Opinion
No. 4-236 / 03-1378
May 26, 2004.
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Warren County, Darrell Goodhue, Judge.
Rick Forsyth appeals from the trial court's judgment denying his request for postconviction relief on six counts of first-degree murder. AFFIRMED.
Unes Booth of Booth Law Firm, Osceola, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Sheryl Soich and Douglas Hammerand, Assistant Attorneys General, and Gary Kendall, County Attorney, for appellee.
Heard by Sackett, C.J., and Huitink and Harris, S.J.
Senior judge assigned by order pursuant to Iowa Code section 602.9206 (2003).
I. Background Facts and Proceedings
Rick Forsyth was charged with six counts of first-degree murder for killing his wife, Joyce; their three children, Brian, Niki, and Jessica; Martina Napodano; and Helen Napodano in June 1993. Prior to trial, Forsyth claimed he was not competent to stand trial, citing amnesia resulting from a gunshot wound to his head. The trial court rejected Forsyth's claim, stating:
The Court finds that the Defendant is suffering from amnesia, which will probably be permanent and that he cannot recall events from June 13, 14, and 15, 1993. The Court further finds that the Defendant understands the charges he faces and the consequences involved. The Court further finds that the Defendant is able to communicate with his counsel and assist in his defense except for his limited recall. Finally, the court finds that there is significant physical evidence, reducing the need for reliance on personal recall of the events of the crime.
Forsyth also filed notice he intended to rely on the defenses of insanity or diminished responsibility. These defenses were, however, withdrawn prior to trial. Forsyth instead relied on a factual defense claiming that the physical and other evidence excluded him as the person responsible for the murders and implicated others. A jury found Forsyth guilty on all six counts of first-degree murder. On direct appeal we rejected Forsyth's challenge to the trial court's ruling finding him competent to stand trial and affirmed his convictions. State v. Forsyth, 547 N.W.2d 833, 838 (Iowa Ct. App. 1996).
The proceedings resulting in this appeal began with Forsyth's application for postconviction relief. Forsyth claimed he was denied effective assistance of trial and appellate counsel, citing (1) counsel's failure to argue he was not competent to stand trial because of mental illness in addition to his amnesia-based argument and (2) trial counsel's choice of a factual defense rather than one based on Forsyth's insanity or diminished responsibility. Appellate counsel was faulted for failing to raise these issues on appeal.
Forsyth offered expert testimony to support both of his ineffective assistance of counsel theories. Dr. William Logan, a forensic psychiatrist who examined Forsyth in October 2001, opined that at the time of the homicides, Forsyth "was experiencing a Major Depressive Disorder complicated by psychotic features, namely a delusional idea that by killing his family and himself, they would escape the emotional pain of the preceding few years, and be reunited again in death." Dr. Logan noted Forsyth believed his family was alive, and that he had been convicted as part of a conspiracy. Dr. Logan stated Forsyth was not competent to stand trial because Forsyth's mental disease precluded him from understanding the nature and quality of the acts with which he was accused.
The State presented the testimony of Dr. Michael Taylor, a psychiatrist who had evaluated Forsyth in 1991 and 1993. Dr. Taylor testified Forsyth was fully capable of appreciating the charges against him, understanding the proceedings, and cooperating in a rational manner with his lawyer. Dr. Taylor also testified there was no evidence Forsyth was suffering from any mental disease or defect in June 1993. He stated that while Forsyth may presently be suffering from a major depressive disorder with psychotic features, there was no evidence that he was suffering from that illness prior to the murders.
Forsyth's defense counsel, John Wellman, stated a defense based on mental illness was not viable because none of the four psychiatric experts who examined Forsyth prior to trial stated he was insane at the time of the murders. Wellman testified he did not raise the issue of mental illness in regard to incompetency or an insanity defense because:
[t]here was no evidence of any mental illness or disease or defect existing prior to the bullet being in his brain from any medical records or any of the descriptions by his neighbors or friends or people close to him.
Wellman testified he felt there was strong scientific and other evidence that Forsyth did not commit the murders and accordingly this was the defense he elected to pursue.
The district court denied Forsyth's claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. The court noted defense counsel made a strategic decision to proceed with a general denial rather than an insanity defense. The court also found Wellman had adequately investigated the issue of Forsyth's mental health, and found no evidence to support an insanity defense. Forsyth appeals the denial of his claims for postconviction relief, arguing that the postconviction record supports his claims for relief and the district court erred by concluding otherwise.
II. Standard of Review
Our review of an allegation of ineffective assistance of counsel is de novo. State v. Bergmann, 600 N.W.2d 311, 313 (Iowa 1999). To establish a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, an applicant must show (1) the attorney failed to perform an essential duty and (2) prejudice resulted to the extent it denied applicant a fair trial. State v. Ceaser, 585 N.W.2d 192, 195 (Iowa 1998).
In proving the first prong, the applicant faces a strong presumption the performance of counsel falls within a wide range of reasonable professional assistance. State v. Hepperle, 530 N.W.2d 735, 739 (Iowa 1995). We will not second guess reasonable trial strategy. State v. Wissing, 528 N.W.2d 561, 564 (Iowa 1995). The second prong is satisfied if a reasonable probability exists that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. Davis v. State, 520 N.W.2d 319, 321 (Iowa Ct. App. 1994).
III. Competency
There is a presumption that a defendant is competent to stand trial, and a defendant has the burden of proving incompetence by a preponderance of the evidence. State v. Rieflin, 558 N.W.2d 149, 152-53 (Iowa 1996). Section 812.3 provides:
If at any stage of a criminal proceeding it reasonably appears that the defendant is suffering from a mental disorder which prevents the defendant from appreciating the charge, understanding the proceedings, or assisting effectively in the defense, further proceedings must be suspended and a hearing had on that question.
A history of mental illness, standing alone, does not show a defendant is incompetent. State v. Edwards, 507 N.W.2d 393, 395 (Iowa 1993); State v. Lyon, 293 N.W.2d 8, 12 (Iowa 1980).
Forsyth claims there is a reasonable probability the trial court would have found him incompetent to stand trial if trial counsel would have premised his argument on Forsyth's then-existing mental illness rather than his amnesia. We disagree. The record indicates Forsyth was examined by four experts prior to the competency hearing: Dr. Olson, Dr. McMordie, Dr. Souza, and Dr. Taylor. Not one opined that Forsyth was incompetent to stand trial. Moreover, we fail to see how a finding that Forsyth suffered from a mental illness would have changed the result. Whether he was suffering from amnesia or some other mental illness, the facts remain that Forsyth understood the proceedings, appreciated the charges, and was able to assist in his own defense. In the absence of some other indication Forsyth was incompetent to stand trial because of a mental illness, counsel breached no essential duty by failing to pursue that theory of incompetency. We affirm on this issue.
IV. Counsel's Choice of Defense
Defense counsel is not considered ineffective simply because his or her trial strategy concerning the presentation of a defense was unsuccessful. State v. Johnson, 534 N.W.2d 118, 127 (Iowa Ct. App. 1995). The real issue is whether defense counsel's actions were "justifiable." Johnson v. State, 495 N.W.2d 528, 533 (Iowa Ct. App. 1992) (citing Pettes v. State, 418 N.W.2d 53, 56-57 (Iowa 1988)). When counsel develops a reasonable strategy regarding which defense to present at trial, we will not second-guess that decision on appeal. Van Hoff, 447 N.W.2d at 670 (citing Fryer v. State, 325 N.W.2d 400, 413 (Iowa 1982)). Counsel may have a reasonable trial strategy not to pursue a psychiatric defense. See State v. Sinclair, 622 N.W.2d 772, 782 (Iowa Ct. App. 2000).
Iowa Code section 701.4 provides:
If the defense of insanity is raised, the defendant must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant at the time of the crime suffered from such a deranged condition of the mind as to render the defendant incapable of knowing the nature and quality of the act the defendant was committing or was incapable to distinguishing between right and wrong in relation to the act.
Diminished responsibility is a common law doctrine which may arise when a defendant has a mental condition which prevents him from forming a specific intent to commit a crime. See State v. Jacobs, 607 N.W.2d 679, 684 (Iowa 2000).
We have already noted trial counsel's stated reasons for rejecting an insanity or diminished responsibility defense. Our review of the record indicates counsel's investigative conclusions were consistent with the relevant expert opinions available at the time counsel made this strategic decision. In view of this evidence and the proof relevant to either defense, we conclude Forsyth has failed to show counsel breached any essential duty by electing not to pursue a psychiatric defense on his behalf.
The reasonableness of counsel's choice of a defense is bolstered by the existence of other potentially exculpatory evidence. As noted earlier, counsel cited scientific evidence, which if believed, would exclude Forsyth as the murderer. Most notably, this evidence included a blood stain found at the scene that could not be matched with Forsyth's or the victims'. A medical examiner testified that the physical evidence suggested that one person could not have committed all six murders. Mark Napodano, the father of the Napodano children, told his former wife in a tape-recorded conversation that he killed their children. Kevin Rinehart, the person who discovered the victims' bodies, claimed that he shot Rick Forsyth, and Rick Forsyth shot him. All of this evidence contradicted the State's theory that Forsyth killed all six of the victims and thereafter attempted suicide by shooting himself in the head.
As we noted on direct appeal, "Defendant produced a vigorous defense and challenged the State's evidence. Defendant was able to impressively confront nearly every aspect of the State's case." Forsyth, 547 N.W.2d at 838. There is nothing in the postconviction record that causes us to change our view. We accordingly conclude defense counsel's trial strategy was reasonable under the facts of this case and was "justifiable." Counsel breached no essential duty by electing to pursue a fact-based defense rather than a psychiatric defense. We affirm on this issue.
Lastly, we note that our findings concerning trial counsel's discharge of his essential duties is dispositive of Forsyth's claim concerning appellate counsel. Appellate counsel was under no duty to raise the insanity issue on appeal for the reasons stated earlier.
We affirm the district court's decision denying Forsyth's claims for postconviction relief.