Opinion
No. COA14–772.
2014-12-31
Sarah A. FOREHAND, Plaintiff, v. Jason A. FOREHAND, Defendant.
No brief filed on behalf of plaintiff-appellee.The Law Corner, by Betsy Gold, for defendant-appellant.N.C. Gen.Stat. § 50B–3(b) (2013). As noted, the statute does not require a criminal act or even an act of domestic violence to renew a DVPO. Id.; N.C. Gen.Stat. § 50B–1(a) (2013). Instead, the trial court must find “good cause” to renew the DVPO. N.C. Gen.Stat. § 50B–3(b).
Affirmed.
Appeal by defendant from order entered 3 February 2014 by Judge Anna Worley in Wake County District Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 17 November 2014. No brief filed on behalf of plaintiff-appellee. The Law Corner, by Betsy Gold, for defendant-appellant.
HUNTER, Robert C., Judge.
Defendant Jason Forehand appeals the order renewing plaintiff Sarah Forehand's domestic violence protective order. On appeal, defendant challenges several findings of fact and ultimate conclusion of law that there was “good cause” to renew the domestic violence protective order (“DVPO”).
After careful review, we affirm the order.
Furthermore, as to the finding that there was a “poor exchange” of the drug test results, there was also competent evidence to support this finding. Plaintiff claimed that she had not seen any of his drug test results except for one illegible result and the positive one from November 2013. Moreover, defendant did not deny that he had failed to provide the results, claiming that “[t]here's nothing that [he] [could] give [plaintiff] that has the drug screen results on them.” However, defendant failed to provide any proof of his negative tests even though he knew that the issue of his drug tests would be raised at the hearing and despite the fact that he claimed to have provided those results to his own attorney in their child custody proceedings. Consequently, the finding that there was a “poor exchange” of the drug test results is supported by competent evidence.
Next, defendant argues that the trial court erred in concluding that “good cause” existed to renew the DVPO. We also disagree.
Section 50B–3(b) provides, in pertinent part, that:
The court may renew a protective order for a fixed period of time not to exceed two years, including an order that previously has been renewed, upon a motion by the aggrieved party filed before the expiration of the current order [.] ... The court may renew a protective order for good cause. The commission of an act as defined in G.S. 50B–1(a) by the defendant after entry of the current order is not required for an order to be renewed.
N.C. Gen.Stat. § 50B–3(b) (2013). As noted, the statute does not require a criminal act or even an act of domestic violence to renew a DVPO. Id.; N.C. Gen.Stat. § 50B–1(a) (2013). Instead, the trial court must find “good cause” to renew the DVPO. N.C. Gen.Stat. § 50B–3(b).
Here, the trial court found that “good cause” existed to renew the DVPO based on: (1) defendant's emails with “vulgar and angry language”; (2) the fact that “plaintiff continues to be in fear of the [defendant] due to his angry attitude-particularly surrounding custody issues”; (3) the “poor exchange” of the drug test results required in their Chapter 50 action which has “heighten [ed] plaintiff's anxiety and fear”; (4) defendant's past attempts to cause bodily injury to plaintiff in September 2012; (5) defendant's past conduct that placed plaintiff in fear of imminent serious bodily injury; (6) the threats defendant made while he was hospitalized at WakeMed hospital in September 2012; (7) defendant's past threats to commit suicide and commitments based on his attempts to commit suicide; and (8) defendant's past issues with drug use. Although the order renewing the DVPO rests, in large part, on defendant's acts from 2012 that served as the basis for the original 2013 DVPO, there is nothing in section 50B–3 nor in our caselaw prohibiting the trial court from basing its decision whether to renew a DVPO on acts that happened in the past which served as the basis for issuance of the original DVPO. In fact, this Court, in an unpublished case, held that prior acts may provide support for and be “incorporated by reference” into orders renewing DVPOs. Basden v. Basden, COA01–1430, 2002 WL 31687267, at *4 (Dec. 3, 2002) (unpublished). Even though unpublished opinions from this Court do not constitute controlling legal authority, N.C.R.App. P. 30(e)(3) (2013), we find its reasoning persuasive and apply it to the facts of the present case. Thus, in totality, based on defendant's past conduct in addition to plaintiff's continued fear of defendant, defendant's use of angry language in emails, and the “poor exchange” of the drug tests results, we are unable to say that the trial court's conclusion that “good cause” existed to renew the DVPO constituted error.
Conclusion
The trial court's reliance on those past acts in addition to other findings were sufficient for plaintiff to meet her burden. Therefore, we affirm the order renewing the DVPO.
AFFIRMED.