Opinion
CVH8534
06-21-2016
Justin C. Freeman v. Maribel Diaz
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION
Nicola E. Rubinow, J.
This memorandum of decision addresses the issues raised through the plaintiff's complaint seeking money damages for breach of an oral month-to-month lease permitting the defendant to occupy the residential premises at 172 Wakefield Circle, East Hartford, CT (the premises) owned by the plaintiff; through the complaint, the plaintiff also seeks reimbursement of the costs of repair to damages allegedly caused to the premises by the plaintiff and/or her authorized agents, along with " interest" on the amounts the defendant is claimed to owe the plaintiff. (Complaint, 5/29/15.)
At trial, the plaintiff amended his complaint: to reflect allegations that the oral lease premises required the defendant to pay him $1,000 each month, relative to the defendant's occupancy of the premises; and to withdraw the claim for attorneys fees.
The plaintiff, an attorney, represented himself in this litigation; the defendant, who is not an attorney, also represented herself. While the defendant filed no special defenses, in the event of a finding in favor of the plaintiff, she presented evidence ostensibly seeking to have the court consider her claim that she received periodic monetary entitlements, specifically referenced as " FMLA" benefits, that were exempt from garnishment. The court permitted the parties to address the relevance of this claim by submitting briefs. The plaintiff filed his memorandum of law on March 11, 2016; the defendant filed her written response on March 17, 2016.
As the plaintiff, Freeman bears the burden of proving the essential allegations of her complaint by a fair preponderance of the evidence. The court finds the plaintiff to have met this burden of proof on almost all allegations of the complaint as amended. Accordingly, the court awards damages to the plaintiff as set forth below.
The standard of proof in this civil matter, a fair preponderance of the evidence, is " properly defined as the better evidence, the evidence having the greater weight, the more convincing force in your mind." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Cross v. Huttenlocher, 185 Conn. 390, 394, 440 A.2d 952 (1981). " The general burden of proof in civil actions is on the plaintiff, who must prove all the essential allegations of the complaint." Gulycz v. Stop & Shop Cos., 29 Conn.App. 519, 523, 615 A.2d 1087, cert. denied, 224 Conn. 923, 618 A.2d 527 (1992).
As to her special defense, the defendant bears the same burden of proof as that assigned to the plaintiff. At trial, the court found Diaz's special defense insufficient as alleged, and dismissed that defense without prejudice to her opportunity to present evidence in opposition to the plaintiff's claims. In resolving this matter, the court has fully considered the defendant's evidence as presented during the trial; as to her claim that she paid the plaintiff all monies alleged to be due as rent or for use and occupancy, the court has acknowledged, but has drawn no inference from, the defendant's submission of a brief but no post-trial evidence that such payments were made. See footnote 10.
The defendant has neither argued for nor presented evidence to support the claim for interest contained in second paragraph of the complaint's prayer for relief. Accordingly, the court deems such claim abandoned.
I
FACTUAL FINDINGS
The court has reviewed the pleadings and considered the evidence in its entirety using the applicable principles of law. At trial, each party testified and presented numerous documentary exhibits for review; each party participated in cross examination. The facts set forth in this decision were proved by a fair preponderance of the credible and reliable evidence received at trial.
" The [fact-finding] function is vested in the trial court with its unique opportunity to view the evidence presented in a totality of circumstances, i.e., including its observations of the demeanor and conduct of the witnesses and parties . . ." Cavolick v. DeSimone, 88 Conn.App. 638, 646, 870 A.2d 1147, cert. denied, 274 Conn. 906, 876 A.2d 1198 (2005)." [A] trier is not required to believe testimony merely because it is not directly contradicted . . ." (Citations omitted.) Johnson v. Fuller, 190 Conn. 552, 556, 461 A.2d 988 (1983). " [T]he trier is free to juxtapose conflicting versions of events and determine which is more credible . . . It is the trier's exclusive province to weigh the conflicting evidence and determine the credibility of witnesses . . . The trier of fact may accept or reject the testimony of any witness . . . The trier can, as well, decide what--all, none, or some--of a witness' testimony to accept or reject." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Osborn, 41 Conn.App. 287, 291, 676 A.2d 399 (1996). The trial court's function as the fact finder " is to draw whatever inferences from the evidence or facts established by the evidence it deems to be reasonable and logical." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Christine F., 6 Conn.App. 360, 366, 505 A.2d 734, cert. denied, 199 Conn. 808, 809, 508 A.2d 769, 770 (1986).
At all times relevant to this litigation, Freeman has owned the single-family condominium residence known as the premises. (Ex. 4; Tes. Freeman.) In late summer or early fall of 2013, the plaintiff and the defendant entered into a month-to-month rental agreement through which the defendant would be allowed to reside at, use and occupy the premises in exchange for payment of $1,000 as rent; rent was due and payable on the first day of each month of occupancy commencing on November 1, 2013. For the months of January through August 2014, the defendant made rent payments to the plaintiff by personal checks, which the defendant accepted and cashed upon receipt. (Exs. 5, F, H; Tes. Diaz, Freeman.)
The court credits the aspect of the defendant's testimony establishing that she took occupancy of the premises in August 2013, but did not transfer electrical or cable service to her name until October 2013. (Tes. Diaz.)
At trial, the plaintiff admitted having received the rent due from the plaintiff for August 2014, and amended his complaint accordingly.
Thereafter, the defendant continued to reside at, use and occupy the premises. At some point in late 2014 or early 2015, the plaintiff learned that the defendant had a heart condition. By April 2015, the plaintiff had made it known to the defendant that he was seeking another tenant for the premises. The defendant vacated 172 Wakefield, East Hartford, CT at sometime during April 2015. When she vacated the premises, the defendant had not paid the rent due during the eight months following August 2014; rent was unpaid each month for September through December 2014, and was unpaid each month for January through April 2015. The total amount of unpaid rent is $8,000. (Exs. 1, 5, 6; Tes. Freeman, Diaz.)
The evidence is insufficient to support the plaintiff's claim that the defendant remained in occupancy during May 2015. (See Ex. 4.) The plaintiff has provided insufficient factual or legal basis to support his claim that the defendant's obligation to continue rent payment under the parties' oral month-to-month lease agreement survived the defendant's self-removal from the premises during April 2014.
The evidence establishing the defendant's non-payment of rent is supported by her admission that she had planned to move from Connecticut to Florida in December 2014, but that this plan did work out. (Tes. Diaz.)
In reaching this conclusion, the court acknowledges but declines to credit the defendant's protests that she paid the plaintiff by check or by cash for the rent due in each of these months. Following trial, the court permitted the defendant additional time within which she could visit the multiple banking institutions with which she claimed to do business, examine her accounts, and submit cancelled checks or other documentation of withdrawals from her accounts equal or similar in amount to support this aspect of her claim; however, she did not do so, instead filing a narrative statement on March 17, 2016 which effectively constituted a post-trial brief, not evidence. (See Exs. F, H; Tes. Diaz. See also FTR, 2-24-12 @4:48:34 et seq.) See In re Isaiah J., 52 Conn.Supp. 485, 497 n.9, 72 A.3d 446 (2013) (" [FTR (For The Record) is the recording facility of the court reporter which digitally records the testimony of a witness while noting the time of the utterance by hour, minute and second during that day's trial . . . ]"). Given the trial evidence in its entirety, the court finds insufficient basis for crediting any aspect of the defendant's contention that she paid the rent due for some or all of the months at issue in cash, but never obtained a receipt for any of these significant posited cash payments. Moreover, the evidence is insufficient to support the defendant's apparent claims the plaintiff forgave her obligation to rent during some or all of the months at issue. Although the parties are clearly at odds with each other, the court finds the plaintiff's evidence, establishing nonpayment of rent from September 2014 through May 2015, to be weightier and more credible on all monetary issues.
At some time during the defendant's residence at 172 Wakefield Circle, East Hartford, CT, damages were caused to the premises consisting of fist-sized holes in walls, disruption of the master bedroom door and door frame. These damages were above and beyond normal and expected wear and tear expected of premises the defendant had inhabited since the fall of 2013. On May 1, 2015, after the defendant had vacated the premises, a vendor hired by the plaintiff repaired and painted these areas of damage and removed personalty that the tenant had discarded. The evidence as a whole supports the conclusion that these damages occurred while the defendant was in possession and control of 172 Wakefield Circle, East Hartford, CT; there is insufficient evidence to support a finding that the damaged conditions existed when the plaintiff took occupancy of the premises, or that the plaintiff caused the damages. The plaintiff reasonably incurred $765 in expenses to restore the premises to a tenantable condition. (Ex. 4; Tes. Freeman.)
The court credits the aspect of the defendant's testimony establishing that she had left some furniture, and some of her belongings, behind when she vacated the premises. (Tes. Diaz.)
Given the strength of the evidence relating to the damages caused to the premises during the defendant's occupancy, the court has considered but attributes no weight to a photocopy of screenshot of a text message exchange stating: " thank you you did a wonderful job cleaning it its spotless." (Ex. 1.)
During the months that the defendant paid no rent, the plaintiff made efforts to obtain the rent due for the plaintiff's use of the premises; those efforts were reasonably given the information the plaintiff had learned about the defendant's heart condition. Although from time to time the defendant informed the plaintiff that her unspecified medical conditions required her intermittent hospitalization, the oral month-to-month lease remained in effect through April 2015 when, as previously noted, the defendant vacated the premises. Thereafter, the plaintiff lawfully instituted the pending civil suit against the defendant to acquire the rent unpaid for the months of September through December 2014, or for January through April 2015. Having to institute such suit, the plaintiff incurred $175 in court costs, and $63.96 in state marshal's fees. (Exs. 1, 2, 3, 5; Tes. Freeman.)
II
RESOLUTION OF THE CLAIMS
For the reasons stated throughout this decision, the plaintiff has met his burden of proving that the defendant occupied the premises known as 172 Wakefield Circle in East Hartford, CT for the months of September through December 2014 and January through April 2015, but did not pay the rent as to due the plaintiff under the oral month-to-month lease that remained in effect until the defendant vacated the premises on April 2015. The defendant is legally liable to the plaintiff for the amount of unpaid rent that accrued during these months. The plaintiff has also met his burden of proving that during the defendant's residence at 172 Wakefield Circle, East Hartford, CT, damages requiring remediation were caused to the premises, and that debris was left behind by the defendant requiring removal after she vacated the premises, all to the loss of the plaintiff. The defendant is legally liable to the plaintiff for the reasonable cost to restore this loss, described above, and is further liable for fees and costs associated with the plaintiff's reasonable pursuit of this civil action.
Despite the defendant's vigorous protests, the court received insufficient evidence to support the conclusion that any aspect of the plaintiff's claims related in any way to: retaliatory action against her; conduct in any way related to grievance proceedings concerning the plaintiff's practice of law; the status of work performed with regard to any decedent's estate; the plaintiff's involvement in an action brought to recover unpaid child support or the plaintiff's distribution of funds to a third party instead of to a child support agency. (Exs. J, K; Tes. Diaz.) Moreover, the defendant actively engaged in the entirety of the trial and post-trial proceedings. Despite her assertions, the court received insufficient evidence to establish, factually or legally, that she is protected from a finding of liability or an award of damages in this civil action based upon her claimed receipt of " FMLA" benefits. (Tes. Diaz. See Defendant's Post-Trial Memorandum, 3/17/16.)
III
DAMAGE AWARD
Based on the findings previously set forth, the court finds the defendant Maribel Diaz liable to pay damages to the plaintiff Justin C. Freeman as follows:
Unpaid Rent, Use
September through December
$8,000.00
and Occupancy
2014 and January through
April 2015
Remediation
Damage to Premises
765.00
Court Filing Cost
Civil Action
175.00
Marshal's Fee
Civil Action
63.96
TOTAL
$9,003.96
WHEREFORE, judgment is now entered in favor of the plaintiff Justin C. Freeman and against the defendant Maribel Diaz in the amount of $9,003.96.
AND WHEREFORE, it is further adjudged and ORDERED that the defendant Maribel Diaz must make nominal weekly payments on this judgment in the amount of $50 to the plaintiff Justin C. Freeman commencing on Monday July 18, 2016 and payable on Monday of each week thereafter until her debt due to Justin C. Freeman is satisfied in full. See Practice Book § 17-26.
The court awards no further costs to either party.