Opinion
Civil Action No. 04-0435 Section: "J" (3).
August 24, 2004
ORDER AND REASONS
In a previous lawsuit, Forest Oil Corporation ("Forest Oil") was sued by Terry Hudson ("Hudson"), an employee of its service contractor, Coastal Production Services ("Coastal"), for personal injuries sustained in an accident occurring aboard a fixed platform owned by Forest Oil. Hudson was ultimately determined to be a "borrowed employee" of Forest Oil, and his suit was dismissed because Forest Oil is immune from tort liability under the Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act ("LHWCA"). Hudson has since made claims for LHWCA compensation benefits directly against Forest Oil as his borrowing employer. In the present lawsuit, Forest Oil seeks indemnity from Coastal (and its insurers) pursuant to a master service agreement. A threshold issue is whether the Louisiana Oilfield Anti-Indemnity Act ("LOAIA") voids any indemnity agreement contained in the Forest/Coastal contract. If the indemnity agreement is valid and enforceable, then the issue becomes who must indemnify Forest Oil among its contractor Coastal and Coastal's two insurers, Ace Indemnity Insurance Company ("Ace") (the workers' compensation insurer) and Gemini Insurance Company ("Gemini") (the general liability insurer). For the reasons explained below, the Court holds (1) the LOAIA does not apply; (2) the indemnity provisions in the Forest/Coastal master service contract are valid and enforceable, requiring Coastal to indemnify Forest Oil for Hudson's claims; (3) the Gemini policy excludes coverage for the claims by Forest Oil; and (4) Forest Oil is an "alternate employer" under the Ace workers' compensation policy, which provides coverage to Forest Oil for the claims made by Hudson.
The Pending Motions
Before the Court are the following motions set for hearing on July 7, 2004:
1) Gemini's Motion for Summary Judgment (Rec. Doc 5);
2) Ace's Cross Motion for Summary Judgment/Alternatively Opposition to Gemini (Rec. Doc. 13);
3) Ace's Motion for Summary Judgment (Rec. Doc. 8);
4) Forest Oil's Motion for Summary Judgment on its Claim Against Gemini (Rec. Doc. 11);
5) Forest Oil's Motion for Summary Judgment on its Claim Against Ace (Rec. Doc. 12).
Additionally, the following motion was set for hearing on August 18, 2004:
6) Forest Oil's Motion for Summary Judgment on its Claim Against Coastal (Rec. Doc. 10).
All of the motions are opposed, and the parties have submitted voluminous briefings on the issues raised. Although the parties filed six different motions, the basic questions raised in these motions boil down to the following: whether the indemnity agreement in the Forest/Coastal master service contract is valid and enforceable, and if so, whether there is coverage for Forest Oil's indemnity claims under either the Ace or Gemini policies. The Court received 18 different memoranda in support or in opposition. The likely reason even more memoranda were not filed is that the Court stopped the presses before any more ink could be spilled or trees killed. The Court ordered "No further briefs or memoranda will be accepted by this Court on any pending motions . . ." (Rec. Doc. 31).
The Court has duly read everything the parties have filed, including multiple memoranda in support of motions, and multiple memoranda in opposition to motions, which in the case of cross-motions for summary judgment are often duplicative. The same party files essentially identical memoranda in support of its own motion, and again in opposition to another party's motion. And the so-called "reply" and "surreply" memoranda are for the most part simply regurgitating what had been said previously. The Court reminds counsel that it serves no valid or useful purpose to file such memoranda when there is nothing new to say. Perhaps counsel believe there is an unwritten rule that "he who files last, wins." If such belief or perception exists, the Court takes this opportunity to assure counsel that it is not true, and the better part of valor in motion practice is to say nothing more if there is nothing new to say.
Background
A lawsuit was originally filed by Terry Hudson against Forest Oil Corporation and Forest Oil's liability insurer, Zurich American Insurance Company, to recover for personal injuries sustained aboard Forest Oil's fixed platform the SATURDAY ISLAND in Barataria Bay, Louisiana. Hudson was formally employed as an operator by Coastal Production Services. However, through a labor supply agreement between Coastal and Forest Oil, Hudson worked exclusively for Forest Oil aboard the SATURDAY ISLAND. On August 11, 2001, Hudson was injured while attempting to repair the saltwater disposal well motor aboard the SATURDAY ISLAND.
Subsequent to the accident, Hudson received workers' compensation benefits through Coastal and its insurer, Ace, until May 2002. Hudson's benefits were paid pursuant to the LHWCA. Hudson then filed his tort suit against Forest Oil in July 2002. Ace intervened, seeking to be reimbursed for the workers' compensation benefits it had paid to and on behalf of Hudson. In April 2003, this Court granted Forest Oil's motion for summary judgment, dismissing Hudson's tort suit because Forest Oil was the "borrowing employer" of Hudson and thus entitled to immunity.
Subsequently, Ace filed a Motion for Summary Judgment on its intervention, contending that Forest Oil, as Hudson's "borrowing employer" was required to reimburse Ace, the insurer of Hudson's "formal employer," for Hudson's LHWCA workers' compensation benefits. In June 2003, this Court denied Ace's Motion for Summary Judgment and dismissed its intervention. The Court held that the indemnification and waiver of subrogation clauses contained in the master contract and the Ace policy were valid and enforceable. Ace appealed, and the Fifth Circuit affirmed this Court's decision. Hudson v. Forest Oil Corp., 372 F.3d 742 (5th Cir. 2004).
While the dismissal of the earlier case was pending on appeal, Forest Oil filed the present complaint, seeking defense and indemnification from Coastal pursuant to the Forest/Coastal master contract. Forest Oil also brought claims against two insurers of Coastal: under the policy of workers' compensation insurance issued by Ace and the general liability policy issued by Gemini Insurance Company. Specifically, Forest Oil seeks indemnity for any loss, expense, or claim brought by Hudson for workers' compensation benefits. Forest Oil asserts that it is entitled to coverage as an "additional insured" or as "alternate employer" under the Ace policy. As against Gemini, Forest Oil seeks "contractual indemnity". Additionally, Forest Oil seeks reimbursement under Meloy v. Conoco, 504 So. 2d 833, 839 (La. 1987), for all costs, attorneys fees, and expenditures in defense of the original tort suit by Hudson against Forest Oil.
On July 1, 2004, Forest Oil submitted a letter to this Court stating that the Meloy claim had been settled, and Gemini agreed to pay a negotiated portion of those costs. Therefore, theMeloy claim will not be addressed.
Standard of Review
Summary judgment is appropriate where the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1075 (5th Cir. 1994) (citing FED. R. CIV. PROC. 56(c)). The moving party bears the initial burden of demonstrating to the court that there is an absence of genuine factual issues. Topalian v. Ehrmann, 954 F.2d 1125, 1132 (5th Cir. 1992). Once the movant meets that burden, the non-moving party must produce evidence sufficient to establish that there is a genuine issue of material fact in dispute. Id. Accordingly, a factual controversy exists when both parties have submitted evidence of contradictory facts. Little, 37 F.3d at 1075. On summary judgment, factual controversies are resolved in favor of the non-moving party. Id.Discussion
After this Court held that Hudson was Forest Oil's "borrowed employee," Hudson made demand upon Forest Oil for payment of workers' compensation benefits. The bottom line issue in the present case is who will ultimately bear the cost of Hudson's compensation claim. Forest Oil has made a demand for defense and indemnity from Coastal, Ace, and Gemini. In their respective motions, Coastal, Ace and Gemini argue any indemnity agreement between Coastal and Forest Oil is void and unenforceable because of the LOAIA. Thus, a threshold issue is whether the LOAIA applies, and if so, whether it invalidates the indemnity agreement. A) Louisiana Oilfield Anti-Indemnity ActIn the earlier case by Hudson against Forest Oil, when analyzing the waiver of subrogation issue, this Court concluded that the LOAIA was inapplicable because Forest Oil was never adjudicated at fault, and the waiver of subrogation clause in the Ace policy did not frustrate the purposes behind the LOAIA.Hudson v. Forest Oil Corporation, No. CIV.A. 02-2225, 2003 WL 21276385 at *7 (E.D. La. Jun. 2, 2003).
This Court found Fontenot v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 676 So.2d 557, 564 (La. 1996), applicable. Id. at *6. The Fontenot court reasoned "the [LOAIA's] prohibition of a waiver of subrogation clause only benefits the oil company, or indemnitee, when it is applied in conjunction with an indemnification clause." Id. This Court first noted that neither side disputed that the master contract and the Ace policy satisfied the initial two-part test to determine applicability of the LOAIA. Id. at *5. The Court then explained that although Forest Oil did originally seek indemnification from Coastal for Hudson's tort claim, Coastal rejected such claim and Forest Oil proceeded to defend the claim on its own. Id. at *7. As a result, there was no shifting of liability under the indemnification clause, and Coastal was never on the hook for tort damages suffered by Hudson. Id. On appeal, the Fifth Circuit affirmed this Court's decision. Hudson v. Forest Oil, 372 F.3d 742 (5th Cir. 2004).
The two-part test to determine applicability of the LOAIA is as follows: (1) an agreement that "pertains to" and oil, gas, or water well, and (2) that agreement "must be related to exploration, development, production, or transportation of oil, gas, or water." Fontenot, 676 So. 2d at 564.
Defendants argue that the present complaint seeking indemnification triggers application of the LOAIA, and Fontenot no longer applies. Defendants observe that in Fontenot the Court explained "the purpose of the Act has been satisfied by Chevron's settling while foregoing its contractual indemnity which, if enforced, would have allowed it to shift liability to the employer." Defendants contend that Forest Oil is now attempting to shift its liability to Coastal.
The LOAIA, Louisiana Revised Statute section § 9:2780 (B), states in pertinent part:
Any provision contained in, collateral to, or affecting an agreement pertaining to a well for oil . . ., is void and unenforceable to the extent that it purports to or does provide for defense or indemnity, or either, to the indemnitee against loss or liability for damages arising out of or resulting from death or bodily injury to persons, which is caused by or results from the sole or concurrent negligence or fault (strict liability) of the indemnitee, or an agent, employee, or an independent contractor who is directly responsible to the indemnitee. LA.REV.STAT. ANN. § 9:2780(B) (West Supp. 2004).
Subsection G, which expands upon subsection B and specifically addresses waiver of subrogation provisions, additionally provides the following:
Any provision in any agreement arising out of the operations, services, or activities listed in Subsection C . . . which requires waivers of subrogation, additional named insured endorsements, or any other form of insurance protection which would frustrate or circumvent the prohibitions of this Section, shall be null and void and of no force and effect. LA.REV.STAT. ANN. § 9:2780(G) (West Supp. 2004).
Lastly, Subsection I expands the coverage of the LOAIA to "certain provisions contained in, collateral to or affecting agreements" covered by the LOAIA. LA.REV.STAT. ANN. § 9:2780(I) (West Supp. 2004).
Defendants argue that if the LOAIA applies, reading sections G and I together, all "additional insured" provisions of the Forest-Coastal contract are unenforceable, and the "alternate employer" endorsement is likewise invalid.
On the other hand, Forest Oil argues that the LOAIA does not void all indemnity agreements, just those requiring indemnity when the indemnitee is at fault. There must be negligence or fault (strict liability) on the part of the indemnitee. In the present case, because the Court has dismissed the tort suit against Forest Oil, it will never be adjudicated as having been negligent or at fault. Absent such a finding, the LOAIA is not implicated. Forest Oil relies on Melancon v. Breaud Enterprises, Inc., 834 F.2d 1238 (5th Cir. 1988).
In Melancon, the Fifth Circuit held that the oil company, Amoco, was entitled to indemnification based on an indemnity provision in its contract with the lending employer. Id. at 1248. The court explained that because Amoco was the borrowing employer, Amoco's negligence would never be determined because of the LHWCA's bar. Id. at 1247-48. Therefore, Amoco was entitled to indemnity from the lending employer, Breaud, and the LOAIA did not apply absent a finding of negligence or fault against Amoco.Id. at 1248.
Defendants dispute the applicability of Melancon and argue that in order for Forest Oil to take advantage of the LOAIA exception, a judicial determination must be made regarding "fault" of Forest Oil. Defendants cite Meloy v. Conoco, Inc., 540 So. 2d 833 (1987), which holds that "the indemnitor's obligation for cost of defense cannot be determined until there has been a judicial finding that the indemnitee is liable or that the charges against it were baseless." Id. at 280. "Whether an oil company (indemnitee) is free from fault and thus outside the scope of the Act can only be determined after a trial on the merits." Id.
Furthermore, Defendants argue that the fact that a determination has not been made regarding Forest Oil's fault does not mean that this Court cannot proceed to make such determination. In Phillips Petroleum Company v. Liberty Services, Inc., 657 So.2d 405 (La.App. 3d Cir. 1995), the court addressed the holding of Melancon and recognized that a litigant could be at fault for an accident but not liable for tort damages because of a legal defense such as the "borrowed employer" doctrine pursuant to the LHWCA. Id. at 409. The court explained that the fact that an indemnitee has a legal defense does not preclude the need for a determination of fault regarding causation. Id. Therefore, La.Rev.Stat. 9:28780 (A) does not prevent the party seeking indemnification from proving that it is free from "negligence or fault (strict liability)" in a separate action from the original litigation. Id. The court overruled the holding of Crater v. Mesa Offshore Co., 539 So. 2d 88 (La.App. 3d Cir. 1989) which held that because the LHWCA barred tort recovery, there would never be a determination of negligence, and any claims under the indemnity provisions were moot. Id. at 93.
Thus, Defendants argue that even in the context of the LHWCA, the employer's fault must be quantified. Defendants further support their position by citing Tanksley v. Gulf Oil Corp., 848 F.2d 515 (5th Cir. 1988), and arguing that Tanksley is directly on point and governs the present matter. However, inTanksley, the Fifth Circuit explained that a trial on the merits was legally possible and was only foreclosed because of a voluntary compromise settlement. Id. at 517-18. The court distinguished Melancon and stated that the factual scenario differed because in Melancon, the LHWCA proscribed any judicial inquiry into fault. Id. at 517. On the other hand, inTanksley, Chevron opted to forego trial, and because of that choice, there would be no determination of fault. Id. at 518. The court specifically stated that absent a finding of fault, "or a legal bar preventing the finding," as in Melancon, the LOAIA nullifies the indemnity agreement. Id. (emphasis added). As is apparent by the clear language of the case, Tanksley is not on point and instead, supports the holding of Melancon.
Lastly, Defendants rely on Fontenot v. Dual Drilling Co., 179 F.3d 969 (5th Cir. 1999), as the latest case that discusses fault under La. Civ. Code art 2323. Defendants argue thatMelancon was decided prior to the 1996 revision to article 2323, which now mandates that the fault of all parties must be considered. In Dual Drilling, the court did not address the "borrowed employer" issue or the LOAIA, but did discuss whether Louisiana's comparative fault scheme was consistent with the LHWCA on quantification of employer fault. Id. at 972. Dual Drilling is factually distinguishable from the present case and in no way overrules Melancon. The holding of Melancon is controlling in this case. Contrary to Defendants' arguments, this Court is precluded from making a determination of fault; instead, this Court recognizes that Forest Oil will never be adjudicated at fault. As explained in Fontenot, the LOAIA was enacted to prevent the service company from being liable for both tort damages and workers' compensation. 676 So. 2d at 565. In the present case, Coastal's liability for both tort damages and workers' compensation is an impossibility. Accordingly, because the LHWCA precludes a finding of fault against Forest Oil and because the master service contract does not frustrate the LOAIA, the LOAIA does not apply.
B) Indemnification
Because the LOAIA does not apply to the present case, this Court must next address whether Coastal owes Forest Oil indemnification. According to Forest Oil, the July 2, 1991 contract between Forest Oil and Coastal imposes an obligation of indemnity upon Coastal. Section 4 of the contract reads as follows:
4. INDEMNITY
4.1 Contractor [Coastal] agrees to indemnify, defend, and save harmless Forest Group . . . from and against any and all claims, demands, judgments, defense costs, or suits . . . by Contractor or its Subcontractors or any employees . . . of Contractor or its Subcontractors . . . in any way, directly or indirectly, arising out of or related to the performance of this Contract . . ., expressly including any claims, demands, judgments or suits actually or allegedly caused by . . . sole, concurrent or partial negligence . . . fault or strict liability of Forest Group or any other person. . . .
4.2 In addition, to Paragraph 4.1, Contractor agrees to indemnify, demand and save harmless Forest Group . . . from and against any and all claims, demands, judgments, defense costs, or suits . . . which may be brought by any person or entity against the Forest Group or in which the Forest Group may be named a party defendant, in any way, directly or indirectly, arising out of or related to the performance of this Contract . . . expressly including any claims, demands, judgments, or suits actually or allegedly caused by the sole, concurrent or partial negligence . . . fault or strict liability of Forest Group or any other person. . . .
Coastal clearly owes indemnity to Forest Oil under the terms of this master contract. Coastal claims that it complied with its obligations to Forest Oil by obtaining appropriate insurance policies from Ace and Gemini. Therefore, this Court must next address whether the Ace or Gemini policies provide coverage for the claims made by Forest Oil in the present case.
c) Gemini's General Liability Insurance Policy
Gemini admits that it was Coastal's general liability carrier. However, Gemini argues that its insurance policy contained an exclusion which stated that such insurance did not apply to workers' compensation and similar laws.
The policy between Gemini and Coastal provides in pertinent part:
Coverage A. Bodily Injury and Property Damage Liability
1. Insuring Agreement
a. We will pay those sums that the insured becomes legally obligated to pay as damages because of "bodily injury" or "property damage" to which this insurance applies.
2. Exclusions
This insurance does not apply to:
b. Contractual Liability
d. Workers' Compensation and Similar Laws
"Bodily injury" or "property damage" for which the insured is obligated to pay damages by reason of the assumption of liability in a contract or agreement. This exclusion does not apply to liability for damages:
(2) Assumed in a contract or agreement that is an "insured contract". . . .
Any obligation of the insured under a workers' compensation, disability benefits or unemployment compensation law or any similar law.
"Bodily injury" to:
(1) An "employee" of the insured arising out of and in the course of:(a) Employment by the insured; or
(b) Performing duties related to the conduct of the insured's business;
This exclusions applies:
(1) Whether the insured may be liable as an employer or in any other capacity; and
(2) To any obligation to share damages with or repay someone else who must pay damages because of the injury.
This exclusion does not apply to liability assumed by the insured under an "insured contract."
SECTION V — DEFINITIONS
9. "Insured contract" means:
f. That part of any other contract or agreement pertaining to your business . . . under which you assume tort liability of another party to pay for "bodily injury" or "property damage" to a third person or organization. Tort liability means a liability that would be imposed by law in the absence of a contract or agreement.
Gemini argues that the policy unambiguously states that it provides no coverage for workers' compensation benefits. Unlike other sections of the policy, the workers' compensation exclusion is not affected by the fact that a claim may arise out of a contractual indemnity agreement. While other exclusions listed in the contract are modified for claims involving contractual indemnity, the workers' compensation section is not. For example, section g, "Aircraft, Auto or Watercraft" exclusion specifically states that the exclusion does not apply to: (4) Liability assumed under any "insured contract" for the ownership, maintenance or use of aircraft or watercraft." However, the workers' compensation exclusion is not affected by the fact that a claim may arise out of a contractual indemnity agreement. Thus, Gemini contends that Forest Oil's contractual indemnity demand for workers' compensation benefits is excluded.
Forest Oil argues that Coastal's obligation to Forest Oil is contractual, and Gemini's CGL policy provides coverage for a contractual indemnity obligation. The exclusion Gemini relies on simply means there is no coverage for Coastal's employees; such liability would be covered by the workers' compensation policy Coastal purchased from Ace. Forest Oil asserts that a close reading of the exclusion demonstrates that it applies to workers' compensation laws, or similar laws, not contractual obligations, and the workers' compensation provision specifically excludes only obligations to the insured. Forest Oil further argues that the Court should narrowly construe the exclusion.
However, Forest Oil fails to recognize that it was listed as an "additional insured" in Gemini's policy. In fact, Exhibit "A" of the master service contract between Coastal and Forest Oil states, "Forest Group shall be included as an additional assured on all policies (Except Workers' Compensation coverage.)" In addition, Exhibit "C" entitled "Certificate of Insurance" states that Forest Group is included as an additional insured on all policies (except Workers' Compensation coverage). Therefore, although Forest Oil argues that the claim against Gemini is contractual, Forest Oil was, in fact, an additional insured. Thus, the exclusion applicable to workers' compensation laws applies to both Coastal and Forest Oil. As a result, the Gemini policy does not provide coverage to Forest Oil in the circumstances of the present case.
D) Ace Workers' Compensation Insurance Policy
Is Forest Oil an "additional insured" or "alternate employer" under the Ace insurance policy and is the policy language ambiguous?
Ace argues that the claims by Forest Oil are not covered by its workers' compensation policy because Forest Oil is neither an additional insured nor an alternate employer under the policy.
Paragraph 3.1 of the Forest/Coastal contract required Coastal to procure and maintain insurance in favor of Forest Oil, as listed in Exhibits A B attached to the contract. Exhibit "A" Minimum Insurance Requirement provides:
The following apply to all policies:
1) Forest Group shall be included as an additional insured on all policies (except Workers' Compensation coverage).
The Ace policy is obviously a workers' compensation policy, and there was no requirement that it include Forest Oil as an additional insured. Forest Oil concedes it is not an additional insured on the Ace policy.
Although it is not an additional insured, Forest Oil nonetheless argues that the Ace policy provides coverage to Forest Oil as an "alternate employer" (i.e., "borrowing employer"). Ace argues that although its policy has an alternate employer endorsement, it does not apply in favor of Forest Oil.
The endorsement to the policy states:
This endorsement applies only with respect to bodily injury to your employees while in the course of special or temporary employment by the alternate employer in the state named in Item 2 of the schedule (LA). Part One (Workers Compensation Insurance) and Part Two (Employers Liability Insurance) will apply as though the alternate employer is insured.
Schedule 1. Alternate Employer As Required by Written Contract
Ace argues that it did not specifically name Forest Oil as an "alternate employer;" thus, Forest Oil is only an alternate employer if Coastal was required by written contract to provide such coverage. Ace argues that no alternate employer endorsement coverage was required by written contract "in favor of" Forest Oil. Paragraph 2 of the Forest/Coastal master contact provides:
It is expressly understood that Contractor (Coastal) is an independent contractor and that neither Contractor nor Contractor's principals, partners, employees, or subcontractors are servants, agents, or employees of Forest.
Ace argues that if Coastal's employees are independent contractors, Forest Oil would not be covered.
Furthermore, Exhibit "A: regarding minimum insurance states:
A. Workers' Compensation and Employer's Liability to include:
5. Alternate Employer/Borrowed Servant
Ace argues that the contract only requires Coastal to procure a workers' compensation and employers' liability policy which includes alternate employer/borrowed servant coverage. Ace contends that there is nothing in the policy which specifically requires that such coverage be "in favor of" Forest Oil. According to Ace's logic, because the Ace policy applies only "as required by written contract" and because there is no specific requirement that Coastal provide alternate employer coverage "in favor of Forest Oil," the alternate employer endorsement does not apply to Forest Oil.
Forest Oil argues that its contract with Coastal clearly requires that the workers' compensation policy contain an alternate employer endorsement. Forest Oil contends that Ace received an additional premium for the alternate employer endorsement, and now Ace must honor it. Furthermore, this Court has already noted that the realities of the workplace, not the language of the contract, control borrowed employee status. Thus, this Court's borrowed employee holding trumps any language in the contract about independent contractor status. As Forest Oil notes, this Court has already determined that Forest Oil is the borrowed employer; therefore, Ace's argument regarding independent contractors must fail.
More importantly, Ace's argument that Forest Oil is not specifically named in the policy and that the endorsement is not "in favor" of Forest Oil is nonsensical. A plain reading of the Ace policy shows that alternate employers are covered "as required by written contract." According to Exhibit "A" of the Forest/Coastal master contract, the parties agreed that Coastal's Workers' Compensation and Employer's Liability policy was to include Alternate Employer/Borrowed Servant. Thus, the "written contract" between Forest Oil and Coastal requires alternate employer coverage, as provided in Ace's policy.
In the alternative, Ace argues that the provisions of the contract are ambiguous and any ambiguities must be construed against Forest Oil, since it drafted the contract. Ace contends that the intent behind the policy was to provide coverage to employees of companies that Coastal subcontracted with to fulfill its obligations to Forest Oil, not to provide coverage to Forest Oil.
After reviewing the contract, this Court finds that the alternate employer provision is not ambiguous. Clearly, the contract requires the Ace workers' compensation policy to include an alternate employer endorsement, and Coastal paid an additional premium to Ace for such an endorsement. The obvious and sole purpose of this endorsement was to provide coverage to Forest Oil as the alternate employer ("borrowing employer") of Coastal's employee, Hudson. As a result, the Ace policy provides coverage for the claims of Forest Oil in this case.
Accordingly,
IT IS ORDERED that Gemini Insurance Company's Motion for Summary Judgment (Rec. Doc 5) is GRANTED; Ace's Cross Motion for Summary Judgment/Alternatively Opposition to Gemini (Rec. Doc. 13) is DENIED; Ace Indemnity Insurance Company's Motion for Summary Judgment (Rec. Doc. 8) is DENIED; Forest Oil's Motion for Summary Judgment on its Claim Against Coastal (Rec. Doc. 10) is GRANTED; Forest Oil's Motion for Summary Judgment on its Claim Against Gemini (Rec. Doc. 11) is DENIED; and Forest Oil's Motion for Summary Judgment on its Claim Against Ace (Rec. Doc. 12) is GRANTED.