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finding that complaints of minor discomfort and fever associated with a spider bite were not indicative of a serious medical condition and did not establish a material question of fact on the objective component of plaintiff's deliberate indifference claim
Summary of this case from Goode v. Cnty. of GeneseeOpinion
Case Number 03-CV-10176-BC
June 1, 2004
OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND DISMISSING COMPLAINT
The plaintiff has filed a complaint against Roscommon County jail personnel alleging that while he was a state prisoner incarcerated from April 4, 2001 until November 22, 2001 he was bit by a spider and his ensuing medical needs were not adequately addressed. He claims that Steven LeMire, the Roscommon County Jail Administrator, and Francis Staley, the Roscommon County Sheriff, were deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs. The complaint alleges a claim pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Roscommon County and the individuals and also contains a state law claim of negligence against LeMire and Staley. On April 7, 2004, the defendants filed a motion for summary. The plaintiff has not filed an answer in opposition to the motion. The Court has reviewed the defendants' submission and finds that the relevant law and facts have been set forth in the motion and that oral argument will not aid in the disposition of the motion. Accordingly, it is ORDERED that the motion be decided on the papers submitted. See E.D. Mich. LR 7.1(e)(2).
The Court finds that the plaintiff has failed to demonstrate a material fact dispute that requires a resolution by trial on the question of whether defendants LeMire and Staley were deliberately indifferent to the plaintiffs serious medical needs, a policy or custom of Roscommon County caused his injuries, and the conduct of defendants LeMire and Staley was grossly negligent. The Court, therefore, will grant the defendants' motion for summary judgment and dismiss the case.
I.
As mentioned, the plaintiff, Kenneth Crozier Ford, was incarcerated at the Roscommon County Jail from April 4, 2001 until November 22, 2001. On October 9, 2001, the plaintiff entered a guilty plea on charges of manufacturing methamphetamine and his status changed from pre-trial detainee to convicted felon. Before that date, on August 4, 2001, while he was still a pre-trial detainee, the plaintiff alleges that he was bitten by a "spider or similar insect" and the bite immediately caused "soreness, irritation, redness, and swelling." Compl. ¶ 7. The plaintiff alleges that he reported the bite to jail officials and requested medical treatment. Although the plaintiff contends in his complaint that prison officials initially denied his requests for treatment, he testified in his deposition that he was given some Tylenol after receiving the bite.
It is undisputed that on April 6, 2001, two days after he requested medical treatment, the plaintiff was examined by a nurse. Defendant LeMire was present during the examination. After the examination, the nurse contacted a physician and obtained an antibiotic prescription for the plaintiff. Although the plaintiff alleges he told prison officials that he wanted to see a doctor, it is undisputed that he took the antibiotics as directed. He also continued to take the Tylenol that was given to him by prison officials. In addition, prison officials provided the plaintiff with a hot cloth on several occasions to ease the pain associated with the bite.
On April 7, 2001, the plaintiff developed a fever. Prison officials again called a nurse who came to the jail and after examining the plaintiff, decided that the plaintiff needed to be taken to a local hospital. Prison officials transported the plaintiff to the emergency room at the hospital in Grayling, Michigan that same day. There the plaintiff received treatment for the bite wound and returned to the jail within a few hours. The plaintiff does not allege any wrongdoing by prison officials or Roscommon County after he was taken to the hospital.
II.
A motion for summary judgment under Fed.R.Civ.P. 56 presumes the absence of a genuine issue of material fact for trial. The Court must view the evidence and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party, and determine "whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 251-52 (1986). The "[s]ummary judgment procedure is properly regarded not as a disfavored procedural shortcut, but rather as an integral part of the Federal Rules as a whole, which are designed to secure the just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every action." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 327 (1986) (internal quotes omitted).
A fact is "material" if its resolution affects the outcome of the lawsuit. Lenning v. Commercial Union Ins. Co., 260 F.3d 574, 581 (6th Cir. 2001). "Materiality" is determined by the substantive law claim. Boyd v. Baeppler, 215 F.3d 594, 599 (6th Cir. 2000). An issue is "genuine" if a "reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Henson v. Nat'l Aeronautics and Space Admin., 14 F.3d 1143, 1148 (6th Cir. 1994) (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248). Irrelevant or unnecessary factual disputes do not create genuine issues of material fact. St. Francis Health Care Centre v. Shalala, 205 F.3d 937, 943 (6th Cir. 2000). When the "record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party," there is no genuine issue of material fact. Michigan Paytel Joint Venture v. City of Detroit , 287 F.3d 527, 534 (6th Cir. 2002). Thus a factual dispute which "is merely colorable or is not significantly probative" will not defeat a motion for summary judgment which is properly supported. Kraft v. United States, 991 F.2d 292, 296 (6th Cir. 1993); see also Int'l Union, United Auto., Aerospace and Agric. Implement Workers of Am, v, BVR Liquidating, Inc., 190 F.3d 768, 772 (6th Cir. 1999).
The party bringing the summary judgment motion has the initial burden of informing the district court of the basis for its motion and identifying portions of the record which demonstrate the absence of a genuine dispute over material facts. Mt. Lebanon Personal Care Home, Inc. v. Hoover Universal, Inc., 276 F.3d 845, 848 (6th Cir. 2002). The party opposing the motion then may not "rely on the hope that the trier of fact will disbelieve the movant's denial of a disputed fact" but must make an affirmative showing with proper evidence in order to defeat the motion. Street v. J. C. Bradford Co., 886 F.2d 1472, 1479 (6th Cir. 1989). A party opposing a motion for summary judgment must designate specific facts in affidavits, depositions, or other factual material showing "evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for the plaintiff." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252. If the non-moving party, after sufficient opportunity for discovery, is unable to meet his or her burden of proof, summary judgment is clearly proper. Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 322-23.
The party who bears the burden of proof must present a jury question as to each element of the claim. Davis v. McCourt, 226 F.3d 506, 511 (6th Cir. 2000). Failure to prove an essential element of a claim renders all other facts immaterial for summary judgment purposes. Elvis Presley Enters., Inc. v. Elvisly Yours, Inc., 936 F.2d 889, 895 (6th Cir. 1991). "[T]he party opposing the summary judgment motion must `do more than simply show that there is some "metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.'"" Highland Capital, Inc. v. Franklin Nat. Bank, 350 F.3d 558, 564 (6th Cir. 2003) (quoting Pierce v. Commonwealth Life Ins. Co., 40 F.3d 796, 800 (6th Cir. 1994), and Matsushita Elec, Indus, Co, v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986)). "Thus, the mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of the plaintiffs position will be insufficient; there must be evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for the plaintiff." Ibid, (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252) (internal quote marks omitted).
In this case, the plaintiff has failed to file a response to the defendants' motion for summary judgment. Nonetheless, "a district court cannot grant summary judgment in favor of a movant simply because the adverse party has not responded." Carver v. Bunch , 946 F.2d 451, 455 (6th Cir. 1991). The moving party must always bear the initial burden of demonstrating the absence of a genuine issue of material fact, even if the opposing party fails to respond. Id. at 454-455. "The court is required, at a minimum, to examine the movant's motion for summary judgment to ensure that he has discharged that burden." Id. at 455. See also Stough v. Mayville Community Schools , 138 F.3d 612 (6th Cir. 1998).
A.
The plaintiff alleges that defendants LeMire and Staley were deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs as a result of the spider bite. The Supreme Court has held that the Eighth Amendment imposes upon prison officials the duty to "provide humane conditions of confinement," and that among the obligations attendant to the discharge of that duty is to "ensure that inmates receive adequate food, clothing, shelter, and medical care." Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994). However, "Eighth Amendment scrutiny is appropriate only after the State has complied with the constitutional guarantees traditionally associated with criminal prosecutions. . . . [T]he State does not acquire the power to punish with which the Eighth Amendment is concerned until after it has secured a formal adjudication of guilt in accordance with due process of law." Ingraham v. Wright , 430 U.S. 651, 671-672, n. 40 (1977). Because the plaintiff in this case was detained prior to trial and therefore had not received a formal adjudication of guilt at the time he required medical care, the Eighth Amendment has no application. City of Revere v. Massachusetts General Hosp. , 463 U.S. 239, 244 (1983); Watkins v. City of Battle Creek , 273 F.3d 682, 685 (6th Cir. 2001). "Under the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause, however, pretrial detainees have a right to adequate medical treatment that is analogous to the Eighth Amendment rights of prisoners." Watkins , 273 F.3d at 685-86; see City of Revere , 463 U.S. at 244 (holding that the due process rights of a pretiral detainee "are at least as great as the Eighth Amendment protections available to a convicted prisoner"). To sustain a cause of action under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, via Section 1983, for failure to provide medical treatment, the plaintiff must establish that the defendants acted with "deliberate indifference to serious medical needs." Estelle v. Gamble , 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976).A claim that a prison official was deliberately indifferent to a prisoner's adequate medical care has both an objective and a subjective component. To satisfy the objective component, the plaintiff must allege that the medical need asserted is "sufficiently serious." Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834. "To satisfy the subjective component, the plaintiff must allege facts which, if true, would show that the official being sued subjectively perceived facts from which to infer substantial risk to the prisoner, that he did in fact draw the inference, and that he then disregarded that risk." Comstock v. McCrary, 273 F.3d 693, 703 (6th Cir. 2001) (citing Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837).
Proof of the objective seriousness of a need for medical treatment is necessary, for it is only the deprivations that offend the social conscience, given the rigors and privations of a prison environment, that can implicate the Fourteenth Amendment. See Jennings v. Al-Dabagh , 275 F. Supp.2d 863, 868 (E.D. Mich. 2003). As the Supreme Court explained:
The objective component of an Eighth Amendment claim is therefore contextual and responsive to "contemporary standards of decency." Estelle, supra, 429 U.S., at 103. For instance, extreme deprivations are required to make out a conditions-of-confinement claim. Because routine discomfort is "part of the penalty that criminal offenders pay for their offenses against society," Rhodes, supra, 452 U.S., at 347, "only those deprivations denying `the minimal civilized measure of life's necessities' are sufficiently grave to form the basis of an Eighth Amendment violation." Wilson [v. Setter], supra, 501 U.S. [294], at 298 [(1991)] (quoting Rhodes, supra, 452 U.S., at 347) (citation omitted). A similar analysis applies to medical needs. Because society does not expect that prisoners will have unqualified access to health care, deliberate indifference to medical needs amounts to an Eighth Amendment violation only if those needs are "serious." See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S., at 103-104.Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1992) (emphasis added). The Ninth Circuit has held that "[a] `serious' medical need exists if the failure to treat a prisoner's condition could result in further significant injury or the `unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.'" McGuckin v. Smith, 974 F.2d 1050, 1059 (9th Cir. 1992) (quoting Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104), overruled on other grounds by WMX Technologies v. Miller, 104 F.3d 1133 (9th Cir. 1997). Another district court in this Circuit, after reviewing appellate decisions from other Circuits, held that a prisoner has "serious medical needs" if his needs have been diagnosed by a physician as mandating treatment, or are so obvious that even a lay person would easily recognize the necessity for a doctor's treatment, and those needs require immediate attention. Smith v. Franklin County, 227 F. Supp.2d 667, 677 n. 10 (E.D. Ky. 2002) (citations omitted).
The record shows that while the plaintiff was under the care of the defendants, he was given Tylenol, seen and treated by a nurse, and given a prescription for antibiotics. Although the complaint alleges that the defendants refused to provide him with a doctor when he requested to see one, there is no proof that the treatment performed by the nurse who saw the plaintiff was inappropriate, and it is undisputed that the plaintiff was eventually taken to the emergency room at a hospital where he more than likely saw a medical doctor. In all events, the most that can be proved from these undisputed facts is that the plaintiffs medical treatment was delayed, not that it was denied. See Jennings, 275 F. Supp.2d at 868.
The Sixth Circuit has established a standard for proving that medical needs are sufficiently serious to satisfy the objective component of a Fourteenth Amendment claim in such circumstances. Following the Eleventh Circuit, the court stated that the district court must focus on the effect of the delay on the prisoner's health and the extent of his suffering, requiring that an "inmate who complains that delay in medical treatment rose to a constitutional violation must place verifying medical evidence in the record to establish the detrimental effect of the delay in medical treatment to succeed." Napier, 238 F.3d at 742 (quoting Hill v, Dekalb Reg'l Youth Det. Ctr., 40 F.3d 1176, 1188 (11th Cir. 1994)); see Smith, 221 F. Supp.2d at 677.
Although a spider bite can lead to more dire consequences, possibly including a systemic infection, amputation of a limb, or even death, the plaintiff has come forth with no evidence of any such consequences. There is no indication that the plaintiff suffered anything other than minor discomfort and a fever. The Court has little trouble concluding, therefore, that the delay in treating the plaintiff's spider bite did not amount to the deprivation of treatment for a "serious" medical condition, or that it offended "the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society" from which the Eighth Amendment, construed in this case as a cause of action arising under the Fourteenth Amendment, draws its meaning. See Trop, 356 U.S. at 101. Because the plaintiff has not offered evidence to establish a material fact question on the objective component of his claim, it must fail as a matter of law.
As noted above, the plaintiff must also satisfy the subjective component of a claim of deliberate indifference to medical needs under the Fourteenth Amendment by offering evidence that the defendants disregarded a known risk of further harm that might result from the deprivation of medical treatment. The Sixth Circuit in Comstock reiterated the Supreme Court's caution that "an official's failure to alleviate a significant risk that he should have perceived but did not, while no cause for commendation, cannot under our cases be condemned as the infliction of punishment." Comstock, 273 F.3d at 703 (citing Farmer, 511 U.S. at 838). Nonetheless, a custodial official may "not escape liability if the evidence showed that he merely refused to verify underlying facts that he strongly suspected to be true, or declined to confirm inferences of risk that he strongly suspected to exist." Farmer, 511 U.S. at 843 n. 8. Officials also may be shown to be deliberately indifferent to serious medical needs without evidence of conscious intent to inflict pain. Molton v. City of Cleveland, 839 F.2d 240, 243 (6th Cir. 1988).
However, the conduct for which liability attaches must be more culpable than mere negligence; it must demonstrate deliberateness tantamount to intent to punish. Knowledge of the asserted serious needs or of circumstances clearly indicating the existence of such needs, is essential to a finding of deliberate indifference.Horn by Parks v. Madison County Fiscal Court, 22 F.3d 653, 660 (6th Cir. 1994) (internal citations omitted). Furthermore, although the Supreme Court has found that deliberate indifference to serious medical needs of prisoners does constitute an "unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain" in violation of the Eighth Amendment, the fact that a prisoner disagrees with a course of treatment that was prescribed, or even that the treatment he did receive was negligently administered, does not rise to a constitutional violation. Estelle, 429 U.S. at 105-06.
In this case, the plaintiff has failed to demonstrate a subjective awareness on the defendants' part of any needs demanding immediate attention. There is no evidence suggesting that the defendants at any time deliberately ignored the plaintiffs medical needs with the intent to inflict pain or prolong any suffering. In fact, the record demonstrates that the defendants treated the plaintiff by giving him Tylenol, calling a nurse, and taking him to the hospital. As with the objective component, there is no material fact question as to the subjective component of the plaintiff's Fourteenth Amendment claim, and the defendants therefore are entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
In addition to his claims against defendants LeMire and Staley as being deliberately indifferent to his medical needs in their individual capacity, the plaintiff also alleges that defendant Staley, in his official capacity as Sheriff of Roscommon County, violated the plaintiff's constitutional rights. In an official-capacity suit against a local governmental official, the real party in interest is not the named official but the local government entity of which the official is an agent. Kentucky v. Graham , 473 U.S. 159, 165 (1985). Therefore, the claim asserted against Staley in his official capacity are duplicative of the claims asserted against Roscommon County and these claims will also be dismissed.
B.
The plaintiff alleges in his complaint that "[i]t was the policy and/or custom of [Roscommon County] and [defendant Staley] . . . to inadequately supervise and train its sworn officers . . . thereby failing to adequately discourage further constitutional violations on the part of their employees." Compl. ¶ 25. As previously noted, the plaintiff's federal cause of action is based on 42 U.S.C. § 1983, under which the plaintiff must establish that a person acting under color of state law deprived him of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States. Berger v. City of Mayfield Heights, 265 F.3d 399, 405 (6th Cir. 2001). Local governmental institutions are considered "persons" for the purpose of Section 1983; however, municipalities cannot be held responsible for a constitutional deprivation unless there is a direct causal link between a county policy or custom and the alleged constitutional deprivation. The plaintiff "must identify the policy, connect the policy to the city itself and show that the particular injury was incurred because of the execution of that policy." Garner v. Memphis Police Dep't, 8 F.3d 358, 363-64 (6th Cir. 1993). Proof of a single incident of unconstitutional activity may be sufficient to impose liability, but not unless the evidence includes proof that it was caused by an existing, unconstitutional municipal policy. City of Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 823-24 (1985); see Monell v. Dep't of Soc, Servs. of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978) (holding that a municipality is accountable for a violation of a plaintiffs rights only if it is caused by a policy, practice, or custom that was the "moving force" behind the plaintiff's injury).Under some circumstances, a municipality or local county may be held liable under Section 1983 for constitutional violations caused by its failure to train its employees. City of Canton, Ohio v. Harris , 489 U.S. 378, 380 (1989). In City of Canton, a detainee brought suit against the City alleging, among other claims, that jail officials were inadequately trained to deal with her medical needs. Id. at 381. The Supreme Court held that a municipality can be held liable for inadequate police training under Section 1983 "only where [the] failure to train amounts to deliberate indifference to rights of persons with whom police come into contact." Id. at 388. The mere fact that a few officers may be inadequately trained is not sufficient to demonstrate liability, as the shortcomings could be caused by officer inattention or poor administration. Id. at 390-91. Allegations that the officers in question could have been better trained are also insufficient. Ibid, Rather, the "failure to train [must] reflect a deliberate or conscious choice by a municipality." Id. at 389. The Court recognized two fact patterns in which a citizen could state a claim for failure to train. First, the nature of the officers' duties could be such that "the need for more or different training is so obvious, and the inadequacy so likely to result in the violation of constitutional rights, that the policymakers of the city can reasonably be said to have been deliberately indifferent to the need" in not providing training. Id. at 390. Second, the police may have so often violated constitutional rights in the past that the need for further training must have been "plainly obvious to the city policymakers, who, nevertheless, are `deliberately indifferent' to the need." Ibid.
The Sixth Circuit applied this standard in Walker v. Norris, 917 F.2d 1449 (6th Cir. 1990). In that case, an inmate's estate brought suit against prison guards and their supervisors for failure to prevent his death. There, prison guards refused to open a prison door to assist an inmate who was being stabbed to death on the other side. The plaintiff alleged that the guards' supervisors had failed to give them proper training in opening the prison doors. After considering that corrections officers received three weeks of training upon hiring and forty hours per year of refresher training after that, the district court rejected the plaintiffs claim. In effect, the plaintiff alleged only that the guards could have been better trained, which is not sufficient to state a claim under City of Canton. Id. at 1456. There was no other evidence in the record of deliberate indifference toward training, and the district court's decision to dismiss the plaintiff's claim was affirmed. Ibid.
Thus, in order to prevail on a Section 1983 "failure to train" claim, the plaintiff must show that the "training program is inadequate to the tasks that the officers must perform; that the inadequacy is the result of the city's deliberate indifference; and that the inadequacy is closely related to or actually caused the plaintiff's injury." Hill v. McIntyre, 884 F.2d 271, 275 (6th Cir. 1989) (citations omitted).
In this case, the plaintiff has made general allegations in his complaint against Roscommon County that it, through its sheriff, did not adequately train jail workers to handle inmates with medical needs, and that as a result the county was deliberately indifferent to the plaintiff's medical needs. However, the plaintiff has failed to designate specific facts in affidavits, depositions, or other factual material showing "evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for the plaintiff on his claim against Roscommon County as the plaintiff must do in responding to a proper motion for summary judgment. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252. The plaintiff has not identified a policy and connected the policy to Roscommon County, nor has he shown that his injuries were incurred because of the execution of a policy or custom. See Garner, 8 F.3d at 363-64. In contrast, like the defendants in Walker, Roscommon County has provided the Court with information regarding the training of its personnel at the Roscommon County Jail. The Roscommon Jail Policy and Procedures Manual states that "[b]asic medical and dental care will be provided to all inmates. The health care will be comparable to those available to area general public." Def.s' Mot. Summ. J. Ex. F at 1. Faced with only the plaintiff's unsworn allegations and no supporting evidence, the Court must conclude that the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the plaintiff as the non-moving party on his claim against Roscommon County. See Simmons-Harris, 234 F.3d at 951. Therefore, Roscommon County is entitled to summary judgment.
C.
Finally, the plaintiff alleges a state law claim in his complaint against defendants LeMire and Staley, contending that they are liable for improperly caring for the plaintiff while he was in the custody of Roscommon County. Compl. ¶ 20. "Generally, government officers and employees acting within the scope of their authority are immune from tort liability, provided that their actions are not grossly negligent." Maiden v. Rozwood , 461 Mich. 109, 121-122, 597 N.W.2d 817, 824 (1999). Although the plaintiff contends in general terms that LeMire and Staley were grossly negligent, gross negligence is defined by statute as "conduct so reckless as to demonstrate a substantial lack of concern for whether an injury results." Mich. Comp. Laws § 691.1407(2)(c).
The Court finds that once again the plaintiff has failed to provide evidence on which a jury could find for him on his claim of gross negligence against defendants LeMire and Staley. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252. At most the plaintiffs complaint contains allegations of ordinary negligence on the part of these defendants. However, " evidence of ordinary negligence does not create a material question of fact concerning gross negligence." Maiden , 461 Mich. at 122-23, 597 N.W.2d at 824. Rather, the plaintiff "must adduce proof of conduct so reckless as to demonstrate a substantial lack of concern for whether an injury results. To hold otherwise would create a jury question premised on something less than the statutory standard." Id. at 123, 597 N.W.2d at 824-25. Because the plaintiff has failed to designate specific facts in affidavits, depositions, or other factual material showing that the defendants' conduct was reckless and demonstrated a substantial lack of concern for the plaintiff, the defendants are entitled to a judgment in their favor as a matter of law.
III.
The plaintiff has failed to show that the defendants' actions violated his constitutionally protected rights or were grossly negligent. Therefore, the Court finds that the defendants are entitled to summary judgment.
Accordingly, it is ORDERED that the defendants' motion for summary judgment [dkt # 22] is GRANTED.
It is further ORDERED that the defendants' motion for leave to file brief in excess of twenty pages [dkt # 22] is GRANTED.
It is further ORDERED that the defendants' motion in limine [dkt # 26] is DENIED as moot.
It is further ORDERED that the complaint is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.