Opinion
No. C 02-504 MMC (PR)
August 6, 2003
ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR A WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS
Curtis Fountila is a California prisoner who filed this pro se petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. After an initial review, this Court granted petitioner leave to proceed in forma pauperis and ordered respondent to show cause why the petition should not be granted. Respondent filed an answer, along with a memorandum and exhibits. Petitioner has not filed a traverse.
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Petitioner stands convicted of two counts of attempted murder, two counts of assault with a deadly weapon, infliction of injury upon a child, sexual battery, carjacking, and being under the influence of methamphetamine. He is currently serving a determinate sentence of thirteen years and eight months and an indeterminate life sentence with the possibility of parole. The California Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court of California rejected his direct appeals. Petitioner did not file a state habeas petition.
In this federal habeas petition, petitioner raises three issues. First, he contends that the trial court's instruction on insanity and the single verdict form violated his Fourteenth Amendment right to Due Process. Second, he contends that the California jury instruction concerning insanity by reason of voluntary intoxication, CALJIC 4.02, violated Due Process. Finally, he contends there was insufficient evidence of premeditation and deliberation to find him guilty of attempted first degree murder. The issues before this court are exhausted and the petition is timely.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
The factual background is derived from the opinion of the California Court of Appeal, which has been lodged as respondent's Exhibit A.
The events in question occurred on April 28, 1997. At that time, petitioner was a friend of Mark Robinson and his brother, Craig Robinson. Craig lived with his mother, Margaret Franklin, in a second floor apartment on Olive Street in Sunnyvale, California. Petitioner and Mark were frequent visitors to the apartment complex and occasionally stayed overnight at Franklin's apartment. Directly across the walkway from Franklin lived James Armstrong and his family.
Armstrong supplemented his income as a blues guitarist by working the night shift at a nearby 7-Eleven. At 6:45 a.m. on April 28, 1997, he was working behind the counter when petitioner entered the store and selected a bottle of wine from the cooler. When petitioner approached the counter, he grabbed Armstrong by the head and shoulders and pushed him down on the counter. At first, Armstrong thought petitioner was giving him a hug, but he realized that something was wrong when he heard petitioner grunting and mumbling. Armstrong managed to slip from his grasp. Petitioner did not say anything, but turned and walked toward the door. As a customer held the door open for him, petitioner raised a cane he had been carrying and jabbed the customer in the chest with it, hard enough to knock the wind out of him and draw blood. His face had no expression, but he growled at the customer as he passed.
A short time later, Armstrong's wife, Sonja, was at home getting ready for work. She was downstairs putting some clothes in the dryer when she noticed petitioner's driver's license on the walkway near the laundry room. She picked up the license and put it on the stairs leading up to Franklin's apartment. Mrs. Armstrong heard a noise, looked up, and saw petitioner using a screwdriver on the doorknob of Franklin's front door. She called up to him that he had dropped his driver's license, and he responded that he did not have one and told her to throw it away.
Mrs. Armstrong put the license in her pocket and walked up the stairs to her apartment. Petitioner followed her and asked whether Armstrong was home. She replied that he was at work, and petitioner asked if he could come inside. When she refused, petitioner put his right arm around her shoulder, and grabbed her buttocks with his left hand. She testified that petitioner appeared intoxicated, but she did not smell alcohol on his breath. She pushed him away, hurried inside her apartment, slammed the door, and locked it behind her. At about 7:45 a.m., Mrs. Armstrong left for work.
Armstrong returned home shortly after his shift ended at 8 a.m. He played with his children then called his manager. While Armstrong was talking on the telephone, the door opened, and petitioner walked into the apartment. Armstrong hung up, and asked petitioner what he wanted and what he was doing. Petitioner headed into the kitchen, saying "Shh," and "I got to get something." Armstrong followed petitioner into the kitchen and asked him what he wanted. Petitioner looked through the kitchen drawers and said: "I know what I'm looking for." Armstrong asked him repeatedly to leave. When petitioner refused, Armstrong went into the living room to call 911. When he turned around to see what petitioner was doing, he saw petitioner standing behind him with a raised knife. Petitioner stabbed Armstrong in the left shoulder, almost severing a major artery. As Armstrong tried to defend himself, petitioner stabbed him repeatedly on the chest, stomach, back, face, and hands. When police later arrived at the scene, they saw blood splattered over the floors, walls, furnishings, and in the kitchen. In the living room, they found two bloody kitchen knives with the blades broken off at the handle.
During the attack, Armstrong's two-year-old son, James Jr., was standing in the living room screaming. Armstrong crawled out of the apartment on his hands and knees in an attempt to draw petitioner away from his children. Petitioner, however, picked up James Jr. and threw him off the second floor balcony. Armstrong ran down the stairs, picked up the unconscious child from the pavement, and tried to flee. After taking a few steps, he collapsed on the sidewalk. From where he lay, Armstrong saw petitioner standing at the top of the stairs. Petitioner removed his bloody shirt, walked down the stairs, and stood looking at Armstrong bleeding on the ground. After a few moments, he turned and walked away. A college student who had just parked her car in front of her apartment testified that petitioner, approached her from behind and knocked her to the ground. While she lay on her stomach, petitioner pulled the keys from her hand, stole her car, and drove away.
A few minutes later, petitioner abandoned the car behind a furniture store in Santa Clara, leaving the driver's side door open and the keys in the ignition. Observers noticed blood on the car and called the police. Petitioner crossed the street and entered the Granada Inn. According to the motel clerk, petitioner was not wearing a shirt, he was dripping blood on the counter, and he seemed to be in a rush. She refused to assign him a room and he left.
In the meantime, Sergeant Victor Karazija of the Santa Clara Police Department had responded to the 911 call about the car at the furniture store and was searching the area for the driver. When he saw petitioner on the street, Sergeant Karazija followed him in the squad car. Petitioner climbed over a barbed-wire fence into the Granada Inn property and locked himself in a room on the second floor. Police officers secured the area, evacuated the rest of the floor, and tried to negotiate petitioner's surrender. Officer Ted Zitnay testified that petitioner appeared on a second-floor balcony, acting agitated, and yelling excitedly. He shouted, "You're not going to take me alive. I know what I've done," and "Shoot me, kill me, get it over with." An officer told petitioner that if he calmed down and cooperated he would not be hurt. Petitioner seemed to understand and calmed down.
The police attempted to open the door with a master key, but found that petitioner had fastened the chain and shoved a small refrigerator against the door. When the officers announced their presence, they heard heavy objects being thrown at the door. As they entered the room, petitioner yelled and ran toward them. Officer Zitnay discharged a baton round and petitioner fell to the floor. The police restrained him and he was taken into custody at about 9:30 a.m.
Officer Zitnay examined petitioner for injuries after his arrest. Based on his observation that petitioner's pupils were "about mid-dilation," his pulse was 160, and he appeared sweaty and generally agitated, Officer Zitnay concluded that petitioner was under the influence of a central nervous system stimulant. Officer Mark Sole similarly concluded that petitioner was under the influence of a methamphetamine based on his observation that petitioner had a dry mouth, his eyes were wide and "bugged out," his speech was rambling and unintelligible, and he had a rapid pulse. At the jail after his arrest, petitioner was acting so strangely that Officer Frank Bellucci concluded he was either mentally ill or under the influence of drugs. A videotape of the booking process showed petitioner displaying behavior consistent with drug use, but that he was verbally responsive and cooperated with officers. A sample of petitioner's blood tested positive for both methamphetamine and alcohol.
At his two-phase trial to determine guilt and sanity, petitioner pled not guilty and not guilty by reason of insanity. During the guilt phase, several witnesses described the events leading up to the charged offenses. Craig Robinson testified that petitioner and Mark Robinson had spent the weekend hanging out at Franklin's apartment. Craig Robinson testified that petitioner seemed different that weekend. Whereas he was usually extroverted and easygoing, he was quiet and appeared to have been drinking. When Craig asked what was wrong, petitioner said he had had a long conversation with Mark that was "making him think." After dinner on Sunday, Craig drove petitioner and Mark to a nearby motel where they were spending the night.
Franklin testified that at about 2 a.m., Mark returned to the apartment alone. She let him in and went back to bed. Later, she heard a noise followed by Mark yelling. When she went to check on him, she saw petitioner standing in the hall and the front door was wide open. Petitioner apparently had broken down the door to get inside. Mark told her everything was okay and she went back to bed.
Craig testified that at about 4 a.m., he saw Mark and petitioner asleep in the living room. Petitioner was tossing and turning on the sofa, grunting weirdly and wildly, like he was having a bad dream. Craig's wife, Angelique, testified that when she entered the living room, petitioner got up off the sofa and began to wander around with a strange expression on his face, saying, "No, no, no." When he came close to her, she pushed him away. Petitioner then grabbed Craig by the cheeks and kissed him on the lips, something he had never done before. Craig asked him what was wrong, and petitioner said "No."
Franklin testified that the next morning when she was in the bathroom getting ready for work, petitioner came in and asked her some questions about salvation and the Holy Spirit. This was an unusual subject for petitioner, and his voice was quiet and distant. Franklin testified that he seemed to be only partially there, like "his mind was someplace else and he was really carrying on another conversation in his head." After Franklin left for work, petitioner committed the crimes for which he was convicted.
The defense called Dr. Jeffrey Kline, a clinical psychologist who evaluated petitioner in December 1998 for the purpose of assessing an insanity plea. At the time of the interview, petitioner was no longer exhibiting psychotic symptoms. Dr. Kline described him as oriented, responsive, cooperative, remorseful, and very open to talking about what had happened. Petitioner told Dr. Kline that in the two days prior to the crimes, he had been doing drugs with Mark Robinson and talking intensively about Egyptian mysticism. In Kline's view, the petitioner had begun to believe that black people were part of the body of Osiris, an Egyptian god of the underworld, that they were destined to kill white people, and that they would lose and be banished to Venus; petitioner also believed that Mark was communicating with him through other people and doing magical things, such as turning lights on and off without flipping the switch and having petitioner's name broadcast on television.
Both petitioner and Armstrong are African-American; Armstrong's wife is Norwegian.
Petitioner told Dr. Kline that on the morning of the crimes, he had awakened in a terror thinking he was possessed by evil. He went to Franklin's apartment and broke down the door to get to some kind of safety. Later, he was so agitated and frightened he went to buy some wine to "change his feelings." When petitioner saw Armstrong at the 7-Eleven, he thought Armstrong was "part of a ploy" and had been sent to try to convince petitioner that things were all right. Petitioner threw his driver's license away because he believed that he was not himself anymore. He felt he was governed by evil spirits and was told by Mark to "look for the #3" and to "do damage there." When Dr. Kline inquired further, petitioner remembered only a few details of what happened inside apartment #3, which belonged to the Armstrongs, but did tell Dr. Kline that after he left he asked Mark: "What should I do now?" and said: "I've got to get out of here."
Dr. Kline further testified that petitioner denied experiencing any prior breaks with reality, but admitted that he had been abusing drugs on and off since 1994. He admitted that in the two days prior to the crimes he had used a large amount of methamphetamine, crack, cocaine, marijuana, and alcohol. He also stated that he had not slept much before the crimes. Dr. Kline explained that prolonged sleeplessness could cause one to experience delusions or psychosis. He also explained that methamphetamine and other stimulants usually trigger delusions or psychosis only with chronic, long-term use. He concluded that petitioner had experienced a "psychotic break," primarily due to lack of sleep and the use of drugs.
Erlinda Mulrine, a toxicologist, was unable to determine how much methamphetamine petitioner had used because there is no known elimination rate. She testified, however, that prolonged use or an increased dosage of methamphetamine can cause paranoia, confusion, violent behavior, and psychosis.
At the close of the guilt phase, the jury found petitioner guilty.
During the sanity phase of the trial, Dr. Kline again testified that at the time of the offenses petitioner was psychotic due to long-term use of methamphetamine. According to Dr. Kline, petitioner, at the time of the offenses, was incapable of distinguishing right from wrong, and incapable of knowing or understanding the nature and quality of his acts due to his psychosis. Dr. Kline was of the belief that petitioner did not have any sense of who Armstrong was apart from his delusions that he was compelled to carry out the orders of the evil spirits who were ruling him. Dr. Kline was not certain whether petitioner's psychosis met the legal definition of insanity, because his psychosis was due to methamphetamine use.
Dr. Stephen Diamond, a psychologist, also testified for the defense during the sanity phase. Dr. Diamond interviewed petitioner on June 10, 1997, and reviewed police reports and medical records. During the interview, petitioner was distraught, and Dr. Diamond concluded that petitioner was still experiencing lingering psychotic symptoms. Petitioner believed people were talking about him and that Mark was conspiring against him.
In Dr. Diamond's opinion, petitioner was psychotic at the time of the crimes. His opinion was based on reports of petitioner's bizarre behavior before and during the incident, as well as petitioner's statements regarding Mark and his philosophy. Initially, Dr. Diamond believed that petitioner was suffering from bipolar disorder with psychotic features. This opinion was based in part on petitioner's denial that he had used methamphetamine. When he learned that blood tests showed that petitioner was under the influence of methamphetamine at the time of the crimes; he changed his diagnosis to substance-induced psychotic disorder.
Dr. Diamond's opinions as to whether petitioner was capable of distinguishing right from wrong, or of knowing or understanding the nature and quality of his actions were equivocal. Initially, he testified he had no opinion as to petitioner's ability to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct. Later, he testified that he was not convinced that petitioner understood what he was doing at the time of the crimes, lie also testified that one could surmise that petitioner fled the scene at least in part because he realized what he had done and realized he was in trouble.
Dr. Vitali Rozynko, a psychologist, testified for the prosecution. Dr. Rozynko reviewed police reports, medical records, and other psychological evaluations; he interviewed petitioner on November 6, 1997. At the interview, Dr. Rozynko found petitioner to be fully oriented and speaking clearly, a little anxious and pessimistic, but he "seemed just fine to [Dr. Rozynko]." Dr. Rozynko testified that petitioner said he had been using a lot of methamphetamine at the time he stabbed Armstrong; petitioner recounted the Osiris delusion, and reported seeing signs on the street with his name on them. Petitioner could only recall a few flashes of the crimes he committed, including going into the kitchen and taking a knife. He recalled clearly the carjacking, which he said he committed because "he was trying to escape." Dr. Rozynko testified, "[I]t seemed to me he knew he had done something wrong."
Dr. Rozynko formed the opinion that petitioner was psychotic at the time of the crimes due to methamphetamine use. Dr. Rozynko believed that petitioner was incapable of understanding the nature or quality of his acts. According to Dr. Rozynko, however, petitioner did not suffer from any mental disease or defect caused by long-term use of drugs. He found no evidence of brain damage or other continuing mental health problems, other than a depressive episode during jail confinement.
The jury rejected petitioner's defense of not guilty by reason of insanity.
DISCUSSION
A. Standard of Review
A district court may not grant a petition challenging a state conviction or sentence on the basis of a claim that was reviewed on the merits in state court unless the state court's adjudication of the claim:
(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.28 U.S.C. § 2254 (d); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 402-04, 409 (2000).
Habeas relief is warranted only if the constitutional error at issue had a "`substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury's verdict.'" Penry v. Johnson, 532 U.S. 782, 795 (2001) (quoting Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 638 (1993)). A federal court must presume the correctness of the state court's factual findings. 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (e)(1).
B. Legal Claims
1. Jury instruction and single verdict form
Petitioner contends he was denied a fair trial because the court failed to instruct the jury that it must determine the issue of sanity separately as to each count. During the sanity phase, the court instructed the jury: "You must now determine whether [the petitioner] was legally sane or legally insane at the time of the commission of the crimes. This is the only issue for you to determine in this proceeding." Petitioner asserts there was a reasonable likelihood that the jury interpreted this instruction to require petitioner to prove that he was legally insane during the commission of all of the crimes, rather than prove he was insane on a count-by-count basis. Petitioner posits that the jury may have thought he was legally sane when he assaulted Mrs. Armstrong on the stairs or when he committed the carjacking, and therefore rejected his insanity defense for the other crimes. Petitioner further asserts that this instructional error was compounded by the court's providing a single verdict form, which presented jurors with an "all or nothing choice" on the sanity issue. He cites no clearly established federal law that was violated by either the instructions or the single verdict form.
It is not the province of a federal habeas court to re-examine state court determinations on state law questions. Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67-68 (1991). A challenge to a jury instruction does not raise a federal constitutional issue unless "the ailing instruction by itself so infected the entire trial that the resulting conviction violates due process." Estelle, 502 U.S. at 72 (citing Cupp v. Naughten, 414 U.S. 141, 147 (1973)). This Court must evaluate jury instructions in the context of the overall charge to the jury as a component of the entire trial process. United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 169 (1982) (citing Henderson v. Kibbe, 431 U.S. 145, 154 (1977)); Prandil v. California, 843 F.2d 314, 317-18 (9th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 861 (1988).
In reviewing ambiguous instructions, the inquiry on habeas review is whether there is a "reasonable likelihood" that the jury applied the challenged instruction in a way that violates the Constitution. Estelle, 502 U.S. at 72 n. 4 (citing Boyde v. California, 494 U.S. 370, 380 (1990)). If the court finds constitutional error under the Boyde test, it must then assess prejudice by determining whether the error "had substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury's verdict." Brecht, 507 U.S. at 637; Bains v. Cambra, 204 F.3d 964, 967 (9th Cir. 2000). Actual prejudice is required before relief may be granted. Brecht, 507 U.S. at 637.
Given the record here, there is no reasonable likelihood that the jury in this case misunderstood the instructions on sanity. In addition to the challenged instruction, the court gave the jury a second more specific instruction that addressed the precise issue before this court. The trial court stated: "When the evidence shows that at times the defendant was legally insane and at other times he was legally sane, he has the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that he was legally insane at the time of the commission of the crime." On direct review, the Court of Appeal determined that while the first instruction might have been confusing, any confusion was cured by the second, and, consequently, considering the instructions as a whole, there was no constitutional error. This conclusion was not contrary to clearly established federal law, nor was it an unreasonable application of federal law as determined by the Supreme Court. See Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. at 402-03, 412.
The Court next addresses the Court of Appeal's holding that the trial court did not err by providing a single verdict form. This holding is neither contrary to nor an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law. See Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. at 409-11. Petitioner cites no federal authority for the proposition that a single verdict form violates due process. Moreover, as the Court of Appeal correctly noted, under California law a judge has no duty to furnish verdict forms to the jury. Where "the jury has been properly instructed . . ., it must be presumed that if their conclusion called for a different form of verdict with which they were not furnished, they would either ask for it or write one for themselves." See People v. Hill, 116 Cal. 562; see also People v. Cisneros, 34 Cal.App.3d 399, 429-30 (1973); People v. Elliott, 115 Cal.App.2d 410, 424 (1953); People v. Chapman, 93 Cal.App.2d 365, 385 (1949) ("It is the custom but there is no duty to furnish the jury with any form of verdict. Furthermore, defendant made no complaint in the trial court and cannot raise the matter for the first time on appeal.").
Accordingly, petitioner is not entitled to habeas relief on this claim.
2. Jury instruction: CALJIC No. 4.02
During the sanity phase, the trial court instructed the jurors under CALJIC No. 4.02:
A person is legally insane, if by reason of mental disease or mental defect, either temporary or permanent, caused by the long, continued use of alcohol, drugs, or narcotics, even after the effects of recent use of alcohol, drugs, or narcotics have worn off, he was incapable at the time of the commission of the crime of either: One. Knowing the nature and quality of his act; or Two. Understanding the nature and quality of his act; or Three. Distinguishing right from wrong.
Petitioner's second claim is that the jury instruction on insanity by intoxication violated his right to due process because it required him to prove that the effects of methamphetamine had worn off at the time he committed the crimes before the jury could find he was not guilty by reason of insanity. Petitioner argues it is unclear what the phrase even after the effects of recent use of alcohol, drugs, or narcotics have worn off' purports to modify, and that there is a reasonable likelihood the jury interpreted this instruction to preclude a finding of legal insanity if the petitioner was still under the influence of drugs.
The Court of Appeal held:
Here CALJIG No. 4.02 correctly informed the jury that an insanity verdict was based on whether defendant satisfied the M'Naughten test as a result of a mental disease or defect, which was the product of long-continued drug or alcohol use. It also correctly informed the jury that the disease or defect must have lasted beyond the immediate period of intoxication. (See People v. Kelly (1973) 10 Cal.3d 565, 575-577.) In his arguments, defense counsel stressed that the instruction did "not say that the effects of recent use had to have worn off. It merely state[d] and suggest[ed] that in fact [the mental disease or defect] can't be due to just the recent use of the drug. And it can't disappear when the drug is taken away when the drug wears off." Accordingly, there was not a "reasonable likelihood" that the jury understood it could find defendant legally insane only if he proved that he was no longer intoxicated when the crimes were committed. ( Estelle v. McGuire (1991) 502 U.S. 62, 72; People v. Cain (1995) 10 Cal.4th 1, 36.)
The Supreme Court has held it is for state courts to interpret provisions of state law that define the elements of an offense and available defenses. See Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 875 (1987); Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 210-11, 215-16 (1977). Whether the instruction correctly sets forth the applicable law of voluntary intoxication is a matter of interpretation of state law and is not a federal question. See Henricks v. Vasquez, 974 F.2d 1099, 1107 (9th Cir. 1992). Habeas relief is available only if the Court of Appeal's decision is contrary to or an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law, see Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. at 412, and that prejudice resulted. See Brecht, 507 U.S. at 623. The Court of Appeal's decision was neither contrary to nor an unreasonable application of federal law.
In any event, the asserted error had no substantial and injurious effect on the verdict. See Brecht, 507 U.S. at 623. Although alcohol and methamphetamine were present in petitioner's blood at the time of the crimes, defense counsel made clear to the jury that it could still find petitioner insane even if he were under the influence at the time he committed the offenses. There was no argument to the contrary by the prosecution. Moreover, the record reflects that petitioner did not have a history of mental illness prior to committing these crimes. Further, expert witnesses for both the defense and prosecution were of the opinion that petitioner fled the scene because he knew what he had done and realized that he was in trouble. As a result, petitioner was unable to convince the jury that his long-term drug use resulted in insanity as defined by the M'Naughton test, and which would have existed even after the drugs had worn off, as required by Kelly.
Accordingly, petitioner is not entitled to habeas relief on this claim.
3. Insufficiency of the evidence
Petitioner's final claim is that his conviction for attempted first-degree murder of Armstrong should be reversed for insufficiency of the evidence. In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the question in a federal habeas corpus proceeding is "whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt." Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979) (emphasis in original).
Here, the trial court properly instructed the jury on attempt to commit "willful, deliberate, and premeditated murder." As the Court of Appeal noted: "The true test [of premeditation] is not the duration of time as much as it is the extent of the reflection. Thoughts may follow each other with great rapidity and cold, calculated judgment may be arrived at quickly." People v. Thomas, 25 Cal.2d 880, 900 (1945). In evaluating the sufficiency of the evidence to support a finding of premeditation, courts have focused on evidence of planning activity, motive, and the manner of the attack. See People v. Perez, 2 Cal.4th 1117, 1124-1127 (1992) (summarizing the factors listed in People v. Anderson, 70 Cal.2d 15, 26-27 (1968)).
The record here reflects ample evidence that petitioner planned the murder. Armstrong testified that petitioner entered his apartment, walked directly into the kitchen, and began looking through the drawers. When Armstrong asked petitioner repeatedly to leave and what he wanted, petitioner responded, "I know what I'm looking for." Based on this evidence, the jury could have reasonably inferred that petitioner had entered the apartment with the intent to kill Armstrong and planned to search the kitchen drawers for a murder weapon.
Evidence of motive was provided during the defense case; The Court of Appeal noted that petitioner told Dr. Kline:
[H]e had begun to believe in things that Mark Robinson had told him: that Black people were part of the body of Osiris, an Egyptian god of the Underworld, that they were destined to kill White people, and that they would lose and be banished to Venus. . . . When [petitioner] saw Mr. Armstrong at the 7-Eleven store, he thought that he was "part of a ploy" and had been sent to try to convince him that things were all night. He threw his driver's licence away, because he believed that he was not himself anymore. He felt that evil spirits were telling him to kill, and to look for the number 3 and "do damage.
The jury could have reasonably inferred that petitioner sought to kill Armstrong because of the delusional beliefs he held about him. Although petitioner's motive was irrational and inconsistent, "the law does not require that a first degree murderer have a "rational' motive for killing. . . . [A]ny motive, "shallow and distorted but, to the perpetrator, genuine' may be sufficient." People v. Lunafelix, 168 Cal.App.3d 97, 102 (1985) (quoting People v. Smith, 33 Cal.App.3d 51, 66 (1973)).
Finally, the purposeful manner of petitioner's attack reflects premeditation and deliberation. When Armstrong turned his back on petitioner to dial 911, petitioner came up behind him and raised the knife. When Armstrong turned around, petitioner immediately stabbed him, nearly severing a major artery. After the initial blow, petitioner continued to stab Armstrong repeatedly, causing life-threatening injuries. Moreover, the police found two knives at the crime scene in the living room, both with the blades broken off at the handle, and blood in the kitchen. From this evidence the jury could have reasonably inferred that when one knife broke, petitioner returned to the kitchen to obtain another. See People v. Perez, 2 Cal.4th at 1127. "This action bears similarity to reloading a gun or using another gun when the first one has run out of ammunition." Id. Consequently, it "is also indicative of premeditation and deliberation." Id.
In light of the foregoing, the Court of Appeal's decision that the jury could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt was not contrary to or an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (d)(1). Furthermore, the appellate court's decision was not an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the state court proceeding. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (d)(2). Accordingly, the evidence of premeditation and deliberation was legally sufficient to support petitioner's conviction.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated, the petition for a writ of habeas corpus is DENIED.
All pending motions are terminated.
The Clerk shall close the file.
IT IS SO ORDERED.