Opinion
(Spring Riding, 1798.)
Where money is payable on demand, interest does not accrue until a demand is made; when no time is appointed, the money is payable immediately without a demand, and interest accrues immediately.
DEBT upon a bond, with a penalty, conditioned to pay without any time mentioned; and the question was, from what time interest was to be calculated.
HAYWOOD, J. The rule is fixed that bonds payable without any certain time mentioned are payable instanta, and bear interest immediately from the delivery.
W. R. Davie for plaintiff: I wish we could have the reason upon which these determinations have been founded, that we might examine them and see whether they be good or not. A bond payable on demand is payable immediately, and may be sued upon immediately, without any previous demand made for that purpose. The same is the case with a bond payable on no certain day mentioned in the bond. I believe the British determinations have concurred with ours on this subject, but really I can perceive no good reason for the distinction. Our own act directs that bonds payable on demand shall bear interest from the demand; by the same act an account stated and signed bears interest immediately from the signature.
The reason of the distinction is this; in case of a bond payable without saying when, the obligee has not to do any act either to entitle himself to the action or to the interest; in case of a bond payable on demand, he undertakes to make a demand, otherwise the words "on demand" have no meaning; and if a demand is to be made, it is for some purpose. It is not to entitle himself to the action, therefore it must be to give a right to demand interest. The act of Assembly proceeds upon this very principle. It says a note payable on demand shall bear interest from a demand made. When speaking of an account signed, it says interest shall accrue from the signature; yet in both instances an action may be brought immediately without any formal demand. But if we could not give the reason of the decision, yet we know the rule is so established. It is therefore far better to make it the standard of our adjudications than to render the law again uncertain by departing from it.
There was judgment accordingly for interest from the date.
Cited: Caldwell v. Rodman, 50 N.C. 139.