Opinion
No. 3-118 / 02-0378
Filed March 26, 2003
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Chickasaw County, James L. Beeghly, Judge.
Defendants appeal the district court's denial of their motion for a new trial based on juror misconduct. AFFIRMED.
Richard Stochl of Elwood, O'Donohoe, Stochl, Braun Churbuck, New Hampton, for appellant.
James Wagner of Gartelos, Wagner Ament, Waterloo, for appellee.
Considered by Huitink, P.J., and Mahan and Hecht, JJ.
Kim Franzen sued Allen Tweten and Leland Buseman for wrongful death damages after Kim's husband, Alan, was struck and killed by Buseman's truck while riding a bicycle on Highway 18 near Fredericksburg. Kim claimed Tweten, the driver of the truck, was at fault, and his fault was the cause of the damages claimed. Tweten and Buseman denied liability, claiming Alan was at fault and his fault was a proximate cause of the damages claimed.
At trial an accident investigator from the Iowa Highway Patrol testified Alan was riding his bicycle on the highway when he was struck by Buseman's truck. Tweten testified Alan was riding on the shoulder of the highway when he first saw him and Alan suddenly swerved on to the highway, leaving Tweten with no time to avoid the accident.
The trial court submitted Kim's various theories of fault to the jury. The jury was also instructed on the defense of comparative fault and was furnished with special verdict forms to complete based on its findings of fault.
Jury deliberations began on a Friday afternoon. Prior to resuming deliberations Monday morning Rollin Cahoy, a juror, drove past the scene of the accident. The jury returned their special verdict that morning, finding Tweten one hundred percent at fault.
Defendants filed a motion for new trial pursuant to Iowa Rule of Civil Procedure 1.1004(2) citing Cahoy's view of the accident scene. The district court denied the motion, stating that:
the court finds the misconduct was not reasonably probable to have influenced the verdict in this case. The misconduct would not affect issues of damages, but only liability. The physical evidence in this case and the evidence resulting from law enforcement investigation strongly supports the plaintiff's position that Alan A. Franzen was traveling on the paved portion of the roadway at the time of impact. The jury chose to not believe the testimony of defendant Lane A. Tweten who was driving the semi involved. It is highly unlikely that anything Mr. Cahoy may have observed at the accident scene in December of 2001 could have substantially influenced the jury in determining whether Alan Franzen was on the paved portion or the gravel shoulder.
We review a district court's ruling on a motion for new trial for an abuse of discretion. Ten Hagen v. DeNooy, 563 N.W.2d 4, 10 (Iowa Ct.App. 1997). An abuse of discretion will not be found unless it is shown that the trial court's actions were clearly unreasonable. Id.
To successfully impeach a jury verdict, the complaining party must establish all of the following:
(1) evidence from the jurors must consist only of objective facts concerning what actually occurred in or out of the jury room bearing on misconduct;
(2) the acts or statements complained of must exceed tolerable bounds of jury deliberations; and (3) it must appear the misconduct was calculated to, and with reasonable probability did influence the verdict.Ten Hagen, 563 N.W.2d at 10 (quoting State v. Arnold, 543 N.W.2d 600, 605 (Iowa 1996)). In determining whether the misconduct affected the verdict, the trial court may "examine the claimed influence critically in light of all the trial evidence, the demeanor of witnesses and the issues presented before making a common-sense evaluation of the alleged impact of the jury misconduct." State v. Christianson, 337 N.W.2d 502, 506 (Iowa 1983). Satisfying the third requirement is not easily done. State v. Johnson, 445 N.W.2d 337, 342 (Iowa 1989).
Cahoy stated he drove by the accident scene because he was curious, and he wanted to refresh his recollection of the stretch of highway upon which he traveled numerous times before. He said he had no intention of investigating the accident or influencing the jury members. He did not take pictures, notes, or measurements. Even though Cahoy relayed his observations to the jury, the trial court's conclusion was not unreasonable. Cf. State v. Feddersen, 230 N.W.2d 510, 514 (Iowa 1975) (holding no new trial was warranted where juror drove through the streets where chase and arrest occurred and juror's observations were not conveyed to other jurors); Mead v. Scott, 256 Iowa 1285, 1289-90, 130 N.W.2d 641, 644 (1964) (holding no new trial was justified when three jurors visited the scene because there was no real controversy over what the jurors observed); State v. Crouch, 130 Iowa 478, 485-86, 107 N.W. 173, 175-76 (1906) (holding no new trial was warranted where two jurors went to the scene, discussed it amongst themselves, did not share their observations with the remaining jurors, and their observations merely confirmed uncontradicted testimony).
The trial court made a common-sense consideration of all of the trial evidence in reaching its conclusion. See Christianson, 337 N.W.2d at 506. Clearly, the location of Alan's bicycle at the time of impact was on the roadway. Two members of the Iowa State Patrol concluded that Alan was riding his bicycle on the roadway, rather than the gravel shoulder. Tweten's own testimony indicated that the bicycle was on the roadway at the time of impact. Cahoy's observations of the road two and a half years after the accident could not realistically shed any light on whether or not Alan was on the gravel shoulder immediately prior to being on the roadway. The trial court's conclusion that there was no reasonable probability the misconduct influenced the verdict was not an abuse of discretion. We affirm.