Opinion
No. CV 03 0193008 S
August 8, 2005
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION
Presently before the court is a motion for summary judgment dated March 29, 2005 filed by defendant, KeyBank USA (KeyBank). In that motion KeyBank requests the court to grant summary judgment in its favor with respect to each of the four remaining counts directed against it in the plaintiff's amended complaint.
The eighth count alleging reckless entrustment by KeyBank was withdrawn by plaintiff.
This case involves claims for damages arising out of a motor vehicle accident which occurred on December 16, 2000 in Westport. The plaintiff is Darren P. Fredette, who alleges that he sustained personal injuries as the result of the negligence of the defendant, Michael Mourounas, who was operating a Porsche automobile in which the plaintiff was a passenger. The vehicle was originally leased by Mourounas' parents from an automobile dealer. At the time of the accident the owner of the automobile was the defendant, KeyBank which had taken an assignment of the lease from the dealer.
The second, fifth and sixth counts of the plaintiff's amended complaint set forth causes of action against KeyBank based upon its alleged liability under General Statutes § 14-154a. The seventh count alleges KeyBank's liability under a theory of negligent entrustment. KeyBank moves for summary judgment claiming that the evidence shows that it was not the lessor of the automobile and that it did not entrust the vehicle to anyone.
The affidavit of Denny Lehman, KeyBank's Vice President, and the documentary evidence appended thereto CT Page 11769-gj show that in 1996, KeyBank entered into an agreement with a Connecticut automobile dealer, Silver Star Motors Sports, Inc. ('Silver Star"), under which KeyBank agreed to accept assignment of automobile leases from Silver Star. One of the leases assigned to KeyBank was a June 17, 1999 lease of a Porsche automobile from Silver Star to Evelyn and Elefterios Mourounas. That lease, along with title to the automobile was assigned to KeyBank on June 23, 1999. On the date of the accident, KeyBank remained the owner of the automobile and the holder of the lease between Silver Star and Mr. and Mrs. Mourounas.
"In deciding a motion for summary judgment, the trial court must review the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party . . . The party moving for summary judgment has the burden of showing the absence of any genuine issue of material fact and that the party is, therefore, entitled to judgment as a matter of law . . . The test is whether a party would be entitled to a directed verdict on the same facts . . ." Bartlett v. Heise, 84 Conn.App. 424, 428, 853 A.2d 612 (2004).
In its motion for summary judgment KeyBank claims that it was not the lessor of the automobile and therefore concludes that it has no liability pursuant to General Statutes § 14-154a as alleged in the second, fifth and sixth counts of the plaintiff's amended complaint. KeyBank claims that any liability under the statute should be imposed on Silver Star, the entity which leased the automobile to Mr. and Mrs. Mourounas.
The court does not agree. General Statutes § 14-154a(a) provides:
Any person renting or leasing to another any motor vehicle owned by him shall be liable for any damage to any person or property caused by the operation of such motor vehicle while so rented or leased, to the same extent as the operator would have been liable if he had also been the owner.
The statute does not purport to impose continuing liability on the original lessor of a vehicle. Instead it imposes liability on CT Page 11769-gk the owner of the vehicle when that vehicle is rented or leased to another. Without question, the evidence shows that at the time of the December 16, 2000 accident, the Porsche automobile was owned by KeyBank and was subject to a lease to Mr. and Mrs. Mourounas.
However, KeyBank claims that, as a matter of law, it did not as an assignee of the lease, assume any liabilities of Silver Star. In pressing this claim, KeyBank fails to understand the basis for its potential liability in this case. Such liability does not arise under the terms of the lease, but rather, under the statute, by virtue of KeyBank's status as the owner of a vehicle leased or rented to another.
In Gionfriddo v. Avis Rent A Car System, Inc., 192 Conn. 280, 284 the Supreme Court considered the purposes of General Statutes § 14-154a. "It cannot be regarded otherwise than as an expression of legislative judgment as to the extent — beyond the limitations of the general principles of respondeat superior and the `family-car doctrine' — to which the owner of a motor vehicle which he entrusts to another should be liable for the acts of the latter . . . We have consistently construed the statute as imposing on one who rents or leases a motor vehicle to another the same liability as that of its operator, provided the vehicle, at the time in question, is being operated by one in lawful possession of it pursuant to the terms of the contract of rental . . . By virtue of the express terms of the statute the owner lessor is made the alter ego of the operator so that the latter's acts with respect to the operation of the car . . . are in law the acts of the owner-lessor." (Citations omitted; emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted.)
Thus, the statute imposes liability, not on the party who originally enters into the lease of the vehicle (in this case, Silver Star), but on the owner of the vehicle "at the time in question" (in this case, KeyBank). KeyBank's motion for summary judgment with respect to the second, fifth and sixth counts of the plaintiff's complaint is denied.
KeyBank's motion for summary judgment is also addressed to the seventh count of the plaintiff's complaint which alleges negligent entrustment of the Porsche automobile to Michael Mourounas, who is alleged to have been an unsuitable driver. KeyBank claims that the undisputed evidence shows that it did not entrust the automobile to anyone, let alone Michael Mourounas. KeyBank points out that Silver Star, not KeyBank, entered into the lease with Mr. and Mrs. Mourounas and that Silver Star delivered that automobile to them. In addition KeyBank notes that there is no claim that either Mr. Mourounas or Mrs. Mourounas were unsuitable drivers. In response, the plaintiff claims that KeyBank mandated the form of lease used by Silver Star and that the lease permitted the automobile to be CT Page 11769-gl operated by "licensed drivers covered by your insurance who are not (for insurance purposes) deemed an assigned risk."
Our Supreme Court first recognized a cause of action for negligent entrustment of an automobile in Greeley v. Cunningham, 116 Conn. 515, 165 A. 678 (1933). The court stated: "When the evidence proves that the owner of an automobile knows or ought reasonably to know that one to whom he intrusts it is so incompetent to operate it upon the highways that the former ought reasonably to anticipate the likelihood of injury to others by reason of that incompetence, and such incompetence does result in such injury, a basis of recovery by the person injured is established. That recovery rests primarily upon the negligence of the owner in intrusting the automobile to the incompetent driver." 116 Conn. at 520.
The undisputed facts in this case show that under the terms of the lease the lessees, Mr. and Mrs. Mourounas, were allowed to permit other persons to operate the vehicle only if they were licensed drivers covered by their insurance who were not deemed assigned risks for insurance purposes. The plaintiff does not claim that the vehicle was negligently entrusted to Mr. and Mrs. Mourounas by anyone. Instead the plaintiff claims that by mandating the use of lease forms which allowed persons other than the named lessees to operate the vehicle KeyBank facilitated the use of the vehicle by Michael Mourounas who it is claimed was a convicted speeder and therefore an incompetent and unsafe driver. Even assuming that Michael Mourounas was so convicted and that he was not competent to drive, the facts do not support a cause of action against KeyBank for negligent entrustment.
In Shea v. Brown, 146 Conn. 631, 153 A.2d 419 (1959), the Supreme Court upheld a verdict in favor of a defendant used car dealer, where the plaintiff had claimed liability on the basis on negligent entrustment. The dealer had allowed a prospective buyer to test drive a vehicle without ascertaining that he held a valid driver's license. In fact, the driver's license was under suspension.
The court held that the mere fact the defendant did not inquire as to the competency of the driver did not provide a basis for liability for negligent entrustment.
In this case the very lease document upon which the plaintiff relies, mandates not only that each driver of the vehicle possess a valid license, but also that the driver be covered under the leasees' insurance policy and not be considered an assigned risk. The lease did not expressly permit Michael Mourounas to operate the vehicle. Because the undisputed facts show that KeyBank did not entrust the vehicle to Michael CT Page 11769-gm Mourounas, KeyBank's motion for summary judgment with respect to the plaintiff's seventh count is granted.
David R. Tobin, Judge