Opinion
2:21-cv-02506-RMG-MGB
07-28-2022
Forney Tracey Estate, Executrix Tracey Briggs-Hall, Plaintiff, v. Ernest Jarrett; Berkeley County Department of Social Services;[1] Berkeley County Police Department; Summerville Police Department; and Berkeley County Family Court, Defendants.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
MARY GORDON BAKER, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
This is a civil action brought by a pro se litigant. Notwithstanding the nonsensical, disorganized nature of the Complaint, it appears that at least some of this case relates to a parental rights dispute before the Berkeley County Family Court. Under Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2) (D.S.C.), the assigned United States Magistrate Judge is authorized to review this case and submit a recommendation to the United States District Judge. For the reasons discussed in greater detail below, the undersigned recommends that this action be summarily dismissed without prejudice.
BACKGROUND
Upon reviewing the initial filings in this matter, the undersigned issued an order notifying Plaintiff that her case was not in proper form, as she had submitted an incomplete Application to Proceed Without Prepayment of Fees (“Form AO 240”); failed to provide the Court with a completed set of proposed service documents; and did not sign her Complaint or her answers to the Court's Local Civil Rule 26.01 Interrogatories. (Dkt. No. 11.) The undersigned also noted numerous inconsistencies within the captions of the initial filings, which made it difficult to identify the true plaintiff(s) in this action. (Id. at 1 n.1.) For example, the Complaint names “Forney Tracey Estate” as a plaintiff, with “Tracey Briggs-Hall” listed as the “Executrix.” (Dkt. No. 1-5 at 1.) Other filings, however, contain conflicting iterations of these parties, including “Forney, Tracey Nicole,” “Forney Tracey,” “Tracey Nicole Briggs-Hall,” “Tracey-Nicole,” “Tracey Nicole Forney [Briggs-Hall],” and “Tracey Nicole: House of Forney.” (See, e.g., Dkt. Nos. 1-2, 1-3, 3, 4, 9.) Moreover, the first page of the Complaint (Dkt. No. 1-5) lists additional plaintiffs-E.M.S.M.; Z.M.; J.E.M.; J.J.M.; Joseph E. Malone, Sr.; and Aaron A. Briggs-Hall-although most of the other filings omit these individuals from the captions entirely.
Shortly after filing the initial Application to Proceed Without Prepayment of Fees (Dkt. No. 3), Plaintiff submitted a duplicate application-also incomplete-using an outdated Form AO 240 (Dkt. No. 8 at 20-21). Accordingly, the undersigned considered only the updated form filed at Dkt. No. 3 in issuing the proper form order.
As discussed in greater detail below, it appears that E.M.S.M., Z.M., J.E.M., and J.J.M. are the children of Tracey Briggs-Hall (mother); Joseph E. Malone, Sr. (father); and Aaron A. Briggs-Hall (stepfather). (See Dkt. No. 1-3 at 19; Dkt. No. 13 at 12; see also Dkt. No. 1-2 at 5-8.)
In light of Plaintiff's pro se status, the undersigned gave her twenty-one days to remedy these deficiencies and bring her case into proper form. The order made clear that the Court could not review the substance of Plaintiff's claims for possible service of process until she provided the requested information. (Dkt. No. 11 at 2.) The order also emphasized that if Plaintiff did not follow the undersigned's instructions within the time permitted, her case would be dismissed “for failure to prosecute and failure to comply with an order of this Court under Rule 41 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.” (Id. at 3.)
In compliance with the undersigned's instructions, Plaintiff submitted executed signature pages for the Complaint (Dkt. No. 1-6) and her responses to the Local Civil Rule 26.01 Interrogatories (Dkt. No. 4-2). Notably, both documents are exclusively signed by “Forney Tracey” as “Executrix” and “Authorized Representative,” although the Complaint also lists “Tracey-Nicole; House of Forney” under “Printed Name of Plaintiff,” once again leaving the Court to scratch its proverbial head regarding Plaintiff's identity.
Based on these signature pages, the Court assumes that it can, at the very least, eliminate E.M.S.M.; Z.M.; J.E.M.; J.J.M.; Joseph E. Malone, Sr.; and Aaron A. Briggs-Hall as plaintiffs in this matter. To be sure, non-attorney parents generally may not litigate the claims of their minor children anyhow. See Thomas v. S.C. Dep't of Soc. Servs., No. 6:18-cv-3140-TMC-KFM, 2018 WL 6596261, at *1 n.1 (D.S.C. Nov. 26, 2018), adopted, 2018 WL 6590751 (D.S.C. Dec. 14, 2018). Thus, for purposes of clarity and ease, the undersigned hereinafter refers to “Plaintiff” in the singular.
With respect to the Form AO 240, Plaintiff's answers remain fairly unintelligible. (Dkt. No. 14.) For example, while Plaintiff indicates that she is “employed” by a “non-profit” organization, “Forney Tracey Nicole Estate,” she does not claim any wages. (Id. at 1.) Additionally, in response to Question No. 8, Plaintiff indicates that she has no debts or financial obligations (see id. at 2, noting “not applicable”), but in that same space writes, “court debts payable to the United States Department of Treasury. All bills, all debts are also payable to the U.S. Treasury” without any further context or the amounts owed. (Id.)
Finally, with respect to the requested service documents, Plaintiff filed five completely blank summons forms that fail to include any of the requisite information in the designated spaces.(Dkt. No. 15.) This error is particularly critical where, as here, there is confusion surrounding the plaintiff's identity and the service documents could serve to alleviate that issue. Nevertheless, the undersigned finds that any further opportunities to bring this case into proper form ultimately would be futile, as Plaintiff's Complaint is subject to summary dismissal regardless of the deficiencies described above.
Although Plaintiff's original summons form included Defendants' names and addresses, the document omitted Plaintiff's information. (See Dkt. No. 6; Dkt. No. 8 at 23-25.)
LEGAL STANDARD
Plaintiff filed this Complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915, which permits an indigent litigant to commence an action in federal court without prepaying the administrative costs of proceeding with the lawsuit. To protect against possible abuses, the court must dismiss any complaints, or portions of complaints, that are frivolous or malicious, fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).
A complaint is frivolous if it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact. Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 31 (1992). Thus, a claim based on a “meritless legal theory” or “baseless” factual contentions, such as “fantastic or delusional” scenarios, may be dismissed sua sponte at any time under § 1915(e)(2)(B). Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 324-25, 327-28 (1989); see also McLean v. United States, 566 F.3d 391, 399 (4th Cir. 2009) (noting that examples of frivolous claims include those whose factual allegations are so “wholly fanciful” as to be simply “unbelievable”) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). The United States Supreme Court has explained that the statute “is designed largely to discourage the filing of, and waste of judicial and private resources upon, baseless lawsuits.” Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 326.
As to failure to state a claim, a complaint filed in federal court must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). In order to satisfy this standard, a plaintiff must do more than make conclusory statements. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (explaining that the court need not accept as true a complaint's legal conclusions). Rather, the complaint “must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'” See id. (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). When “it is clear that no relief could be granted under any set of facts that could be proved consistent with the allegations,” Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73 (1984), the complaint fails to state a claim.
Pro se complaints are held to a less stringent standard than those drafted by attorneys. Gordon v. Leeke, 574 F.2d 1147, 1151 (4th Cir. 1978). A federal court is therefore charged with liberally construing a complaint filed by a Pro se litigant to allow the development of a potentially meritorious case. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). Nonetheless, the requirement of liberal construction does not mean that the court can ignore a clear failure to allege facts that set forth a cognizable claim in a federal district court. See Weller v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 901 F.2d 387, 390-91 (4th Cir. 1990); see also Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 684 (outlining pleading requirements under Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for all civil actions). The Fourth Circuit has explained that “though Pro se litigants cannot, of course, be expected to frame legal issues with the clarity and precision ideally evident in the work of those trained in law, neither can district courts be required to conjure up and decide issues never fairly presented to them.” See Beaudett v. City of Hampton, 775 F.2d 1274, 1276, 1278 (4th Cir. 1985) (noting that district judges “cannot be expected to construct full blown claims” on behalf of Pro se litigants).
DISCUSSION
As discussed above, Plaintiff has failed to submit a comprehensible Form AO 240 or a completed set of proposed service documents. Despite the undersigned's warning, the documents Plaintiff did submit have only generated further confusion surrounding the identities of the parties in this matter. Thus, the undersigned finds that this action is subject to summary dismissal under Rule 41(b), Fed. R. Civ. P., for failure to comply with an order of this Court. See Link v. Wabash R.R. Co., 370 U.S. 626 (1962). Notwithstanding Plaintiff's failure to bring this case into proper form, however, the undersigned finds that the Court cannot entertain Plaintiff's Complaint in any event.
I. Plaintiff's Complaint Is Completely Devoid of Merit
“Although a Pro se plaintiff is general[ly] given more leeway than a party represented by counsel . . . a district court is not obligated to ferret through a [c]omplaint . . . that is so confused, ambiguous, vague or otherwise unintelligible that its true substance, if any, is well disguised.” Bell v. Bank of Am., N.A., No. 1:13-cv-00478-RDB, 2013 WL 6528966, at *1 (D. Md. Dec. 11, 2013) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Nor is the court “required to scour through [a] [p]laintiff's attachments in an attempt to cobble together the facts” on the plaintiff's behalf. Campbell v. StoneMor Partners, LP, No. 3:17-cv-407, 2018 WL 3451390, at *4 (E.D. Va. July 17, 2018), aff'd, 752 Fed.Appx. 166 (4th Cir. 2019); see also Beaudett, 775 F.2d at 1278 (explaining that federal courts are not required to serve as “mind readers” or advocates for pro se litigants when construing Pro se pleadings).
Rather, a Pro se plaintiff “must meet certain minimum standards of rationality and specificity” in filing a complaint. See Adams v. Rice, 40 F.3d 72, 74 (4th Cir. 1994). When a pleading is “so incomprehensible and filled with what could only be considered by a reasonable person as unconnected, conclusory, and unsupported comments or gibberish, that it is unclear what is to be made of them,” summary dismissal is appropriate. Witherspoon v. Berry, No. 9:13-cv-2942-MGL, 2015 WL 1790222, at *3 (D.S.C. Apr. 15, 2015); see also Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528, 536-37 (1974) (noting that federal courts lack the power to entertain claims that are “so attenuated and unsubstantial as to be absolutely devoid of merit”); Holloway v. Pagan River Dockside Seafood, Inc., 669 F.3d 448, 452-53 (4th Cir. 2012) (noting that a federal court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over a complaint raising claims “so insubstantial, implausible . . . or otherwise completely devoid of merit as not to involve a federal controversy”) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
In the instant case, the Complaint form itself (Dkt. No. 1-5) does not contain any factual allegations or causes of action. Instead, Plaintiff refers the Court to over one hundred pages of disorganized, incoherent attachments-many of which appear to be unofficial, arbitrary statements written by Plaintiff without any context-such that it is virtually impossible to distill an intelligible claim from the pleadings. (See Dkt. Nos. 1-2, 1-3.) Indeed, while most of the attachments appear to mimic legal documents and expound a lengthy collection of legal buzzwords, the references are largely nonsensical and assert “legal interest[s] which clearly [do] not exist.” Adams, 40 F.3d at 75. To illustrate, the undersigned provides examples from the attachments below:
• Unofficial statement by “Claimant Forney Tracey,” regarding “fraudulent intent against the Forney Estate for extortion and embezzlement of the Estate.” (Dkt. No. 1-2 at 24.) The statement reads,
Current Occupant Administrator, Executrix Tracey N. Briggs-Hall, Forney; Tracey, Tracey-Nicole: House of Forney understands that this is Mail Fraud under, Title 18 section 1341, frauds and swindles under the all CAP name. This is a conspiracy to Defraud. Taking Ownership of a name that does not belong to you or that is not your name is a Felony. Forney Tracey does not take ownership of the named Corporation Tracey N. Briggs-Hall.(Id.) The statement then cites Rudolph v. Steinhardt, 721 F.2d 1324 (11th Cir. 1983), in relation to “gold clause contracts.” (Id. at 25-37.)
• U.C.C. Financing Statement for “Tracey Forney” listing “Debtor” as “Tracey; Forney-an American Royal ‘Civilly Alive-Living Land' Mining Republic Civis [sic] Organization” and “Tracey Forney-American Principality-Republic Private Attorney General; International Organization.” (Id. at 48.)
• Unofficial statement titled “Claimant of Death” written by Tracey Nicole:
Tracey Nicole Forney is officially dead. I, Tracey Nicole: the house of Forney and the dog, Ferdinand, had a funeral for that person over the weekend. It's officially a deceased estate, which I, as the living woman, manage as my full-time job.... I am the successor to the estate of the decedent and to the decedent's interest in funds held by various inflations and no other person has a superior right to the interest of the decedent by any described property. No proceeding has been conducted Administration of the decedent's estate in the State of Maryland or anywhere else....(Id. at 53.)
• Unofficial statement signed by Forney Tracey alleging unlawful conduct against Berkely County authorities:
In the interest of law and justice mandates a hearing of Libel review pursuant to the Law of Nations and that said Claimants and for the protection of their person, property, estate and trust thereby enters their Complaint of Involuntary Servitude and Peonage due to wanton and malicious acts and threats, duress, coercion fraud by Defendants in violation of the Laws of the forum United States of America....(Id. at 56-57).
• “American Civil U.C.C. Arrest Warrant” against Berkeley County authorities noting that “Tracey Nicole: the House of Forney,” as a “Private Attorney General,” will be “filing an indictment against defendant” for certain “criminal offenses,” including solicitation, kidnapping, trafficking of persons and involuntary servitude, terrorism, offenses affecting governmental functions, and treason. (Id. at 58; Dkt. No. 1-3 at 1-3.)
• Various documents from Case Nos. 2018-DR-08-461 and 2021-DR-08-1048 before the Berkeley County Family Court, including the first page of a “Complaint for Termination of Parental Rights” against Tracey Nicole Briggs-Hall. (Dkt. No. 1-2 at 18-22; Dkt. No. 13 at 12.)
• “Execution of Will by Power of Appointment” from the “Occupant of the Office of the Executrix, Forney Tracey Nicole, Estate,” and signed by Forney Tracey, stating:
It is By my Will, Hopes, and Desires that Forney Tracey, a Civilly-Alive, Non-Belligerent, Non-combative, Civil Administrator, clarifies the renouncing of any unknown communism implied titles that may have been brought upon without consent unbeknownst and out of Error, Forney Tracey is of the Republic, and for the Republic.
[ . . . ]
It is the Will of Forney Tracey that any contracts made out of Error or by foreign entities in the Demise of Forney Tracey, Estate be dissolved and exonerated for these devices have been set for the destruction of the Forney Estate.... Prayer in My Hope, Wishes, and desires is for the Court to comply to the Republican Duty Held to Issue the Clerk of Court an Order to the Secretary of State to issue the required documents in sequestration of the Perpetuity Account and the Sequestration of Receivership with the Aid of the U.S. Marshall to seize the assets.(Dkt. No. 1-3 at 25-28.)
Because the Court is unable to make sense of Plaintiff's attachments and the confused, nonsensical allegations on which the Complaint rests, the undersigned finds that this action is subject to summary dismissal for frivolousness and failure to state a claim to relief. See, e.g., El v. Myers, No. 0:19-cv-1280-BHH-PJG, 2019 WL 2615695, at *2 (D.S.C. June 3, 2019), adopted, 2019 WL 2612739 (D.S.C. June 26, 2019) (summarily dismissing Pro se case where court was “unable to discern a cognizable legal claim” from plaintiff's “incoherent” allegations); Clervrain v. McMaste, No. 6:21-cv-00021-SAL-KFM, 2021 WL 2582223, at *2 (D.S.C. Jan. 22, 2021), adopted, 2021 WL 2582216 (D.S.C. June 23, 2021) (summarily dismissing Pro se case as frivolous because the court could “infer no plausible claims from Plaintiff's 203 pages of gibberish” and the complaint lacked “an arguable basis in law or fact”); Fox v. U.S. State Dep't, No. 2:16-cv-185-RMG, 2016 WL 1046971, at *2 (D.S.C. Mar. 10, 2016), dismissed, 668 Fed.Appx. 442 (4th Cir. 2016) (summarily dismissing case for frivolousness and failure to state a claim where complaint's allegations were “largely incoherent and [could] be described as the ‘the ramblings of a troubled mind'”) (internal citations omitted).
II. Plaintiff's Claims Are Barred Under the Domestic Relations Exception
Notwithstanding the above, the undersigned has combed through Plaintiff's Pro se filings numerous times in a serious effort to consider any potential claims. And while the undersigned has been unable to identify any explicit causes of action, a liberal construction of Plaintiff's Complaint suggests, at the very least, that this case likely stems from certain family court proceedings involving Tracey Nicole Briggs-Hall and/or Forney.
Based on the undersigned's review, it appears that Tracey Nicole Briggs-Hall and Tracey Nicole Forney-and the numerous derivatives thereof-are most likely one in the same, as many of the filings use these names interchangeably and in tandem. (See, e.g., Dkt. No. 1-2 at 24, listing “Current Owner Occupant Administrator, Executrix Tracey N. Briggs-Hall, Forney; Tracey, Tracey-Nicole: House of Forney;” Dkt. No. 1-2 at 46-47 for “Common Law Copyright Notice” prohibiting “unauthorized use of ‘Tracey Nicole Forney/Briggs-Hall©'” and listing “Tracey Nicole Forney [Briggs-Hall]” as the “Secured Party;” Dkt. No. 1-2 at 52, referencing “Private Attorney General Forney Tracey Nicole [Briggs-Hall].”) Although less logical, the undersigned does acknowledge that there are inconsistencies within the record that, theoretically, could also support the contention that Tracey Nicole Briggs-Hall and Tracey Nicole Forney are not the same individual. (See, e.g., Dkt. No. 1-2 at 24 for the same “Common Law Copyright Notice” stating that “Forney Tracey does not take ownership of the named Corporation Tracey N. Briggs-Hall;” Dkt. No. 1-2 at 53 for “Claimant of Death” stating that, as of July 21, 2021, “Tracey Nicole Forney is officially dead;” Dkt. No. 1-3 at 62 for “Power of Attorney” statement wherein Tracey Nicole Forney appoints “Tracey; Briggs-Hall” as her “true and lawful attorney-in-fact.”) For purposes of this Report and Recommendation, however, the undersigned proceeds under the first assumption-that these parties are the same person.
As noted above, the attachments in this case include several records from the Berkeley County Family Court regarding Tracey Briggs-Hall's parental rights over her children, E.M.S.M.; J.E.M.; and J.J.M. Specifically, these records include a “Notice of Hearing” on “permanency planning” filed by the South Carolina Department of Social Services (“D.S.S.”) against Mrs. Briggs-Hall, Aaron Briggs-Hall (her husband), and Joseph Malone, Sr. (the children's father) (Dkt. No. 13 at 12, Case No. 2018-DR-08-461), and a “Complaint for Termination of Parental Rights” filed by D.S.S. against Mrs. Briggs-Hall and Mr. Malone (Dkt. No. 1-3 at 19, Case No. 2021-DR-08-1048). Buried in Plaintiff's supplemental documents is also a statement labeled “Complaint/Indictment-Bill of Complaint and Equity,” confirming that Mrs. Briggs-Hall did in fact lose custody of her children after moving from Maryland to South Carolina in 2018. (Dkt. No. 1-2 at 5.) The statement, which has the general appearance of a legal filing and corresponds to the Defendants named in this action, asserts that Berkeley County authorities “kidnapped” Mrs. Briggs-Hall's children after one of them lied to the police about certain “inappropriate” behavior in the home. (Id. at 6.) Although the statement devolves into much of the same legal “gibberish” described above, it seems to suggest that, over time, D.S.S. and the Berkeley County Family Court impeded Mrs. Briggs-Hall's attempts to regain custody of her children and return them to Maryland by ignoring and/or rejecting her various filings. (Id. at 6-8, 56-57.)
It appears that Mrs. Briggs-Hall attempted to file this document in the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina in August 2021. (See Dkt. No. 1-2 at 5.) However, the document was apparently returned and/or rejected (id. at 56) and there is no indication that a civil action was ever opened in relation thereto.
Although not entirely clear, Plaintiff also appears to claim that, at some point during Case Nos. 2018-DR-08-461 and 2021-DR-08-1048, D.S.S. case workers attempted to “fraudulently claim authority” to “administer” the “Tracey Forney Estate.” (See Dkt. No. 13 at 6 for notice of “unauthorized administration.”) In her responses to the Court's Local Civil Rule 26.01 Interrogatories, Plaintiff similarly indicates that D.S.S. and the Berkeley County Family Court “are embezzling” and “extorting” the “Estate.” (Dkt. No. 4 at 1.)
This construction is further supported by a “Writ of Replevin” executed by the Tracey Nicole Forney Estate and Mrs. Briggs-Hall (as “Administrator”) against Berkeley County authorities. (Id. at 54-55.) The document, which references Case No. 2021-DR-08-1048, seeks the immediate “seizure and delivery” of Mrs. Briggs-Hall's children-who are being “detained” by D.S.S. and the Berkeley County Family Court-in exchange for a bond issued by the Tracey Nicole Forney Estate in the amount of “$100,000,000,000,000,000,000 (One Hundred Quintillion) U.S. Dollars.” (Id. at 54; see also Dkt. No. 1-3 at 12-13 for “Private Registered Surety Bond” to be paid to Robin L. Blume, Clerk of Court for the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina, in relation to Case Nos. 2018-DR-08-461 and 2021-DR-08-1048.) Along those same lines, one of Plaintiff's more recent filings (Dkt. No. 17, “Notice of Assume Name Filings of Good Standing”) demands “a schedule fee of $250,000 for each living child per day of stay in South Carolina” if authorities do not “send[] the living children back to Maryland....” (Id. at 1.)
Assuming the undersigned's interpretation is correct and the Complaint is challenging Berkeley County authorities' purported interference with Mrs. Briggs-Hall's parental rights, any such claims are barred by the domestic relations exception, which generally precludes federal courts from exercising jurisdiction over child custody matters. See Cantor v. Cohen, 442 F.3d 196, 202 (4th Cir. 2006) (noting “the long established precedent that federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction and generally abstain from hearing child custody matters”); Pelham v. Wilson, No. 1:22-cv-155, 2022 WL 1211783, at *2 (M.D. N.C. Apr. 25, 2022) (same); see also Ross v. Rakes, No. 3:18-cv-00537, 2018 WL 6175462, at *4 (S.D. W.Va. Oct. 30, 2018) (explaining that child custody matters “are generally not heard in federal court” because state courts “have the experience to deal with this specific area of the law”) (internal citations omitted), adopted, 2018 WL 6173885 (S.D. W.Va. Nov. 26, 2018). Because the “surrender of parental rights” is “intricately connected to the issue of child custody,” such claims are typically subject to the domestic relations exception. Ross, 2018 WL 6175462, at *9.
Courts have described the domestic relations exception as consisting of both a “core and a penumbra.” See Ross, 2018 WL 6175462, at *4 (citing Friedlander v. Friedlander, 149 F.3d 739, 740 (7th Cir. 1998)). The “core” consists of cases “in which the plaintiff is seeking one or more of the distinctive forms of relief associated with the domestic relations jurisdiction such as . . . an award of child custody. . . .” Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted); see Wasserman v. Wasserman, 671 F.2d 832, 835 (4th Cir. 1982) (explaining that federal courts lack jurisdiction over cases that “seek a declaration of present or future rights as to custody or visitation”). “The ‘penumbra' by contrast, consists of ‘ancillary' proceedings that should have been litigated in the original domestic relations proceeding.” See Ross, 2018 WL 6175462, at *4 (citing Friedlander, 149 F.3d at 740).
In the instant case, Plaintiff's primary request for relief appears to be the release of her children from State custody-in other words, the restoration of her parental rights. (See Dkt. No. 1-2 at 54; Dkt. No. 17 at 1.) Thus, notwithstanding the confused, rambling allegations that make up the Complaint, the undersigned finds that Plaintiff's claims, at their core, affect present and/or future custody rights and are therefore barred to some extent under the domestic relations exception. See, e.g., Stratton by & through Stratton v. North Carolina, No. 3:20-cv-00455-MR, 2021 WL 328884, at *3 (W.D. N.C. Feb. 1, 2021) (dismissing case under the domestic relations exception where the petition, which sought release from the State's guardianship, implicated “present and future rights” regarding custody and challenged the “state court's prior determination of the [] legal guardian”); Ross, 2018 WL 6175462, at *6 (dismissing claims for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under the domestic relations exception where the “true nature of the complaint” was an attempt to “reopen” prior custody and visitation determinations made by family court);
Abessolo v. Smith, No. 1:11-cv-680, 2012 WL 668773, at *3 (S.D. Ohio Feb. 29, 2012) (finding lack of jurisdiction where, “[u]ltimately, Plaintiff's suit stem[med] from an ongoing child custody and protection case in which Plaintiff, the biological father, [was] unhappy with both the process and the result of past and current state judicial decisions”).
III. Plaintiff's Claims Are Barred Under the Rooker-Feldman Doctrine
Similar to the domestic relations exception, the undersigned finds that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine counsels abstention in this case. See Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923) and D.C. Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983). Under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, a “party losing in state court is barred from seeking what in substance would be appellate review of the state judgment in a United States district court.” Am. Reliable Insurc. Co. v. Stillwell, 336 F.3d 311, 316 (4th Cir. 2003) (citing Johnson v. De Grandy, 512 U.S. 997, 1005-06 (1994)). This general rule “extends not only to issues actually decided by a state court but also to those that are ‘inextricably intertwined with questions ruled upon by a state court.'” See Boyd v. Simmons, No. 6:18-cv-576-BHH-JDA, 2018 WL 4999804, at *2 (D.S.C. Mar. 14, 2018) (referencing Plyler v. Moore, 129 F.3d 728, 731 (4th Cir. 1997)), adopted, 2018 WL 4356579 (D.S.C. Sept. 13, 2018). An issue is “inextricably intertwined” with a state court decision “if in order to grant the federal plaintiff the relief sought, the federal court must determine that the state court judgment was erroneously entered or must take action that would render the judgment ineffectual.” Jordahl v. Democratic Party of Virginia, 122 F.3d 192, 202 (4th Cir. 1997).
The undersigned cannot determine the current status of Plaintiff's family court proceedings from the filings here. However, to the extent Plaintiff is attempting to challenge any rulings made by the Berkeley County Family Court regarding her parental rights, such claims are likely precluded under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. To be sure, Plaintiff asks that she be awarded monetary damages for each day the State of South Carolina has improperly exercised guardianship over her children. (See Dkt. No. 17 at 1.) In order to grant this relief, however, the Court would have to conduct what amounts to an appellate review of issues already decided by a state court of competent jurisdiction and override, or otherwise find invalid, the determinations that resulted in the termination of Plaintiff's parental rights. This is precisely the type of impermissible “appellate review” barred under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. See, e.g., Campbell v. Bennett, No. 0:19-cv-973-JFA, 2019 WL 4593567, at *4-5 (D.S.C. Sept. 23, 2019) (explaining that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine precluded the court from reviewing the family court's determinations regarding custody and neglect, as those issues were decided by the family court after a full opportunity to litigate those issues), aff'd, 801 Fed.Appx. 144 (4th Cir. 2020), cert. denied, 141 S.Ct. 362 (2020); Guion v. Marsh, No. 6:18-cv-1609-DCC, 2019 WL 1771736, at *2 (D.S.C. Apr. 23, 2019) (finding plaintiffs' federal claims “inextricably intertwined” with family court's rulings because, at its core, the complaint challenged state judge's various determinations and defendants' actions throughout the family court proceedings), aff'd, 806 Fed.Appx. 252 (4th Cir. 2020); Hall v. Hall, No. 3:06-cv-3130-MJP-BM, 2007 WL 433182, at *2 (D.S.C. Jan. 8, 2007) (declining to consider plaintiff's constitutional claims because to rule in her favor would have required the court to find invalid various orders and rulings made in the Richland County Family Court), adopted, 2007 WL 465577 (D.S.C. Feb. 2, 2007). Thus, because this Court lacks jurisdiction to review the judicial decisions rendered in the Berkeley County Family Court and grant Plaintiff the relief she seeks, her claims are subject to summary dismissal under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.
IV. Plaintiff's Claims Are Barred Under Younger Abstention Doctrine
To the extent Plaintiff's family court proceedings are ongoing, any claims involving the current status of her parental rights are not properly before this Court under the Younger abstention doctrine. In Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), the United States Supreme Court held that a federal court should not equitably interfere with state criminal proceedings “except in the most narrow and extraordinary of circumstances.” Gilliam v. Foster, 75 F.3d 881, 903 (4th Cir. 1996). The Supreme Court has since made clear, however, that the Younger abstention doctrine also applies “to noncriminal judicial proceedings when important state interests are involved.” See Harper v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of W. VA., 396 F.3d 348, 351 (4th Cir. 2005) (referencing Middlesex County Ethics Comm. v. Garden State Bar Ass'n, 457 U.S. 423, 432 (1982)). Specifically, the Younger Court noted that courts of equity should not act unless the moving party has no adequate remedy at law and will suffer irreparable injury if denied equitable relief. Younger, 401 U.S. at 43-44.
From Younger and its progeny, the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit has culled the following test to determine when abstention is appropriate: “(1) there are ongoing state judicial proceedings; (2) the proceedings implicate important state interests; and (3) there is an adequate opportunity to raise federal claims in the state proceedings.” Martin Marietta Corp. v. Md. Comm'n on Human Relations, 38 F.3d 1392, 1396 (4th Cir. 1994) (citing Middlesex Cnty. Ethics Comm'n, 457 U.S. at 432). In the instant case, the undersigned assumes Plaintiff's custody proceedings are ongoing based on her recent request that her children “be escorted to [their] home state of Maryland,” and, therefore, returned to her custody. Thus, the first criterion under Younger is likely satisfied.
The second criterion is also satisfied, as the Supreme Court has stated that matters concerning child custody implicate important state interests: “Domestic relations is an area that has long been regarded as a virtually exclusive province of the States. Indeed, the whole subject of the domestic relations of husband and wife, parent and child, belongs to the laws of the States and not to the laws of the United States.” Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, 133 S.Ct. 2552, 2565 (2013) (internal citations omitted); see also Kawai v. UaCearnaigh, 249 F.Supp.3d 821, 825 (D.S.C. 2017) (referencing Harper, 396 F.3d at 351) (noting that ongoing family court action involved “an area of family law, which is a core source of state authority and thus is an ‘important' state interest”).
And finally, the third criterion is likely satisfied because Plaintiff presumably can address her claims in the pending proceedings before the Berkeley County Family Court. See Barnes v. Kinsler, No. 3:18-cv-1567-CMC, 2018 WL 3853556, at *2 (D.S.C. Aug. 14, 2018) (finding that plaintiff could raise due process claims relating to the removal of her children in her ongoing child custody proceedings in state family court), aff'd, 748 Fed.Appx. 523 (4th Cir. 2019). Thus, to the extent Plaintiff's parental rights dispute remains ongoing, any claims for relief are barred by the Younger doctrine at this time.
V. The South Carolina Department of Social Services and Berkeley County Family Court Are Entitled to Eleventh Amendment Immunity
In addition to the legal doctrines discussed above, the undersigned notes that some of Plaintiff's claims may be subject to summary dismissal under various doctrines of immunity. The Eleventh Amendment divests this Court of jurisdiction to entertain a suit brought against the State of South Carolina or its integral parts absent a specific waiver. See U.S. Const. amend. XI (stating that “[t]he Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State”); see also Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89 (1984). “It is well established that [the South Carolina Department of Social Services], as an arm of the state, is immune from a suit for damages under the Eleventh Amendment.” Sallis v. Child Support Div., No. 7:19-cv-0320-TMC-JDA, 2019 WL 8953164, at *4 (D.S.C. Feb. 6, 2019), adopted, 2020 WL 995125 (D.S.C. Mar. 2, 2020); see also Allen v. Del Valle, No. 2:19-cv-2042-MBS-MGB, 2019 WL 6718055, at *2 (D.S.C. Oct. 25, 2019) (“The South Carolina Department of Social Services is a state entity and thus is immune.”), adopted, 2019 WL 6715930 (D.S.C. Dec. 9, 2019). Likewise, the Berkeley County Family Court is part of South Carolina's unified judicial system and therefore protected from suit under the Eleventh Amendment. Guidetti v. Cnty. of Greenville, No. 6:11-cv-1249-HMH-JDA, 2011 WL 5024287, at *6 (D.S.C. Sept. 12, 2011) (explaining that “[s]uing the unified judicial system is the same as suing the State, and the State of South Carolina has immunity from suit under the Eleventh Amendment of the United States Constitution”), adopted, 2011 WL 5024277 (D.S.C. Oct. 20, 2011); see also Bey v. Jefferson, No. 2:17-cv-1007-RMG-MGB, 2017 WL 9250348, at *7 (D.S.C. Apr. 24, 2017), adopted, 2017 WL 1956979 (D.S.C. May 11, 2017). Accordingly, while Plaintiff's claims against D.S.S. or the Berkeley County Family Court are barred under the Eleventh Amendment absent a waiver of immunity.
VI. Family Court Judge Ernest Jarrett Is Entitled to Absolute Judicial Immunity
Although not entirely clear from the Complaint or its attachments, the undersigned assumes that Judge Ernest Jarrett, who serves as a family court judge for the State of South Carolina, was and/or is involved in Plaintiff's custody proceedings. It is well-settled that judges have absolute immunity from civil suit for actions taken in their judicial capacities. See, e.g., Chu v. Griffith, 771 F.2d 79, 81 (4th Cir. 1985); Webb v. Cty. of Allendale, No. 1:15-cv-02766-JMC, 2018 WL 661462, at *7 (D.S.C. Jan. 31, 2018) (“This judicial immunity also extends to the county for a county Magistrate Judge's or a state Family Court Judge's judicial actions.”). Notably, absolute immunity is not pierced by allegations of corruption or bad faith, nor will a judicial officer “be deprived of immunity because the action he took was in error, was done maliciously, or was in excess of his authority.” Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 356-57 (1978) (internal citations omitted). Moreover, absolute judicial immunity is a protection from suit, not just from damages. Mireless v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 11 (1991); see also Lepelletier v. Tran, 633 Fed.Appx. 126, 127 (4th Cir. 2016).
See https://www.sccourts.org/familyCourt/alphaList.cfm (last visited July 28, 2022).
Assuming Judge Jarrett presided-or is currently presiding-over Plaintiff's family court matters, he is entitled to absolute immunity for any judicial actions taken in relation to those proceedings, and any such allegations against him are therefore subject to summary dismissal. See Guion, 2018 WL 8300524, at *5 (finding claims against family court judge for judicial actions taken in relation to the termination of plaintiffs' parental rights barred by absolute judicial immunity and lacking any basis in fact or law); Garner v. Cohen, No. 2:16-cv-561-TLW-MGB, 2016 WL 9175627, at *4-5 (D.S.C. Sept. 1, 2016), adopted, 2017 WL 2645754 (D.S.C. June 20, 2017) (dismissing claims against family court judge for judicial actions taken in relation to plaintiffs' parental rights as frivolous and barred by absolute judicial immunity); Thomas v. Charleston Cty., No. 2:17-cv-1958-MBS-MGB, 2017 WL 11562553, at *5 (D.S.C. Sept. 5, 2017) (noting that plaintiff's claims against family court judges for their judicial actions “lack[ed] any basis in law, and [were] legally and factually frivolous”), adopted, 2020 WL 5569766 (D.S.C. Sept. 15, 2020).
VII. Plaintiff Cannot Compel Criminal Charges Against Defendants
Finally, although the core of this action appears to be the loss of Plaintiff's parental rights, the undersigned reiterates that the Complaint also references “embezzlement” and “extortion” in relation to the “Tracey Forney Estate.” (Dkt. No. 4 at 1; see also Dkt. No. 13 at 6 for notice of “unauthorized administration” of estate by D.S.S. caseworkers.) Thus, it is worth noting that, to the extent Plaintiff is attempting to bring criminal charges of any kind against the Berkeley County authorities, a private citizen cannot compel such prosecution through a civil action. See Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 619 (1973) (finding that a private citizen does not have a judicially cognizable interest in the prosecution or non-prosecution of another person); Hoffman v. Smart-Gittings, No. 9:18-cv-1146-RMG-BM, 2019 WL 8759417, at *10 (D.S.C. Aug. 26, 2019) (noting that a private citizen “has no constitutional, statutory, or common law right to require a public official to investigate or prosecute a crime”) (internal citations omitted); see also Diamond v. Charles, 476 U.S. 54, 64-65 (1986) (collecting cases). Accordingly, any such relief is unavailable here.
CONCLUSION
The undersigned finds that Plaintiff's Complaint is subject to summary dismissal for failure to bring this case into proper form and comply with an order of this Court pursuant to Rule 41(b), Fed.R.Civ.P. However, for the reasons discussed herein, the undersigned is of the opinion that providing Plaintiff with any additional opportunities to bring this case into proper form would be futile, as this Court likely lacks jurisdiction over the Complaint. The undersigned therefore RECOMMENDS that this action be dismissed without prejudice and without issuance and service of process. Because this action is subject to summary dismissal, the undersigned also RECOMMENDS that Plaintiff's Motions to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (Dkt. Nos. 3, 14) be dismissed as moot. In light of the foregoing, the Clerk of Court shall not issue the summons forms or forward this matter to the United States Marshal Service for service of process at this time.
IT IS SO RECOMMENDED.
The parties' attention is directed to an important notice on the following page.
Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation
The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. “[I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must ‘only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.'” Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 72 advisory committee's note).
Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b); see Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:
Robin L. Blume, Clerk
United States District Court
Post Office Box 835
Charleston, South Carolina 29402
Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).