Opinion
A-14034 0376
06-19-2024
CLAUDE EDWARD FOWLKES III, Appellant, v. STATE OF ALASKA, Appellee.
Michael L. Barber, Barber Legal Services, Boston, Massachusetts, under contract with the Office of Public Advocacy, Anchorage, for the Appellant. Eric A. Ringsmuth, Assistant Attorney General, Office of Criminal Appeals, Anchorage, and Treg R. Taylor, Attorney General, Juneau, for the Appellee.
UNPUBLISHED See Alaska Appellate Rule 214(d)
Appeal from the Superior Court, Fourth Judicial District, Fairbanks, Michael A. MacDonald, Judge Trial Court No. 4FA-14-00882 CR
Michael L. Barber, Barber Legal Services, Boston, Massachusetts, under contract with the Office of Public Advocacy, Anchorage, for the Appellant.
Eric A. Ringsmuth, Assistant Attorney General, Office of Criminal Appeals, Anchorage, and Treg R. Taylor, Attorney General, Juneau, for the Appellee.
Before: Allard, Chief Judge, and Wollenberg and Terrell, Judges.
SUMMARY DISPOSITION
This case returns to us following a remand for resentencing. A jury found Claude Edward Fowlkes III guilty of seven counts of first-degree sexual abuse of a minor for sexually abusing a fifteen-year-old student on school grounds. The jury also found two aggravating factors: AS 12.55.155(c)(32) (the offense was committed on school grounds) and AS 12.55.155(c)(18)(E) (the defendant was at least ten years older than the victim).
AS 11.41.434(a)(3)(B).
At the original sentencing in the case, the superior court imposed a composite sentence of 100 years to serve. In imposing this sentence, the superior court found a third aggravating factor - AS 12.55.155(c)(18)(B) (the defendant engaged in the same or other sexual offenses involving another victim) - based on Fowlkes's conviction for sexually assaulting a fourteen-year-old boy in a separate case for which Fowlkes was being separately sentenced (Court of Appeals File No. A-12604). On appeal, we affirmed Fowlkes's convictions in this case but remanded the case for resentencing, holding that it was error for the court to aggravate the sentence in this case based on conduct in another case for which Fowlkes was being separately sentenced.
See Fowlkes v. State, 2021 WL 3076856, at *1 (Alaska App. July 21, 2021) (unpublished).
Fowlkes v. State, 2020 WL 232793, at *2-3 (Alaska App. Jan. 15, 2020) (unpublished); see also Juneby v. State, 641 P.2d 823, 842-43 (Alaska App. 1982), modified on reh'g, 665 P.2d 30 (Alaska App. 1983).
On remand, the resentencing was held jointly with the resentencing we ordered in Fowlkes's other case. At the resentencing hearing, the court denied Fowlkes's request to refer his case to the three-judge sentencing panel, and sentenced Fowlkes to a composite term of 57.5 years to serve, the lowest sentence within the applicable composite presumptive range.
See Fowlkes, 2021 WL 3076856, at *6-7.
AS 12.55.125(i)(1)(A)(ii); AS 12.55.127(c)(2)(E), (e)(3).
Fowlkes now raises two issues on appeal.
First, Fowlkes argues that the court erred in denying his request for a referral to the three-judge sentencing panel. "We consider the totality of the circumstances in determining whether the sentencing court erred in not referring the case to a three-judge panel." Fowlkes sought referral on two grounds: that he had proved the non-statutory mitigating factor of extraordinary potential for rehabilitation, and that a sentence within the presumptive range would be manifestly unjust.
Manrique v. State, 177 P.3d 1188, 1193 (Alaska App. 2008).
AS 12.55.165(a).
On appeal, Fowlkes argues that the superior court mistakenly believed that it was precluded from referring Fowlkes's case to the three-judge panel under AS 12.55.165(b). This statutory provision precludes a trial court from referring a case to the three-judge sentencing panel based on the defendant's extraordinary potential for rehabilitation if certain aggravating factors exist - including AS 12.55.155(c)(18)(B) (the defendant engaged in the same or other sexual offenses involving another victim). Fowlkes asserts that the superior court mistakenly believed that this statutory provision also precluded the court from referring Fowlkes's case to the three-judge panel based on a finding of manifest injustice, and he claims that the court never ruled on this alternative ground for referral in this case.
We read the record differently. Although the superior court referred to AS 12.55.165(b), the court also made a number of findings explaining why it was independently rejecting both grounds for referral to the three-judge sentencing panel. Contrary to Fowlkes's argument on appeal, the record demonstrates that the court carefully considered the referral requests and rejected them based on sound reasons rooted in the Chaney sentencing criteria.
Second, Fowlkes argues that the superior court's comments at resentencing "suggest that the court relied on emotion and other improper factors when resentencing Fowlkes." We disagree. The court's comments were commensurate with the seriousness of the sexual abuse at issue in this case. The court also did not rely on improper factors. Fowlkes claims that the court relied on general outside knowledge about the psychological harm that sexual abuse can cause children. But it is clear, in context, that the court was only responding to what it believed was a claim by Fowlkes's attorneys that the victims in both cases had not suffered psychological harm. We have independently reviewed the sentencing record, and we conclude that the sentence imposed - a sentence at the lowest end of the presumptive range - is not clearly mistaken.
See McClain v. State, 519 P.2d 811, 813-14 (Alaska 1974) (adopting the "clearly mistaken" test for review of excessive sentence claims).
The judgment of the superior court is therefore AFFIRMED.