore, she is required to utilize a nanny for much of her time with the children.
b. Father's employment now provides him 17-18 days off each month, which allows him to be present for more frequent parenting time than he previously was able.
c. The children's ages and wishes concerning parenting time have changed substantially.(App. Vol. 2 at 45).
[¶12] In July 2022, Parents tendered to the trial court an agreed order regarding the appointment of a guardian ad litem. The order specifically provided that Parents had agreed to the appointment of GAL Finnell to prepare a report concerning the children and their potential parenting time arrangements and to make recommendations regarding child-related issues through a report to the trial court. The agreed order further provided that "Father initially shall be responsible for the GAL's fees, subject to a request for reallocation at the hearing in this matter." (App. Vol. 2 at 48).
[¶13] GAL Finnell met with Father in July 2022. Father told GAL Finnell that he would like for his parenting time to be modified to a "week on/ week off" schedule because he had the seniority to "schedule his work around a 50/50 schedule." (App. Vol. 2 at 50). He expressed his concern that Mother was not home to exercise her parenting time because of her work schedule and pointed out that because she was no longer married, she had a nanny to watch the children while she worked. Father also told GAL Finnell that he and Stepmother wanted the children vaccinated for COVID, but Mother would not agree to the vaccination. Father also expressed concerns that Mother had issues with Stepmother.
[¶14] When GAL Finnell met with Mother in August 2022, Mother told GAL Finnell that she believed that Father's motivation for seeking joint physical custody of the children was to reduce his child support payments. Mother saw no reason to change the parenting time schedule and did not believe that Father would be able to exercise additional parenting time because of his work schedule. Mother believed that a change in the parenting time schedule would only result in Stepmother having more time with the children. Mother acknowledged that she and Father "struggle[d] with communication." (App. Vol. 2 at 52). GAL Finnell had follow-up calls with Mother in November and December 2022. During the November call, Mother told GAL Finnell that she had paid for C.F.'s ballet classes because Father had "indicated that he d[id] not agree to ballet and under the agreement d[id] not need to pay for it." (App. Vol. 2 at 52). According to Mother, she had already paid $4,000 for C.F.'s ballet classes that year. During the December call, Mother told GAL Finnell that she had recently begun working an 8:00 a.m. to 4:00 p.m. schedule.
[¶15] In addition, GAL Finnell met with the children in August, September, and October 2022. The children told GAL Finnell that sometimes Parents "hate[d] each other" and that Parents were in a "hate" period at that time. (App. Vol. 2 at 53). The children also told GAL Finnell that they would like more time with each parent and that a "week on/week off" schedule might be easier. (App. Vol. 2 at 53).
[¶16] GAL Finnell completed her report and filed it with the trial court in December 2022. In her report, GAL Finnell noted that she had "found the matter of fact way the children stated their parents hate[d] each [other] to be heartbreaking." (App. Vol. 2 at 54). GAL Finnell further noted that Parents had "issues with decision making and communication related to the children." (App. Vol. 2 at 55). GAL Finnell specifically pointed out that Parents disagreed on whether the children should receive a COVID vaccine and whether to obtain a math tutor for C.F. Parents also had difficulty scheduling holiday parenting time, agreeing on the payment of extracurricular activities, and determining "what [were] agreed to extracurriculars which trigger[ed] sharing in the cost." (App. Vol. 2 at 55). GAL Finnell believed that Parents could benefit from working with a PC again. In addition, GAL Finnell recommended that Father have more parenting time with the children.
[¶17] In January 2023, Mother filed a petition to establish an extra-curricular arrearage. In the petition, Mother stated that she had provided Father with "documentation showing the cost for [C.F.]'s ballet; however, [Father] refuses to pay his portion stating that he does not agree to [C.F.] participating in ballet." (App. Vol. 2 at 58). According to Mother, she did "not believe that [Father]'s position [had been] made in good faith because he attend[ed] [C.F.'s] performances and practices and ha[d] occasionally purchased items for [C.F.] related to the activity." (App. Vol. 2 at 58). Mother asked the trial court to establish Father's extra-curricular arrearage for ballet and to order Father to pay Mother the arrearage.
[¶18] Also, in January 2023, Mother filed a petition for a child-related order. In this petition, Mother alleged that Stepmother's involvement in matters relating to the children had "been an ongoing issue and concern." (App. Vol. 2 at 61). According to Mother, Stepmother had "often assert[ed] herself and her opinions during conversations between [Parents] and in conversations with the children's medical and educational providers." (App. Vol. 2 at 61). Mother alleged that Stepmother's involvement in these matters created tension. According to Mother, she had attempted to resolve this issue with Father; however, Mother believed that the situation seemed to be further deteriorating. Mother asked the trial court to "order only biological parents be present for all medical and educational appointments." (App. Vol. 2 at 62). Mother also asked the trial court to order that "all communication related to the minor children be between [Parents] only." (App. Vol. 2 at 62).
[¶19] Further, in January 2023, the trial court re-appointed PC Shive to the case and asked the parties to submit a detailed order concerning the appointment. In February 2023, Parents tendered to the trial court a six-page agreed order, wherein they agreed to the appointment of PC Shive. The agreed order set forth PC Shive's role and the issues that he was to address with Parents. In addition, the agreed order provided that PC Shive had been appointed for a two-year term. The agreed order also provided that Father would pay sixty-five percent of PC Shive's fees and Mother would pay thirty-five percent of the fees. Further, according to the agreed order, "[t]his pro rata sharing of the PC's fees shall be subject to reapportionment at final hearing upon completion of discovery and request of either party for the Court to review the issue." (App. Vol. 2 at 64).
[¶20] The trial court held a two-day hearing on the pending motions and petitions in July 2023. At the hearing, GAL Finnell testified and reiterated her recommendation that Father's parenting time be increased. GAL Finnell also characterized the case as being "high conflict." (Tr. Vol. 2 at 9).
[¶21] In addition, Father asked the trial court to award him joint physical custody of the children with a "week on/ week off" schedule. (Tr. Vol. 2 at 153). Father explained that he was requesting a modification of physical custody of the children because he wanted to spend more time with them. He further explained that he was not seeking joint physical custody of the children in an attempt to modify his child support. Rather, he explained that he wanted a modification of custody without a child support modification. Father further pointed out that the children were six and eight years old when the previous parenting time schedule had been established and that they were now twelve and fourteen years old.
[¶22] Father also testified that he was a co-pilot or first officer. He explained the process for bidding for his monthly flight schedule and explained that because of his seniority, he would be able to schedule his flight times around his parenting time schedule. Father further explained that as a result of his seniority, he had seventeen or eighteen days off each month that he would be able to use for parenting time.
[¶23] Father also testified that he had initially not agreed to pay for C.F.'s ballet classes because Mother had registered C.F. for the classes without discussing the registration with him. According to Father, he believed that a discussion about ballet should have occurred before Mother registered C.F. for the classes. Father further explained that he had paid for other activities for both children even though Mother had not agreed to the activities or contributed to their cost. Specifically, Father testified that he had paid for the children to participate in Vacation Bible Camp, tennis lessons, swim lessons, ice skating lessons, gymnastics classes, and a safe sitter program. Father believed that paying for these activities was a way to "even the cost." (Tr. Vol. 2 at 136).
[¶24] Father also testified that as C.F. had progressed in ballet at her current dance school, Father had not agreed with the intensity of her schedule. Specifically, at the time of the hearing, C.F. was attending four ballet classes each week. Further, if there was a ballet show, C.F. had practice every day and sometimes had to miss school. Father pointed out that C.F. was only twelve years old and that academics needed to come first before dance. Father explained that C.F. had difficulty in math courses and had a math tutor. Father also explained that C.F. had bedwetting issues. Father testified that he was glad that C.F. enjoyed ballet but believed that there needed to be a balance between ballet and academics. Father further pointed out that there were other dance schools that had less intensive programs.
[¶25] Father also asked the trial court to order that each parent be equally responsible for PC Shive's fees. According to Father, PC Shive did "equal work for both [parents]." (Tr. Vol. 2 at 113). Father also asked the trial court to order that each parent be equally responsible for GAL Finnell's fees. Father testified that he earned $177,000 in 2022.
[¶26] Mother testified that she works from 8:00 a.m. until 4:00 p.m. and that she is generally available to pick up the children from school and spend the evenings with them. However, she further acknowledged that she sometimes works additional hours for training, overtime, or criminal jury trial appearances when she is the State's assisting witness. When Mother is not available for parenting time, the children are with a nanny, who has worked for Mother for twelve years. Mother also testified that she believed that Stepmother had interfered in medical and educational issues regarding the children. In addition, Mother testified that she and Father had recently disagreed about possible treatments for twelve-year-old C.F.'s bedwetting issues and about the children receiving COVID vaccines.
[¶27] Mother asked the trial court to order Father to pay her approximately $7,500 for past ballet expenses from 2019 through 2022. Mother acknowledged that Father had "never agreed to pay for ballet" and that he had said that he did not agree to C.F. participating in ballet. (Tr. Vol. 3 at 38). However, Mother further testified that she believed that Father's actions, such as taking C.F. to ballet classes and attending her recitals and shows, showed that Father supported C.F.'s participation in ballet. In addition, Mother acknowledged that there were less rigorous dance schools in Indianapolis. Mother also acknowledged that Father had paid for other activities for the children. According to Mother, she had not agreed to or financially contributed to those other activities.
[¶28] Mother asked the trial court to terminate PC Shive's services because she believed that she and Father could work out any issues regarding the children without the services of PC Shive. If the trial court kept PC Shive's services in place, Mother asked the trial court to keep in place the provision of the January 2023 agreed order that allocated sixty-five percent of PC Shive's fees to Father and thirty-five percent of the fees to Mother. Mother also asked the trial court not to order her to pay for any of the GAL's fees because Mother was "not making the amount of money that [Father] makes[,]" and Father was in a better position to pay those fees. (Tr. Vol. 2 at 242). Mother earned $86,000 in 2022.
[¶29] In September 2023, the trial court issued a detailed thirteen-page order, which is titled "FATHER'S PROPOSED ORDER AFTER FINAL HEARING[.]" (App. Vol. 2 at 70). Regarding Father's motion to modify physical custody of the children, the trial court found that substantial changes in Father's work schedule, the children's ages and wishes, and Mother's marital status requiring her to have a nanny care for the children when she is not available justified a modification of the children's physical custody. Accordingly, the trial court ordered that Parents would equally share physical custody of the children.
[¶30] Regarding Mother's petition to establish an extracurricular arrearage, the trial court found that the 2012 Agreement required Parents to share the costs for the children's extracurricular activities upon which they had jointly agreed that the children would participate. The trial court further found that Mother had admitted in her testimony that Father had never agreed to C.F. participating in ballet and that Father had repeatedly expressed concerns about twelve-year-old C.F.'s participation in such an intensive dance program. The trial court concluded that because the evidence revealed that Parents had repeatedly disagreed about C.F.'s participation in ballet, the trial court could not establish Mother's requested arrearage. In addition, the trial court concluded that given the many concerns that Father had articulated over the years regarding C.F.'s participation in ballet, the trial court would not find that Father had unreasonably withheld his agreement to C.F.'s participation in ballet. Accordingly, the trial court denied Mother's petition to establish an extracurricular arrearage.
[¶31] Regarding Father's request that he and Mother equally contribute to PC Shive's fees, the trial court found that the agreed order had contemplated that the pro rata sharing of PC Shive's fees was subject to reapportionment at the final hearing at the request of either party. The trial court further found that the actions of both parties had called for the involvement of PC Shive and that it was important to place Parents on an even playing field when it came to PC Shive's fees to avoid incentivizing Parents from involving PC Shive in parental disputes. Accordingly, the trial court ordered each parent to equally divide PC Shive's fees as of the date of the order.
[¶32] Regarding Father's request that he and Mother equally share GAL Finnell's fees, the trial court found that the agreed order appointing GAL Finnell had required Father to pay GAL Finnell but contemplated a reallocation of those costs at the final hearing. The trial court further found that GAL Finnell's involvement in the case had been necessary to determine the best interests of the children. Specifically, GAL Finnell had assisted in determining the children's wishes without subjecting the children to the stress of participating more directly in the proceedings. Based on these findings, the trial court concluded that Parents should be equally responsible for GAL Finnell's fees. Accordingly, the trial court ordered Mother to reimburse Father $1,200 for one-half of GAL Finnell's fees incurred before the final hearing and to further pay one-half of GAL Finnell's additional fees, including preparation for and attendance at the final hearing.
[¶33] Mother now appeals.
Decision
[¶34] At the outset, we note that Mother points out that "the trial court apparently adopted Father's proposed Order verbatim as evidenced by its title, 'Father's Proposed Order After Final Hearing.'" (Mother's Br. 17). Although a trial court is not prohibited from adopting a party's proposed order verbatim, this practice weakens our confidence as an appellate court that the findings are the result of considered judgment by the trial court. Safety National Casualty Company v. Cinergy Corporation, 829 N.E.2d 986, 993 (Ind.Ct.App. 2005), trans. denied. In Carpenter v. Carpenter, 891 N.E.2d 587, 592 (Ind.Ct.App. 2008), we further stated that although the "wholesale adoption" of a party's proposed order is not prohibited, "we do not encourage trial courts to engage in this practice." We also stated that wholesale adoption of a party's proposed order does not alter our standard of review, but "near verbatim reproductions may appropriately justify cautious appellate scrutiny." Id. at 593 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). We have cautiously scrutinized the order in this case, and we once again encourage trial courts not to engage in this practice of wholesale adopting a party's proposed order.
[¶35] We further note that neither party requested special findings under Indiana Trial Rule 52(A) and that the trial court entered its findings sua sponte. As to the issues covered by the findings, we apply the two-tiered standard of whether the evidence supports the findings and whether the findings support the judgment. McDaniel v. McDaniel, 150 N.E.3d 282, 289 (Ind.Ct.App. 2020), trans. denied. We review any remaining issues under the general judgment standard and will affirm the judgment if it can be sustained on any legal theory consistent with the evidence. Id. "'We may look both to other findings and beyond the findings to the evidence of record to determine if the result is against the facts and circumstances before the court.'" Id. (quoting Stone v. Stone, 991 N.E.2d 992, 998 (Ind.Ct.App. 2013)). Clear error occurs when our review of the evidence most favorable to the trial court's judgment leaves us firmly convinced that a mistake has been made. Quinn v. Quinn, 62 N.E.3d 1212, 1220 (Ind.Ct.App. 2016). We now turn to the issues in this case.
[¶36] Mother argues that the trial court abused its discretion when it: (1) modified physical custody of the parties' two daughters; (2) denied her petition to establish an extracurricular arrearage; (3) ordered her to pay fifty percent of PC Shive's fees; and (4) ordered her to pay fifty percent of GAL Finnell's fees. We address each of her contentions in turn.
1. Custody Modification
[¶37] Mother first argues that the trial court abused its discretion in modifying physical custody of the children. She specifically contends that the trial court abused its discretion when it modified her sole physical custody of the children to joint physical custody with Father.
[¶38] We review custody modifications for an abuse of discretion. McDaniel, 150 N.E.3d at 288. A trial court's custody determination is afforded considerable deference on appeal as it is the trial court that sees the parties, observes their conduct and demeanor, and hears their testimony. Kondamuri v. Kondamuri, 852 N.E.2d 939, 945-46 (Ind.Ct.App. 2006). Thus, on review, we will not reweigh the evidence, judge the credibility of witnesses, or substitute our judgment for that of the trial court. Id. at 946. We will reverse the trial court's custody determination only if it is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances or the reasonable inferences drawn therefrom. Id. "'[I]t is not enough that the evidence might support some other conclusion, but it must positively require the conclusion contended for by appellant before there is a basis for reversal.'" McDaniel, 150 N.E.3d at 288 (quoting Kirk v. Kirk, 770 N.E.2d 304, 307 (Ind. 2002)).
[¶39] INDIANA CODE § 31-17-2-21 provides that a trial court may not modify an existing child custody order unless: (1) the modification is in the best interests of the child; and (2) there has been a substantial change in one or more of the statutory factors that are outlined in INDIANA CODE § 31-17-2-8. These factors are:
(1) The age and sex of the child.
(2) The wishes of the child's parent or parents.
(3) The wishes of the child, with more consideration given to the child's wishes if the child is at least fourteen (14) years of age.
(4) The interaction and interrelationship of the child with:
(A) the child's parent or parents;
(B) the child's sibling; and
(C) any other person who may significantly affect the child's best interests.
(5) The child's adjustment to the child's:
(A) home;
(B) school; and
(C) community.
(6) The mental and physical health of all individuals involved.
(7) Evidence of a pattern of domestic or family violence by either parent.
(8) Evidence that the child has been cared for by a de facto custodian[.]IND. CODE § 31-17-2-8. In interpreting Indiana Code § 31-17-2-21, this Court has held that "'all that is required to support modification of custody . . . is a finding that a change would be in the child's best interests, a consideration of the factors listed in I.C. § 31-17-2-8, and a finding that there has been a substantial change in one of those factors.'" McDaniel, 150 N.E.3d at 289 (quoting Nienaber v. Nienaber, 787 N.E.2d 450, 456 (Ind.Ct.App. 2003)).
[¶40] At the outset, we note that Mother does not argue that the custody modification is not in the children's best interests. Rather, her sole argument is that there was no substantial change in one or more of the statutory factors. However, our review of the evidence reveals a substantial change in several of the statutory factors. First, the children, who were six and eight years old when the previous parenting time schedule had been established, are now twelve and fourteen years old. Second, Father would like to spend more time with the children and now has a work schedule that allows him to do so. Specifically, Father has seventeen or eighteen days off each month, and based on his seniority, he will be able to schedule his flight times around an equally shared parenting time schedule. Third, the children both expressed to GAL Finnell that they would like to spend more time with Father and suggested a week on/week off parenting time schedule. We further note that G.F. was fourteen years old at the time of the hearing, and her wishes were entitled to more consideration. These substantial changes in the statutory factors support the trial court's modification of the children's physical custody, and we find no abuse of the trial court's discretion.
2. Extra-Curricular Expenses
[¶41] Mother next argues that the trial court abused its discretion when it denied her petition to establish an extracurricular arrearage and failed to order Father to reimburse her for C.F.'s past ballet expenses. We review a trial court's decision regarding a parent's payment for his child's expenses for an abuse of discretion. See In re Marriage of Blanford, 937 N.E.2d 356, 363 (Ind.Ct.App. 2010) (payment of college expenses); Neudecker v. Neudecker, 577 N.E.2d 960, 962 (Ind. 1991) (explaining that the expenses of college are not unlike those of orthodontia, music lessons, summer camp, and various other optional undertakings). A trial court abuses its discretion when its decision is against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before the court, including any reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom. Blanford, 937 N.E.2d at 360.
[¶42] Here, our review of the record reveals that Parents' 2012 Agreement requires Parents to share the costs for the children's extracurricular activities upon which they had jointly agreed that the children would participate. The 2012 Agreement further provides that Parents shall not unreasonably withhold their agreement for such extracurricular activities.
[¶43] Our review of the record further reveals that Father has never agreed to C.F.'s participation in ballet. Specifically, Father did not initially agree to C.F.'s participation in ballet because Mother had registered C.F. for ballet without discussing the registration with him. In an attempt to even the cost of the children's activities, Father paid for the children to participate in several other activities that Mother had neither agreed to nor contributed to financially. Further, as C.F. progressed in ballet, Father did not agree to the intensity of the ballet program and believed that C.F., who struggled in math and required the assistance of a math tutor, needed to concentrate on academics. Father was also concerned about twelve-year-old C.F.'s bedwetting issues. Our review of the record further reveals that when Mother testified at the hearing, she acknowledged that Father had never agreed to C.F.'s participation in ballet. Because Father has never agreed to C.F.'s participation in ballet, pursuant to the terms of the 2012 Agreement, he was not required to share the costs of C.F.'s ballet.
[¶44] Further, to the extent that Mother argues that Father has unreasonably withheld his agreement to C.F.'s participation in ballet, we note that Father's multiple concerns over the years about the intensity of the ballet program support the trial court's finding that Father had not unreasonably withheld his agreement to C.F.'s participation in ballet. The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it denied Mother's petition to establish an extracurricular arrearage.
3. PC Shive's Fees
[¶45] Mother also argues that the trial court abused its discretion when it ordered her to pay fifty percent of PC Shive's fees. Indiana Parenting Time Guidelines Section V(A) provides that "[p]arenting coordination is a court ordered, child-focused dispute resolution process in which a Parenting Coordinator is appointed to assist high conflict parties by accessing and managing conflicts, redirecting the focus of the parties to the needs of the child, and educating the parties on how to make decisions that are in the best interest of the child." Section V(C)(6) further provides that the trial court "has the discretion to apportion the [Parenting Coordinator's] fee between the parties absent an agreement." We, therefore, review the trial court's apportionment of the parenting coordinator's fee for an abuse of that discretion. As previously stated, a trial court abuses its discretion when its decision is against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before the court, including any reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom. Blanford, 937 N.E.2d at 360.
[¶46] Here, our review of the record reveals that in February 2023, Parents tendered to the trial court an agreed order, wherein they agreed to the appointment of PC Shive. The agreed order provided that Father would pay sixty-five percent of PC Shive's fees and Mother would pay thirty-five percent of the fees. Further, according to the agreed order, "[t]his pro rata sharing of the PC's fees shall be subject to reapportionment at final hearing upon completion of discovery and request of either party for the Court to review the issue." (App. Vol. 2 at 64). At the custody hearing, as contemplated by the agreed order, Father asked the trial court to order each parent to pay fifty percent of PC Shive's fees.
[¶47] Our review of the record further reveals that Parents have a contentious relationship that the children have characterized as a "hate" period and GAL Finnell has characterized as high conflict. (App. Vol. 2 at 53). Parents have difficulty communicating about issues related to the children. They have specifically disagreed about Stepmother's involvement in medical and educational decisions regarding the children, whether the children should receive COVID vaccines, C.F.'s participation in ballet, C.F.'s need for a math tutor, and how to best treat C.F.'s bedwetting issues. Because Parents appear to be equally responsible for the communication issues, PC Shive will be doing equal work for each parent. We further note that the 2023 agreed order appointing a parenting coordinator contemplated a reapportionment of PC Shive's fees. Based on these facts and circumstances, the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it ordered Mother to pay fifty percent of PC Shive's fees.
4. GAL Finnell's Fees
[¶48] Lastly, Mother argued that the trial court abused its discretion when it ordered her to pay fifty percent of GAL Finnell's fees. Pursuant to INDIANA CODE § 3115-6-1, the trial court may appoint a GAL at any time. The purpose of the GAL is to "represent and protect the best interests" of the children. I.C § 31-156-3. The trial court may also order either or both parents to pay the GAL's fee. I.C § 31-15-6-10. We review the trial court's order regarding the payment of GAL fees for an abuse of discretion. In re Paternity of N.L.P., 926 N.E.2d 20, 23 (Ind. 2010). As previously stated, a trial court abuses its discretion when its decision is against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before the court, including any reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom. Blanford, 937 N.E.2d at 360.
[¶49] Here, our review of the record reveals that in July 2022, Parents tendered to the trial court an agreed order regarding the appointment of GAL Finnell. The order specifically provided that Parents had agreed that GAL Finnell would prepare a report and make recommendations about child-related issues. The agreed order further provided that "Father initially shall be responsible for the GAL's fees, subject to a request for reallocation at the hearing in this matter." (App. Vol. 2 at 48). At the custody hearing, as contemplated by the agreed order, Father asked the trial court to order each parent to pay fifty percent of GAL Finnell's fees.
[¶50] Our review of the record further reveals that GAL Finnell's participation in the case was necessary to determine the best interests of the children. In addition, GAL Finnell was able to assist the trial court in determining the children's best interests and their wishes regarding their physical custody without requiring them to participate more directly in the proceedings, such as testifying at the hearing. Because GAL Finnell's participation in the case directly benefited the children and because the 2022 agreed order appointing GAL Finnell contemplated a reallocation of GAL Finnell's fees, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in ordering Mother to pay fifty percent of GAL Finnell's fees.
[¶51] Affirmed.
Bailey, J., and Crone, J., concur.