Opinion
2018-08370 Docket No. B-8639/16
10-02-2019
In the MATTER OF ARYELLE L.F. (Anonymous). Forestdale, Inc., Respondent; v. Esperanza F.F. (Anonymous), Appellant.
Tennille M. Tatum–Evans, New York, NY, for appellant. Rosin Steinhagen Mendel, PLLC, New York, N.Y. (John Cappiello of counsel), for respondent. Janet E. Sabel, New York, N.Y. (Dawne A. Mitchell and Riti P. Singh of counsel), attorney for the child.
Tennille M. Tatum–Evans, New York, NY, for appellant.
Rosin Steinhagen Mendel, PLLC, New York, N.Y. (John Cappiello of counsel), for respondent.
Janet E. Sabel, New York, N.Y. (Dawne A. Mitchell and Riti P. Singh of counsel), attorney for the child.
MARK C. DILLON, J.P., JOHN M. LEVENTHAL, JOSEPH J. MALTESE, LINDA CHRISTOPHER, JJ.
DECISION & ORDER In a proceeding pursuant to Social Services Law § 384–b, the mother appeals from an order of the Family Court, Queens County (John M. Hunt, J.), dated May 4, 2018. The order, insofar as appealed from, terminated the mother's parental rights and freed the subject child for adoption.
ORDERED that the order is affirmed insofar as appealed from, without costs or disbursements.
The Family Court found that the mother permanently neglected the subject child and a suspended judgment dated June 28, 2017, was entered against her. Several months later, the petitioner moved to terminate the mother's parental rights and to free the child for adoption, alleging that the mother had violated the conditions of the suspended judgment. Following a combined fact-finding and dispositional hearing, the Family Court, inter alia, determined that the mother had failed to comply with at least one of the conditions of the suspended judgment, terminated her parental rights, and freed the child for adoption. The mother appeals. We affirm insofar as appealed from. By enacting Family Court Act §§ 631(b) and 633, the Legislature vested the Family Court with discretion to give a "second chance" ( Matter of Michael B., 80 N.Y.2d 299, 311, 590 N.Y.S.2d 60, 604 N.E.2d 122 ) to a parent of a "permanently neglected child" ( Family Ct Act § 611 ; Social Services Law § 384–b[7] ), before terminating the parent's parental rights (see Matter of Michael B., 80 N.Y.2d at 311, 590 N.Y.S.2d 60, 604 N.E.2d 122 ; Matter of Arianna I. [Roger I.], 100 A.D.3d 1281, 1283–1284, 955 N.Y.S.2d 413 ). It is not, however, intended to be indefinite, but only to afford the parent "a brief grace period designed to prepare the parent to be reunited with the child" ( Matter of Michael B., 80 N.Y.2d at 311, 590 N.Y.S.2d 60, 604 N.E.2d 122 ). Even after a suspended judgment is entered, the court may revoke it if, after a hearing, it finds by a preponderance of the evidence that the parent failed to comply with one or more of its conditions (see Matter of Malik S. [Jana M.], 101 A.D.3d 1776, 1777, 957 N.Y.S.2d 801 ; Matter of Chanteau M.R.W. [Pamela R.B.], 101 A.D.3d 1129, 1129, 956 N.Y.S.2d 505 ; Matter of Carmen C. [Margarita N.], 95 A.D.3d 1006, 1008, 944 N.Y.S.2d 214 ). " ‘The best interests of the child ... remain relevant at all stages of a permanent neglect proceeding, including at the revocation of a suspended judgment’ " ( Matter of Isabella M. [Benida M.], 147 A.D.3d 1061, 1062, 47 N.Y.S.3d 466, quoting Matter of Phoenix D.A. [Jessie A.], 123 A.D.3d 823, 824, 998 N.Y.S.2d 214 ; see Matter of Phoenix D.A. [Jessie A.], 143 A.D.3d 701, 702, 38 N.Y.S.3d 437 ).
We agree with the Family Court's determination that the mother failed to comply with certain conditions of the suspended judgment (see Matter of Kaiden L. [Kdaya R.], 168 A.D.3d 846, 847, 92 N.Y.S.3d 83 ; Matter of Mashlai D.M. [Jalisa R.D.], 110 A.D.3d 813, 814, 971 N.Y.S.2d 900 ). We also agree with the court's determination that the best interests of the child would be served by terminating the mother's parental rights and freeing the child for adoption (see Matter of Kaiden L. [Kdaya R.], 168 A.D.3d at 847, 92 N.Y.S.3d 83 ; Matter of Phoenix D.A. [Jessie A.], 143 A.D.3d at 702, 38 N.Y.S.3d 437 ).
Moreover, contrary to the mother's contention, under the circumstances of this case, the Family Court providently exercised its discretion in determining that a separate dispositional hearing was not required before terminating the mother's parental rights. "The Family Court may enforce a suspended judgment without the need for a separate dispositional hearing, particularly where, as here, the court has presided over prior proceedings from which it became acquainted with the parties, and the record shows that the court was aware of and considered the child's best interests" ( Matter of Kai G. [Janice K.], 126 A.D.3d 902, 903, 2 N.Y.S.3d 922 ; see Matter of Breana R.S.[Triana B.-S.], 148 A.D.3d 1157, 1158, 49 N.Y.S.3d 182 ).
DILLON, J.P., LEVENTHAL, MALTESE and CHRISTOPHER, JJ., concur.