Opinion
No. 00 Civ. 3437 (SAS).
December 11, 2000.
Plaintiff (Pro se), Wayne Ford.
For Defendants: Nicola N. Grey Assistant Attorney General State of New York.
OPINION AND ORDER
Pro se plaintiff Wayne Ford brings suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against officials and employees of the New York State Department of Correctional Services ("DOCS") at Downstate Correctional Facility ("Downstate") ("defendants"). The Complaint alleges that while the plaintiff was incarcerated at Downstate, the defendants failed to provide him with a religious meal in connection with the celebration of a religious holiday in violation of the First Amendment. The Complaint seeks compensatory and punitive damages.
Pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6), defendants now move to dismiss the Complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Specifically, defendants contend that the plaintiff failed to state a valid First Amendment claim, that the defendants were not personally involved in the alleged constitutional violation, and that the defendants are entitled to qualified immunity. For the reasons stated below, defendants' motion to dismiss is denied.
I. BACKGROUND
The facts set forth below are drawn from the Complaint and are presumed true for purposes of this motion.
Wayne Ford, a Muslim inmate, was housed at Downstate in the Special Housing Unit ("SHU") from January 7, 2000 through January 21, 2000. See Complaint ("Compl.") ¶¶ 1, 6-7. On January 10, 2000, Imam Hamin Rashada, the "Islamic leader" at Downstate, informed Ford that "the Superintendent and other administrators of Downstate prohibits [sic] Muslims with SHU or keeplock status . . . from receiving the special [`Eid-ul-Fitr] and [`Eid-ul-Adha] meals." Id. ¶¶ 9-11. That same day, Ford filed a grievance with Downstate's Inmate Grievance Resolution Committee ("IGRC") complaining about this policy and requesting "to be provided [his] meal from the upcoming `Eid-ul-Fitr that will be held at Downstate on 1/15/00." Id. ¶¶ 13-14. Ford did not receive a response to his grievance. See id. ¶ 16. On January 13, 2000, Ford wrote a letter to defendant John McGinnis, Superintendent at the Downstate facility, and repeated the requests he made in his grievance. See id. ¶ 17. Again, Ford received no response to this letter. See id. ¶ 18.
Ford alleges that `Eid-ul-Fitr is an Islamic religious celebration to mark the successful completion of time Ramadan fast. He claims that the `Eid-ul-Fitr meal is an integral part of this religious celebration. See Compl. ¶¶ 1-5.
The `Eid-ul-Fitr was held at Downstate on January 15, 2000, but Ford, along with other Muslim prisoners in the Downstate SHU, was denied his `Eid-ul-Fitr meal due to the defendants' policy. See id. ¶¶ 19-21. That same day, Correction Officer Bremer told Ford that certain Muslim prisoners at Downstate were not permitted to receive the `Eid-ul-Fitr meal. See id. ¶¶ 22-25.
In his Complaint, plaintiff alleges that Downstate is the only prison under DOCS control that denies the `Eid-ul-Fitr meal to Muslims in SHU and keeplock. See id. ¶ 25. Plaintiff contends that his `Eid-ul-Fitr meal could have been delivered to him in his cell in the same way his regular meals were delivered to him with no threat to prison security.See id. ¶¶ 26-27. As a result of defendants' denial of his `Eid-ul-Fitr meal, plaintiff claims defendants prohibited the free exercise of his religion in violation of the First Amendment. See id. ¶¶ 28-29. The Complaint seeks compensatory and punitive damages. See id.
To the extent plaintiff seeks damages for mental anguish, those claims are dismissed. See Wright v. Miller, 973 F. Supp. 390 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) prisoners are nor entitled to damages for mental anguish under 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e).
II. LEGAL STANDARD
Dismissal of a complaint for failure to state a claim pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) is proper only where "it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff[s] can prove no set of facts in support of [their] claim which would entitle [them] to relief." Harris v. City of New York, 186 F.3d 243, 247 (2d Cir. 1999). "The task of the court in ruling on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion is merely to assess the legal feasibility of the complaint, not to assay the weight of the evidence which might be offered in support thereof." Cooper v. Parsky, 140 F.3d 433, 440 (2d Cir. 1998) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). To properly rule on such a motion, the court must accept as true all material facts alleged in the complaint and draw all reasonable inferences in the nonmovant's favor.See Harris, 186 F.3d at 247. Nevertheless, "[a] complaint which consists of conclusory allegations unsupported by factual assertions fails even the liberal standard of Rule 12(b)(6)." De Jesus v. Sears, Roebuck Co., 87 F.3d 65, 70 (2d Cir. 1996) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)
However, pro se complaints are held to "less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers," and are to be construed liberally on a motion to dismiss. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972). Thus, a pro se complaint "should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff[s] can prove no set of facts in support of [their] claim[s] which would entitle [them] to relief." Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U.S. 5, 10 (1980)
III. DISCUSSION
A. First Amendment Claim
Plaintiff claims that he has been denied his First Amendment right to the free exercise of his religion. See Compl. ¶¶ 1-29. Plaintiff alleges that he was denied his `Eid-ul-Fitr meal, which he claims is an integral part of the celebration of the Islamic holiday of `Eid-ul-Fitr, due to defendants' policy to deny this meal to Muslims incarcerated in the SHU at Downstate. See id. Defendants move to dismiss asserting that the plaintiff has failed to state a valid First Amendment claim. See Defendants' Memorandum of Law in Support of their Motion to Dismiss the Complaint ("Def. Mem.") at 4-9.
Prisoners retain their right to religious freedom under the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment while incarcerated, and are therefore entitled to a reasonable accommodation of their religious beliefs. See Jackson v. Mann, 196 F.3d 316, 320 (2d Cir. 1999). This includes the constitutional right to participate in religious services.See Salahuddin v. Coughlin, 993 F.2d 306, 308 (2d Cir. 1993); Young v. Coughlin, 866 F.2d 567, 570 (2d Cir. 1989). "Confinement in keep-lock does not deprive prisoners of this right." Salahuddin, 993 F.2d at 308. The reasonable accommodation of religious beliefs also includes the accommodation of religious dietary beliefs, and "prison officials must provide a prisoner a diet that is consistent with his religious scruples."Bass v. Coughlin, 976 F.2d 98, 99 (2d Cir. 1992); see also Jackson, 196 F.3d at 320.
However, the constitutional right of inmates to the free exercise of their religion is restricted due to their confinement. See Salahuddin v. Mead, No. 95 Civ. 8581, 2000 WL 335552, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 30, 2000). This right "may only be infringed to the extent that such infringement is `reasonably related to legitimate penological interests.'" Young, 866 F.2d at 570 (quoting O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342 (1987)). This reasonableness analysis considers four factors: (1) whether there is a rational relationship between the prison regulation and legitimate government interests; (2) whether alternative means are available for prisoners to exercise their rights; (3) the impact accommodating the right will have on prison resources; and (4) whether ready alternatives exist which both accommodate the right and satisfy the governmental interest.See Salahuddin v. Coughlin, 993 F.2d at 308-09. In most cases, however, the balancing required by this four factor test cannot be accomplished without the benefit of an evidentiary record. See, e.g., Jones v. Goord, 190 F.R.D. 103, 109 (S.D.N.Y. 1999); Cruz v. Jackson, No. 94 Civ. 2600, 1997 WL 45348, at *7 (S.D.N Y Feb. 5, 1997).
Defendants first argue that the `Eid-ul-Fitr meal was not a religious observance, but part of a prison-organized family party. See Def. Mem. at 5-8. This is an issue of fact that cannot be addressed at this stage of the proceedings. The defendants also argue they were justified in denying SHU prisoners the `Eid-ul-Fitr meal because as a reception facility with a high number of transitory inmates, they could not ensure the proper planning and maintenance of order at Downstate if they allowed SHU prisoners to receive the meal. See id. Although defendants' legitimate need to maintain order in the prison may ultimately provide a rational justification for depriving Ford of the `Eid-ul-Fitr meal, it cannot be said that Ford can prove no set of facts that would entitle him to relief under the First Amendment. The plaintiff has asserted in his Complaint that the `Eid-ul-Fitr meal is a religious meal integrally connected with the celebration of the `Eid-ul-Fitr Muslim holiday, which is sufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss. The balancing required by the First Amendment cannot be done without further development of the factual record.
B. Personal Involvement
Defendants further contend that the Complaint should be dismissed because plaintiff failed to allege that the three defendants had any personal involvement in the alleged constitutional deprivation. See Def. Mem. at 9-11. It is well settled in this Circuit that "`personal involvement of defendants in alleged constitutional deprivations is a prerequisite to an award of damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.'" Colon v. Coughlin, 58 F.3d 865, 873 (2d Cir. 1995) (quoting Wright v. Smith, 21 F.3d 496, 501 (2d Cir. 1994)). A defendant who occupies a supervisory position may be "personally involved" if the defendant: (1) directly participated in the alleged constitutional violation; (2) failed to remedy the wrong after being informed of the violation through a report or appeal; (3) created a policy or custom under which unconstitutional practices occurred, or allowed such a policy or custom to continue; (4) was grossly negligent in supervising subordinates who committed the wrongful acts; or (5) exhibited deliberate indifference to the rights of inmates by failing to act on information indicating that unconstitutional acts were occurring. See Colon, 58 F.3d at 873.
Defendants argue that the letter Ford sent to McGinnis requesting the `Eid-ul-Fitr meal was insufficient to establish personal liability as to either McGinnis or Patrick McGann, Deputy Superintendent of Administration, or Gordon Lord, Assistant Deputy Superintendent of the Downstate facility. See Def. Mem. at 10-11. However, plaintiff has specifically alleged that Downstate's policy to deny the `Eid-ul-Fitr meal to Muslim inmates in the SHU is the cause of the deprivation of his right to the free exercise of religion. See Compl. ¶ 20. He alleges that this policy is unique to Downstate and that "the named defendants, all supervisory officials, are the head administrators and chief policy makers in Downstate. Each of the defendants participated in either creating the Downstate policy . . . or they each allowed the continuance of the unconstitutional policy." Plaintiff's Response and Opposition to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint ("Pl. Resp.") at 8. This allegation is sufficient to support a finding of supervisory liability, as plaintiff has pled that the defendants created a policy or custom under which unconstitutional practices occurred.
C. Qualified Immunity Defense
Defendants also argue that even if Ford has stated a valid claim for a First Amendment violation, they are entitled to qualified immunity for their actions. See Def. Mem. at 11-13. Qualified immunity protects state actors sued in their individual capacity from a suit for damages. See Lewis v. Cowen, 165 F.3d 154, 166 (2d Cir. 1999). A state actor is entitled to qualified immunity when his actions did not violate rights that a reasonable person would have known were clearly established. See Stuto v. Fleishman, 164 F.3d 820, 825 (2d Cir. 1999). This determination involves three factors: (1) whether the plaintiff alleges a violation of a constitutionally protected right; (2) whether the right allegedly violated was clearly established; and (3) whether defendants' actions were objectively reasonable. See Tellier v. Fields, 230 F.3d 502, 511-16 (2d Cir. 2000).
Defendants argue that it was objectively reasonable for them to believe they were not violating plaintiff's constitutional rights by denying him a special events meal. However, this argument is based on facts not contained in the Complaint. Assuming the truth of the plaintiff's allegations that he was denied a meal integral to the celebration of a religious holiday, he has sufficiently alleged the violation of the constitutionally protected right to the free exercise of religion.
When prison officials denied Ford's request for the `Eid-ul-Fitr meal, it was clearly established in this Circuit that even prisoners confined in keep-lock have a constitutional right to participate in religious services. See Salahuddin v. Coughlin, 993 F.2d at 308; Young v. Coughlin, 866 F.2d at 570. It has also been clearly established since 1975 that inmates have a First Amendment right to a meal consistent with their religious dictates. See Kahane v. Carlson, 527 F.2d 492, 495 (2d Cir. 1975) (holding that "prison authorities are proscribed by the constitutional status of religious freedom from managing [an] institution in a manner which unnecessarily prevents [an inmate's) observance of his dietary obligations."); see also Bass, 976 F.2d at 99. The plaintiff's right to both participate in religious services and receive a meal consistent with his religious dictates was therefore clearly established.
Finally, assuming that plaintiff's allegations are true, defendants have not established objectively reasonable behavior that would entitle them to qualified immunity. As stated above, defendants' argument that their actions were objectively reasonable is not based on facts pled in the Complaint. Consequently, the determination of qualified immunity is better left for consideration at trial or in the context of a motion for summary judgment following discovery. See Messina v. Mazzeo, 854 F. Supp. 116, 144 (E.D.N.Y. 1994); see also Hutchinson v. McCabee, No. 95 Civ. 5449, 1999 WL 147712, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 15, 1999) (a plaintiff need not plead facts showing the absence of a qualified immunity defense because defendants have the burden of raising it in their answer and establishing it at trial or in a motion for summary judgment)
IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, the defendants' motion to dismiss Ford's claims is denied. A conference is scheduled for January 5, 2001 at 5:00 p.m.
SO ORDERED: