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finding laboratory owed no duty of care to employee
Summary of this case from Webster v. Psychemedics Corp.Opinion
Civil Action No. 3:00-CV-2772-R.
August 2, 2001.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiff Philip J. Frank ("Frank") has asserted claims against LabOne, Inc. ("LabOne") for negligence, defamation, and intentional infliction of emotional distress ("IIED"). Now before this Court is LabOne's Motion to Dismiss, filed July 9, 2001. For the reasons stated below, Defendant's motion is GRANTED.
I. BACKGROUND FACTS
In 1991, Frank began working for Delta Airlines ("Delta") as an aircraft mechanic. In this position he was subject to the drug testing restrictions established by the Federal Aviation Administration ("FAA") in 14 C.F.R. part 121, in accordance with 49 U.S.C. § 45102. On February 16, 2000, Delta summoned Frank to participate in a random drug test and submitted Frank's sample to Defendant LabOne. LabOne examined the results and concluded that due to the presence of the drug-masking substance pyridine, Frank's urine sample had been adulterated. LabOne reported these results to Delta. Delta and LabOne chose not to retest Frank.On February 25, 2000, Delta suspended Frank without pay. He offered to submit another sample, but Delta declined due to its policy of labeling adulterated specimens as a refusal to test, thereby prohibiting an employee from later offering to submit to another test. Delta stripped Frank of his employee badge and ignored his attempts to contact management following the suspension. Delta terminated Frank on March 3, 2000 because of the "adulterated" drug screening test results. As required by 14 C.F.R. § 121, Appendix I, Delta later filed a letter with the FAA advising the agency that Frank submitted an adulterated sample, which indicated a refusal to test for the random drug screening.
In disputing LabOne's conclusions, Frank alleges that LabOne negligently selected, administered, and interpreted Frank's random drug test to LabOne. Furthermore, he argues LabOne is responsible for defamation and IIED, both resulting from the administration of the drug test.
II. LEGAL ANALYSIS
A. Standard of Review
When ruling on a motion to dismiss, the court must accept all well-pleaded facts as true and view them in the light most favorable to the pleading party. See Baker v. Putnal, 75 F.3d 190, 196 (5th Cir. 1996); Campbell v. City of San Antonio, 43 F.3d 973, 975 (5th Cir. 1995). The complaint will only be dismissed if it appears beyond doubt that the pleading party can prove no set of facts in support of its claim that would entitle it to relief. See Campbell, 43 F.3d at 975; Cinel v. Connick, 15 F.3d 1338, 1341 (5th Cir. 1994). The relevant question is not whether the pleading party will prevail, but whether it may offer evidence to support the claims. See Cross Timbers Concerned Citizens v. Saginaw, 991 F. Supp. 563, 571 (N.D. Tex. 1997).
B. Negligence
Frank seeks damages arising from LabOne's alleged negligence in finding and reporting to Delta that Frank tested positive for pyridine. The prima facie case for negligence in Texas requires the Court to find a duty, breach of that duty, proximate cause, and damages. Bird v. W.C.W., 868 S.W.2d 767, 768 (Tex. 1994). Examining the existence of a duty is the threshold inquiry, and to survive this Motion, Frank must establish that LabOne owed him a duty. See Centeq Realty v. Siegler, 899 S.W.2d 195, 197 (Tex 1995).
The Fifth Circuit has held that under Texas law a laboratory owes no duty of reasonable care to an employee whose urine is tested for drugs at the request of his employer. Willis v. Roche Biomedical Labs, Inc., 61 F.3d 313, 315 (5th Cir. 1995). In Willis, the plaintiff's employer ordered him to submit to a random drug test. Id. at 314. The laboratory performed the test and issued a report to the employer that indicated the Plaintiff, Willis, had tested positive for methamphetamine use.Id. Willis filed suit against the laboratory for negligence and defamation resulting from the allegedly "false" test result.Id. His negligence claim, however, was barred because under Texas law the laboratory owed Willis no duty of reasonable care.Id. at 316; See also SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Doe, 903 S.W.2d 347, 354 (Tex. 1995). Without a direct relationship between the tested employee and the laboratory, a duty cannot be created. Id.
Similar to Willis, Frank has commenced a negligence claim against LabOne, the laboratory that Delta hired to test his urine sample. Frank had no other relationship with LabOne. The law clearly establishes that an independent drug-testing laboratory, such as LabOne, that is contracted by a third party to perform analysis of a drug test has no duty to the tested employee. See Willis, 61 F.3d at 315. Therefore, in the absence of a duty, Frank cannot show a prima facie case of negligence against LabOne. As a result, Frank's negligence claim is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
C. Defamation
Frank also seeks damages arising from LabOne's notification to Delta of the allegedly false positive test results. Texas law uses a negligence standard of liability in defamation cases.Foster v. Laredo Newspapers, Inc., 541 S.W.2d 809, 819 (Tex. 1976). Regardless of consent, release of the results of a drug test to the employer is protected by qualified privilege.Willis, 61 F.3d at 315-16. Furthermore, even publication of false positive results is qualified, thereby precluding the employee's recovery on a defamation claim. See id.
To defeat qualified privilege, the plaintiff must show that the communication was motivated by actual malice. Duffy v. Leading Edge Products, Inc., 44 F.3d 308, 312 (5th Cir. 1995). In a defamation case, actual malice does not include ill-will or spite, but rather requires evidence to support the conclusion that the defendant entertained doubts as to the truth and accuracy of the communication. St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 731 (1968); Carr v. Brasher, 776 S.W.2d 567, 571 (Tex. 1989). A negligent failure to investigate the truth or falsity of a statement before publication, or a failure to act as a reasonably prudent person is insufficient to support a finding of malice. Duffy, 44 F.3d at 313.
Frank concludes in his Complaint that LabOne knew or recklessly disregarded the alleged fact that the drug test results were false. Although this may be the case, Frank has not provided factual allegations that LabOne entertained doubts as to the accuracy of its test results. Without these specific allegations in support of a conclusion that LabOne acted with actual malice, Frank cannot overcome LabOne's qualified privilege. Accordingly, he fails to state a claim for which relief can be granted, and his defamation claim is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.
D. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress
To recover for IIED, Frank must prove that (1) LabOne acted intentionally or recklessly, (2) LabOne's conduct was extreme and outrageous, and (3) that LabOne caused him severe emotional distress. See Worick Co. v. Casas, 856 S.W.2d 732, 734 (Tex. 1993). Outrageous conduct is that which goes beyond all possible bounds of decency and is regarded as atrocious and utterly intolerable in a civilized community. Id. The classification of conduct as outrageous is a legal inquiry. Washington v. Naylor Indus. Services, Inc., 893 S.W.2d 309, 313 (Tex.App. — Houston 1995). Further, a laboratory reporting drug test results based on innocent motives does not act outrageously. Id.
Frank's complaint alleges that LabOne's conduct was extreme and outrageous. This conclusion is not supported by facts demonstrating that LabOne's conduct exceeded all possible bounds of decency. Instead, the facts suggest that LabOne potentially erred in its analysis and then reported the results. With the facts presently alleged, LabOne appears to have acted on innocent motives. See id. Under these circumstances, the average citizen of reasonable prudence cannot exclaim, "Outrageous!" and, therefore, without more facts in support of Frank's IIED claim, it must be DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.